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THE MUNICH 
CONSPIRACY 

by 

ANDREW ROTHSTEIN 


1958 

LAWRENCE & WISHART 
LONDON 


PREFACE 


H ARDLY anyone under the age of thirty-five, when these lines are 
being written, can have any personal recollection of the terrifying 
events which are nowadays grouped together under the general 
description of “Munich”. For most it has become a matter for the 
history-books, or perhaps for the political articles in newspapers, a 
self-explanatory phrase not requiring further argument. Yet it does. 

For months in 1938 and 1939 it was a question which divided 
friends, families, parties, nations, especially in Britain and France. 
That was not surprising. It was at the behest of the Governments of 
those two countries, as well as under threat of armed force by the 
Nazi Government of Germany, that an astonishing tiling happened in 
September, 1938, to one of the most prosperous, democratic and 
progressive States in Europe. Within less than three weeks, against the 
express wish of its Government, amid the lamentations of its people, 
contrary to the declared will of its powerful army, the Czechoslovak 
Republic was dismembered without a war, and lost its democracy 
without a counter-revolution. 

The controversy passed from the newspapers and the meetings into 
the world of books — memoirs, histories, collections of documents. At 
first it was the turn of angry exposures, to rouse the peoples against the 
Governments responsible for Munich. By the summer of 1939 a num- 
ber of such indictments had appeared. Even during the second world 
war, the flow continued, though less abundantly. Before the war 
ended, however, something like the situation which had produced 
Munich seemed to be looming ahead: and in 1944 began the counter- 
stream of apologetics, which was taken up and expanded during the 
first five or six years after the war. British apologists for Munich, in 
the main, threw the blame on the French: French apologists on the 
British. Actions which in British politicians were half-excused as due 
to their narrow-minded, ignorant, but sincere hatred of war, were 
indignantly condemned as double-dealing, treachery and cowardice 
when committed by Frenchmen. French writers found little to com- 
mend except realism in their own statesmen, and plenty of hypocrisy 
and “sacred egoism” — devotion to the interests of Albion, to which 
everyone else must conform — in the behaviour of their British counter- 
parts. Official collections of diplomatic documents, personal memoirs 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


6 

embodying others, began to appear in the late 1940s, which turned out 
to be omitting vital particulars — when they did not do worse. Some 
of the apologists thought the U.S.S.R. in 1938 wanted to save peace, 
but was powerless to act: others that its main aim, on the contrary, was 
to set the other countries by the ears, and get off scot-free itself. 

A considerable literature has been built up in this way, and the 
reader will find many traces of it in the following pages. For what I 
have written above does not mean that an enormous amount of 
factual and useful material has not emerged from the controversy. 
The student of contemporary history always owes a debt of gratitude 
to those who have come before him, for their part in producing that 
material, even when he thinks that many of them have used it wrong- 
headedly, and for purposes which he condemns. That kind of dialectics 
has always existed in liistory- writing : but it inevitably applies most of 
all in contemporary history — for obvious reasons. And the history of 
Munich is still very much with us, even if Munich is not always men- 
tioned, as maybe the reader will realise. 

The writer, in one sense, “lived through” Munich: in a special way, 
in the press-room and lobbies of the League of Nations palace at 
Geneva, during 1938 and several years before that. With the press and 
the diplomats of all countries flowing into Geneva, and London, 
Paris, Berlin and Moscow at easy telephoning distance, the tragic 
events leading to Munich were so sharply delineated in convenient 
perspective, day by day, that it compensated to some degree for one’s 
remoteness from the stages on which the drama was being acted. The 
first rough sketch of narrative taken up in this book, indeed, was made 
at that time, twenty years ago. Nor was there lack of drama of its own 
kind, from the angry discussions in League corridors and talks at 
the Hradschin Castle at Prague, with spokesmen of the main actors — 
and sometimes with the actors themselves — over the weeks and 
months of that black year, to the day when the very Liberal corres- 
pondent of a very Conservative newspaper, who had refused to credit 
what was going on, cried out to me: “I’m ashamed to be an English- 
man !” To-day a vast compendium of documents is available, however, 
to supplement (if not to replace) the emotions of those months; and 
the twentieth anniversary of Munich seems a suitable time to try and 
bring them into motion. 

In the first three chapters, forming Part One of this book, there is a 
preliminary outline of the general setting — Western relations with 
Germany before Hitler, the successive disputes with him and his allies 
after 1933, and some essential facts about Czechoslovakia. Part Two 


PREFACE 


7 


deals with the role hi 1938 of the Powders directly involved— Germany, 
Britain, France, Czechoslovakia (with a note on the U.S.A.) and the 
U.S.S.R., a chapter on each. The titles of the other four chapters in 
this section are self-explanatory. Part Three suggests, in the light of 
all the evidence, an explanation of Munich (Chapter XIII), and the 
main immediate consequences for the countries concerned (Chapter 
XIV). 

The purpose of this book, therefore, is to examine the conditions in 
which the Munich agreement was effected, and more particularly the 
actions of the Powers principally concerned. Its aim is to discover, if 
possible, what principles actually prompted the settlement of Munich. 
The book seeks light on this question, not only as a piece of historical 
research, but also to illuminate to some small degree the problems of 
world peace which were involved, and which still remain. 

July, 1958 Andrew Rothstein 





CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

Preface 5 

PART ONE: BACKGROUND TO MUNICH 

I. Before Hitler n 

II. Step by Step 20 

III. Czechoslovakia 40 


PART TWO: MUNICH 


IV. 

Redividing the World 

47 

V. 

“Without War and Without Delay” 

75 

VI. 

An Inconvenient Pact 

in 

VII. 

“We Must Not Quarrel with England and France” 

134 

VIII. 

Where the Soviet Union Stood 

165 

IX. 

Could Germany have Fought? 

191 

X. 

Labour Leaders and Czechoslovakia 

208 

XI. 

The Peoples and Czechoslovakia 

226 

XII. 

The Defence of Munich 

237 


PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS 


XIII. 

Why Did They Do It? 

255 

XIV. 

Towards New Aggressions 

272 


Epilogue 

307 


Books and Papers Quoted 

310 


Index 

313 


PART ONE 


BACKGROUND TO MUNICH 


CHAPTER I 

BEFORE HITLER 

AT the end of 1918 the German Empire and its allies, defeated in 
the great war to redivide the world which they had been waging 
for more than four years, lay prostrate at the feet of the other coalition 
led by Great Britain, France and the United States. The Slav peoples 
oppressed for centuries in Austria-Hungary were tearing that Empire 
apart, setting up new States of their own. In Germany great mutinies 
in the armed forces, mass strikes and workers’ demonstrations, the 
setting up of workers’ and soldiers’ councils marked the end of the 
Imperial regime, 1 and similar events were taking place in Vienna and 
Budapest. It seemed that the end of Prussian militarism, the menace 
of which for years had been the constant theme of writers on inter- 
national politics, had come at last. 

But the first world war had brought something else. In 1917, after 
the Russian Tsarist Empire had suffered a series of heavy defeats at the 
hands of the Germans and its economy had been completely exhausted 
and disorganised, the Russian working class had also risen in revolt, 
supported by the soldiers and the mass of the peasantry. In March, 
beginning at the nerve-centre of the Empire, Petrograd, it overthrew 
the Tsar and established workers’ and soldiers’ councils (Soviets) in the 
towns, while the peasants set up their own Soviets in the country. In 
November, now under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party in the 
principal industrial centres and on the principal war fronts, the w r orkcrs, 
sailors and soldiers overthrew the Provisional Government formed by 
pro-capitalist parties to replace the Tsar, and set up the Soviet Republic, 
with the aim of building a Socialist State of society. 2 

1 There arc, of course, many accounts of this upheaval. One that cannot be accused 
of sympathy with revolutionaries may be mentioned — the Memoirs of Prince Max of 
Baden (English edition, 1928), vol. II. 

2 M. Philips Price, My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution (1921), and John Reed, 
Ten Days that Shook the World (1919, 1926 and later), give a documented picture of this 
period. 


12 


BEFORE IIITLER 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

For over a year now the British, French, American and other 
Governments of the States now supreme in Western and Central 
Europe had been waging a war on the Soviet Republic— first by 
subsidising counter-revolutionary rebel leaders: then by directly 
organising various acts of invasion. 3 It was natural that they should 
be greatly alarmed lest events in Germany should proceed in the 
same direction as in Russia: for in other European countries conditions 
were also very disturbed. Accordingly, while laying down the most 
stringent terms of surrender for Germany with the one hand, the 
Allied rulers began at the same time modifying these terms of 
surrender for pohtical reasons with the other. 

“I pointed out the danger of bringing about a state of Bolshevism 
in Germany if the terms of the armistice were made too stiff, and the 
consequent danger to England, France and Italy”, wrote President 
Wilson’s personal representative. Col. House, of a talk with Lloyd 
George and Clemenceau on October 30, 1918. The first agreed there 
was danger in England, the second denied there was any in France, 
but both agreed that “anything might happen in Italy”. 4 In fact, the 
German delegates who met Marshal Foch to negotiate the armistice 
pleaded on November 19 to be allowed to retain the rifles and over 
30,000 machine guns of the former German army, because “Germany 
is on the verge of Bolshevism” and it was “necessary for them to form 
an army to oppose Bolshevism and re-establish order”. 5 Moreover, 
article 12 of the armistice which they signed on November 11 pro- 
vided that German troops in territories which before the war had 
formed part of Russia, unlike the German armies in Western Europe, 
should be withdrawn only “as soon as the Allies shall think the moment 
suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories”: 
and article 16 gave the Allies free access to the territories when they 
were evacuated, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, “for the 
purpose of maintaining order”. A similar provision was made at the 
time for Austro-Hungarian, Rumanian and Turkish territories. But 
by the time the Versailles Peace Treaty was signed, on June 28, 1919, 
these had been evacuated; and it was only in the regions directly con- 
venient for the war on Soviet Russia that German troops were ordered 
to remain until the Allied Governments told them to go — “in order 

3 Philips Price (op. cit.) gives an account of these operations as one present in Russia 
a * u . lr ! c ' w - p - and Z. Coates, Armed Intervention in Russia (1935), draw on Hansard, 
the British press and Government publications. 

4 Intimate Papers of Colonel House (1928), vol. IV, p. 121. 

5 Ibid., p. 141, and D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs, vol. II, ch. LXXXV. 


13 

to ensure the restoration of peace and good government in the Baltic 
provinces and Lithuania”. 6 

Thus from the first there was a duality and a contradiction in the 
policy of the Western Powers after 1918. On the one hand, they 
wanted to eliminate the danger to themselves from German militarism, 
which had developed through three Prussian wars — against Denmark 
(1864), Austria (1866) and France (1871) — into the Hohenzollern 
Empire of 1871-1918, equipped with all the means of modem warfare 
by an alliance of the landowners, big banks and industrial monopolies. 
On the other hand, by keeping a section of the Kaiser’s army for use 
against Soviet Russia, and by encouraging the building up of the most 
reactionary fragments of the rest into a new army expressly for the 
purpose of stamping out working-class revolution in Germany, 7 the 
Allies were placing at the disposal of those very same classes the reliable 
nucleus of a revived militarism, which could expand as and when 
circumstances permitted. In fact, as was recognised in later years, the 
Allied Governments for the same reasons turned a blind eye at the 
“secret” rearmament of Germany beyond the limits fixed by the 
Versailles Treaty — by building artillery, planes, a skeleton General 
Staff, and above all by organising secret military formations under 
various disguises (the “Black Reichswehr”). 8 

Nor should it be supposed that this happened by accident, or that 
the Allied Governments were not aware of the implications. One may 
quote here one of their keenest critics and one of their most important 
officials: a Liberal critic, because he had been the British Treasury’s 
representative at the Peace Conference of 1919 up to the eve of the 
signature of the Treaty, and his analysis was both weU-informed and 
prophetic: and a high Tory official, because, as Britain’s Ambassador 
in Germany from 1920 to 1926, he was known as the “uncrowned 
King of Germany” during the first years after Versailles, and it was his 
policy, not the critic’s, winch was accepted. 

6 Article 433 of the Treaty of Versailles. 

7 The new units were composed in the main of ex-officers, ex-N.C.Os. and the most 
politically immature soldiers of the old Imperial Army. A compact account of how they 
operated can be found in M. Philips Price, Germany in Transition (1923), chapters E-VI; 
or in contemporary German novels like Ludwig Renn’s After the War. 

8 A useful summary of this process was published in X942 by the late Sir Geoffrey 
Knox in his The Last Peace and the Next. As a British Embassy official at Berlin in 1924-6, 
and as President of the International Governing Commission in the Saarland in 1932-5, 
Knox had many opportunities to see the “secret” rearmament in progress; and, as Sir 
Walter (afterwards Lord) Layton pointed out in 1944 (How to Deal with Germany, p. 37), 
"the politicians were frankly warned by the Allied Commissioners that evasion was 
taking place”. A British Cabinet Minister had a list of sums spent for this purpose from 
1920 to 1933 (Ambassador Dodd’s Diary, January 31, 1936). See also Churchill, The Second 
World War, vol. I (1948), pp. 36-7, and J. H. Morgan, Assized Arms (Methuen, 1945)- 


14 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


BEFORE HITLER 


Mr. J. M. Keynes (later Lord Keynes) wrote in November, 1919: 
“The same conflict of purpose is apparent in the attitude of the Council 
of the Allies at Paris towards the present Government of Germany. 
A victory of Spartacism in Germany might well be the prelude to 
revolution everywhere; it would renew the forces of Bolshevism in 
Russia, and precipitate the dreaded union of Germany and Russia. . . . 
Therefore Paris does not love Spartacus. But on the other hand a vic- 
tory of reaction in Germany would be regarded by everyone as a 
threat to the security of Europe, and as endangering the fruits of 
victory and the basis of the Peace. Besides, a new military power 
establishing itself in the East, with its spiritual home in Brandenburg, 
drawing to itself all the military talent and all the military adventurers, 
all those who regret emperors and hate democracy, in the whole of 
Eastern and Central and South-Eastern Europe, a power winch would 
be geographically inaccessible to the military forces of the Allies, 
might well fomid — at least in the anticipation of the timid — a new 
Napoleonic domination, rising as a phoenix from the ashes of cosmo- 
politan militarism. So Paris dare not love Brandenburg.” 9 

But Paris did decide in favour of “Brandenburg” — even though, for 
a number of years, the latter put on the disguise of a Republic, in which 
Social-Democratic, Liberal or Catholic governments ruled with the 
help of the new armed forces. Here is the testimony of Lord D’ Aber- 
non, writing in his diary on November 23, 1920: “Without in any way 
abandoning the demand for the surrender of rifles and small-arms, I 
should advise a somewhat less energetic and categorical attitude than 
in regard to the larger material. I should fear to disarm the orderly 
sections of the people, leaving arms in the hands of the extreme 
Socialists and the Spartacists. Regarding the Einwohnerwehr and 
Orgesch organisations” (two of the illegal military formations) “it is 
difficult to decide whether these make for order or for future trouble. 
They are at bottom monarchical and military, although they deny it. 
But I consider the danger from the Left far exceeds the danger from 
the Right, and in the event of a new outbreak of Communism in 
Germany, it can be regarded as certain that these organisations would 
powerfully serve the cause of order.” 10 
With the help of the Allied Governments, therefore, the Right got 
the upper hand in Germany, and capitalism was settled back more 

9 The Economic Consequences of the Peace (December, 1919), pp. 271-2. “Spartacism” 
was the title by which the German Communist movement was known at first. “Branden- 
burg” — original domain of the later Prussian kings — stood for German reaction. 

10 Diary (“An Ambassador of reace”), vol. I (1929), p. 92. 


15 

firmly in the saddle. The course of events in the following years, 
however, was by no means a simple one. It was particularly compli- 
cated at first by the insistence of the victor Powers on payment of 
practically unlimited reparations by Germany. The German ruling 
classes were not prepared to accept this price for their rescue in 1918- 
20, and strove to evade the demands presented to them. 

In the spring of 1922 this situation, coupled with the continuing 
hostility of the victorious Powers to Soviet Russia, led to a serious 
reverse for them. Partly driven by their own internal pohtical and 
economic difficulties which had already, a year before, led Britain to 
sign a Trade Agreement with Russia, but inspired also by the hope 
that famine conditions over a great part of eastern Russia since the 
previous summer would now force the Soviet Government to its 
knees, the Allied Powers called an international economic conference 
at Genoa in April. In anticipation of the conference, the British Govern- 
ment promoted discussions of a “European Consortium” to take over 
the work of capital investment and “reconstruction” in Russia on 
capitalist lines. The French Government confined itself to securing a 
conference of Allied economic and financial experts, which met in 
London and worked out the terms of capitulation to be presented to 
the Soviet delegation. The Germans would gladly have taken part in 
the proposed “Consortium”, but never got the chance. When the 
Genoa Conference opened on April 10, it speedily became clear that 
(0 the Soviet Government was ready for extensive co-operation with 
the capitalist countries, including the granting of far-rcaching con- 
cessions on its territory; (it) the Allied Powers demanded nothing less 
than the restoration of the capitalist property system in Russia and of 
foreign control over its finances, extra-territorial rights for foreigners, 
etc. ; (iii) at the same time they would not make the slightest conces- 
sion to the Germans in the matter of reparations; (iv) the Soviet 
Government would not hear of any such surrenders as the Allies were 
demanding, although it was willing to compromise on compensation 
for pre-war foreign owners if it got credits to rebuild the shattered 
economy of Russia. 

After much hesitation, the German Government decided to accept 
the Soviet offer of a treaty which restored normal diplomatic relations, 
cancelled mutual claims (except that Germany would receive no less 
favourable terms than any other country later signing an agreement 
with Russia) and ensured German Government support for private 
firms doing business with Russia. The treaty was signed at Rapallo 
on April 16, 1922, thus breaking the attempted capitalist front against 


1 6 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Soviet Russia. It was a reminder that German capitalism had its own 
national aims, which did not necessarily coincide with those of its con- 
querors, even though they had helped it to crush its own working 
class. Rapallo was also a reminder that, although the Soviet Govern- 
ment had no special love for the German capitalists, it had no special 
respect for the balance of forces in the capitalist world established by 
the Versailles Treaty: and would deal in a friendly way with those who 
showed a friendly attitude, giving tit for tat to those who treated it as 
an enemy. 11 

However, the reparations burden continued to fall on Germany — 
and the German ruling classes naturally passed it on to the workers. 
This led to a series of convulsions, involving occupation of the Ruhr 
coalfield by French and Belgian troops in January, 1923, against the 
wishes of the British Government; and a tremendous financial and 
political crisis, with a big growth in the influence of the Communist 
Party and armed repression by the German Government, later in the 
year. Finally, in 1924, the Allies signed an agreement (the Dawes 
Plan) with Germany, reducing and regularising reparations payments 
and opening the door wide for foreign (particularly American) capital 
to buy shares in German industry, banking and commerce. 

German capitalism was now stabilised, with powerful supporters 
abroad. That fact, together with the continuing growth of its arma- 
ments, emboldened it to begin pressing for its place in the sun once 
more. In the autumn of 1924 it asked for admission to the League of 
Nations, founded by the victorious Powers after the war. 12 Then it 
suggested a joint guarantee by itself, France, Britain and Italy of the 
Rhine frontier, including the demilitarised zone established in German 
territory on both sides of the Rhine (all territory on the left bank and 
a 50-kilomctre strip on the right) by articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles 
Treaty. 13 This zone had originally been imposed on Germany in order 
to make it easier for the Allies to coerce her if she violated the Treaty. 
A new voluntary arrangement of the kind proposed — at a time when 
she was becoming economically and militarily stronger than in 1919, 
while cleavages had begun to appear between Britain and France — 
could mean that she might even be defended against France, should the 

11 The fullest account of Rapallo is in Russian, Istoria Diplomalii, vol. Ill (1945), ch. 6, 
supplemented in some details by N. L. Rubinstein, Vneshniaya Polilika Sovetskogo Gosu- 
d gl tva v 1921-1925 godakh ( 1953 ). ch. 8. In English, see Fischer, The Soviets in World 
Affairs, vol. 1 (1930), pp. 326-44. 

12 Note of Foreign Minister Stresemann to the ten Powers, members of the League 
Council, September 29, 1924. 

13 Stresemann s Note of January 20, 1925, to the British Government, suggested to 
him, according to his Papers (vol. II, pp. 14-15), by D’Abemon himself. 


BEFORE HITLER 


17 

latter take unilateral action like the march into the Ruhr, two years 
before. 

There is no lack of hints in Lord D’Abcmon’s diaries at the time, as 
well as in the talks and writings of Stresemann (to make such an 
arrangement more acceptable) that the agreement would strengthen 
Germany as a “bulwark against Bolshevism”. But the price which 
Germany demanded was that there should be no collective guarantees 
for the frontiers of any of the East European States bordering on 
Germany — particularly Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria. At first 
the French Government, which was interested in preventing German 
domination of these countries, attempted to resist: but under pressure 
from Great Britain, after months of bargaining, it had to yield, because 
the British Government supported the German attitude in this. 14 
Moreover the British Government was reinforced by the United 
States, whose Ambassador in London publicly declared, at a Pilgrims 
dinner, and in the presence of Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister, 
that American financial aid would only be provided to the European 
nations if they convinced the U.S.A. “that the time for destructive 
methods and policies has passed and that the time for peaceful up- 
building has begun”. 15 

After months of negotiation, the Pact of Locarno was initialled on 
October 16, 1925 (it was signed on December 1). Germany, Belgium, 
France, the United Kingdom and Italy, collectively and severally, 
guaranteed the Rhine frontier and maintenance of the demilitarised 
zone. Germany, Belgium and France undertook not to attack or 
invade each other (except where action under the League Covenant 
was concerned, or if there were a breach of the Rhineland provisions), 
and Britain and Italy joined in this guarantee. By agreement between 
the signatories, the Treaty would be ratified when Germany joined the 
League. As action under the League Covenant involved obligations 
under its article 16 — which provided for collective action against 
aggressors — Germany received a special letter assuring her that a State 
member of the League would only be bound by this “to an extent 
which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographi- 
cal position into account”. Simultaneously, Poland and Czechoslovakia 
signed arbitration treaties with Germany, to cover “all disputes of 
every kind”; and they concluded treaties of mutual assistance with 
France, pledging hi each case mutually to “immediately lend aid and 

14 F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (1952), vol. I, pp. 284, 286, 288. 

15 Speech by Ambassador Alanson B. Houghton, May 4, 1925, reported in The Times 
next day. 


B 


i8 


THE MUNICH CONSPIHACY 


BEFORE HITLER 


19 


assistance”, should Germany break the peace or violate the Treaty, 
with “an unprovoked recourse to arms”. 16 

What was the significance of the Locarno Pact, with its associated 
treaties? First, it closed the door to war in the West, to the best of the 
ability of its signatories. Secondly, it weakened the guarantee of security 
to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria provided by the League Coven- 
ant of 1919. hi that Germany — already much stronger than in 1919 — 
had refused to give them the same guarantee as to France and Belgium, 
and Great Britain (one of the chief authors of the Covenant) upheld her 
in this. Thirdly, it enabled Germany for the time being to balance 
between the U.S.S.R. and hostile States in the West, 17 shicc although 
she was to enter the League of Nations she was released in advance 
from the obligation to join in military action against the U.S.S.R. under 
article 16. But fourthly the way was left wide open for such hostile 
action, if she chose to take it in agreement with Poland, France, Britain 
and the other countries. Fifth, the weakening of France’s ties with the 
States set up with her help, out of the wreck of the German, Russian 
and Austro-Hungarian Empires, was imposed on France by Great 
Britain and the U.S.A. 

British Ministers did not hesitate to underline the broad general 
purpose of the Locarno treaties. Before their signature Austen Cham- 
berlain, the Foreign Secretary, had circulated a Cabinet memorandum 
that Russia was “the most menacing of our uncertainties, and it must 
be in spite of Russia, perhaps because of Russia, that a policy of 
security must be framed”. 18 After the Locarno conference the Under- 
secretary for the Colonies expressed the opinion of the British Govern- 
ment: 10 “The Pact has drawn together the Western Powers of Europe 
in defence of Western civilisation. . . . The solidarity of Western 
civilisation is necessary to stand against the most sinister force that has 
arisen, not only in our lifetime, but previously in European history. 
The issue at Locarno as I see it was: is Germany to regard her future as 
bound up with the fate of the great Western Powers, or is she going 
to work with Russia for the destruction of Western civilisation? The 
significance of Locarno is tremendous. It means that, so far as the 

16 The Locarno Agreements. Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, December, 
1925. 

17 On April 24, 1926, Germany signed a treaty with the U.S.S.R. providing each 
party would remain neutral if the other were attacked by a third party, “in spite of its 
peaceful conduct”. 

18 "Leaked” in the first instance to the Paris edition of the Chicago Tribune (March 6, 
I 92 S), its existence was not denied by Chamberlain ( Hansard , May u, 1925). 

10 Speech of Mr. W. C. A. Orinsby-Gore at Manchester, October 24, 1925 (reported 
in The Times of the 26th). 


present Government of Germany is concerned, it is detached from 
Russia and is throwing in its lot with the Western party.” 

Thus the Locarno Pact represented a further strengthening of the 
international position of Germany. In the eyes of its authors Germany 
was once more a bulwark against the U.S.S.R. (a revenge for Rapallo, 
as it were). In reality, Germany was reinforced as against the smaller 
States of eastern and central Europe likewise, and therefore as against 
their particular ally France. In this way it carried a good deal further 
the process which began with the Armistice terms of November, 1918, 
and it prepared the way for more. “There was already something of 
the spirit of Munich in Locarno”, wrote a French ex-Premier, Paul 
Reynaud, over twenty years later. 20 

But it was not until Flitler was put in power by the big monopolists 
in Germany in January, 1933, 21 on the crest of a wave of demagogy 
and subsidised thuggery for which the opportunity was provided by 
the economic crisis from 1930 onwards, that the real meaning of 
Locarno w 7 as revealed. 

20 Reynaud, La France a sauve L’Europe (1947), vol. I, p. 48. 

21 “He (William II) was only the creature of militarism, heavy industry and those 
East Elbian junkers with whom the Hohenzollerns had struck an early and enduring 
bargain. The same evil forces, particularly the first two, made that yet louder and 
swankier creature, Hitler” ( Lessons of My Life, 1943, pp. 100-1). This was one of the 
occasions when Lord Vansittart talked sense, during the war. 


CHAPTER II 


STEP BY STEP 

H ITLER had a programme when he came to power. It had been set 
forth most explicitly in Ills book, Mein Kainpf, written long before, 
and circulated after 1933 in millions of copies — not only in German, 
but also in English and French. The following arc the striking passages 
of this book in which the new ruler of Germany had warned the 
world of his policy: 

“The size of a country has a further military significance, in addition 
to that which it has as the direct source of a people’s food supply. 

“Even if a people has secured a sufficient expanse of territory, it must 
nevertheless necessarily also consider how to make this available 
territory secure. This security is founded on the general political 
strength of the State, which in its turn is to no small degree determined 
by the factors of military geography. 

“Thus only as a world Power wall the German people be able to 
defend its future” (pp. 728-9). 1 * * 

“Germany to-day is not a world Power. Even if our present military- 
impotence were overcome, we should, nevertheless, have not the 
slightest claim to this title. What is the si gnificance to-day of a country 
on this planet, the relation between population and territory of which 
is so pitiable as that of the German Reich? In an epoch in which the 
earth is gradually being divided between States, some of which com- 
prise almost complete continents, it is impossible to speak of world 
power in connection with a country whose political territory is limited 
to the ridiculous area of scarcely 500,000 square kilometres” (p. 729). 

“The National-Socialist movement must attempt to remove the 
disproportion between the number of our population and the size of 
our territory — the latter regarded as the source of our food supplies 
and also as the basis of our political power — between our liistorical 
past and the hopelessness of our impotence at the present time. It must 
be fully conscious in doing so that we, as the guardians of the highest 

1 The page references throughout arc to the 1935 German edition, quoted from 

Hitler Means War, a most valuable booklet issued by the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary 

Committee in June, 1936. 


STEP BY STEP 


21 


forms of humanity on this earth, are bound by the highest obligations, 
and it will be able the better to fulfil this obligation the more it sees 
that the German people remember their race” (p. 732). 

“Yes, all we can learn from the past is that our political activity 
must pursue a double aim: new soil as the aim of our foreign policy, 
and a new, ideologically firm and uniform foundation as the aim of 
our internal political activity. . . . The demand for a restoration of the 
boundaries of the year 1914 is political nonsense, so colossal and grave 
in its consequences that it appears criminal. Quite apart from the fact 
that the boundaries of the Reich in the year 1914 were anything but 
logical. For in reality they were neither complete, from the point of 
view of comprising all people of German nationality, nor rational 
from the point of view of military geographical utility. They were 
not the result of conscious political action, but temporary boundaries 
in a political struggle in no way terminated” (pp. 735-6). 

“The boundaries of the year 1914 have not the slightest significance 
for the future of the German nation. They neither provided protection 
in the past, nor could they provide pow'er in the future. 

“The German people will neither obtain internal cohesion 
through them, nor will its food supply be guaranteed, nor are these 
boundaries effective or even adequate from the military point of 
view', nor, finally, can they improve our present relations with the 
other world Powers or, more correctly, with the real world Powers” 

(pp- 738-9). 

“In contrast to this aim (the restoration of the 1914 frontiers) we 
National Socialists must steadfastly maintain our aim in foreign policy, 
namely, to secure for the German people the soil that is due to them 
on this earth. And this action is the only one that can justify a sacrifice 
of blood before God and our German posterity. . . . 

“In this connection I must take a strong stand against those National- 
ist scribblers w 7 ho regard such an acquisition of territory as a ‘viola- 
tion of sacred human rights’. ... A thoughtless imbecile may regard 
the division of the earth as fixed for all eternity, but in reality each 
temporary division is only an apparent point of rest in the current of 
development, created in constant change by the mighty forces of 
Nature, only perhaps to be destroyed and remodelled by stronger 
forces to-morrow — and the same is true in human history of the 
boundaries of national living spaces. 

“Boundaries are made by men and altered by men” (pp. 739-40). 

“The fact that a people succeeds in acquiring a disproportionate 
amount of territory does not imply the obligation for others eternally 


22 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


to acquiesce in this fact. It proves at best the strength of the con- 
querors and the weakness of the sufferers. This strength alone in such 
cases determines what is right. . . . 

“Just as our ancestors did not receive the soil on which we live to- 
day as a gift from Heaven, but had to fight for it with the sacrifice of 
their lives, so in future no national grace will secure our soil and the 
life of our people, but only the power of the victorious sword” 
(pp. 740-1). 

“However much we realise the necessity of a settlement of accounts 
with France, it would remain ineffectual for our great line if this were 
the exclusive aim of our foreign policy. Such a settlement can and 
will only be of any significance in so far as it provides security in our 
rear for the task of enlarging our living space in Europe. For we must 
look not to colonial conquests for a solution of this question, but 
exclusively to the acquisition of an area of settlement that enlarges the 
size of the home country itself. . . . 

“Germany will either be a world Power or nothing at all. But to be 
a world Pow 7 er it requires a territory which gives it the necessary 
strength in the world of to-day and life to its citizens. 

“Thus we National Socialists consciously turn our backs on the 
foreign orientation of our pre-war period. We begin where we left 
off six centuries ago. 2 We have finished with the eternal Germanic 
crusades towards the south and west of Europe, and turn our eyes 

towards the land in the cast But when we speak to-day of new soil 

in Europe we can in the first instance only think of Russia and the 
border States subordinate to her” (pp. 741-2). 

“The giant empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of the 
Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a State. We are 
chosen by fate to become the witnesses of a catastrophe which will be 
the most powerful proof of the correctness of the national race theory” 
(p- 743). 

As an immediate policy, Hitler advocated an “Anglo-German- 
Italian Alliance” which would ensure that “the mortal enemy of our 
people, France, is left in isolation” (pp. 755-6). The overthrow of 

2 At the beginning of the 10th century, the whole of what is now central and eastern 

Germany was inhabited up to the Laba (Elbe) by Slav tribes. From then onwards for 
some 300 years the German feudal nobility waged wars of extermination against them, 
settling the land with German colonists and monasteries; or, further east along the 

Baltic seaboard, carving out feudal estates in which the native peoples worked as serfs 
or slaves. German progress eastward was stopped by the Russian forces of Alexander 
Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod, in the “Battle on the Ice” (1242); and a second drive 
was defeated by combined Russian, Lithuanian, Polish, Belorussian, Kievan and Czech 
forces at Tannenbcrg-Grunwald (1410). 


STEP BY STEP 


23 

France would give Germany the strength necessary for the proposed 
“Eastern policy” (p. 757)- 

It is perhaps necessary to say that Hitler did not immediately offer 
an alli ance to Britain, declare war on France or launch a crusade to the 
East. The achievement of his basic objectives, said his intimate con- 
fidant and interpreter many years later, “seems to be characterised by 
improvisations. Each succeeding step was apparently carried out as each 
new situation arose, but all consistent with the ultimate objectives”. 3 
And he was helped by the widespread belief among influential people 
in Britain and France that his government w r as an “added bulwark 
against the spread of Communism towards Western Europe”, a 
“rampart against Communism”. 4 

Step by step the “improvisations” took shape. 

The Four-Power Pact 

In March, 1933, Mussolini invited the British Premier and Foreign 
Secretary (Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon) to Rome and 
proposed to them a Four-Power Pact, under which Britain, France, 
Italy and Germany would co-operate to maintain peace in Europe, to 
carry out revision of the Peace Treaties, gradually secure arms equality 
for Germany and co-ordinate their policies in all international dis- 
putes. The proposal had Hitler’s agreement. The British and French 
Governments secured majorities for it in their Parliaments. But it con- 
tinued to arouse violent opposition, not only in Britain and France, 
but in Poland and other East European States hitherto relying on 
French support — Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Finally it 
was much revised, so as to appear to be in conformity with the League 
Covenant and the Locarno Treaty: and was signed on June 8, 1933. It 
was never ratified. 

But Flitlcr had won a success. For the first time — if only for a 
moment — the idea of a kind of directorate of the Western Powers, 
including Germany, had been substituted for the League Council. 
For the first time — if only for a moment — the French and British 
Governments had accepted the principle of a substantial increase in 
German armaments. By the reference to treaty revision, to be agreed 
primarily between the four Powers, they alarmed the four smaller 
countries above mentioned, who immediately concluded that this 

3 The Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (referred to further as Trial), part X, p. 143, Interrogation of Paul Otto 
Schmidt. 

4 J. W. Whccler-Bennett, Munich, Prologue to Tragedy (1948), pp. 232, 234. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


24 

would be done at their expense— particularly the Poles: and this 
still further weakened the alliances in central and eastern Europe by 
which the victorious Powers had underpinned the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles.^ By excluding the U.S.S.R. from the proposed arrangement, it 
seemed to take over one of Hitler’s cardinal aims. “The danger of the 
Four-Power Pact was to let it be believed that we were neglecting 
Russia and that we were going to leave Germany a free hand in the 
east”, wrote General Gamelin, chief of the French General Staff (true 
many year s afterwards) . 6 

There was an unmistakable sign of the encouragement this gave to 
Hitler. On May 11, 1933, the German Foreign Minister Neurath 
published an article announcing that his country would equip itself 
with aircraft, heavy artillery, and land forces irrespective of the results 
of the f Disarmament Conference. The next day Hitler’s deputy 
Chancellor, von Papen, said in a speech at Munster that since January 
30 Germany had struck the word pacifism out of its dictionary”. 7 

When Germany on October 4, 1933, suddenly withdrew from the 
League of Nations and from the Disarmament Conference, with the 
obvious intention of carrying out the intentions thus openly announced, 
the British press close to the Government (and most of the other news- 
papers as well) suddenly abandoned tire previous line of sharp criticism 
of the Germans for their armaments demands. Threats by British 
Ministers— Lord Hailsham, War Minister (May 11) and the Prime 
Minister himself (October 6)— to carry out sanctions if there were any 
breach of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact, were forgotten. 
Instead, the press began championing the German cause against the 
French, and warning France against any “hasty action”. The result 
was that no international action of any kind was taken against Ger- 
many, hasty or otherwise. Yet she was still completely powerless to 
resist the British and French armed forces if they took drastic measures, 
and in fact the British Government’s military adviser at Geneva sug- 
gested to Sir John Simon that the Rhine bridgeheads should be 
occupied. But nothing was done— perhaps just because that adviser 
t lought that such action “would have ensured a change of regime in 

J/ Scc ** vivid acco J unt by Robert Dell, The Geneva Racket (1940), pp. 199-202 (Dell 

vonf pp.1 4 tS M " £ta " Gu " iim in G “ eva for T 

6 Servir, vol II (1946), p. 94. The German military attache in London has recorded 

SiTwdr reSS( ff h uT S Whcn * that autumn > thc Director of Military Intelligence General 
Sir William Bartholomew, suddenly asked him in the middle of a converfarion • 'S 

“ mtl1 reS "‘* “ ‘ h ' Ufaai “ ! '' ™n Schweppcnburg, Ttu, CriL 

7 Quoted by Istoria Diplomatii, vol. HI, p. 473. 


STEP BY STEP 


25 

Germany”. 8 Hitler understood that the road to German rearmament 
was now finally open. 

The Eastern Locarno 

In the spring and summer of 1934, the growing alarm of the small 
States in Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, in face of 
German rearmament, led the Soviet Government to propose first a 
Baltic Pact, and then a general Eastern Pact of mutual assistance, in 
which Germany, Poland and thc U.S.S.R. should enter on terms of 
equality, guaranteeing one another’s frontiers and those of the other 
adherent States. It accepted the proposal of Barthou, the French 
Foreign Minister, that France should be a guarantor of the Eastern 
Pact while thc U.S.S.R. should become guarantor of the 1925 Locarno 
Pact. But the frankly hostile tone of the politicians and press closest in 
touch with the British Government encouraged Poland and Germany 
to reject these schemes. 

Out of many examples that could be given, one must suffice. The 
Viennese Neuc Erne Presse on May 17, 1934, published its London 
correspondent’s interview with “a prominent English Conservative 
statesman”, outlining British policy as follows: (i) “We give Japan 
freedom of action with regard to Russia”; («j “We give Germany the 
right to rearm; we conclude an alliance with France so that, as a 
result of Franco-British co-operation, an expansion by Germany to 
the west will be impossible. On the other hand, we open to Germany 
the way to the cast by giving it a possibility of expansion. By this 
means we divert Japan and Germany and keep Russia in check.” 
Although the paper did not reveal the identity of the statesman, the 
sensation which the interview aroused in Europe led to its speedy dis- 
covery. It was Lord Lloyd— a former Governor of Bombay, a friend of 
Winston Churchill and of Neville Chamberlain, and certainly an 
impressive figure of the inner circle in the British ruling class, whether 
in office or out of it. 9 

And although the firm course steered by Barthou towards such 
pacts, or at least a tripartite Franco-German-Soviet Pact, led to a 
weakening of overt British hostility to thc scheme, and even to a series 
of declarations in Parliament in July, 1934, approving of it, no sooner 
was Barthou assassinated by the agents of Hitler and Mussolini on 

5o" Tetp r S;™l C ;dS" P ' rl ' y ' 71,1 m ‘ SPe "" S Gd ‘ ,ry ° fE “ Wpt (1938) ' PP - ^ 

T’v' L ‘ fe ?f NeviUe Chamberlain (1946), p. 285, gives an indication 
J? yd 1 P OW f rful , P 0 «tion as one of a group of “ex-Ministers or would-be Mini- 
sters —what in French politics are called ministrables. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


2 6 

October 9, 1934, than the old note began to appear in the governmental 
press in London. 10 Hitler refused to join the Pact, which would have 
been a brake on his activities. 

Rearmament 

Hitler now took the next steps. On March 11, 1935, he announced 
the formation of— or rather brought out into the open — the new 
German Air Force, and on the 16th reintroduced conscription: both 
violations of the Versailles Treaty. In conversation with Sir John (later 
Lord) Simon, the Foreign Secretary, at Berlin on March 25, Flitlcr 
told him he needed thirty-six divisions (550,000 men), 35 per cent, of 
British naval tonnage and air parity with Britain and France. More- 
over, Hitler once again made clear to him that he would never sign 
an eastern pact, nor one guaranteeing Austrian independence — “that 
Germany greatly desires a good understanding with Britain, but that 
she is determined to go her own course in rearmament; that she expects 
in time to get all Germans within her borders, including Austria; that 
she does not fear isolation, and has no intention of joining in collective 
security. ...” In the memorandum which Simon made of this talk, he 
admitted that the obvious conclusion ought to be co-operation of the 
rest of Europe — “British Tories collaborating with Russian Commun- 
ists”: but he “most gravely” doubted that this would preserve the 
peace. 11 Nor was tins opinion confined to Cabinet memoranda. 
“Germany means to make war. The present rulers of that country are 
absolutely and resolutely bent on pursuing a policy of war. If that was 
in doubt before Sir John Simon went to Berlin, it is in no doubt now”, 
wrote Lord Beaverbrook in the Sunday Express (March 31, 1935). 
The commentator in the Sunday Times, the same day, made it more 
precise, in exactly the same sense as Simon: “The new Germany 
which wants peace on her western borders also has eastern frontiers 
where, though her immediate intentions may be peaceful, she has 
political ambitions which it may be impossible to satisfy without 
war. . . . She might even argue to herself that she would he rendering a 

10 Thus Lord Lothian (formerly a secretary to Lloyd George in the 1914-18 war, a 
friend of Lord Halifax and of Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times), after inter- 
viewing Hitler and other Nazi chiefs, declared at the end of January, 1935, that he had 
“not the slightest doubt” about Hitler’s sincerity in renouncing war and any designs on 
his neighbours, if he were only given equality. The Times commented (January 31): 
“Lord Lothian is not the first observer in Germany to be convinced that, in the first 
place, she does not want war and that, in the second, her eyes are turned anxiously 
towards the East rather than the West.” 

11 Viscount Simon, Retrospect (1952), p. 203. Neville Chamberlain’s comment on 
Hitler’s attitude to the U.S.S.R. in a private letter on March 30, was (after hearing 
Simon’s report): “I don’t think it’s unreasonable” (Feiling, op. cit., p. 256). 


STEP BY STEP 


27 

service to ivestern politics as well as to her own ambitions, if she detached the 
Ukraine” (my italics). 

What conclusion, however, did the British Government draw? 
True, it supported a French appeal to the League against the breach of 
the Peace Treaty as a threat to peace: but Hitler had some reason to 
expect that nothing much would come of that, beyond a resolution 
deploring his action. What was important— Hitler knew it already, 
but the world only learned of it some five weeks later — was that, 
without consulting the French with whom Britain was jointly appeal- 
ing against a breach of solemn engagements, Simon during the talks 
had suggested (on Hitler’s declaration about warship tonnage) that 
“German representatives should come to London for a preliminary 
discussion with a view to a naval agreement in the future”. 12 In due 
course this took place, and a naval agreement agreeing to the 35 per 
cent, tonnage ratio for Germany — and a large submarine tonnage, 
also a breach of the Peace Treaty — was signed, in spite of a French 
protest, on June 18, 1935. 13 

Extreme embarrassment has been shown by all the Conservative 
writers on this action ever since: such a calculated piece of perfidy 
towards a close ally has rarely been justified on a flimsier official excuse — 
that Hitler was breaking the Treaty already, and a voluntary agreement 
on his part would at any rate set a limit to his naval construction. 
Hardly any have had the courage to point out that, while opinions 
might differ as to what proportion of the British Navy would have 
to be kept in the North Sea after the Treaty, and as to the strain it 
would impose on France — nominally enjoying a 40 per cent, superior- 
ity over Germany, but in fact mainly possessed of older vessels — there 
could be no doubt that it made the German Navy “master of the 
Baltic”. 14 In effect, so far as it went, it gave Hitler the free hand in 
eastern Europe which he was demanding. 

Meanwhile, in April, the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secre- 
tary had been in conference with the corresponding French and 
Italian Ministers at Stresa, in northern Italy. They were to discuss 
Hitler’s announcements, and it appeared probable that a new declara- 
tion would be made in favour of security in eastern Europe no less than 
in the west (i.e. warning Hitler that he could not expand eastward 
any more than westward). It was Mr. Neville Chamberlain himself 

12 Hansard, May 2, 1935 (statement by the Prime Minister). 

13 British aggregate tonnage at that time was about 1,200,000 tons: Germany thus 
gained the right to a total of 400,000 tons: she actually possessed at the time under 
80,000 tons of modem warships ( Istoria Diplomatii, vol. Ill, p. S47). 

14 Churchill, op. cit., p. 109. 


28 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


(then Chancellor of the Exchequer) who, under the guise of “an 
authoritative quarter”, told the parliamentary correspondents of the 
British newspapers 15 that there could be no question of further British 
commitments in Europe, that collective security beyond the Rhine 
presented httle more than academic interest to Great Britain, and that 
what Great Britain was really interested in was an air pact in the west 
(i.e. the closing of the door to German aggression westward). The 
statement was “indignantly” repudiated at Stresa by the British dele- 
gation, and the Foreign Office in London issued a polite correction, 
to the effect that the statement printed in the press “should not be 
taken as representing any new official pronouncement”. In fact, how- 
ever, the British delegation made clear that they would not consider 
applying sanctions against Germany for breaking the Treaty. And the 
Germans understood very well, as did indeed most other observers of 
international affairs, that it was the time and manner of publication that 
upset the Foreign Office, rather than the substance of Mr. Chamber- 
lain’s remarks. 

This was confirmed by the fact that the Stresa Conference duly 
adopted a resolution on April 14 pledging opposition “by all possible 
means” to unilateral violations of treaties threatening peace — and two 
months later Great Britain and Germany joined in precisely such a 
violation, in the shape of the Naval Treaty ! 

Ethiopia 

Laval, a patron of Fascism, became the French Prime Minister in 
June, 1935, and he replied to these tactics of the British Government 
by according his moral support to Italy in a war of aggression against 
Ethiopia, which began almost immediately. 16 Tins support was un- 
doubtedly of importance for Mussolini ; it played an invaluable part, 
from his point of view, when the notorious “Hoare-Laval” proposals 
(or, more truly, Vansittart-Hoare plan) for securing peace by dis- 
membering Ethiopia and putting her virtually under Italian control, 
were revealed later in the year. But the proposals were formulated on 
the initiative of the British Government. On September 9 — before 
making a great speech at the League Assembly declaring that the 
British policy was “steady and collective resistance to aggression” — 
Sir Samuel Hoare had informed Laval that in no circumstances would 

16 April 11, 1935 — the day the conference opened. 

16 Circumstantial evidence on the question of who bore most responsibility for the 
tactics which helped Mussolini in this war — the French or the British Government — 
is provided by A. Werth, The Destiny of Frame (1937), ch. 11, and Dell, op. cit., pp. 
114-15, 129-30. 


STEP BY STEP 


29 

the British Government apply any sanctions to Italy other than 
economic and financial sanctions, and that a naval blockade of Italy 
or the closing of the Suez Canal were quite out of the question. 17 When 
the war reached its critical stage in December, 1935, and again in 
January, 1936, the head of the British delegation at Geneva (Mr. Eden) 
informed Maxim Litvinov, head of the Soviet delegation, which was 
pressing for oil sanctions against Italy, 18 that there could be no question 
of these cither, since they might involve a risk of general war. 

It is true that by this time the British Government had safely rounded 
the danger-point of a General Election, in which it had secured an 
overwhelming majority on the strength of Sir Samuel Hoare’s declara- 
tion and of a flood of similar pledges. But, as Neville Chamberlain 
told a foreign diplomat at that time, there could be no question of 
letting Mussolini be overthrown in consequence of a military defeat, 
since this would mean “chaos in Italy”, 19 i.e. revolution. 

The Rhineland 

Once again, Hitler took his cue, and in March, 1936, sent his troops 
into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarised by the Versailles 
Treaty, reaffirmed in this respect by the Locarno Treaties of 1925. 
At the same time he offered a twenty-fivc-ycars pact of peace, an air 
pact, etc. The French Cabinet considered ordering mobilisation, but 
the majority opposed it — partly because the War Minister stated that 
a general mobilisation was necessary if there was to be any action at 
all under the Peace Treaty and the Locarno Pact: partly because the 
British Government by telephone was urging them to “keep calm” 
— which they interpreted as a threat not to support them against 

17 French Note to Great Britain, October 18, 1935. quoted by Dell, op. cit., pp. 120-1. 
It is interesting that politicians with such divergent views as Chamberlain and Churchill 
agreed that it was Mussolini’s regime which was in danger if there were a war, not 
Britain, and that his threats were bluff (Feiling, op. cit., pp. 272-3 ; Churchill, op. cit., 
pp. 137-8). 

18 By December 12, 1935, when the League’s Committee on Sanctions was due to 
meet, the U.S.S.R., Irak, the Netherlands, Rumania and five other Powers — suppliers 
of just under 75 per cent, of Italy’s oil imports — were ready to impose oil sanctions. 

19 The diplomat, a man of exceptional caution, informed the writer. Churchill, op. 
cit., p. 133, records his alarm at the possibility which Count Grandi, the Italian Ambas- 
sador with whom he was talking (September 28, 1935), called “the fall of the regime”. 
Three days later he wrote to Sir Austen Chamberlain: “It would be a terrible deed to 
smash up Italy” (ibid., p. 136). F. P. Walters, Deputy Secretary-General of the League 
of Nations for many years, wrote in his history of that organisation (op. cit., vol. II, 
p. 673) that some of the chief Foreign Office officials “had no desire to see Mussolini 
overthrown” and that there was fear lest “the defeat of Mussolini should lead to Com- 
munism in Italy” (ibid., p. 704). A glance at Lessons of My Life (i943. ch. IV) will leave 
little doubt that Vansittart held such views — and he was Permanent Under-Sccrctary 
of State for Foreign Affairs. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


30 

Hitler. In fact, the French Government decided only to appeal to the 
League Council (which was held in London on March 14-19) and 
in the meantime to consult with the signatories of Locarno. When 
they did so, they found that all the pledges of Locarno were aban- 
doned. Both Mr. Eden, the new Foreign Secretary, and Neville 
Chamberlain (still Chancellor of the Exchequer, but acting for the 
Prime Minister Baldwin) were emphatic tliat nothing should be done 
to clash with Hitler, and that full advantage should be taken of his 
offers to negotiate. In fact all that was decided by the Council was 
that there had been a breach of the Treaty, and to ask Hitler for 
further guarantees that he meant no harm — the British Government 
promising really to support France if he went back on his word. 20 

Litvinov on March 17, speaking in the League Council for the 
Soviet Union, thoroughly exposed Hitler’s pretence of being con- 
cerned for peace, and analysed the real aggressive theory and practice 
of Nazi Germany. Although not a signatory either of the Versailles 
Treaty or of the Locarno Pact, the Soviet Union was “ready to take 
part in all measures that may be proposed to the Council of the League 
by the Locarno Powers and will be acceptable to other members of 
the Council”. 21 But this solitary voice was ignored. 

It is now known that in fact Flitler had instructed his generals, 
who -were protesting against the gamble, to withdraw if French 
troops entered the Rhineland. With nearly a hundred divisions on 
mobilisation, and an air force still far more powerful than the Ger- 
man, France could have enforced her will alone (Churchill has pointed 
out). So general was the expectation of this that the Polish Govern- 
ment, one of the most reactionary in Europe and increasingly pro- 
Hitler in its policy, informed the French Ambassador in Warsaw on 
the very evening of Hitler’s move that it would mobilise if France 
did. Nevertheless, Hitler was allowed to bring forward many miles 
his advanced bases for an attack on France, and to gain territory on 
which to build fortifications which were bound seriously to interfere 
with France’s help to her allies in Central and Eastern Europe. 

Why was this permitted? Only the most delicate of hints have 
appeared in print, so far, from those inside the top Tory circle. One 
of Stanley Baldwin’s closest friends, Thomas Jones (a member of the 
Cabinet Secretariat from 1916 to 1930, and an intimate of many other 

20 J. Paul-Boncour, the French Foreign Minister, has given a pretty full picture of 
this affair ( Ettlre Deux Cuerres, vol. HI, 1946, pp. 33-44). In essence Feiling, Chamberlain’s 
biographer, confirms it ( op . tit., p. 279). 

21 Maxim Litvinov, Against Aggression (1939), pp. 22-34. 


STEP BY STEP 


31 

leading Tories), has recorded that Tory backbenchers’ meetings in 
the last week of March had swung round from a pro-French to a 
pro-German majority — partly “influenced by the fear of our being 
drawn in on the side of Russia”. 22 On May 23, writing to a friend 
from Chequers, where he was spending a week-end with Mr. and 
Mrs. Baldwin, Jones said: “We have to choose between Russia and 
Germany, and choose soon. . . . Hitler feels quite unequal to standing 
up alone to Russia. ... He is therefore asking for an alliance with us 
to form a bulwark against the spread of Communism. Our P.M. is 
not indisposed to attempt this.” 23 Editorials in The Times — whose 
editor, Geoffrey Dawson, was another close friend of Baldwin and 
other Tory leaders — urged that the need of the moment w 7 as to “re- 
build” on the basis of Hitler’s offer (March 9), which represented “the 
best immediate hope of the stabilisation of Western Europe” (July 6) 
— my italics; and the paper expressed disapproval of France’s pact of 
mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. Thus, according to its own his- 
torians, it “tacitly admitted the fact, if not the right, of German 
dealings with Russia”. 24 Another intimate of the Government’s lead- 
ing figures, of Thomas Jones and (as mentioned earlier) of Geoffrey 
Dawson, was Lord Lot Irian. He w 7 as a convinced supporter of Hitler’s 
arguments, and in April denounced the Soviet Union as anxious “to 
maintain discord in Europe”. Litvinov’s speech of March 17, 193d, 
he declared, W'as for this reason “the most sinister speech ever made 
at the Council of the League since its inception”. 26 (It is worth recall- 
ing that, after a talk with Lothian, William Dodd, the United States 
Ambassador at Berlin, had made this note in his diary for May 6, 
1935: “FIc favours a coalition of the democracies to block any move 
in their direction, and to turn Germany’s course eastwards. That this 
might lead to w 7 ar between Russia and Germany does not seem to 
disturb him seriously. In fact he seems to feel this would be a good 
solution of the difficulties imposed on Germany by the Versailles 
Treaty.”) 

It is fairly clear that, when Mr. Churchill wrote that a check to 
Hitler in the Rhineland “might w r ell have proved fatal to his rule”, 20 
he was stating one of the very reasons why the British Government 
used its influence to prevent that check being inflicted. 

22 A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950 (1954). P- 185. 23 Ibid., p. 209. 

24 History of "The Times’’, vol. IV (1952), pp. 899, 902. 

25 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Germany and the Rhineland (1936), p. 55 - 
The speech was delivered at a private discussion at Chatham House: but, with a number 
of others, it was published the same month. 

28 Op. cit., p. 152. 


32 


TIIB MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


The Attack on Spain 

The ground was now suitable for a real military challenge by Hitler 
and Mussolini. In July, 1936, prepared by careful consultations with 
the General Staffs in Berlin and Rome, a Fascist military rebellion 
began in Spanish Morocco against the legitimate Government formed 
after the General Election of February 16, 1936. It was revealed, almost 
at once, as a mere camouflage for invasion by Germany and Italy, 
to put in their own creature as dictator. They helped to transport the 
rebel forces to Spain itself. Their planes, warships and military ex- 
perts participated from the very first. 27 By March, 1937, their troops 
numbered almost 100,000. The overwhelming sympathy of the mass 
of the people in France and Britain (as elsewhere) was with the Repub- 
lican Government; which, deprived of the bulk of its officers as well 
as of arms, munitions and planes, began building a new army and 
ordering war material from abroad. But the British Government 
threatened that, if war with Germany or Italy broke out through the 
French Government allowing the Spanish Republic to import arms, 
it would not necessarily honour its obligations to France. The warn- 
ing was conveyed to the French Premier Blum first during a visit 
to London in July, and then, by diplomatic channels in August. At 
the same time the Radical Ministers in the Blum Cabinet — who had 
earlier in the year led the Government at the time of the Rhineland 
crisis — threatened to resign if the Spanish Republic were supported: 
their attitude was enthusiastically endorsed by the Right parties. 28 

The French Government under this double pressure adopted the 
policy of “non-intervention” (never yet so clearly revealed to be what 
Talleyrand called it over a century before — “a diplomatic phrase which 
means ‘intervention’ ”) proposed by the British Government. A Non- 
Intervention Committee was set up in London by the European 
Powers, on the grounds that this would Emit the conflict. The British 
Government repeatedly supported this contention in Parliament and 
at the League, arguing that any other policy would mean dividing 
the world into “ideological blocs”. 29 The Soviet Union protested 
against the policy, as meaning in effect freedom for Germany and 
Italy to organise rebellion and a blockade of the legitimate Govern- 
ment of Spain. 

When it became clear that these arguments had no effect, the Soviet 

27 A witness who can scarcely be suspected of partiality on this is Sumner Welles 
(U.S. Under-Secretary of State), The Time for Decision (1944), p. 49. 

28 The story is told very fully in Werth, Destiny of France, ch. 22. 

20 Robert Dell tells the story of the intrigues in the League of Nations, of which he 
was a witness and very well informed, in chapter 12 of his Geneva Racket. 


STEP BY STEP 



33 

Union in October, 1936, began sending aeroplanes, guns and officers 
to Spain : and thousands of genuine volunteers from fifty-four countries 
went to help the cause of Spanish democracy. 30 But they had to run 
the gauntlet of the police of several countries, including the French, 
and to face shortage of arms when they got to Spain : while the Soviet 
ships bringing weapons to Spain had to run the gauntlet of Italian 
and German submarines during their nearly 2,000-mile journey. 31 
Finally the Anglo-French blockade and the Gcrman-Italian invasion 
accomplished their purpose, and the Republic was defeated and over- 
thrown in 1 93 9. 32 

It is significant that the Spanish war, in which Nazi Germany in 
alliance with Fascist Italy first passed to open military operations in 
western Europe, was the occasion for a long and sustained campaign 
hi the French and British Conservative press, accusing the U.S.S.R. 
of being at least as responsible for events as Germany and Italy: in 
terms which made it clear that, should Germany and her allies use 
the pretext of Soviet assistance to the Spanish Republic for an attack 
on the U.S.S.R., neither France nor Britain would hold themselves 
bound by either League obligations of collective security under the 
Covenant or by the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty. And the 
legend that it was “six of one and half a dozen of the other” has been 
maintained ever since, as anyone who takes the trouble to consult 
the memoirs or biographies of the principal directors of Western 
pohey, particularly the British— Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, 
Viscount Simon, the then editor of The Times and others — can see. 
Yet it is only a legend, and one trading on gross ignorance — ignorance 
to which, as the far from revolutionary author of A History of the 
League of Nations has rightly pointed out, a League-minded Tory like 
Eden contributed, no less than his fellow-Tory Chamberlain. 33 

80 The Spanish Republic’s struggle is movingly described by Alvarez del Vayo, who 
was its Foreign Minister (Freedom’s Battle, 1940). For the story of the British volunteers, 
sec William Rust, Britons in Spain (1939). A survey of the contribution of the Inter- 
national Brigades is made by Jose Garcia, Intematzionalnye brigady v Ispanii (1936-1938 
g.g.) in the Soviet historical journal Voprosy Istorii (No. 7, 1956). Other works by par- 
ticipants (which the writer has not himself seen) are: S. Nelson, The Volunteers (New 
York, 1953), Ludwig Renn, Der Spanische Krieg (Berlin, J 955 ). L. Longo, Le Brigate 
Intemazionali in Spagna (Rome, 1956), and Epopte d’Espagne (Paris, 1957). 

31 Total Soviet deliveries to the Spanish Government, which were supplied on credit, 
were to the value of $85 millions: large quantities of foodstuffs, clothing, drugs, etc., 
were sent as free gifts (Istoria Mejdunarodnykh Otnoshenii i Vneshnei Politiki S.S.S.R., 
Moscow, 1957, p. 232). 

32 A. Berriedale Keith, the well-known Conservative constitutional historian, wrote: 
“General Franco’s victory was essentially one of foreigners over Spaniards” ( The Causes 
of the War , 1940, p. 309). 

33 F. P. Walters, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 729-30. Walters has many damning observations 
on the “equal guile” legend. 

c 


34 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


STEP BY STEP 


But why was the legend launched? More important, why did the 
rulers of Britain and France pursue the policy they did, so obviously 
and flagrantly weakening their own positions in the world (since it 
set up a third Fascist menace on France’s frontiers) ? 

One argument wliich was widely used for not helping the Republic 
was — as on Ethiopia and the Rhineland — the alleged danger of war 
and the unpreparedness of Britain and France. Yet for many months 
Germany and Italy failed to attack the U.S.S.R. which was helping 
the Republic on its own — when they knew that an anti-Soviet war 
on their part would have been applauded by Britain and France. 
How much more cautious they would have been if the latter had 
joined forces with the U.S.S.R. ! Even more striking is what hap- 
pened in September, 1937, when Germany and Italy, feeling them- 
selves thoroughly masters of the situation, not only began torpedoing 
British merchant vessels but on August 31 attacked a British destroyer 
as well. The whole scene changed like lightning. The British and 
French Governments forgot all the excuses about the danger of war. 
A few days later they called a conference of Mediterranean States, 
including the U.S.S.R.: it met at Nyon in Switzerland on September 
10: within thirty-six hours an agreement was initialled to sink at sight 
unknown submarines which failed to give their identity when called 
upon; and by September 14 the agreement was signed and in force. 
No more submarine attacks took place— except on Spanish ships, 
which were expressly excluded in spite of Litvinov’s protests. And no 
declarations of war followed. 

It is interesting to note that two British statesmen of very opposed, 
though Conservative, tendencies commented in very similar terms. 
“Undoubtedly similar vigorous procedure could have stopped the 
Spanish war, and, indeed, could have called a halt to the whole policy 
of aggression by Germany and her imitators”, wrote Viscount Cecil 
(Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Blockade dur- 
ing the first world war, Lord Privy Seal charged with League Affairs 
and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster after the war, repeatedly 
a British delegate to the League). Mr. Churchill said that the Nyon 
Conference was “a proof of how powerful the combined influence 
of Britain and France, if expressed with conviction and a readiness 
to use force, would have been upon the mood and policy of the 
Dictators . . . any sign of a positive counter-offensive by the Western 
Democracies immediately produced an abatement of tension”. 34 

But why, then, was there no such counter-offensive? Why did they 
34 Cecil, A Great Experiment (1941), p. 292; Churchill, op. cit., p. 194. 


35 

not call a halt to Germany’s aggression? The leaders of the Western 
Governments have not been very communicative. But by good luck 
an extraordinarily brilliant flash of light has been shed on the very 
centre of the darkness, by one who knew them well. 

“July 27 (1936). I went straight from L.G. (Lloyd George) to lunch 
with S.B. (Stanley Baldwin) at No. 10 (Downing Street). . . . S.B. 
was much affected by the Spanish troubles. ‘I told Eden yesterday 
that on no account, French or other, must he bring us in to fight on 
the side of the Russians.’” Earlier in the conversation, Baldwin told 
the diarist that the decision of the British, French and Belgian Govern- 
ments, four days before, to convene a meeting of the five Locarno 
Powers (themselves with Germany and Italy) did not mean that the 
latter “must agree to participate in conversations on a European 
Locarno” (underlined by the diarist). 35 

Nothing could be plainer. Restore the old Locarno — i.c. mutual 
guarantees of security' in the West, rudely shattered when Hitler sent 
his troops into the Rhineland on March 7? Yes— but only for the 
West: there would be no attempt to restrain Germany in the East 
by an all-Europe arrangement. Solidarity with France, if Germany 
attacks her on the pretext that she is allowing the Spanish Government 
to buy arms — thereby bringing in the U.S.S.R. under the Franco- 
Soviet Pact? O11 no account. In other words, Russia was the real 
enemy, for the British Government — and its Spanish policy followed 
from that. 

It is only in the light of such directives that one can at last explain 
the extraordinary remark by Eden in Parliament on November 19 the 
same year — which caused much talk at the time, but over wliich 
the veil of time was allowed to drop: “So far as non-intervention is 
concerned, I say categorically that I think there are other Governments 
more to blame than those of Germany and Italy.” Eden was preparing 
public opinion for support of Germany should she strike eastwards. 

The Attack on China 

A year later Japan — now formally allied to Germany by an “Anti- 
Comintern Pact” (November, 1936), a title which made the fact of 
the aggressor alliance sound more attractive in certain ears — took 
advantage of the differences between the Powers to advance her cam- 
paign for the conquest of China wliich had begun in 193 t. She 
launched a large-scale war in northern and central China in Jdy. 
T 937 » which incidentally threatened the last vestiges of British and 

36 Thomas Jones, op. cit., p. 231. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


36 

American interests in China. The representatives of both countries 
at the Brussels Conference of Powers affected, convened on Nov- 
ember 3, 1937, to discuss the war, made it clear that they were against 
any effective action in support of China — in which action, the Soviet 
representative Potemkin plainly stated, his country was prepared to 
co-operate. So far as Japan was concerned, all the other Powers would 
do was to send her humble invitations to come to the Conference — 
which she twice rejected — and finally to beg her to change her attitude 
to China and seek a “peaceful solution”. But in regard to the U.S.S.R. 
they attempted an ingenious manoeuvre, through the conference 
chairman Spaak (the Belgian Foreign Minister). They proposed that 
the U.S.A. and Great Britain should carry out a “naval demonstra- 
tion” in Far Eastern waters (which of course would mean little or 
nothing to the Japanese, since the British and American naval bases 
were a very long way away), while the U.S.S.R.’s “share” would 
be to . . . mobilise land forces along the Manchurian border and send 
air forces over Tokyo (which naturally would immediately precipitate 
war). Needless to say, the suggestion was rejected. 

It was all the more impudent, so far as the British Government was 
concerned, because of the following. At the recent meeting of the 
League Assembly (September, T937), it had subscribed — like other 
governments — to a general pledge to do nothing to help the Japanese, 
and to consider individually how they could help the Chinese. The 
net result of this resolution, so far as the British Government was 
concerned, was a repeated refusal to place an embargo on the export 
of armaments and other necessaries of war to Japan, and the conclu- 
sion (May, 1938) of an agreement with the Japanese which gave the 
advantages of diplomatic recognition to their seizure of the Chinese 
Customs — at the price of a promise to pay to Great Britain that share 
of the proceeds which was earmarked for service of the Chinese debt. 
The policy of the United States was a little better: its businessmen 
sold oil, cotton and scrap metal to Japan, but also some materials to 
China. The Soviet Union, which had signed a non-aggression agree- 
ment with China a month after the new Japanese attack began (it 
had earlier offered a mutual assistance pact), began sending arms and 
equipment soon after, and in 1938 provided a loan of $100 millions 
to China. This explains the statement of the Chinese delegate at the 
League Council’s session in May that year: “The League members, 
with one exception, have done little or nothing to aid China in her 
struggle against aggression.” 30 

36 Monthly Summary of the League of Nations, May, 1938, p. 106. 


STEP BY STEP 


37 


Austria 

After this chain of events in the process of “appeasing” Hitler and 
his allies, it was scarcely to be expected that in March, 1938, when 
Hitler seized and annexed Austria in defiance of numerous pledges to 
the contrary, the British Government should do anything but publicly 
refuse— in Parliament on the day before the invasion— even to make 
representations to him about the consequences of such an action. 37 
Of any collective measures in effective restraint of Hitler there was 
no question at all. 

The truth was that on both sides the issue w^as predetermined. As 
long ago as July, 1936, as the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders 
proved ten years later, Hitler had ordered military plans to be drawn 
up for the invasion of Austria (called by the code-title “Case Otto”): 
and on November 5, 1937, in the talk with his chief military leaders 
recorded in the published German arcliivcs 38 as the “Hossbach Memo- 
randum”, he spoke of a war “to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria 
simultaneously”. On the other side — Thomas Jones had put down in 
his diary' for May 23, 1936 — Stanley Baldwin (then Prime Minister) 
considered that “we should not be compromised into undertaking to 
protect Austria from falling into the lap of Germany”. Lord Halifax 
in a private interview with Hitler on November 19, 1937, recorded 
in the German archives, mentioned Austria among those “possible 
alterations in the European order which might be destined to come 
about with the passage of time” (though he added that Britain w^as 
concerned that these alterations should take place by means of peaceful 
evolution). Mr. Eden (then Foreign Secretary) let the German Ambas- 
sador Ribbentrop know' on December 2, 1937 (again according to the 
German archives), that in recent conversations with French Mini- 
sters he had informed them “that the question of Austria w'as of much 
greater interest to Italy than to Britain: furthermore, people in Eng- 
land recognised that a closer connection between Germany and Austria 
would have to come about some time” (again with the reservation 
that force should be avoided). 39 As for the French Government, its 
Premier Chautemps told the German Ambassador in Vienna, von 
Papen, in November, 1937, that he “had no objection to a marked 
extension of German influence in Austria obtained through evolu- 
tionary means” (and the Foreign Minister Bonnet had said the same). 40 

37 Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons, March n, 1938. 

38 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D (referred to further as 
D.G.F.P.), vol. I, pp. 29-39. 

39 Ibid., p. 90. 40 Ibid., pp. 42-4. 


38 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


One may guess that both parties in these diplomatic conversations 
knew precisely what weight should be given to the reservations about 
peaceful and evolutionary means, after the examples of the Rhine- 
land remilitarisation and the bloody struggle in Spain. 

At all events, Hitler took the hint to heart. He surrounded Austria 
with large German forces in the first fortnight of February. He sum- 
moned the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg to his seat at Bcrchtes- 
gaden on February 12, 1938, and forced him to agree, under threat 
of Austria being invaded within three days, to put Scyss-Inquart, a 
well-known Austrian Nazi, in charge of the Ministry of Security and 
to give the Austrian Nazis (a well-equipped branch of the German 
Nazi organisation) full freedom of activity. And, when Schuschnigg 
on March 9 announced that a plebiscite would be held on whether 
Austria should remain independent, Hitler sent him, on March 11, 
a two-hour ultimatum (through the Austrian Nazis, so that it should 
not come “from outside”) to resign in favour of Scyss-Inquart, fail- 
ing which 200,000 men would invade Austria. Schuschnigg did resign, 
Scyss-Inquart took his place, and that very night the Germans marched 
in after all. Two days later Austria was annexed to Germany. Very 
“evolutionary”. 41 

The mass of the people in all countries did not know of the political 
and diplomatic conversations which preceded these events. The docu- 
ments and memoirs -were not published until ten years later, or more 
— after the most devastating war in history had ravaged many coun- 
tries, and Hitler’s regime had been destroyed by force of arms. What 
the world did see was the events of March 1 1-13, and the Nazi atroci- 
ties which followed. They also heard the British and French politicians 
and historians explaining why these had been allowed to happen 
(often before they happened). There was no invasion: juridically the 
Austro-German agreement was “unobjectionable”: it did not violate 
Austria’s treaty obligations: it was inevitable anyhow: the Stresa 
Agreement of 1935 pledging Britain, France and Italy to uphold 
Austrian independence did not operate unless all three were prepared 
to act: the idea that the League could help a small country was a 
delusion (J. L. Garvin, editor of The Observer, December 19, 1937): 
Britain was too weak anyway to defend herself (this was six months 
after the Nyon Conference). 

But there was also — amid this mass of varied, and often conflicting 
explanations — another, the same as that used on previous occasions. 

41 The best eye-witness account in English of what happened in Austria is still G. E. R. 
Gcdyc, Fallen Bastions (1939). 


STEP BY STEP 



39 

It was contained in a House of Commons speech by Neville Chamber- 
lain, now Prime Minister, on February 21, 1938. “The peace of 
Europe must depend upon the attitude of the major Powers — Ger- 
many, Italy, France and ourselves”: friendly discussion between the 
f our , and a settling of their differences, would save the peace of 
Europe “for a generation”. And he expressly excluded the Soviet 
Union as “half Asiatic”. This could hardly have referred to her geo- 
graphy: since on that score the British Empire was four-fifths Asiatic 
and African. But this was the habitual description used by the Nazis 
to justify their need for expansion eastwards. And by now it was very 
difficult to imagine “differences” arising between the four Powers if 
Hitler attacked the U.S.S.R. 

There was an echo of this remark in what Mr. Gedyc, then The 
Times correspondent in Vienna, said he found in London when he 
came back at the end of March after the seizure of Austria. It was 
obviously Czechoslovakia’s turn next, and he talked about this “to 
British statesmen and politicians, people from the War Office, famous 
political writers, editors and Foreign Office people”. He said he 
couldn’t understand why the general tendency was to abandon “this 
last bastion against German expansion” too. They generally replied 
that Britain could not defend herself; and then, he wrote, the ex- 
planation went on: “Probably Chamberlain and his friends hope that 
if Germany destroys Czechoslovakia, she will go on down through 
the Balkans and extend eastwards in preparation for an attack on 
Russia. But by the time she is ready for this, they trust, we and France 
will be so strong that we shall be able to say to her: ‘If you attack us, 
you will attack a strong opponent, and you know that Russia will 
attack you from the rear, whereas if you attack Russia, we can pro- 
mise not to attack you, and to wish you luck.’ ” 42 

The seizure of Austria was the last of Hitler’s improvisations— and 
saw the last of the improvised network of arguments used in western 
Europe to justify them — before Munich. 

42 Fallen Bastions, p. 356. 


CHAPTER m 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 

T HE background of Munich requires at least some reference to 
Czechoslovakia and its right to exist — which began to be ques- 
tioned very widely in Britain and France after Hitler’s occupation of 
Austria. This is more necessary because, many years later, we find 
the man who was Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time (and a 
former Foreign Secretary) still writing in his reminiscences : “The 
landlocked state of Czechoslovakia, with an outline like an elongated 
kidney, was devised by the Allies, and its boundaries drawn by the 
Treaty of Versailles, in defiance of the doctrine of self-determination 
and without regard to distinctions of nationality. Geographically and 
historically, there was nothing to hold the various parts of this hetero- 
geneous combination together.” 1 

Such a tissue of absurdities has rarely been committed to print even 
by a British ex-Cabinet Minister. Of the thirteen and a half million 
of people registered at the 1921 Census — two years after the Treaty 
of Versailles — the Czechs and Slovaks between them numbered about 
nine million. The first represented a big majority of the population 
in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia: the second a big majority in Slovakia 
— and the four territories between them make up the Republic. Czech 
and Slovak tribes are known to have been living in their present lands 
at least 1200 years ago: to-day as then, they are closely kindred Slav 
peoples, whose languages differ less than (say) English and American : 
and they have tenaciously kept their identity under the most adverse 
circumstances. This alone was ample cement to hold Czechoslovakia 
together: but there is more. The first organised State with which 
they arc known to have been associated— the Great Moravian Prince- 
dom in the 9th century — embraced them both. 

At the end of the 9th century the Slovaks were conquered by the 
Magyars, and remained under their rule, in the feudal kingdom of 
Hungary, for a thousand years. Yet their language, culture, folklore 
and, in the last 150 years, their political struggle in far more difficult 
conditions left them closely akin to the Czechs. For the two peoples 

1 Viscount Simon, Retrospect (1952), p. 239. 


C ZECHOSLOVAKIA 


41 

to come together in their own State, as they decided in the great mass 
upheavals of October, 1918 (when the Austro-Hungarian Empire by 
which they had been ruled collapsed) — months before the Versailles 
Treaty — was one of the outstanding acts of self-determination in 
modern history: and a proof that historically a very great deal was 
“holding them together”. 

The greater part of the 2500 miles of Czechoslovakia’s frontiers in 
1919 were not “drawn by the Versailles Treaty”. It was not by chance 
that the French Note of recognition of June 30, 1918, addressed to 
the National Council of Bohemian Lands — set up by emigrant foreign 
political leaders in Paris — spoke of “independence within the historic 
boundaries of your territories”. For the boundaries of Bohemia, 
Moravia and Czech Silesia, the “lands of the Bohemian Crown”, 
were drawn by nature, settlement and a great history, many centuries 
before Lord Simon was bom. 

Look at the map of Germany 2 in the 10th century: you will sec 
the Principality of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia under the suzerainty 
of the medieval Empire, its basic frontier quadrilateral the same 
as to-day — Bohemian Forest, Ore Mountains, Sudeten Highlands, 
White Mountains. Look at the map of Europe in 1914, 3 when the 
Czechs were ruled by the Austrians and the Slovaks by the Hun- 
garians in the old Empire of the Hapsburgs — and you will sec the 
same. By the last quarter of the 10th century — when Ethdrcd the 
Unready ruled a very wobbly English State — the Princes of Prague 
were not only recognised as rulers of all Czech lands by the Emperor, 
but held lands far beyond their borders as well. In the middle of the 
1 2th century they themselves became kings and electors to the throne 
of the “Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation” — and their State 
was strong enough to rout the assembled German feudal nobility at 
Chlumec in 1 T26, and the dread Mongols themselves in Silesia in 1241. 
Charles I of Luxemburg, King of Bohemia in the 14th century, be- 
came the Emperor Charles IV, and Prague was his capital. Incident- 
ally Bohemia twice had the sea-coast which Shakespeare attributed to 
it — once when the realms of the King reached the Adriatic in the 
13 th century and once when they stretched to the Baltic at the begin- 
ning of the 15th. 

With one of the oldest Universities in Central Europe, founded 
in 1348: with rapidly developing mining, woollen mdustries and 
agriculture, with historical chronicles and other literature in its own 

2 E.g. the famous Justus Perthes Gcschichts-Atlas, in any of its editions. 

3 E.g. Grant Robertson and Bartholomew, Historical Atlas of Modem Europe (1915). 



42 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

language (when chronicles in England were still written in Latin) and 
with a growing home market in its towns, Bohemia in the 14th cen- 
tury was one of the most advanced centres of civilisation in Europe. 
Their early reformation and national uprising of the first half of the 
15th century, in which John Hus and his followers made the teach- 
ings of Wyclif for years the inspiration of a great popular struggle 
against the German feudal nobles and the Jesuits, brought the Czechs 
politically into the front rank of European peoples. Although the 
movement finally broke up along class lines and its most militant 
element — the peasants and the town artisans — were defeated, its tradi- 
tions and ideas became a great national heritage of the Czech people. 
From 1526 they passed under the dominion of the Duke of Austria 
and in 1620, after an unsuccessful rebellion, that dominion was restored 
by the defeat inflicted on the Czechs at the battle of the White Moun- 
tain, near Prague. Even the savage repressions, compulsory recon- 
version to Catholicism, reintroduction of serfdom, and wholesale 
expropriation of Czechs in favour of German nobles, which went 
on for over 100 years thereafter, did not crush the Czech spirit. Great 
peasant risings in 1680 and 1775 were a reminder of it, and the second 
in particular forced the Empire to relax the burdens of serfdom. 

When capitalist development in the 18th and early 19th centuries 
brought Bohemia once again to the position of the most industrially 
advanced centre in Central and Eastern Europe, the national revival 
was not only the work of the middle-class intellectuals of the 30s 
and 40s, most often the subject of historical study. In 1821 there was 
another big peasant rising: in 1832, 1843 and particularly 1844 a suc- 
cession of great strikes; and in 1848, a fortnight before the “June days” 
of Paris (when for the first time in Western Europe a working-class 
insurrection took place), there were five “June days” (from 12th to 
the 17th) in Prague, in which the factory workers, artisans and students 
fought for a Czech Provisional Government responsible to an elected 
Assembly, and a Czech national army. The Czech people of to-day 
look back through the national revival of the 19th century to the 
cultural glories of Bohemia in the Middle Ages, of which there are 
many reminders around them; but the working class and peasants 
also look back to the great mass struggles of their 18th- and 19th- 
century ancestors against the Hapsburgs (in which the bourgeoisie for 
the most part — as in June, 1848 — backed the people’s enemies) and 
past them to the great democratic anti-feudal armies of the Taborites 
and their leaders Zizka and Prokop in the 15 th century. 

True, the Slovaks were unable to take part in this evolution, ground 


CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


43 

under the heel of the Magyar nobles. But when they joined their part 
of the “kidney” to that of the Czechs in 1918, adding another 1100 
miles of frontier to those of the Czech lands — they neither defied 
“distinction of nationality” nor contributed anything artificial or diffi- 
cult to “hold together”. In the tragic days of Munich it was not the 
Slovaks who proved a “heterogeneous” element. It was the agents 
of the Nazis and the Hungarian Fascists among them, who were given 
fictitious strength by the ability of their patron Hitler to terrorise 
the Government of the Republic; and then used it to undermine the 
State. 

Ah, but what about the “Sudeten Germans” — three million of them, 
German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia? These were the descen- 
dants of Germans who had settled in the Czech lands during the Middle 
Ages, when Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were part of the Holy 
Roman Empire, and during the period of the Hapsburg rule. At no 
time had they any connection with what is now modem Germany: 
at most they were part of the Germans of the Austrian realm. In 
Austria-Hungary, before 1918, they were a section of the tw'O ruling 
races; their middle classes and landowners provided many of the offi- 
cials of the Imperial regime, and only the Social-Democratic workers 
among them refused to regard the Czechs as an “inferior race”. Apart 
from 700,000 of them scattered in “pockets” in the interior, they lived 
within the liistoric mountain frontiers of the Czech lands — mostly 
along the forested mountainous borders, because that was where 
natural conditions favoured the development of industry in the 18th 
and 19th centuries: but distributed in eight quite separate areas. 

No power on earth could apply the “doctrine of self-determination”, 
in its usual sense, in their case: they could not join Austria, and they 
could not be constituted as a single administrative unit. And to de- 
prive the Czech lands of their historic frontiers — and make their 
fortification impossible — by joining these territories to Germany of 
all countries, at the end of the 1914-18 war: to give that defeated 
country a series of footholds for later subjugating the Czechs once 
more in a w r ar of revenge, footholds which it had never had in history 
— would indeed have been “defiance of the doctrine of self- 
determination”. 

Moreover, it had become perfectly clear by 1938 that in reality 
no national minority in Central or Eastern Europe outside the U.S.S.R., 
and certainly no Germans in Germany itself, enjoyed such political 
rights as the German citizens of Czechoslovakia. They shared with 
all other citizens the right of adult suffrage and nomination of their 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



44 

own candidates to the local and national assemblies : they represented 
just over 22 per cent, of the population at the 1935 elections, and had 
72 M.P.s out of 300 (24 per cent.). Out of 15,000 municipal councils, 
3400 were elected in districts where German-speaking citizens were 
in a majority: the majority of the councillors were therefore German- 
speaking (under Austro-Hungary the municipalities had been con- 
trolled by property-owning people, and the workers had no vote). 
Out of 3200 judges, 730 were Gennan-speaking — and conducted their 
courts (if they were in German-speaking areas) in the German lan- 
guage. The vast majority of German-speaking children went to schools 
where instruction was in their own language. There was a University 
and many colleges to which the same applied. For one of the changes 
confirmed by the Czechoslovak Constitution in February, 1920, was 
that all citizens could use their mother-tongue in public bodies, in the courts 
and in all official business — thereby putting the national minorities of 
Czechoslovakia in afar superior position to the Welsh in Great Britain. 4 

In fact, Czechoslovakia was a democracy — in sharp contrast with 
most of the countries by which she was surrounded: Germany, Hun- 
gary, Rumania (and after March, 1938, Austria) under open Fascist 
rule, and Poland a police State ruled by the great landowners and big 
business, tolerating a certain amount of Parliamentarism tempered by 
arbitrary arrests and beatings of M.P.s, police control of trade unions 
and shooting of strikers, etc. In Czechoslovakia there -were legal 
workers’ parties, trade unions and a workers’ press of every political 
hue. There was a strong co-operative movement. It was the only 
country among the six mentioned where anti-Semitism was not prac- 
tised by the Government. Candidates did not have to put down a 
deposit when standing for Parliament; and both Houses of Parliament 
were elected bodies. The President was elected by Parliament. 

At the same time, Czechoslovakia was a bourgeois democracy, i.e. 
her democracy was tacitly based on acceptance of the capitalist system 
by all parties (except the Communists). Within the framework of the 
democratic Republic, therefore, it was the capitalist class of the most 
economically developed part of the country — Bohemia and Moravia 
— which pulled the strings. This had its influence (to take one relevant 
example) on the Government’s nationalities policy. There were some 
defects in its application to the German-speaking citizens: for example, 

4 In Great Britain in 1938, a Welshman in court might only use his national language 
if he could show that his knowledge of English was deficient : but he had to be interpreted, 
because the judge had to conduct the business in English. Welsh may not be used in 
Parliament. The Post Office has refused to allow envelopes with Welsh imprints to be 
franked by the machines which it licenses. 




CZECHOSLOVAKIA 




45 

the machinery of government — the civil service — had had to be con- 
structed entirely anew after 1918, since it was the Austrians who 
governed the country beforehand. Naturally, it was not among those 
of them who remained when the Republic was created that the new 
officialdom for a number of years was recruited, except in their own 
areas. By the time they had accepted the new state of tilings, the 
posts elsewhere had been filled; and this was exceptionally convenient 
for the Czech capitalists and middle classes. Comparatively little, again, 
was done to promote the all-round economic development of Slovakia, 
a peasant country and source of cheap labour under the Hungarians 
— and practically nothing for the Sub-Carpathian Russians, as they 
were called, in the far eastern tip of the country. It was simpler for 
the bigger capitalists of Bohemia and Slovakia to leave matters there 
in the hands of the rich peasants and wholesale merchants. 

In foreign affairs the bourgeois aspect of Czechoslovak democracy 
was particularly manifest. The leading bourgeois parties — the Agrar- 
ians, National Socialists (Bcnes Party) and Catholics — were vigilant 
enough about the danger of Germany and Hungary trying to take 
revenge for their 1918 defeats. Their foreign policy was based on 
alliance with France. For that very reason and by the same token they 
were extremely hostile to the Soviet Union for very many years. 
Masaryk and Bcnes, founders of the National Socialist Party, had in 
May, 1918, by direct arrangement with the Western Governments 5 
who were promoting counter-revolution in Soviet Russia, launched 
an armed rebellion of the Czechoslovak military units in Russia, 
formed of deserters from the Austro-Hungarian armies. This rebel- 
lion played an important part in introducing the White regime of 
Admiral Kolchak in Siberia and other counter-revolutionary forces 
elsewhere. In 1919 the newly-established Government joined in the 
Allied invasion of Soviet Hungary which led to the consolidation of 
Admiral Horthy’s Fascist dictatorship. When the White armies were 
driven out of Russia in 1920, the Czechoslovak Government provided 
a home, jobs and subsidies to many Russian counter-revolutionary 
organisations. At the trial of Socialist-Revolutionary leaders in Moscow 
in 1922, authentic documents, “lifted” from their Paris archives and 
later published in facsimile, showed President Masaryk and Foreign 
Minister Benes personally arranging these subsidies. In June, 1922, the 

6 This fact, strenuously denied for many years, has recently been established beyond 
any doubt by an abundance of secret documents from the archives of the President’s 
Chancery, the Foreign and War Ministries, and the Institute of Military History, quoted 
in Krai, O Konlrrevolutsionnoi Anti-Sovctskoi Politiki Masarika i Benesha (Russian, translated 
from the Czech original, 1955). 



46 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

Czechoslovak Government signed a trade agreement with Soviet 
R uss i a — l as t of the series which began with the Anglo-Soviet trade 
agreement in 1921 — but refused to establish diplomatic relations until 
June, 1934, after Hitler had conic to power. The following year it 
followed France in concluding a treaty of mutual assistance with the 
U.S.S.R. (May 16, 1935). However, this treaty was not to operate — 
on the insistence of the Czechoslovak Government — unless France’s 
similar treaty with the U.S.S.R. came into play; and because the 
French Government avoided holding staff talks about practical ways 
of putting the treaty into effect, the Czechoslovak Government 
avoided them too. 


PART TWO 


MUNICH 

CHAPTER IV 

REDIVIDING THE WORLD 

1. Hitler’s Plans 

T HE rulers of Nazi Germany, as we have seen, had been working 
for a redivision of the world for years. Their aim was to upset, 
step by step, the world settlement dictated by the victorious Allies 
after the first world war of 1914-18. Treaty obligations imposed on 
Germany under the peace of Versailles in 1919-20, her own frontiers 
and those of new States set up under the peace treaties, w r ere to be 
broken through and smashed. A new balance of power, political, 
economic and military, was to be found. It must weigh as heavily in 
favour of Germany as did the peace of Brest-Litovsk, temporarily 
imposed by the Kaiser upon defeated Russia in 1918. And this was 
to be a stepping-stone to domination of the world: Mein Kampf left 
no doubt about that. 

The months between March and October, 1938, in which the con- 
quest of Czechoslovakia was added to the long list of Hitler’s previous 
successes, were the decisive and culminating stage in achieving this 
balance of power. Henceforth a new redivision of the W'orld in favour 
of Germany became a practicable and more promising objective. 

Looking back over those months, Hitler’s lieutenant, Goebbels, de- 
clared this more openly than had ever been done since Mein Kampf 
appeared. In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) in Czechoslovakia on 
November 19, 1938, he said that while Germany was disunited, “the 
great nations of the world got busy partitioning the continents— 
Africa, South America, Asia, Australia. By the time we had finished 
with our domestic struggles and appeared united for the first time 
on the stage of the world, we found that the partitioning was complete. 

“Not often in history is the world re-partitioned; but when one 
great new development has started, when the time is ripe for the 
goddess of History to descend to the earth, and when the scam of 
her robe touches the ground, then w r e must be sure that the respon- 
sible statesmen of a nation must have the courage and determination 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


48 

to grip this seam and hold to it fast. I believe that we live in such an 
historic hour.” 

But whatever Goebbels might say about the goddess of History, 
Hitler’s clearly-expressed desire was not sufficient to ensure the re- 
partitioning of the world in Germany’s favour. There were three 
more essential conditions, at the very least. 

One was that Germany should become once again, as in 1914, a 
first-class industrial Power, capable of organising, equipping and 
financing a major war. In all essentials, this condition was achieved 
by Germany in 1929, long before Hitler came into power. In that 
year Germany reached the front rank among European States in the 
production of iron, coal, steel, machinery, chemicals, textiles, in the 
volume of her railway traffic and foreign trade, in the development 
of her roads and airways. 

The second condition was that the threat of revolution should be 
eliminated, and the unfettered rule of the class interested in a new war 
of world conquest be established. Economic successes had been achieved 
by methods of rationalisation and speeding up unequalled in any other 
country. The strain of this process had already pushed the German 
people so far to the Left that, when the world economic crisis struck 
Germany with devastating force in 1930, her ruling classes felt it safer 
to begin governing virtually without parliament, by dictatorial 
methods, hi 1933, the internal strain of resistance to the effects of the 
crisis, and of preparations for a world struggle for markets, was so 
severe that the ruling classes, taking advantage of divisions in the 
labour movement, established the most dictatorial and terrorist of all 
forms of government operating in the interests of property — Fascism. 

There was, however, a third essential condition for success in a 
new war. That was the destruction of the barrier to German expan- 
sion, and the threat to the flank of any German military operations 
by land, represented by the existence of an independent and well- 
armed Czechoslovak Republic. 

Without Czechoslovakia the route leading from the Rhine and the 
Main into the Danube basin could not be blocked, the alternative 
German route to the Danube basin — along the north of the Car- 
pathian Mountains — also lay open, and no one could close the similar 
route, descending to the Danube further east. If Czechoslovakia, with 
its ancient natural mountain barrier projecting like a huge fortified 
arch into Southern Germany, were transformed instead into a Ger- 
man salient into Central Europe, all three military routes to the 
Danube basin lay open. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 



49 

This meant that Germany, given superiority in the weapons which 
modern industrial technique had been responsible above all for creat- 
ing — aeroplanes, tanks, armoured cars, motorised transport of infantry 
— would be strategically enabled to break her way westwards to the 
Mediterranean, south-eastwards to the Dardanelles, and eastwards to- 
wards the plains of Poland and the Ukraine, without the menace of 
a serious flank attack (except from the Soviet Union). None of the 
other States of Central or South-Eastern Europe possessed either the 
liigh degree of industrial development or the strong democratic in- 
ternal cohesion which were enjoyed by the Czechoslovak Republic; and 
consequently, none of them, in the event of war, could take its place — 
quite apart from geography — as a threat to German military operations. 

The significance of breaking down the Czechoslovak barrier was 
even more far-reaching. It deprived France of her most powerful and 
reliable ally in Central Europe. She had already lost much of her 
influence in the countries with which she was formerly allied in that 
region (Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania). She now would be in 
virtual isolation, save for the good will of Great Britain and of the 
U.S.S.R. 

It meant the resumption of the advance of the dominance of Ger- 
man finance-capital towards Turkey, Bagdad, and the Indian Ocean, 
which was stopped by the first world war, and which directly threat- 
ened the British territories scattered around that ocean. Only one 
real barrier — Turkey — would stand in the way of that advance by 
Land, after the fall of Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the essential differ- 
ence between the war of 1914 and a war twenty-five years later would 
be the immensely increased part of the aeroplane and other oil-driven 
engines of destruction. The overcoming of the Czechoslovak barrier 
would make more probable easy access for Germany to one great 
source of petrol, the Rumanian oilfields ; and the fall or circumventing 
of the second barrier — Turkey — 'would open the door to a second 
great source, in Irak and Persia, which would be the last stage on the 
road to India. 

In addition to these strategical considerations, the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia, following that of Austria, and the further consequent 
possibilities, would also add the great heavy industries of Czecho- 
slovakia and Polish Silesia, the great food resources of Hungary and 
Rumania, and an enormous new source of manpower to the economic 
potential referred to earlier. 1 

1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of International Affairs, 1938, vol. II 
(1951), p. 11 (referred to further as S«rwy). 

D 



50 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


The first step taken by Hitler was to try and conquer Czecho- 
slovakia from within. In November and December, 1936, he attempted 2 
by confidential negotiations with Benes to persuade the latter, in ex- 
change for “recognition” of Czechoslovakia’s existing frontiers, to 
sign an agreement that the two States would “in no circumstances” 
go to war with each other, and to grant freedom freely to “profess 
and cultivate German nationality”. This meant in practice the right 
to organise a branch of the Nazi Party, and thus to undermine 
Czechoslovakia from within: at the same time, it meant that she 
must renounce the mutual assistance treaties with France and the 
U.S.S.R., and thus stand alone when the process of internal dis- 
integration had gone far enough to allow’ Hitler to proceed to direct 
attack. 

Although Benes was prepared to go pretty far in these negotia- 
tions (as will be seen later), he would not accept such a patent trap. 
As a result, in the spring of 1937, a systematic hate-campaign against 
Czechoslovakia was launched in the German press; and, to the accom- 
paniment of that campaign, the initiative was taken up by the slightly 
camouflaged organisation of the German Nazis in Czechoslovakia, 
the Henlein or “Sudeten German” Party. On February 18, 1937, it 
publicly demanded abandonment of the treaties with France and the 
U.S.S.R., and the “harmonising” of Czechoslovak foreign policy with 
that of Germany. On April 27 its M.P.s introduced Bills into Parlia- 
ment for the compulsory registration of all citizens in national cor- 
porations, according to their nationality; the corporations to be 
controlled by a “spokesman”, who would be elected by the M.P.s 
of that nationality. 3 Thus the unity of the country would be disrupted, 
and the German Nazis in particular would get the elbow-room for 
Nazi organisation which they desired. 4 With the prestige of Nazi 
Germany continually rising in 1936 and 1937, on account of its easy 
international victories, this programme was a powerful propaganda 
weapon in the German-speaking districts of Czechoslovakia. 

But Hitler’s preparations did not coniine themselves to pohtical 
intrigue. On June 24, 1937, von Blomberg, the chief of his High 
Command, signed the first draft of plans for “Operation Green”— 

2 Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes. English edition, 1954, pp. 15-20. 

3 D.G.F.P., vol. II (1950), pp. 6-7. 

4 Henlein explained in a lecture at Vienna on March 4, 1941 : “Although we had to 
behave differently in public, we were of course secretly in touch with the National 
Socialist revolution in Germany, so that we might be a part of it.” It would have been 
doubtful, he explained, had they openly confessed their allegiance, whether “we could 
have fulfilled the political task of destroying C2echoslovakia as a bastion in the alliance 
against the German Reich . . .” (Trial, part H, p. 29). 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 


1 


51 

a military attack on Czechoslovakia. 5 Other preparations followed; 
but the idea of that attack was first set out fully by Hitler before the 
Nazi leaders — Gocring, Foreign Minister Neurath, and Admiral 
Raeder, and the generals Blomberg (War Minister) and Fritsch (then 
Army Commander-in-Chief) 6 — at the conference in his Chancery, on 
November 5, 1937, already mentioned. In his address, Hitler gave 
an exposition of Germany’s need for living space, and declared that 
it was “Iris unalterable resolve to solve Germany’s problem by force”. 
He considered that “almost certainly Britain, and probably France as 
well, had already tacitly written off the Czechs, and were reconciled 
to the fact that this question would be cleared up in due course by 
Germany”. He made it clear that his aim was “annexation” and “in- 
corporation” of Czechoslovakia in the German Empire, and spoke 
of “the compulsory emigration of two million people” from Czecho- 
slovakia thereafter. 

Publicly, of course, Hitler and his representatives went on assuring 
Czechoslovakia and its supposed friends that his intentions were 
peaceful, and that all Germany wanted — as he said in the conversa- 
tion with Lord Halifax, a fortnight later, already referred to — was 
“reasonable counsels” in Czechoslovakia, “good relations with all her 
neighbours”, and “consolidation of peace”. Lord Halifax had spoken 
of Czechoslovakia (and Danzig), as well as Austria, as countries where 
“possible alterations” might come “with the passage of time” — and 
Flitlcr did not disabuse him. 7 A month earlier, Henlein had been in 
London spreading the same impression of moderation and good feel- 
ing: Lord Vansittart, one of those whom he impressed, told him that 
Britain would “work with the Czechoslovak Government to secure 
the most far-reaching autonomy for the Sudeten Germans” — but 
would not stand for force. 8 On December 1 Mr. Eden likewise told 
the Italian Ambassador Grandi that Britain was prepared to support 
a solution “in accordance with German wishes, namely, on the basis 
of autonomy — and so was France”. 9 As late as March 3, 1938, Flitler 
was assuring the British Ambassador in Berlin that for a satisfactory 
solution in Czechoslovakia “the Germans must be granted the auto- 
nomy to which they arc entitled both culturally and in other re- 
spects”. 10 

In short (for other examples could be quoted), Hitler used the 

6 Trial, part II, p. 4. 0 The text was also quoted at the Nuremberg Trial in 1946. 

7 Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War, English edition. 
Moscow, 1948, vol. I, pp. 38, 45 (further referred to as D. & M.). 

8 D.G.F.P., vol. IT, p. 30. 9 Ibid., p. 74. 10 D. & M., vol. I, p. 57. 



52 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


months after his conference of November 5 precisely in order to test, 
again and again, whether he was right in his impression that Britain 
and France had “tacitly written off the Czechs”. 

For, so far as autonomy was concerned, Henlcin had with exem- 
plary clearness stated on November 19 (but in a secret memorandum 
to his masters, not of course in public) that “it has become senseless 
to advocate the autonomy of the Sudeten German territory, since it 
is this very region that has been made the concrete wall and fortified 
belt of the Czechoslovak State”. And the Czechoslovak Premier 
Hodza an Agrarian only too anxious to make concessions to Ger- 
many-told the German Minister in Prague, Eisenlohr, on December 
21, 1937, that autonomy would be “suicide for this State”. 11 No one 
can seriously suppose that the leading Ministers of the British and 
French Governments were ignorant of this elementary fact. 

At all events it was not only the Germans who proceeded as though 
it was perfectly clear what was brewing. By February 19, 1938, 
deputies of Hcnlein’s party who visited Budapest had discussed the 
question with Hungarian Ministers, who told them that they wanted 
Czechoslovakia s disappearance from the map of Europe”, and that 
their Government’s attitude to the fate of Czechoslovakia “was com- 
pletely in accord with the Fiihrcr’s”. 12 So much so, indeed, that 
shortly afterwards Ribbcntrop (now Hitler’s Foreign Minister) was 
reporting to the new Chief of Hitler’s General Staff, Keitel, that the 
Hungarian Ministers were asking for military talks “to discuss pos- 
sible war aims against Czechoslovakia”— which had already been 
agreed on, but which the Germans wanted to postpone for fear of 
premature leakages 13 — and possibly for other reasons. Thus we find 
General Jodi noting in his diary— there is no date, but it was in the 
spring, as the context shows — “After the annexation of Austria the 
Fiihrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question, 
because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for 
Operation Green’ will have to be carried out energetically.” 14 
The preparations were most meticulous. On February 5, 1938, 
Neurath was writing to Eisenlohr to avoid, in his conversations in 
Prague, anything suggesting that the German-Czechoslovak arbitra- 
tion treaty, signed at Locarno in 1925, was still in force. It might 


11 D. & M., vol. I, pp. 58, 86. 

November 25, 1937, Hitler had advised the Hungarian Prime Minister Daranyi 
and Foreign Minister Kanya not to “dissipate their political forces” and to “concentrate 
only m one direction, name y Czechoslovakia” (Dokummty Ministerstva Inostrannyh Del 
Ljermanu. l. Lsermanskaya Pohtika v Vcngrii , Moscow, 1946, p. 23). 

13 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 152-3. 14 Trj^ part n> p> ro _ 


53 


“prove an inconvenient restriction on our freedom of action” should 
“complications arise between Germany and Czechoslovakia”: on the 
other hand, if it were denounced, this “would be construed as pre- 
paration for active plans against Czechoslovakia”. 15 

With the seizure of Austria, the active plans in fact began. At first 
the German Government sought to allay suspicions. On March n 
Goering twice gave the Czechoslovak Minister his word of honour 
that nothing was intended against his country: in a third assurance, 
the next day, he expressed the hope that the Czechoslovaks would 
not mobilise. The same day yet a fourth assurance was given, this 
time by Neurath — who, notwithstanding his own instructions of 
February 5, went out of his way to assure the Minister that the arbi- 
tration treaty was still in force. 16 On March 14, two days after these 
assurances had been given, the French Government promised the 
Czechoslovaks that, if Germany did not stand by her word and 
attacked them, France would go to their assistance. On March 24, 
the British Prime Minister hinted in Parliament that such circumstances 
would probably involve British support for France. However, im- 
mediately after this, when the Soviet Government went further, and 
proposed an immediate consultation of interested Pow r ers to concert 
collective measures to halt the further development of aggression and 
the growing peril of a new war, the British Government rejected 
the proposal. 

The consultation did not take place, but Germany did not attack 
Czechoslovakia by military means from without. Instead, she under- 
took a process of blackmail, in which her own tlircats of military 
action and diplomatic pressure by the British and French Govern- 
ments converged, together with the threats and pressure of Hitler’s 
friends inside the country, upon one single point — the Government 
of the Czechoslovak Republic. After seven months of this process, 
the culminating point was reached at the Munich conference: and the 
barrier broke. 


2. After Austria 

hi March, after the occupation of Austria, a sudden storm of propa- 
ganda about Czech “oppression” of the Sudeten Germans broke out 
in the German newspapers and on the German radio. We shall see 
later how little justification in fact there was for this campaign. The 

15 D. & M., vol. I, pp. 48-9. 

16 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39. Third Series, vol. I (i949)> PP- 36-7 
(further referred to as D.B.F.P . ). 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



54 

important tiling is that, directly the campaign broke out, it was sup- 
ported by troop movements on the Gcrman-Czecboslovak frontier. 
So convincing was this sudden menace that the leaders of most of 
the non-Nazi German-speaking parties in Czechoslovakia withdrew 
from their coalition with the Czech Conservative, Liberal and Soci- 
alist parties. Some of them took their parties into the ranks of Henlein s 
organisation, which had begun “harping on incorporation into the 
Reich”. 17 

During March and April, in fact, it launched a campaign of threats 
within the districts bordering on Germany, in order to break down 
the last vestige of resistance to its claim to be the spokesman of all 
the German-speaking population of Czechoslovakia. Terrorism took 
the form of dismissal, and threats of dismissal, of workmen and em- 
ployees if they refused to join the Sudeten German Party, processions 
outside the houses of the Party’s opponents, the dispatch of threaten- 
ing letters, ill-treatment and abuse of their children in the schools, 
the boycotting of their shops, and even upon occasion, the refusal 
of the services of doctors. 

This campaign was now directed through the German Legation 
in Prague, which had on March 16 reported steps to bring Henlein’ s 
organisation under close control”, in view of “coming developments 
of foreign policy”. Henlein and his deputy, Frank, had agreed that 
public speeches and their press were to be under Eisenlohr’s super- 
vision, and his instructions were to be “strictly observed”. 18 So im- 
portant had the role of the Henlein party become, indeed, that 
Hitler himself received Henlein on March 28, and told him that “he 
intended to settle the Sudeten German problem in the not too distant 
future”. The purport of the instructions which Hitler gave to Henlein 
on this occasion (a German Foreign Office memorandum recorded) 
is that demands should be made by the Sudeten German Party which 
are unacceptable to the Czech Government. . . . Henlein summarised 
his view to the Fiihrer as follows: We must always demand so much 
that we can never be satisfied. The Fiihrer approved this view.” He 
was very pleased with Henlein s success on Iris visit to England the 
previous October, and asked him to go again, “with a view to ensur- 
ing non-intervention by Britain”. From next day “you will be my 
Viceroy , said Hitler. 19 On the same day he made a speech about 
Germans being tormented” outside Germany’s frontiers. 

Hitler was now talking to Hossbach about bigger plans. He must 

17 Basil Newton, British Minister at Prague, March 19, 1938 ( D.B.F.P . , vol. I, p. 70). 

18 D.C.F.P., vol. If, p. 170. 10 Jbid., pp. 198-202. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 



55 

help Mussolini to get an African Empire, but for this Czechoslovakia 
was the prerequisite: “return with Czechoslovakia hi the bag”, the 
adjutant noted. 20 On April 22, after a conversation between Hitler 
and Keitel the previous day, Hossbach put down the “top secret” 
mam points of “Operation Green”. Action was to come “after a 
period of diplomatic discussions which gradually lead to a crisis and 
to war”. It might follow some incident — “for example the murder 
of the German Minister”— and was to be lightning in character, 
carried out by a motorised army and complete in four days, to “con- 
vince foreign Powers of the hopelessness of military intervention”. 21 

The Czechoslovak Government was already under heavy pressure 
from the British and French Governments to conciliate Henlein, and 
took no effective action to stop the terrorism in the German-speaking 
areas. This encouraged the Nazis to take a further step in the direc- 
tion agreed with Hitler. On April 24 Henlein made a speech at Karlovy 
Vary (Carlsbad) in which he put forward more forcibly than ever 
(in the form of “Eight Points” and “Three Requests”) the Nazi 
programme calculated to break up the Czechoslovak Republic from 
within. 22 

He demanded the complete autonomy of the Sudeten districts with 
purely German officials, under nominal Czechoslovak sovereignty — 
which was not to prevent the establishment of a Nazi regime in the 
districts concerned (“full freedom to profess German nationality and 
the German political philosophy”)— and the right of the leaders of 
the Ilcnlcin party to control all German-speaking citizens of Czecho- 
slovakia (“recognition of the Sudeten German national group as a 
legal personality”), wherever they might be. The first demand meant 
the destruction of the military barrier constituted by the independent 
existence of Czechoslovakia, since large stretches of the border forti- 
fications of the Republic would come under the control of Henlein. 
The second demand meant the destruction of the political barrier, 
since the setting up of what Henlein called “the Sudeten-German 
national group as a legal personality”, controlled by the leaders of 
his Party, would mean the disorganisation not only of democracy 
throughout Czechoslovakia, but of the State itself. He also demanded 
fundamental revision of Czechoslovak foreign policy, abandonment 
of the existing connections with other Slav peoples, and “co-operation 
in a German-influenced Central Europe”. 

The meaning of the Karlovy Vary speech was well understood 

20 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 238. 21 Ibid., pp. 239-40. 

22 Ibid., pp. 242-3. A summary is in Wheeler-Bennctt, op. cit., pp. 46-7. 









THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



56 

abroad; but no condemnation of it was uttered by Great Britain and 
France, 23 and Germany grew bolder. 

In May, the movement of German troops on the Czechoslovak 
frontier became really menacing. The acting British Consul in Dresden 
reported that they were concentrating in southern Silesia and northern 
Austria, and the same day (May 19) confirmatory evidence appeared 
in the Leipzig Zeitung. It was accompanied, inside Czechoslovakia, 
by the announcement of the formation by the Henlein party (May 13) 
of a “Volunteer Defence” organisation. It was modelled on the lines 
of the Nazi storm troops, and in fact had been in existence for some 
time, and clandestinely armed from across the border. At the same 
time, the German press piled threat upon threat of what would hap- 
pen to Czechoslovakia if the Sudeten Germans were not “set free”, 
including the threat that “dissolution will not stop at the Language 
frontiers ( Manchester Guardian Berlin Correspondent, May 18): in 
other words, that unless the Czechs handed over their fortified dis- 
tricts to Germany, the latter would destroy their State altogether. 
The press also abandoned the pretence that the issue was between 
Henlein and Bcnes: it told Czechoslovakia that its military alliance 
with “Bolshevism” was “intolerable” (the British Ambassador re- 
ported on May 20). 24 In Berlin, Ribbcntrop on May 17 had ridiculed 
talk of “Sudeten-Gcrman provocation” and threatened the French 
Ambassador, Fran^ois-Poncct, with war in which Germany would 
be supported by world opinion”, if France intervened to defend 
Czechoslovakia — a handful of Hussites with Communist leanings”. 25 

It was clear that a combined campaign was in progress, similar to that 
which preceded the sudden ultimatum to Austria. 26 Indeed, on May 
20 Keitel sent Hitler a revised and expanded directive for “Operation 

23 On the contrary : on April 29 the German Charge 5 d’Affaircs in London reported 
that Lord Ha , had assurc d him of his desire to continue “fruitful” collaboration with 
Ribbentrop, and on April 30 de Brinon (a friend of Premier Daladicr) informed the 
German Embassy m Paris that the French Government had decided to “put to sleep” 
the Franco-Soviet Pact (ibid., pp. 246, 258). A visit by Henlein to London, during which 
he talked much soft soap to Churchill, the Liberal leader Sinclair, Vansittart and a num- 
ber ofM.P.s, produced public comments by The Times on his “reasonable” attitude 
and private confessions of similar impressions by Vansittart and Halifax; the latter said 
he gave the impression of being genuinely anxious for a speedy settlement” ( D.B.F.P. , 
voL 1, pp . 297-9). hi fact, Henlein had disclaimed any intention of “imposing” the Nazi 
ideology, dropped talk of the corporate “legal personality” of German-speaking citizens, 
ana even denied any orders from Berlin— although, as shown above, his visit itself was 
on Hitler s instructions, as were his denials! (D.G.P.P., vol. II, p. 273). 

24 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 320. 25 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 286-7. 

28 Even Neville Chamberlain wrote on May 28: “I cannot doubt in my own mind 
(t) that the Germans made all preparations for a coup, (») that in the end they decided 
alter getting our warnings, that the risks were too great” (Foiling, op. cit., p. 354). The 
wammgs came because of Czechoslovakia’s mobilisation. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 57 

Green”, similar to that of April 22 — though in it was a warning 
“to avoid all action which might adversely affect the political attitude 
of the European Great Powers”. 27 Neither the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment nor the world at large knew that this had happened: but from 
previous experience they could guess what was going on 28 — especially 
when, on the same day, Henlein’s party publicly broke off talks with 
the Government on its proposed “'Nationality Statute”, on the pretext 
of the disorders which it was itself organising. 

On May 20, the situation was so dangerous that the Czechoslovak 
Government ordered a partial mobilisation, which met with a sym- 
pathetic response from French and British public opinion. The more 
provocative forms of Nazi terrorism inside the country at once dis- 
appeared, the press in Berlin became more moderate, and the Ger- 
man army did not invade Czechoslovakia. But the Germans soon 
discovered that the British and French Governments themselves w r crc 
annoyed at the Czechoslovak Government’s action. 29 After a few days’ 
respite, therefore, the German pressure from outside was resumed, 
taking a characteristic form in an interview given by Henlein to the 
Daily Mail on May 26. In this he plainly threatened a military attack 
by Germany if complete local autonomy were not granted to the 
German-speaking areas, defined as “an almost continuous strip of 
territory along the national boundary, some 50 miles deep at its 
broadest”. It would be giving the German authorities credit for less 
than normal political intelligence to imagine that the British and 
French pressure on Czechoslovakia, which was now (as will be seen 
later) being publicly exercised, counted for nothing in their calculations. 

Now, in profound secrecy, Hitler moved a step further to his goal. 
On May 28 he gave orders to redraft the plans for “Operation Green” : 
and when it was issued to the military leaders, two days later, it began 
with the words: “It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia 

27 Felling, op. cit., pp. 299-303. 

28 For example: the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, noted in his 
journal on May 15 a conversation with the French Ambassador Coulondrc: “The Czech 
situation and the German propaganda barrage worry him. It indicates in his opinion 
a definite and aggressive German purpose against Czechoslovakia. To him the German 
army ‘manoeuvres’ on the Czech border are definitely threatening and ‘might mean 
anything’ ” (Mission to Moscow, 1941, p- 3 2 7)- 

20 Nevilc Henderson, British Ambassador in Berlin, told Ribbentrop on May 21 that 
the mobilisation was “very foolish”, and the next day told the Germans that the French 
Government had taken “grave exception” to it (D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 3x3; D.B.F.P., 
vol. I, p. 346). The French Foreign Minister Bonnet told the German Ambassador in 
Paris that, if the Czechs continued to be “unyielding”, the French Government would 
be obliged to “review” their obligations under the Franco-Czcchoslovak treaty of mutual 
assistance. Needless to say, the Ambassador replied that this seemed to him “the proper 
way to make progress” (D.G.F.P., vol. I, p. 344)- 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


58 

by military means in the near future.” Once again it detailed methods 
for lightning action — but, instead of selecting the German Minister 
as the object of a convenient murder, it stressed another aspect. The 
“unbearable provocation”, whatever it was, should be such as, “in 
the eyes of at least a part of world opinion, affords the moral justifica- 
tion for military measures”. Tins shows that Hitler was now well 
aware of the growing sympathy for his demands in the London and 
Paris governments. The directive further reveals that he was already 
looking past the conquest of Czechoslovakia. It ordered the sparing, 
so far as possible, of “Czechoslovakian industrial and works installa- 
tions , since it was decisive to “reinforce total war economic strength” 
by rapidly restarting “important factories”. October 1, 1938, was 
fixed as the day of action. 30 “Military preparations all along the line” 
were thereby initiated, Jodi entered in his diary on May 30. 31 

In June, meanwhile, the orchestration of secret military and public 
press preparations was resumed, and the anti-Czech campaign in the 
German press readied new heights. The regime in the German- 
speaking districts was never described as otherwise than one of “bloody 
terror , the conduct of the Czech authorities was never less than 
bestial , foul , monstrous and the like. The three weeks from 
May 22 onwards had been a period of municipal elections, and every 
petty incident at an election meeting, or squabble in a tavern, was 
made the occasion for new abuse and threats— all the more unre- 
strained because, as numerous foreign journalists who visited the 
Sudeten districts at the time could testify, neither accusations nor 
abuse had any foundation in fact (except for Henlcinite intimidation 
of anti-Nazis). Indeed, Eiscnlohr himself on June 9 protested to Berlin 
about tills campaign which, while so obviously contrary to the truth, 
was leading to a ruinous decline of business for watering places like 
Carlsbad and Marienbad, which were falsely being presented as in 
the “war zone”; moreover, such patent lies were being taken by 
diplomats as “signs of Germany’s aggressive intent”. 32 

30 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 357-62. The German generals had genuine misgivings about 
this plan, and Survey, pp. 145-6, gives a useful summary of their views. But, like other 
apologists for Downing Street policy, the authors attribute Hitler’s overriding his 
generals in this case (as in others) to his “exasperation” at the foreign press presenting the 
Czechoslovak mobilisation as his defeat: they even themselves censure such a presenta- 
tion as maladroit” and “unfortunate”. Ibis version— swallowed holus-bolus from 
Hitler s own propaganda version, in a Nuremberg speech on September 12 that year 
—not only ignores all the evidence that Hitler was a cool and calculating adventurer 
knowing perfectly well the advantages of simulating madness and “carpet-biting” at 
times— but also serves to distract attention from the abundant evidence that, on May 20 
and alter it, he had ascertained that the practical sympathies of the British and French 
Governments were more with him than with the Czechoslovak Government. 

31 Triat > lr > P- 11. 32 D.C.F.P., vol. II, pp. 398-9. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 


But the naive German diplomat, who had so recently been treated 
as expendable in his master’s military directives, was wasting his in- 
dignation. By these means, a favourable atmosphere of disquiet in 
Europe was being created for a re-statement of the Nazi terms to 
Czechoslovakia, in the shape of the “fourteen points” of a Memor- 
andum drawn up by the leaders of the Elcnlein party (June 7). 33 

The memorandum demanded that a “Volkstag” (Parliament) should 
represent all Germans within the Republic, whether living in the 
autonomous German territory (which was to be set up) or not: with 
the right to take a plebiscite of them, if required. 

This autonomous “Parliament” was to have wide powers over 
German-speaking citizens (including the right to educate them in 
Nazism, since the Republic’s common Ministry of Education was to 
be abolished, to give them para-military training and to control the 
police). Composed of deputies elected from the German-speaking 
area, it was to elect a “President” who would ex-officio be a hfc 
member of the Central Cabinet and of the Republic’s Supreme De- 
fence Council. There was to be a similar form of organisation for the 
other nationalities of Czechoslovakia. Thus, under the guise of “self- 
determination”, the programme provided for the splitting-up of the 
country — and in particular (since this was where the main threat came 
from) for the wide opening of its gates to Nazi Germany. 

Not only did these points meet with no condemnation on the part 
of the British and French Governments, but a threatening speech by 
Goebbcls on June 21 (“we will not look on much longer while three 
and a half million Germans are being maltreated”) met with no 
further reproof than a statement of the British Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Butler, on June 27 that he could not find the 
words complained of in the published version of the speech. 

By this time, the Czechoslovak Government was already very far 
advanced in its readiness to meet what was legitimate in its German- 
speaking citizens’ complaints of unfair treatment. In addition to 
equality of opportunity in education, in the courts and in most of 
the public services, which existed for all nationalities in Czechoslovakia, 
the Government were willing to concede district autonomy (freely 
elected municipal councils and rural councils existed already, and were 
for the most part in the hands of Henlcin supporters) and also control 
of local police. From June 15 negotiations began with the Henleinites 
on the basis of both their “fourteen Points” and the Government’s 
draft Nationality Statute. 

33 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 269-71 3nd pp. 636-43. 



60 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


But these concessions were for Germany but the thin end of the 
wedge. As a memorandum submitted to Ribbentrop early in June 
put it: the Czech problem was “not yet ripe enough politically for 
immediate attack”. If the German Government would “slowly adopt 
the slogan, emanating at the moment from Britain, ‘Self-determination 
for the Sudeten Germans’ ”, this would promote “the chemical pro- 
cess of the disruption of the Czech political structure”. Thereby the 
“ultimate fate of the rump of Czechoslovakia . . . would be already 
sealed”. Once this question was settled, “it is generally taken for 
granted that Poland is next on the list”. But the later this began to 
be discussed internationally, the better: too great haste “would bring 
the opposition of the Entente into play sooner and more energetically 
than our strength will bear”. 34 

Hider, however, was convinced now that he could rely on the 
British and French Governments also doing their best to accelerate 
the “chemical process”. He had good reason for this, as will be shown 
later. From time to time he would continue to frighten them with 
tlireatening talk. Thus on June 12 FIcss proclaimed in a public speech 
that Czechoslovakia was created by the “lies of Versailles” and had 
become “a source of danger to the peace of Europe”; 011 June 23 we 
find Gocring privately telling Nevile Henderson that Czechoslovakia 
was “an untenable proposition” and that the incorporation of the 
Sudeten areas in Germany was “sooner or later inevitable”; 35 and on 
July 18 Hitler’s personal adjutant, Wiedemann, on a visit to London 
to arrange for a visit to London by Goering, informed Halifax that, 
while his government was not planning to use force “in present cir- 
cumstances”, it could not give such an assurance “for all time”. 36 
In the meantime, due publicity was given to war preparations — the 
large numbers of men at work on the eastern fortifications, reservists 
retained for extra training, and so forth; 37 and the press campaign 
against Czechoslovakia continued. 

3. Military Blackmail 

When the Czechoslovak Government on July 23 made known the 
first of its new proposed law's — the statute of nationalities — the Ger- 
man newspapers violently denounced the law as a “manoeuvre”. 
Henlein told the press on July 25 that “there will be no war so far as 

34 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 420-2. The author of this truly Hitlerian document appears 
to have been von Weizsackcr, State Secretary at the German Foreign Office. 

36 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 513. 36 Ibid., pp. 586, 587. 

37 The British Ambassador in Berlin, in conversation with Weizsackcr, is recorded as 
having called them “understandable defence measures” ( D.G.F.P . , vol. II, p. 523). 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 


6l 


wc are concerned”, but that he could not be responsible for what might 
happen if there were no agreement by the autumn. He said he was 
“restraining” his people, who wanted “annexation to the German 
Reich”. 38 The Germans received with pleasure, on the contrary, the 
news that, in face of this new deadlock, the British Government was 
sending Lord Runciman to Prague as a “mediator”. A leading Ger- 
man correspondent in London cabled: “It is the first open attempt 
since the war to revise an essential part of the Versailles Treaty” 
(quoted in the Manchester Guardian, July 27). “One can say that the 
role of Lord Runciman will be appreciated in Berlin to the extent to 
which it will serve pan-German aims; but that it is very doubtful if 
the Nazi leaders will accept a compromise”, cabled the well-informed 
Berlin correspondent of the Petit Parisien on August 2. 

Events in August provided practical evidence that the correspondent 
was right. While Lord Runciman in Czechoslovakia was working in 
the greatest secrecy, with frequent week-ends spent in the society of 
some of the greatest pro-Nazi landowners and businessmen of Czecho- 
slovakia, the German Government, during the first fortnight of August, 
mobilised many hundreds of thousands of reservists for “manoeuvres”, 
sending hundreds of thousands more to the western frontiers of Ger- 
many to build fortifications. 39 So great were these unprecedented 
manoeuvres that the railway and road transport systems of Germany 
were again and again temporarily disorganised, and great alarm spread 
throughout the German population. In order to heighten the effect 
outside Germany, and to make the blackmail more effective, die 
German authorities began to hint more or less openly at the prospects 
of immediate war. 

On August 19, Goering’s paper, the National Zeitung, published an 
article by a former Colonel of the Hungarian General Staff, which 
was widely reprinted in Germany. The article calmly discussed the 
mediods and prospects of dismembering Czechoslovakia, which it de- 
scribed as “the weak point in the defence of Western Europe against 
the U.S.S.R.” Immediately afterwards, when General Vuillemin, Chief 
of the French Air Staff, came on a visit to Germany, Goering asked 
him— with a laugh— whether France really meant to attack Germany 
if the latter were involved in war with Czechoslovakia. On August 22, 

38 Daily Telegraph, July 26, 1938. 

39 General Mason-Macfarlane, British military attach^ in Berlin, reported on August 3 
that the intention was “to carry out what would seem little short of a partial test mobili- 
sation in September” ( D.B.F.P . , vol. II, p. 42). Earlier a British Foreign Office official, 
William Strang, had written to Nevile Henderson quoting many details of German 
military preparations for the autumn, from a secret source (D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 610-11). 


62 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


the German representatives in Moscow, Belgrade and Bucharest (in 
“private and purely informal” conversations) informed the govern- 
ments to which they were accredited that, in the event of armed con- 
flict breaking out in the Sudeten districts, Germany would give the 
Sudeten Germans “every support”, and enquired what would be the 
attitude of the Soviet and other governments. 40 On August 26, the 
Nazi press in Czechoslovakia published what appeared to be the signal 
for that conflict, according to the rules of the game which had, after 
years of experience, become internationally familiar — an alleged “secret 
circular” of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, ordering an 
insurrection, and simultaneously a manifesto of the leaders of the 
Henlein Party, giving their members a free hand for “self-defence”, i.e. 
for launching civil war. 

hi reality, large quantities of arms were now being smuggled in 
from Germany, and the police had begun arresting the smugglers. 
Moreover, it had at last issued an order prohibiting the use of terror, 
physical or economic (i.e. victimisation), on behalf of a political party. 
Lord Runciman himself had to intervene, to warn the Henleinites 
that they were going too far, on August 28 ; and the British military 
attache in Prague presented a memorandum to his superiors next day 
on German military infiltration and illegal arming of the population. 41 
A little while earlier, in fact, the German Charge d’ Affaires in Prague 
had circularised German consulates in Czechoslovakia (August 17). He 
warned them that the authorities were looking for evidence of illegal 
activities by the consulates, and requested them “to destroy at once all 
incriminating evidence, especially any with military content”. 42 

In the meantime, negotiations between the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment, Lord Runciman and the Henlein party were in progress — very 
slowly, in fulfilment of the deliberate policy pursued by the latter, 
as outlined by the German Charge d’ Affaires on August 12: “By 
introduction of a special exchange of documents regarding its memor- 
andum of June 7, the Sudeten German Party pursues the tactical 
design of drawing out negotiations.” 43 The grand purpose of these 
negotiations was once more restated by Ribbentrop in commenting 
on one of the proposals submitted by Benes to Henlein, which were 
so reasonable as to take the Nazis aback (August 17) : “The answer to 
the Benes proposals was contained in the general instructions given 
to Henlein, namely, always to negotiate and not to let the link be 

40 This was in fulfilment of an instruction sent by Ribbentrop to these representatives 
on August 3 (D.G.P.P., vol. II, pp. 529-31). The conversation between Litvinov and 
the German Ambassador in Moscow is reported in the same volume, p. 604. 

41 D.B.F.P., vol. H, p. 186. <12 D.G.F.P., vol. U, p. 576. ™ Ibid., p. 555. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 



63 

broken: on the other hand, always to demand more than could 
be granted by the other side.” He warned Henlein that he would be 
“pinned down” if he accepted Benes’ reasonable proposals as a basis 
for negotiations. 44 

The details of the negotiations are not of importance in examining 
the policy of Germany in these months, just because of the principle 
of always asking more than could be granted. The important thing 
was to appear to negotiate, to gain time for military preparations, for 
arming and organising Nazis on the Czechoslovak side of the border, 
for making threatening speeches or provoking “incidents” from time 
to time which had the effect of bringing more and yet more pressure 
from London and Paris upon the Czechoslovak Government, for 
winning friends and supporters among Ministers and other pohticians 
in the two Western capitals. This is what stands out from the volumes 
of British and German diplomatic reports on the Prague negotiations, 
from July to the beginning of September. 

The determining element in this policy is indicated in the most 
secret preparations of all — those of which a sample is contained in 
Jodi’s memorandum to Hitler, on behalf of the General Staff, on 
August 24. 45 He asked for the day and hour of the proposed “inci- 
dent” in Czechoslovakia to be fixed — since it had to be arranged so 
that the air force got the appropriate orders in time to attack enemy 
airfields by surprise, in “generally favourable weather” — but not so 
far ahead that the Czechoslovaks got wind of it. Both the army and 
the air force should be in a state of preparedness before this, but not 
knowing why. If Germans were to be recalled from abroad, it must 
be done cautiously; and the possibility of friendly or neutral diplomats 
perishing in the first air attacks on Prague must also be reckoned 
with. There were several other such documents, covering different 
aspects of the proposed attack. 46 Perhaps the most characteristic was 
an entry in Jodi’s diary on September n: “In the afternoon, con- 
ference with Secretary' of State Jahnke, from the Ministry of Public 
Enlightenment and Propaganda, on imminent common tasks. These 
joint proposals for refutation of our own violations of International 
Law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were con- 
sidered particularly important.” By October 1 a detailed schedule 
was ready — including stock replies for each case. 47 

44 D.G.F.P., vol. n, p. 587. 

45 Ibid., pp. 618-19. A note on the original document (produced at the Nuremberg 
trial of major war criminals) indicated that, by August 30, Hitler had said he would 
“act on these suggestions”. 

48 Summarised in Survey, pp. 283-5. 47 Trial, part II, p. 19. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


REDIVIDING TIIE WORLD 


64 

By September 5, Bcnes had drafted his “Fourth Plan”, which was 
accepted by the Czechoslovak Government on that day and handed 
to the Henlein party leaders two days later. It granted the German- 
speaking citizens the essence of what Henlein had been demanding — 
local self-government in all except defence, foreign affairs and finance : 
its exercise by cantonal assemblies elected by adult suffrage: special 
rights for the M.P.s or local councillors of a particular nationality to 
take up the case of an aggrieved member of their nationality outside 
the self-governing cantons of his nationality. Lord Runciman him- 
self subsequently admitted that these proposals really met Henlein ’s 
Carlsbad demands — provided they were genuine. As for the Hen- 
leinitcs, they were completely nonplussed. At their meeting on the 
afternoon of September 7, one of them — Kundt — said the plan had 
created “an entirely new situation”, since it “outwardly and in its 
essential content covers the most essential principles of the Carlsbad 
demands”. Kier, their legal adviser, agreed with this. Both saw the 
virtue of the plan in the fact that “the power of the State would 
become so impotent that it could neither be a stronghold of the 
Czech people nor a powerful weapon for other Great Powers to use 
against the Reich” (Kundt), and in fact that “the power of the State 
can be completely undermined from within”. 48 

The moment they had been concerned about had now arrived: if 
they accepted these proposals, they were “pinned down”. It was 
necessary to act quickly. They were assisted by The Times, which had 
repeatedly, in the preceding four months, suggested partition of 
Czechoslovakia so as to transfer German-speaking areas to Germany, 
by plebiscite or otherwise. None of the Henlein proposals had made 
this demand, and the “Fourth Plan” which had so embarrassed the 
Henleinites did not include it either. But evidently the British Govern- 
ment was primarily concerned to demonstrate its friendship to Hitler: 
and the editor of The Times had for many years had “close personal 
friendships with Baldwin, Chamberlain and Halifax”. 49 He supervised 
the preparation of a leading article, which appeared on September 7, 
and which suggested that if Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovaks 

48 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 714-18. 

49 History of “The Times”, vol. IV, part II, p. 931. He “remained in close contact with 
Neville Chamberlain during the latter’s premiership, lasting three years” : while Chamber- 
lain “was strengthened in his own views by the knowledge that Geoffrey (Dawson) 
agreed with his views and would support it in The Times ” (Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson 
and Our Times, p. 373). In fact, it was well known in diplomatic and journalistic circles 
in London during 1938 that Dawson had regular meetings with Chamberlain; and no 
one doubted that the leading article reflected the Prime Minister’s views precisely — ■ 
all the more because of earlier incidents, to be described in the next chapter. 


65 

really could not agree within the framework of a single State, the 
Sudeten districts (i.e. the mountain fortifications of Czechoslovakia) 
might be handed over to Germany (under the guise of “making 
Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous State”). The editorial aroused 
a colossal sensation throughout the world. 

On the evening of the day of its publication, the Sudeten German 
leaders used the pretext of an entirely mythical “outrage”, by Czech 
police against Members of Parliament at Moravska-Ostrava, to break 
off any further negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government on 
the subject of the Benes Plan. The German press welcomed The Times 
editorial, and greeted the “outrage” with a tremendous outcry, this 
time less against the “bestiality” of the Czech police than against the 
alleged “impotence to maintain order” of the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment. 50 The inference that German entry into Czechoslovakia was 
necessary, to restore order, was obvious. 

But at Nuremberg, where the leaders of the Nazi Party had gathered 
for their annual demonstration, they were sure that no such entry 
was yet necessary. True, it was “becoming increasingly clear that the 
Runciman phase of the Czechoslovak dispute was drawing rapidly 
to an end” (reported the Nuremberg correspondent of The Times on 
September 9, adding that Lord Runciman was currently described 
there as the “Czechoslovak Non-Intervention Committee”). Acts of 
violence by the Nazis in the German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia 
and attacks on the police were now a daily occurrence. 51 O11 Sept- 
ember 9 and 10 Hitler was discussing with his generals at Nuremberg 
plans for the “lightning attack” on Czechoslovakia. 52 On September 10 
Goebbels, in a speech at Nuremberg, denounced Prague as “the 
organising centre of Bolshevist plots against Europe”. The next day 
Gocring made a speech declaring that Germany would no longer 
“tolerate the harm done to our German brothers”, and detailing her 
military preparedness which “sent his audience away with the feeling 
that Europe is on the brink of an inevitable war” (cabled The Times 
correspondent at Nuremberg). Elsewhere too, the pressure was re- 
inforced. On the same night as Goering’s speech, the British Prime 
Minister made a statement to the press which once again threatened 

60 British Legation representatives who went to the scene of the alleged “brutality” 
discovered that, in a scuffle between the police and rowdy German students, a German 
M.P. was struck unintentionally on the arm by a policeman who did not know who 
he was. The British assistant military attache came to the conclusion that the whole 
affair was a “frame-up” ( D.B.F.P. , vol. II, p. 265). 

51 Report of the German Charge d’ Affaires at Prague, September 11, 1938 ( D.G.F.P. , 
vol. II, pp. 741-2). 

62 Ibid., pp. 727-30. 


u 


66 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


that, if Germany made war, she would find Britain ranged against 
her on the side of France — that was not new — but added that, if she 
only continued negotiating, she could have all she wanted from Czecho- 
slovakia (which was what Hitler needed to hear). On September 12, 
Hider made a speech at Nuremberg in reply, which, protesting his 
peaceful intentions towards Great Britain, France and Poland, threat- 
ened Czechoslovakia with war unless she yielded to the demands of 
Hcnlein. The speech was distinguished, not only by the insults to the 
Czech people and Benes personally, but particularly by the extra- 
ordinary and calculated lying about the alleged “torture” of German- 
speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, and by direct incitement of the 
Henleinitcs (the text is available in Baynes’ collection of Hitler’s 
speeches published by Chatham House in 1942). 

This was the signal for an actual rising on the night of the 12th in 
a number of important centres. Public buildings were seized on the 
border, bombs were used, and a number of police were killed or kid- 
napped. The chief Henleinitcs fled over the frontier on the 14th, and 
the next day issued a manifesto over the German radio stations declar- 
ing that it was impossible to “live together” with the Czechs in one 
State, and demanding amiexation of the Sudeten districts to Germany. 
There were open threats of intervention by the German press on 
September 14 and 15. However, the rising was easily put down by 
the police and troops, with a total loss of 27 dead (16 of them Czechs) 
and 75 wounded (61 of them Czechs) according to official Czecho- 
slovak figures. 53 Meetings and processions were prohibited, all fire- 
arms were called in throughout the dangerous areas, and the “Sudeten 
German” Party, with its “defence” organisation, was prohibited 
(though its M.P.s remained legal). Within a few days the German 
Charge d’ Affaires at Prague was reporting that the flight of the Hen- 
lcin leaders had had “a crushing effect” among the German-speaking 
population, and was causing a “crisis of confidence” among them: 
local officials of the Nazi Party were abandoning it, local mayors were 
calling for peace and order, and belief in the reliability of the German 
radio had been “shaken” because it had been “grossly exaggerating” 
the supposed “terror” against the German-speaking population. 54 

But now the pretence of negotiations between the Czechoslovak 
Government and the Henleinites — or of “mediation” by Lord Runci- 
man — could go on no longer (Runciman himself returned to London 

63 D-G.F.P., vol. n, p. 812. Gedyc, op. cit., ch. 35, and Alexander Henderson, Eye- 
Witness in Czechoslovakia, pp. 179-85, describe the rising. 

64 Ibid., pp. 822-6, 828, 854. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 67 

on September 16). The open preparations for war, the bellicose 
speeches of the Nazi leaders, the rebellion in the German-speaking 
areas of Czcchslovakia, all showed this. Moreover, in August private 
negotiations had been under way to persuade the Hungarian Fascist 
Government to table its “claims” (mentioned earlier) without delay, 
+ and above all to join in the proposed armed attack on Czechoslovakia: 
the reward for this would be the return of Slovakia to Hungarian rule. 
The Hungarians had refused to commit themselves, but Hitler could 
have no doubt that they would stake out their claim if he was suc- 
cessful: which would strengthen his assertion at Nuremberg that 
Czechoslovakia was “manufactured at Versailles”. 55 While these talks 
were secret, Hitler’s and Horthy’s inspection on August 22 of the 
new German navy — new cruisers, submarines and the battle-cruiser 
Gneisenau — was not. 

4. From Berchtesgaden to Munich 

On the night of September 13, Chamberlain (responding to his 
own fears, and those of the French Government, that Hitler was 
about to attack Czechoslovakia and that this would mean that France 
could not evade her obligations) telegraphed to Hitler proposing to 
come and talk to him about a “peaceful solution”. Hitler, who was 
well informed about Chamberlain’s attitude, gladly accepted: “Ich 
bin von Himmeln gefallen” (' You could have knocked me down 
with a feather”) was his description of his astonishment and delight. 50 
In the ensuing conversations at Berchtesgaden, on September 15, 
Hitler at first threatened immediate war, and brazenly lied about 
“300 dead” in the Sudeten areas, “towns and villages burnt”, “10,000 
refugees 011 German soil”. 0 ' But when Chamberlain said it was a 
waste of time to talk if war was already decided on. Hitler brought 
out his prepared solution — self-determination, or more precisely an- 
nexation without consulting the people, of areas where there was a 
German-speaking majority (Hitler had already had a letter from 
Henlein that day, intimating that he was sure, from his talks with 
Runciman’ s delegation, that Chamberlain would propose “union 
with Germany”). 58 Chamberlain duly accepted the principle, and 
promised to put it before the British Government. 

66 The account of these proceedings — with Hitler’s remark that “he who wants to 
sit at table must at least help in the kitchen” — is in D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 609-11, 623-4, 
628, 651-4. 

66 L. B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude (1948), P- 35 - 

57 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 338, 340, 348- 

68 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 801 ; D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 369. 


68 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


The decisions of the British Cabinet at its meetings on September 17, 
and of the conference of British and French Ministers on September 
18 and 19: the methods which were used to force these decisions on 
the Czechoslovak Government, on September 20 and 21: and the 
protests against the Anglo-French terms in the three countries, will 
be discussed in later chapters. But Hitler was not relaxing his pressure. 

On September 16, German reinforcements (estimated later at ten 
divisions) were ordered to the Czechoslovak frontier. 59 On the 17th, 
the German Legation in Prague received orders to get German women 
and children out of the country. 60 On the same day, Henlein publicly 
announced the formation of a “Sudeten German Free Corps”. This 
(Hitler’s adjutant Schmundt recorded) was under Henlein, but he had 
a German officer assigned as adviser, to whom Hider at a personal 
interview gave “far-reaching military plenary powers”. The purpose 
was “maintenance of disturbances and clashes”. These activities were 
to begin “as soon as possible”, but for camouflage purposes the Corps 
was to be armed only with Austrian weapons. By September 20 
(one may mention in parenthesis), Jodi was recording in his diary 
that these activities had “reached such a pitch that they may have 
brought about, indeed have already brought about, consequences 
harmful to the plans of the army” by causing “rather strong” units 
of the Czechoslovak Army to be sent to the border. This was not 
surprising: a later Free Corps staff report in Schmundt’s file said that 
since September 19 it had carried out over 300 “missions”, capturing 
1500 prisoners and twenty-five machine-guns, and inflicting “serious 
losses”. 61 

On the 1 8th, also, the five armies which were to attack Czecho- 
slovakia from different directions, under “Operation Green”, received 
their marching orders: 62 on the 20th the French Ambassador in Berlin 
put their strength at 22 divisions, while the British Ambassador re- 
ported that 1,500,000 men had been mobilised. 63 On the night of the 
21st, the “Free Corps” crossed from Germany and occupied the town 
of As, while German S.S. and S.A. units occupied Eger. 64 

At the same time political preparations for attack and disruption 
went ahead. On September 16 Goering complained to the Hun- 
garian Minister in Berlin that his Government was not doing enough: 
There was complete cahn in the Hungarian minority districts in 

69 Trial, part II, pp. 22, 26. 60 d.G.F.P., voL II, p. 825. 

61 Trial, part II, pp. 35-6. Newton reported from Prague on the 19th that the Anglo- 
French terms had “leaked” from die French, and that armed attacks by the triumphant 
Henleinites from across the border had already begun (D.B.F.P., vol. n, pp. 414-15). 

62 Trial, part II, p. 23. 03 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 427, 429. Ibid., pp. 454-5, 457. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 69 

Czechoslovakia, in contrast to the Sudeten German ones.” After 
telephoning to Budapest, the Minister promised that “the Hungarian 
ethnic group in Czechoslovakia would be activated to an increasing 
extent from now on”. 65 On the 19th the Henlein leaders remaining 
in Czechoslovakia (their M.P.s and Senators remained at liberty) were 
asked “to get into touch without delay with the Slovaks” (i.e. with 
the Slovak Catholic Fascists who had been in touch with Hitler before) 
“to persuade them to raise their demands for autonomy in the course 
of to-morrow” — although it turned out, to the disappointment of 
the Germans, that the Slovaks “only” demanded autonomy within 
the Czechoslovak Republic. 66 It was a characteristic touch that at that 
very time the German Foreign Office was discussing plans for annexa- 
tion of all the Czech districts to Germany and of Slovakia to Hun- 
gary. 67 As early as May, 1938, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow had 
told the French Ambassador, Coulondre, that Czechoslovakia would 
sooner or later “collapse like a house of cards”; and Coulondre’s im- 
pression that the Polish Government was turning cat-in-pan was 
reinforced by Litvinov’s. 68 Now these impressions were confirmed 
when the Polish Government (which had denounced its non-aggression 
pact with Czechoslovakia, without apparent rhyme or reason, in 1937) 
on September 21 demanded an “immediate decision” by Czecho- 
slovakia to cede Polish-speaking areas 69 — thus adding to Czecho- 
slovakia’s difficulties and reinforcing Hitler’s efforts to break her up. 

Fortified with all these preparations, Hitler received Chamberlain 
for a second conference at Godesbcrg on September 22. He rejected 
the gradual procedure which the British Premier submitted to him, 
based on the surrender of all Czechoslovak territories with 65 per 
cent. German-speaking population, with the right of individuals to 
opt for either nationality, compensation for property left beliind, etc. 
Hitler demanded the cession of all territories which he had already 
determined, with occupation by German troops immediately (made 
more precise as October 1 — already fixed in secret as the day after 
“Operation Green” began) and with similar rights for the Poles and 
Hungarians. He offered a plebiscite under international supervision 
afterwards. In a further memorandum, on September 23, it was added 
that the areas concerned were to be occupied by September 28, and 

65 D.G.P.F., vol. II, pp. 816, 817. 66 Ibid., pp. 841, 852. 67 Ibid., pp. 845-6. 

68 R. Coulondre, De Staline a Hitler (195°). PP- 151-2. 

69 The Germans’ pleasure at this move (which probably was agreed with them in 
any case) is reflected in D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 862-3. The correspondence between the 
Polish and Czechoslovak Governments is reproduced in Namier, Europe in Decay (1950), 
pp. 285-307. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



70 

only those would vote in the plebiscite who lived in these areas on 
October 28, 1918 — the date of the overthrow of Austrian rule. In 
order to emphasise the complete surrender which this settlement in- 
volved, Hider based it on a denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles, 
and of Czechoslovakia as “an artificial construction” which “pos- 
sessed neither a history nor a tradition”. He further underlined that 
his terms were “the irrevocable decision of the German Reich”. 

The whole proceedings 70 were interlarded with completely false 
allegations about “120,000 refugees driven out of Czechoslovakia”, 
“children left wandering uncared-for in the streets or the fields”, 
“twelve German hostages shot at Chcb”, etc. (the latter accompanied 
by one of Hitler’s “madman acts” which he found so effective). 

While the British and French Governments were deliberating on 
these terms — first separately, on the 24th and 25th, and then joindy, 
at a meeting in London on the 25th and 26th — the Czechoslovak 
Government (which had already mobilised) rejected them. The British 
and French Governments took some preliminary measures for partial 
mobilisation. Sir Horace Wilson was sent to see Hitler, and the result 
of his interviews on the 26th and 27th was only to secure a time-limit 
for the Czechoslovaks to accept the terms by 2 p.m. on the 28th. 
The British Government issued a warning on the 26th about Anglo- 
Franco-Soviet help for Czechoslovakia if there were war. But Hitler 
was confident that all these measures, which were thoroughly alarm- 
ing the people of all countries, 71 Germany included, meant nothing 
except that they w r ere bargaining tactics— to secure from him some 
act of noble self-restraint which would enable the British and French 
Governments to present the conquest of Czechoslovakia as really an 
act saving European peace. 

On September 26 he prepared the way for this by a speech at the 
Sportpalast in Berlin, in which raving abuse of Czechoslovakia and 
BeneS, with denunciations of the U.S.S.R. and threats of war, was 
interspersed with assurances that this was “the last territorial claim 
which I have in Europe”, expressions of friendship for Britain, France 
and Poland, and of personal gratitude to Chamberlain. This was well 
calculated to impress : since the British Ambassador in Berlin, at any 
rate, had freely revealed the same train of thought passing through 

'° Reports by the British and German sides respectively are in D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 
463-73, 482-3, 485-7, 489-90, 499-508; and in D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 870-9, 887-8, 889-91 
892, 898-908. 

71 Appeals were sent to Hitler by President Roosevelt on the 26th and 27th, and by 
the King of Sweden on the 27th ( D.G.F.P . , vol. II, pp. 958, 974, 983). Hitler replied to 
Roosevelt with a telegram now saying that there were “214,000 refugees”, with “count- 
less dead and thousands of wounded”. 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 


71 

his mind for many months, and Hitler knew from many sources that 
Nevile Henderson was not alone. He followed up the speech with 
a personal letter to Chamberlain on the 27th (which the Prime Minister 
received the same evening), arguing in the most reasonable tones 
against various criticisms of his terms, offering to guarantee the inde- 
pendence of the remainder of Czechoslovakia once the German, 
Polish and Hungarian minorities had gone, and finishing with an 
invitation to Chamberlain to “continue your effort, for which I should 
like to take this opportunity of once more sincerely thanking you” — 
in order to prevent “Prague” from bringing about a general war. 72 

The calculation was correct. Chamberlain snatched at the oppor- 
tunity, and telegraphed next day to Hitler proposing an immediate 
Four-Power Conference (i.e. including Italy). He had already informed 
the French Government, whose leaders were mainly concerned to get 
in ahead of Chamberlain (on the morning of the 28th) with an even 
more eager offer of co-operation against Czechoslovakia — that it 
should be required to agree (on pain of losing any French support) 
to the immediate occupation by German troops of “all four sides of 
the Bohemian quadrilateral”. 73 Hitler had only to choose: and he 
preferred the British precisely because it involved the public parti- 
cipation of Britain and France in the dismemberment of Czecho- 
slovakia, at his dictation. Mussolini, who feared that a war might end 
in disaster, supported Chamberlain in a series of messages to Hitler. 74 

He sent the necessary invitations on the morning of the 28th; and 
the conference — Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier — met 
on the afternoon of the 29th, sitting until the early hours of the morn- 
ing of the 30th. Mussolini already had the draft of a settlement, which 
had been drawn up the previous day by the Germans, and passed on 
to him by the Italian Ambassador at Berlin: and at a suitable moment, 
after a preliminary statement by Hitler on the usual lines, Mussolini 
produced it as his own. The draft provided for evacuation of the 
“Sudeten-German” territory, according to a map drawn up by the 
Germans, between October i and 10 and without the destruction of 
any existing installations: an international commission (of the four 
Powers with Czechoslovakia) to supervise the evacuation: a plebiscite 
to be held in “doubtful territories”, which until then would be occu- 
pied by international forces : and German troops to begin occupying 
“predominantly German territory” on October i. 75 

72 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 576-8. 73 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 988. 

74 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 641-5: the account by Lord Perth, the British Ambassador at 
Rome. 

75 Ibid., pp. 631, 634. 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


REDIVIDING THE WORLD 


72 

After argument about the drafting of various passages, with intervals 
for meals, these points became the essential features of the Munich 
Agreement, signed on September 30. There were several additional 
points, designed to make the document more palatable to the public 
in Britain and France — since none of those present could have sup- 
posed that they would make the “carve-up” more acceptable to 
Czechoslovakia. Such were the provisions that the international com- 
mission should determine one particular zone which was to be occu- 
pied, the boundaries of which were doubtful at Munich: that there 
was to be the right of option for individuals : that Britain and France 
maintained the offer of an international guarantee of the new bound- 
aries, made on September 19, and that Germany and Italy would join 
it once the Polish and Hungarian minority questions were settled. 

The doubtful zone was determined by the German General Staff, 
which presented an ultimatum from Hitler on the subject at the very 
first meeting of the international commission on October 1 — which 
the majority at once accepted. The right of option was never men- 
tioned again. 76 The international guarantee never came into effect — 
indeed, it was cynically repudiated. 77 The “international commission” 
— composed of the French, British and Italian Ambassadors in Berlin 
and the German Secretary of State, acting together against the Czecho- 
slovak Minister — equally simply, within a few days, cancelled the 
proposed plebiscites and never called in the imaginary “international 
force”. 78 

Although Mr. Chamberlain made much of the modifications sup- 
posed to have been made at Munich in Iiitlcr’s terms, as presented 
at Godcsbcrg, in reality they represented “a distinction without a 
difference”, and Nazi Germany secured in reality all she wanted. “I 
think it is true to say that every contentious point was decided in 

76 As a number of writers have pointed out, the British and French Prime Ministers 
at Munich never troubled to ensure the right of “option” for the unfortunate Czecho- 
slovak police who had been kidnapped by die Nazis in the border territories, long before 
Munich ! 

77 On December io, 1938, the new Czechoslovak authorities received the Brirish 
reply to a reminder they had circulated about the promised international guarantee. 
It was brought by Newton, the British Minister, to Chvalkovsky, the Foreign Minister. 
He said the Brirish did not agree to give a guarantee which they could not make effec- 
tive, and would be very grateful if “Prague” explained what kind of guarantee it had 
in min d. They would only be ready to give a guarantee if two other of the Great Powers 
who signed the Munich Agreement did the same. Chvalkovsky said that any form of 
guarantee would be desirable, and the sooner the better. Newton several times recom- 
mended that Czechoslovakia should content herself with a guarantee from Germany 
alone! (D. & M., vol. I, pp. 336-40). 

78 A full account of these proceedings was already published in 1939 by Ripka, Munich: 
Before and After, pp. 485-95. 


73 

Germany’s favour”, said Lord Halifax on January 20, 1940, in a speech 
OI1 Munich. The great objective — of breaking down the territorial 
barrier which stood in the way of launching a war for redivision of 
the world — had been achieved. The German press emphasised the 

triumph. 

“The will of the Fiihrer is accomplished, as it is written in Mein 
Kampf”, wrote the semi-official Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung on Sept- 
ember 30, 1938. The Angriff boasted, on October 4, that a “diplomatic 
revolution” against the treaties which ended the last war had now been 
completed, including the destruction or rendering inoperative of the 
League of Nations, the Little Entente, the Locarno Treaties, the Rome 
Agreement, the Franco-Belgian Military Agreement, and now the 
Czechoslovak Pacts with Poland, France and the U.S.S.R. 

The Frankfurter Zeitung wrote on October 10 that the chief link 
between France and the U.S.S.R. was now broken. “For years the 
Reich has asked itself how it would be possible to slip out of the Czech 
pincers. It was not difficult to see that the surest means was not to 
seek to escape from them, but to break them. The great historic merit 
of Adolf Flitler is to have recognised this possibility, to have found 
the means of realising it and to have taught Germany to believe in it.” 

It would be difficult to add very much to this eloquent scries of 
tributes, in which considerations of race, blood, or oppressed brethren 
play very little part. Much the same can be said of the claims now pre- 
sented by Hitler’s camp-followers. 

On October 1 Imredy, the Hungarian Premier, declared in a broad- 
cast that the interests of the Hungarian minority had been “ignored”. 
The Polish Government the day before presented an ultimatum de- 
manding the Tesin district, and the Note, Bencs was unofficially told, 
was backed by ten Polish divisions on the frontier. Poland had been 
concentrating troops to seize this coal and iron area (through which 
important European railways pass) ten days before, but had been 
warned off, on September 23, by the Soviet Union. Now its troops 
could march in within the next few days. After deadlock in negotia- 
tions between Czechoslovakia and Hungary (October 9-27), the Ger- 
man and Italian Governments on November 2 issued an “award” at 
Vienna, handing over eastern and southern Slovakia to Hungary, with 
part of Sub-Carpathian Russia. These agriculturally rich areas were 
occupied between November 5 and 10. 

On September 30, 1938, Czechoslovakia covered an area of 54,000 
square miles; on November 30, only 38,000 square miles. Its popula- 
tion numbered 14,500,000 on the first date and 9,600,000 on the 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


74 

second. Moreover, over 800,000 Czechs passed, in the annexed terri- 
tories, under German, Polish and Hungarian rule, while Hungary got 
under her rule 270,000 Slovaks. Poland took over nearly two-thirds 
as many Czechs as she did Poles: and whereas the Hungarian minority 
in Czechoslovakia had represented only 6 per cent, of the population, 
the new Slovak minority in Hungary represented over 20 per cent, 
of the population. 

Czechoslovakia had lost in the process over 66 per cent, of its coal, 
70 per cent, of its iron and steel industry, 90 per cent, of its porcelain 
industry, 80 per cent, of its lignite, and all its zinc and graphite. It had 
also lost nearly 90 per cent, of its sheet glass industry (measured in out- 
put), 80 per cent, of its textile industry, 60 per cent, of its paper in- 
dustry and over 80 per cent, of its chemical industry, 50 per cent, of 
its dyestuffs industry, and 70 per cent, of its power supply; as well 
as 60 per cent, of its famous hop area, most of its wine and tobacco 
output, and 40 per cent, of the woods of Bohemia and Moravia. 

But above all, Czechoslovakia had lost its historic frontiers and the 
means of defending itself— its vast and costly fortifications and its 
well-equipped and well-trained armed forces of forty-five divisions 
(for those which remained, reduced in numbers, were broken in 
spirit) ; while its network of railways Iiad been completely disorganised. 

One more link in a long chain of German successes had been forged: 
but qualitatively, it was the biggest and most decisive of all. Neither 
the signature of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement behind the 
back of France (June, 1935), nor the unpunished breaches of the Ver- 
sailles Treaty involved in the reintroduction of conscription and the 
reoccupation of the Rhineland (1935-6), nor the invasion, under 
various disguises, of Spain (1936-8), nor even the seizure of Austria 
(i93 8 )> could compare in importance with the reduction of Czecho- 
slovakia to a condition in which it was, in the words of the Berlin 
correspondent of The Times (October 3, 1938), “incapable of obstruct- 
ing the extension of German political and economic influence in 
Eastern Europe”. 



chapter v 

“WITHOUT WAR AND WITHOUT DELAY” 

1. Pressure Begins 

1 ET the reader suppose that in January, 1933, after Hitler came to 
j power in Germany, the leaders of the British Government said 
the following to themselves, or to one another: 

“We think the Nazi regime is a useful barrier in defence of property 
in Germany and throughout Central and Eastern Europe. We ought, 
therefore, to give it every support we can. We cannot openly express 
our admiration for it, because we are the largely Conservative Govern- 
ment of a relatively democratic State. 1 But there are plenty of ways 
in which we can help the Nazis without that. 

“Moreover, the more we show the world that we are encouraging 
them, the more will the allies of France among the smaller States of 
Europe tend to abandon her and enter the orbit of the rising Germany. 
This will weaken the independent position of France, and correspond- 
ingly increase her willingness to accept our advice (an old principle 
among allies in past history, formally set out in volume III of Lord 
D’Abernon’s Diaries ). We know that in the event of an attack on 
France, for any reason whatsoever, we should have to go to her aid; 
but, rather than let her draw the conclusion that she can lay down 
terms to us in matters of international policy, will it not be better to 
bring her into such a condition of complete dependence on our good 
pleasure that, on the contrary, it is we who can dictate foreign policy 
to her? 

“There is an additional advantage in giving, at any rate covert, 
and wherever possible overt, support to Hitler. He is already a power- 
ful counter-influence to the growing prestige of the U.S.S.R. The 
stronger becomes the first State which has substituted collective 
ownersliip for private capitalism, the more we shall need some such 
counter-influence. And when the time comes — as in the nature of 

1 The official record of Lord Halifax’s talk with Hitler on November 19, 1937, shows 
the former as saying that in England “the great services the Fiihrer had rendered in the 
rebuilding of Germany were fully and completely recognised. ... He (Lord Halifax) 
recognised that the Chancellor had not only rendered great services to Germany but, 
as no doubt he himself realised, had been able, by preventing the entry of Communism 
into his country, to bar its passage further west” {D.G.F.P., vol. I, p. 56). 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



76 

things it must naturally come — that Germany feels herself strong 
enough to look for territorial aggrandisement and colonial expansion, 
how much more advantageous it will be to head her off against the 
U.S.S.R. than to let her expand in some other direction; when we 
might find ourselves forced, for various reasons, to take the field 
against her!” 

It has become a pleasant tradition in British politics, during the last 
century or so, never to attribute to the Government, or to the social 
forces behind it, any such Machiavellian, or “realistic”, calculations 
as those sketched out above. However, let the reader consider the 
British Government’s policy from 1933 to 1938 — from the Pact of 
Rome to the seizure of Austria — and he will find that it could liardly 
have acted otherwise if those calculations were really the basis of its 
conduct. And in international politics intentions hardly ever produce 
results, unless actions square with them. The question of whether the 
members of the British Government in their intentions — or their in- 
stinctive policies — were actuated by what in their lights were patriotic 
motives, has practically no bearing on the problem at all. 

The policy pursued from March to September, 1938, while it had 
its element of improvisation from stage to stage, was at bottom a 
continuation of that pursued from 1933 (and even earlier). But the 
gravity of the issues involved in the disappearance of an independent 
Czechoslovakia, and the speed at which Hitler felt himself able by 
now to proceed, left tittle time for camouflage, and forced the essen- 
tial features of the British Government’s pohey out into the open. 

During the first stage of the crisis, when the seizure of Austria 
had aroused general alarm about the future of Czechoslovakia, 
the British Government — through Mr. Chamberlain’s speech of 
March 24, 1938, in the House of Commons — explained that (i) it 
believed in satisfying “the reasonable wishes of the German minority”. 
He (k) said, in connection with the Czechs, that there was “no need 
to assume the use of force, or indeed to talk about it”. In the mean- 
time, he mentioned a number of cases in which Britain would regard 
herself as bound to fight — and from these Czechoslovakia was by 
name excluded, (in) In her case aid against aggression might be granted 
-if ‘ ‘in our judgment, it would be proper, under the provisions of 
the Covenant, so to do”. (iV) But he would not even commit Britain 
to supporting France if she went to help Czechoslovakia against Ger- 
man aggression, as laid down by treaty (although, once war started, 
“it would be well within the bounds of possibility” that Britain might 
become involved). As for (v), the Soviet Union’s proposals, made 


“without war and without delay’’ 77 

a week earlier, of discussions with other Powers, “inside the League 
or outside it”, of practical steps to stop the further development of 
aggression, Chamberlain said that these were not so much aiming 
at a settlement as at “a concerting of action against an eventuality 
which has not yet arisen”. 

In the circumstances of the time, ( i ) meant satisfying the Henleinites, 
since these were by far the most vocal section of the German minority, 
and Chamberlain did not attempt to differentiate between them and 
the German-speaking Social-Democrats. It was Hitler who, by a 
speech of February 22, 2 had set all Europe talking of the use of force 
against Czechoslovakia and Austria — and on March n-12 had already 
used it against Austria; therefore Chamberlain’s point (») meant that 
no one should talk about restraining Hitler where Czechoslovakia 
was concerned. Point (Hi) was perfectly explicit. Point (iv) meant that 
Hitler, whom events in France from 1934 onwards had shown to 
have increasingly powerful agents inside that country, could now rely 
on Great Britain to throw her weight on their side if there were any 
question of helping Czechoslovakia. 3 Point (v) not only meant rejec- 
tion of the Soviet offer of co-operation, but also gave the world to 
understand that the British Government did not choose to regard the 
Italian war on Ethiopia, the German and Italian war on Republican 
Spain, the Japanese war on China, and the German seizure of Austria 
by display and threat of armed forces, as “eventualities” of aggression 
which had already “arisen”. 

The speech, therefore, was a public signal to Hitler to go ahead. 
As such it was understood in many countries — certainly in Czecho- 
slovakia, France and the U.S.S.R. And already The Times on March 22 
had given pride of place to a letter from a well-known Labour peer, 
Lord Noel-Buxton, suggesting that there should be a plebiscite under 
international supervision in the “Sudeten” area. This idea was taken 
up in other letters, with attacks on Czechoslovakia’s treaties with 
France and the U.S.S.R., and suggestions that she should be broken 
up into cantons. 

2 “It is intolerable for a self-respecting World Power to know that across the frontier 
are kinsmen who have to suffer severe persecution. ... It is possible with good will to 
find ways of conciliation. ... If one tries to prevent the solution of the problem in this 
way and use force in so doing, then one day this violence will be returned with violence” 
(Baynes, op. cit., vol. 2). 

3 This threw a particularly vivid light on the British Government’s efforts in the 
League of Nations discussions on “Reform of the Covenant” (1936-8) to do away with 
the obligation under article 16 — that Governments “shall severally contribute” armed 
forces, on recommendation of the Council, for action against an aggressor: and to sub- 
stitute for this a mere right to decide for themselves (see the account of these discussions 
in Walters, op. cit., voL II, pp. 709-17, 771-81). 


78 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


What the people did not know was that the editor had already 
received from his assistant, Barrington Ward, a memorandum propos- 
ing “the internationally guaranteed neutralisation of Czechoslovakia, 
which in return would give up its Soviet and French alliances and 
grant federal status to its minorities”. The editor “took it on March 21 
to Chamberlain, who ‘thought it not impossible’ ”. 4 Thus the course 
taken by the published correspondence was far from fortuitous. Yet 
the editor knew from his Prague correspondent on the spot, e.g. in 
a letter written on March 18 5 — and in any case the British Govern- 
ment’s own information unquestionably left no doubt 6 — that Nazi 
Germany meant “to break up this country” (Czechoslovakia), and 
that the Sudeten Germans “are certainly one of the best treated minori- 
ties, now”. Obviously, in these circumstances, to talk of plebiscites and 
federalisation was to delude public opinion in Britain and to ease the 
Germans’ task. We have already seen how in the second half of 
March the Germans launched their propaganda campaign about the 
“ill-treatment” of the German-speaking minority, and how four days 
after Chamberlain’s speech, Hitler gave instructions to Hcnlcin pre- 
cisely in keeping with The Times correspondent’s war ning , 

But there was much else in the same sense going on behind the 
scenes of British diplomacy. 

From the moment that Hitler occupied Austria the British Govern- 
ment’s first concern was to prevent France doing anything to annoy 
him. On March 12 it informed the French Government that it was 
against raising the question of Austria before the League. 7 On the 
same occasion Lord Halifax began questioning the French Ambassador 
how his government proposed to help Czechoslovakia if Germany 
attacked her, since direct assistance would now be “much more diffi- 
cult than formerly”. The French reply (on April 9), agreeing on the 
difficulty, pointed out that things would be easier if other Central 
European and Danubian States co-operated — and for this they would 
need to be certain that the United Kingdom and France had a common 
will “to assure in Europe respect for international law and the right of 
nations to independence”. Franco-British staff talks were proposed. 8 
But no staft talks came. Meanwhile, the British Government again 
and again — on March 14, 15 and 22 — refused to give France any 
assurance of support if she came to the aid of Czechoslovakia. 9 And 

4 History of “The Times", vol. IV, part II, p. 919. 6 p . 9I? . 

6 On March 19 the British Minister at Prague reported that the Henleinite press was 

harping on the theme of “actual incorporation in the Reich” ( D.B.F.P. , vol. I, p. 71). 

7 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 32. 8 JJW., pp. 36> I44 ^. e Ibi( j t pp. 50> 52 _ 3( g 4 . 


“without WAR AND without delay’’ 79 

by the time Chamberlain spoke on March 24, Lord Halifax had on 
March 22 told the French Ambassador that Litvinov’s proposal (for 
consultations on how to stop aggression) had not “any great value”: 
to Maisky, two days later, he said that it would not have “such a 
favourable effect on the prospect of European peace”. 10 Instead, Lord 
Halifax was proposing joint Anglo-French pressure on the Czechs 
for a “solution of the German minority question” which would satisfy 
the German Government. 11 What kind of pressure? The threat of 
isolation: if Chamberlain on the 24th conveyed it in a delicate and 
muffled form, Mr. Newton in Prague had, three days earlier, made 
it more bluntly in a talk with President Belies: “I observed that Lord 
Baldwin had declared that Britain’s frontier lay on the Rhine, and 
that I thought it must be doubtful whether His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment would be prepared to extend it any further towards the East.” 12 

Then came the impulse of Hitler’s speech of March 28, with its 
talk of Germans being “tormented” on Germany’s border. This gave 
a new zest to the campaign against Czechoslovakia — on both sides 
of the Rhine. On April 1, Nevile Henderson from Berlin was press- 
ing that Benes should be made to “yield to Anglo-French advice” 
(i.e. to Hitler) by granting autonomy to the Sudeten districts and 
abandonment of the affiance with Russia. 13 In fact, Sir Samuel Hoare, 
the Home Secretary, had after consultation with Chamberlain and 
Vansittart given an “authoritative suggestion” to the Czechoslovak 
Minister in London, Masaryk, that Czechoslovakia should do its 
“utmost to meet the wishes of the German minority”, and should 
“invite British and French good offices”. The President and Govern- 
ment accepted the advice. 1 ' 1 Meanwhile, Newton objected on April 2 
to any suggestions to the Germans to be patient: “Strong pressure 
should continue to be maintained from the Reich as w'ell as from 
England, and if possible France.” 15 Henderson chimed in, on April 5 
— on receiving a copy of this message — that “the crux of the whole 

10 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 90, 101. 

11 Ibid., p. 87. This was three days after Newton’s report about “incorporation in the 
Reich”. 

12 Ibid., p. 75. This was an interesting example of the stratagems of diplomacy. 
Baldwin’s remark made in Parliament on July 30, 1934, had been made to show that, 
in the changed international situation, “when you think of the defence of England, 
you no longer think of the chalk cliffs of Dover”; i.e. that the defence begins a long way 
beyond the Channel. This was after eighteen months of the Hitler regime, before it 
had “launched out”. The vast changes in the European scene since then — particularly 
since the march into the Rhineland in early 1936 — might well have justified a yet further 
reappraisal of where Britain’s frontier lay: except on live assumption that what Hitler did 
m Central and Eastern Europe did not concern Britain. 

13 Ibid., p. 112. 14 Ibid., pp. 112-13. 16 Ibid., p. 114. 


8o 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


matter is the right of self-determination”; 16 and Newton’s response 
on the nth (the respective missions had copies of each other’s letters) 
made it clear that self-determination was not thought of as applying 
to the Czechs and Slovaks. Most probably Czechoslovakia would 
suffer “inclusion in the German orbit” anyway, and in any case Ger- 
many would expect abandonment of the Russian alliance. The British 
Government should press the Czechs, in fact, to accept “neutralisa- 
tion” by giving up its French and Soviet pacts, he argued next day. 17 

The whole world, of course, had recently witnessed in Austria what 
being “included in the German orbit” meant — and how well it went 
with “neutralisation”. But that did not worry Britain’s official repre- 
sentatives. True, Halifax replied that Germany should not be encour- 
aged to exert more pressure. However, his own dispatch indicated 
that they exerted it without asking him. 18 

On April 19 the first Czechoslovak proposals were handed to 
Newton and cabled to London. In fact, they went a considerable way 
towards eliminating the defects in the legal, budgetary and other 
rights of the minorities as such: but they did not grant territorial 
autonomy, for the very good reason that the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment would thereby be establishing outposts of the Hitlerite State 
on its territory — and very substantial ones too. 

But Henlein knew what he had to do — and his masters, after March, 
had a very good idea of what the British reaction would be. On 
April 24 he delivered his speech at Karlovy Vary, with the “Eight 
Points”. The Czechoslovak Government let both London and Paris 
know that the demands were unacceptable. A consultation of the 
British and French Governments was held in London on April 28 
and 29 to discuss the Czechoslovak and other questions. 19 The British 
side, on the first day, showed themselves very reserved about commit- 
ments to send troops to France in case of war, and also about military 
and naval staff talks between the two countries. When it came to 
Czechoslovakia, on the second day, it turned out that — for a variety 
of seemingly practical reasons — Czechoslovakia indefensible, Britain 
and France unprepared, doubtful whether the U.S.S.R. “could make 
any contribution at all” — the British Ministers wanted to force the 
Czechoslovaks to come to an agreement with Plcnlcin at all costs. 

16 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 1 1 5. It may be noted that on the same day, Newton reported, after a 
talk with F.iscnlohr, the German Minister in Czechoslovakia, that the Germans wanted “a 
loosening of the Sudeten German connection with Prague” merely in order to facilitate 
“the eventual detachment of these areas and their incorporation in the Germanic Reich” 
(ibid., pp. 116-17). 

17 Ibid., pp. 139, 151-5. ls Ibid., pp. 159-60. 19 Ibid., pp. 198-234. 


“without WAR AND without delay” 8l 

Halifax agreed that the “Eight Points” and the Czechoslovak pro- 
posals were very far apart, but borrowing the Henlein formula and 
attributing it to Benes, suggested that Czechoslovakia must become 
a “State composed of nationalities” instead of a national State with 
minorities. Chamberlain doubted whether Hitler really wanted to 
destroy Czechoslovakia: but even if he did, he couldn’t be stopped. 
They insisted that pressure on Benes might produce a compromise; 
but when Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, challenged them, 
Halifax admitted that they would not undertake to join in defence 
of Czechoslovakia even if Benes offered concessions which the British 
Government found reasonable. Daladier pointed out again and again 
the real aims of Hitler — to wipe out Czechoslovakia as a step to further 
aggression — and the danger in delaying action until Germany was 
far stronger by her absorption of Central and Eastern Europe. 

However, the British Ministers stood firm against any commitments 
to France — and possibly they knew that the French Ministers would 
be pleased enough to have this excuse for avoiding the fulfilment of 
their obligations, as will be shown later. Finally, the French ceased to 
insist. The conference agreed to urge “maximum concessions” upon 
the Czechoslovak Government, and restraint and patience upon Hitler. 

Flow did the British Government set about carrying out the deci- 
sions of the conference (which, of course, were kept secret)? First, 
on the very same evening, April 29, Lord Halifax called in Kordt, 
the German Charge d’ Affaires, to assure him that when the com- 
munique spoke of a decision to continue staff talks, this did not mean 
that Britain was taking on any new obligations; and that he wanted 
to continue “fruitful” collaboration with Ribbentrop (recently pro- 
moted from London Ambassador to Foreign Minister). The same was 
said immediately afterwards to Grandi, the Italian Ambassador. 20 
From this evident anxiety to disavow any new measures of military 
preparation, the two Fascist Governments could draw the conclu- 
sion that Britain continued to refuse support to France if Czecho- 
slovakia were attacked. 

On May 2, The Times diplomatic correspondent reported that 
Prague would be advised to accept as much as possible of the de- 
mands put forward at Karlovy Vary by Henlein as would be “con- 
sistent with the dignity of an independent State enjoying a democratic 
constitution”. But the concessions should include autonomy for the 
German-speaking areas, and also for the Germans “living scattered 
in other areas”. Negotiations for a settlement “might then become 
20 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 235; D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 246-9. 



p 


82 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


WITHOUT WAR AND WITHOUT DELAY 


possible.” This was nothing else than the idea of a “unified legal 
personality” of all German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, di- 
rected by a separate governing body, which Henlein put forward at 
Karlovy Vary and which was a typical wrecking proposal, of the 
kind agreed upon with Hitler. Nothing of the kind had been agreed 
upon in the Anglo-French conversations, in fact. But the diplomatic 
correspondent of The Times, the editor of which was an intimate 
friend of the Prime Minister, could only be regarded as an unofficial 
government mouthpiece on this question, at such a time. 

Thus the world was given to understand that the Western Powers 
already were conceding the possibility of disrupting the internal unity 
of the Czechoslovak State — particularly through the suggestion of a 
special position for individual Germans (over and above their equal 
rights with other citizens under the Czechoslovak constitution) : and 
this was only to create the possibility of negotiations. The policy of 
leading the Czechs on to successive concessions, by alternate cajoling 
and threats, and without any guarantee in return, had begun. 

On May 4 the appropriate instructions were sent to the British 
Ambassador at Berlin and the Minister at Prague. Henderson was to 
tell the Germans that representations were being made to the Czecho- 
slovak Government to give the best possible concessions, to ask them 
to restrain Henlein and to find out from them what they themselves 
wanted. He was not to tell them what the British Government was 
recommending to Prague. 21 I11 fact, however, he did tell them on 
May 7 that his Government favoured a “State of Nationalities”. 22 
On May 9 Henderson’s deputy, Mr. Kirkpatrick, informed the Ger- 
man Foreign Office (according to its record) that “if the German 
Government would advise the British Government confidentially 
what solution of the Sudeten German question they were striving 
after, he believed he could assure us that the British Government 
would bring such pressure to bear in Prague that the Czechoslovak 
Government would be compelled to accede to the German wishes”. 23 
The Germans were delighted — but would not tie themselves down 
by saying what they really wanted. They only threatened to inter- 
vene if the “Eight Points” were rejected and bloodshed followed. 24 
In the previous chapter reference was made to the confirmation of 
these threats by Ribbentrop on the same day (May 17) in conversa- 
tion with the French Ambassador. 

As far as Prague was concerned, Newton was instructed on May 4 

21 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 243-6. 22 ibij ' p< 26o 

23 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 265. 24 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 284-6. 


to press for immediate conversations with the Henleinites, with 
the aim of creating a “State of Nationalities”. In his meeting with the 
Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Krofta on May 7, he drew on the 
darkest colours in which to draw the situation of Czechoslovakia. 
Krofta would not abandon the principles of the constitution, however 

nor would the Prime Minister Plodza on May 11 and President 

Benes on May 17. This w r as very vexing for the British Minister, as 
his dispatches show: on one occasion (May 7) he actually threatened 
Krofta that “public opinion in Britain would not tolerate a gamble in 
such matters”. 25 

The fact was, the Czechoslovak leaders made it plain to him, talk- 
ing publicly of a “State of Nationalities” would encourage the Ger- 
mans to make such further demands as would involve “complete 
capitulation”. The Germans “wanted once again to be masters”, said 
Krofta. If the British Government’s views on the military and eco- 
nomic situation were accepted, said Benes, “the only thing was to 
accept German domination with as good grace as possible”. 

2. Chamberlain s Interview 

Benes did not know that he was speaking to a man who, more 
than a month before, had declared his conviction that that precise 
outcome — “inclusion in the German orbit” — was inevitable. 

But the Czechoslovak leaders must by now have had no doubt 
that, broadly speaking, the British Government was already prepared 
to hand them over to the tender mercies of Hitler — or, what amounted 
to the same thing, to disrupt their territory, their fortifications and 
their means of self-defence. For on May 14 there appeared in the 
New York Times a message from a London journalist, “Augur” (a 
Russian emigre, Poliakoff), saying: “Mr. Chamberlain to-day, with- 
out prejudice naturally to the rights of the principal interested parties 
to decide for themselves, certainly favours a more drastic measure — 
namely separation of the German districts from the body of the 
Czechoslovak Republic and the annexation of them to Germany.” 
The next day the New York Herald Tribune published a message from 
a Canadian journalist, Joseph Driscoll (it also appeared in the Montreal 
Daily Star ) saying he w r as privileged “to shed what can truly be called 
official light on the real British attitude towards Czechoslovakia”. 
The accuracy of his information, he said, “cannot be disputed”. His 
information was (») that the British did not expect to fight for Czecho- 
slovakia, and did not think France or Russia would cither; (//) that 

26 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 263-4, 265-71 (Krofta), 282-3 (Hodia), 307 -9, 3x1, 3*3-15 (Benes). 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


84 

being so, “the Czechs must accede to the German demands, if reason- 
able” ; (111) as Henlein’s followers were “scattered along a long irregular 
border”, they could not be gathered into one solid autonomous area; 
(/V) therefore, “frontier revision might be advisable. This might entail 
moving the frontier back for some miles to divorce this outer fringe 
from Prague and marry it to Berlin”; (v) “A smaller but sounder 
Czechoslovakia would be the result. . . . Czechoslovakia cannot sur- 
vive in its present form, the British are convinced”; (W) Hitler posi- 
tively did not want any foreigners; (vii) even if there were a victorious 
war on behalf of the Czechs, their allies “would insist that the Czechs 
disgorge their alien minority”; (viii) Britain “would like to swing 
Germany and Italy into a working agreement with Britain and France 
to keep the peace of Europe. Soviet Russia is excluded.” 

Only after heated discussions in the House of Commons on June 20, 
21 and 27 — in which there was much quibbling over whether there 
had been a luncheon or a dinner, whether a talk was an interview, 
etc. — did it emerge that these messages (and others) were written after 
Neville Chamberlain had talked, “off the record”, with a group of 
American and Canadian journalists on the subject, at a luncheon which 
Lady Astor had arranged in her house on May to. It took some time 
for the reports to come back to London, and during the subsequent 
month the British Government did not attempt to deny them. Thus 
it was amply confirmed in public (as it was already clear to interested 
parties in secret) that the British Government, while pretending to 
act as the honest friend of Czechoslovakia, had in reality accepted 
the standpoint of the Nazi aggressor; and consequently that the pur- 
pose of all the diplomatic activity of its officials was to help him to 
dismember her. This was behind all the talk of a “State of Nation- 
alities”. The effect of the loss of the fortified borders on the future 
fate of Czechoslovakia was ignored, or rather deliberately misrepre- 
sented. And the whole operation was linked with a Four-Power plan 
to keep European peace— one which, as it excluded the U.S.S.R., 
could not fail to encourage Hitler’s next aggression to turn in that 
direction. 

All this may not have been known to Flenlein when he came to 
London again for his three-day visit on May 12, and cooed like any 
sucking dove when speaking of what he wanted— local autonomy 
only, the Czechs to continue to hold the frontier, freedom for all 
parties in the autonomous districts, etc. It was a programme which 
he never put forward in Czechoslovakia itself. But the purpose of such 
a manoeuvre was to underline how “moderate” he was in the face of 


“without war and without delay’’ 85 

“ill-treatment”, and the comments of even men like Vansittart 26 
(“more reasonable and amenable than I had dared to hope”) show 
he was relatively successful. It was during this visit that the “Sudeten 
German Defence Corps” was formed: and immediately after it Keitel 
produced a final revised plan for “Operation Green”. 27 

An indication of how enthusiastically the immediate intimates of 
the British Prime Minister reacted to Henlein’s activities, however, 
was given in an editorial in The Times on May 16, which in essence 
stated, four months in advance, the position taken up by Mr. Chamber- 
lain at the height of the crisis in September. The Times said that no 
limit could be predicted to the upheaval which would be provoked 
by violent measures — the kind of bint of British opposition, if Ger- 
many went to war, which British diplomats had long been giving in 
private. But the Czechs must be prepared for “the maximum of con- 
cessions now”, they should act on the assumption that “the majority 
of the three and a half million Sudeten Germans would vote for union 
with the Reich”, and Czechoslovakia might be neutralised, giving up 
its pacts with France and the U.S.S.R. 

Small wonder that Hitler responded by beginning the concentra- 
tion of troops on the Czechoslovak border. The Czechoslovak reply 
— the mobilisation of one class of reservists, and of certain categories 
of specialist troops on May 20-21 — was a complete surprise for the 
British Ambassador in Berlin and the British Minister in Prague, who 
did not conceal their indignation. 28 The French and British Govern- 
ments, however, were obliged to reckon with the new situation, and 
gave the necessary warnings to Germany, with the result that there 
was no war. 29 

A significant passage in one of Lord Halifax’s messages that day, 
which was intended for Ribbentrop personally, was that in the event 
of a war involving the Great Powers, “only those will benefit from 
such a catastrophe who wish to see the destruction of European civili- 
sation”— a delicate allusion to the U.S.S.R., with whom— if Lord 
Halifax’s fears of war proved justified — Britain would find herself in 
alliance. This must have spoken volumes to the Nazi leaders : if they 
were being begged to save Britain from alliance with the U.S.S.R., 
what blessings Lord Halifax would call down for them if they set 

20 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 630-3. 27 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 299-303. 

28 Henderson even told the Germans “in confidence” on May 22 that “the French 
Government had taken grave exception to the calling-up of Czechoslovak reserves” 
( D.B.F.P. , vol. I, p. 346). 

29 Henderson had several conversations with Ribbentrop on May 21, warning him 
of British intervention being likely if France was involved. (Ibid., pp. 3 2 y- 3 !> 33 I-2 » 
334 - 5 - Halifax’s message is on p. 341.) 


86 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

out instead on an anti-Soviet crusade ! But, as Hitler admitted at the 
Nuremberg Congress on September 12, he decided on May 28 to 
go ahead with preparations for the “solution” of the Czechoslovak 
problem in the course of 1938: and the necessary change in “Opera- 
tion Green” was made by the 30th. As we have already seen, German 
pressure was resumed very shortly. So was the pressure of Britain 
and France. 

It is worth noting that, on May 26, Mr. Newton reported the im- 
pression which the United States military attache in Prague formed 
as a result of talks with officials of the German Legation there — that 
they “had expected a coup over the week-end”, but that it would 
have meant war with England, “and for that Germany was not pre- 
pared”. Newton himself wrote, next day, that “the Germans prob- 
ably did intend to move against Czechoslovakia last week-end”. 

There was no foreign correspondent in Czechoslovakia during the 
ensuing three or four weeks but could bear witness, in the German- 
speaking districts, despite the local election campaign, to the fantastic 
degree of freedom enjoyed by the Henlcin party. The German press 
was nevertheless filled again and again with the most shameless reports 
of persecution and brutality suffered by the population at the liands 
of the Czechs. The Hcnleinitcs broke offnegotiations with the Govern- 
ment on May 21, asserting that peace and order were not guaranteed. 
The British Government at once began to exert every kind of pres- 
sure on the Czechoslovak Government to dismiss the reservists whose 
timely mobilisation had saved the situation on May 21. At this period, 
too, members of the British Legation in Prague were quite openly 
telling journalists that “Sudeten Deutschland must go back to Ger- 
many” (!), that Dr. Bcnes, the President of the Republic, was far too 
friendly with the Bolsheviks, that the only statesmanlike people were 
the Agrarian Party, because they stood for a v Customs Union with 
Germany, that the Minister of the Interior Cerny (who gave full 
freedom of activity to the Henleinites, while prohibiting any counter- 
activities of the democratic parties) was the real man to lead Czecho- 
slovakia, and so forth. 30 

The negotiations were resumed (May 27) and a few days later the 
soldiers began to return home. Meanwhile, Lord Halifax personally 
took up with the Czechoslovak Minister the former proposal about 
his country being neutralised” — its status “guaranteed by the neigh- 
bours of Czechoslovakia and only taken note of by other Powers”. 31 

30 The writer was in Prague, on a journalistic assignment, at the time. 

31 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 378-9. 



“WITHOUT WAR AND without delay” 87 


A State guaranteed by Nazi Germany, alone among the Great Powers, 
and by such powerful and reliable guarantors as Poland and Hungary 

t hj s W as precisely “inclusion in the German orbit”. As for the other 

powers, if all their obligations amounted to was to “take note” of 
Czechoslovakia’s neutrality (after abandoning their obligations under 
the League Covenant and the Franco-Czechoslovak mutual assistance 
treaty), they could be relied upon equally to “take note” of Germany’s 
ending it by annexing the country altogether. The Czechoslovak 
Government would not, of course, touch such a perfidious proposal 
—though they did not know that, during Mr. William Strang’s visit 
to Prague, on behalf of Lord Halifax (May 26 and 27), he confessed 
to Newton that there was no question of a guarantee to such a “rump” 
of Czechoslovakia as would be left once they had lost their fortified 
borderlands: 32 and that later (June 9), when the French took Lord 
Halifax at his word, he objected strongly to any plan “which would 
require Great Britain to guarantee Czechoslovakia”. 33 

On June 3 The Times had in a leading article once again announced 
to all the world that Chamberlain — and presumably the other mem- 
bers of the British Government — stood as before on the side of the 
Germans. It said that the majority of Englishmen probably agreed 
“that the Germans of Czechoslovakia ought to be allowed, by plebis- 
cite or otherwise, to decide their own future — even if it should mean 
their secession from Czechoslovakia to the Reich”. This would leave 
in Czechoslovakia “a homogeneous and contented people”, and her 
neighbours would “lose any sort of claim to interfere” in her affairs 
(the editorial did not say how that would stop them doing so, nor 
who would stop them if they did). Such an outcome, it added, would 
be “rectification of an injustice left by the Treaty of Versailles” (as 
though these German-speaking citizens of Austria-Hungary up to 
1918 had ever formed part of Germany). 

This editorial aroused many protests, including one from John 
Walter, a co-proprietor of The Times. 34 He said the article advocated 
“the cause of the wolf against the lamb, on the ground of justice. 
No wonder there is rejoicing in Berlin” — and pointed out that the 
writer did not mention the cruelties that would overtake the minori- 
ties handed over to the Nazis, and seemed “to have forgotten all too 
soon the rape of Austria”. The really astonishing event, however, was 
that Lord Halifax should have thought it worth while to cable Prague, 
Paris and Berlin, denying that the article in any way “represents 

32 D.B.P.P., vol. I, pp. 403-4. 33 Ibid., p. 458. 

34 History of “The Times”, vol. IV, part II, pp. 921-2. 


88 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

the views of His Majesty’s Government”. As we have seen, the 
whole American and Canadian public had been aware since Chamber- 
lain’s interview was published on May 14 and 15 that on the contrary 
it did exactly represent those views. Of course, Lord Halifax may 
not have anticipated that this would come out a fortnight later, in 
the House of Commons! Moreover, on Wednesday evening, June 1, 
Chamberlain had had another off-the-record talk with selected joum- 
alists (British, this time), and the German Ambassador’s press adviser 
rightly surmised that the leading article did no more than reflect the 
views he expressed. 36 

On June 7— whether encouraged by knowledge of The Times edi- 
torial or not — Henlein produced his “Fourteen Points”: and speeches 
threatening military action against Czechoslovakia were made by 
Goebbels on May 29 and Hess on June 12. The Times — that is, Neville 
Chamberlain s reply was another leading article on June 14, defend- 
ing Czechoslovakia against the charges of oppression of her German- 
speaking citizens, but returning to talk of “the errors of 1919” and 
once again declaring: The only question that really matters (!) is: Do 

they wish to remain where they arc? Or have they a wish to belong 
somewhere else?” Naturally, such expressions of opinion were not 
calculated to abate the “violent press and wireless campaign in Ger- 
many against Czechoslovakia which was going on in spite of the 
negotiations with the Henleinites and on which the Foreign Secretary 
himself remarked in a cable to Henderson next day. 36 

The whole of the following month secs recorded in British official 
correspondence unremitting pressure on the Czechoslovaks— demands 
by Newton appear, for example, on June 21, 22, 26, 28, four repre- 
sentations in seven days — -with the British representative playing for 
all he was worth on the political differences between the Prime 
Minister, Hodza, leader of the Agrarian Party notorious for its yearn- 
ing for German markets, and the “National Socialist” Party of Presi- 
dent Bencs and the Foreign Minister, Krofta. The attitude of the 
British Ambassador in Berlin speaks for itself: the Czechs should 
get a real twist of the screw . . . we have got to be disagreeable to 
the Czechs ’ (July 18): “We can regard no scheme as comprehensive 
that is not based on a form of federalism” (July 19, i.e. on giving the 
Nazis of Czechoslovakia a territory all to themselves to prepare as 
a jumping-off ground for Hitler): the Czechs are “an incorrigibly 
pigheaded people (July 20) : “the Jews and Communists everywhere” 
were among “the extremists” supporting the Czechs, and “there can 
35 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 399-401. 3 « D.B.F.P., voL I, p. 485. 


“without WAR and without delay’’ 89 

never be appeasement in Europe so long as Czechoslovakia remains 
the link with Moscow and hostile to Germany” (July 22) — and so on, 
ad nauseam . 37 

On July 17 and 18 Hitler’s confidential assistant, Captain Wiede- 
mann, was in London, to assure the British Government that Hitler 
was not at present planning the use of force, but that he might if there 
were bloodshed; and to persuade the British Government to invite 
Goering to London for all-round talks. The British Government, said 
Chamberlain to the German Ambassador afterwards, would welcome 
the proposal, providing the atmosphere in regard to Czechoslovakia 
were “as favourable as possible”: which would mean renouncing the 
use of force. 38 Lord Halifax went further in his talk with Wiedemann 
on the morning of the 18th (if the German record is to be trusted): 
while also insisting that there could be an improvement of relations 
with Germany only if she could give an under taking not to use force, 
“it would be the proudest moment of his life when the Fiihrer rode 
down the Mall with the King during an official visit to London”. 39 
Allowing for exaggerations permissible in diplomacy, such an atti- 
tude — after Spain and Austria — might appear to be spreading the 
butter too thick not to have the effect of giving at least some modest 
encouragement to the Germans. “You shall have the German-speaking 
areas with the Czechoslovak fortifications”, Hitler had now been told. 
“You can have the Czechs isolated, without their alliances.” “You can 
have a Four-Power agreement to maintain peace in Europe — and the 
U.S.S.R. is not Europe.” “You can even ride through London in 
triumph”, it was now added — only please don’t use force. It should 
be added that Lord Halifax’s remark about the Mall is all the more 
probable because — although the British record of the interview does 
not mention the phrase — it docs state that at the end of the talk the 
Foreign Secretary asked Wiedemann when Hitler or Goering would 
find it convenient to come: to which Wiedemann replied that he 
thought it could not be before the autumn. 40 

Evidently, too, some draft agreement on the subject was prepared 
(as an experienced Soviet historian and former Ambassador has pointed 
out). 41 The collection of Foreign Office papers contains a strange 
summary of the Halifax-Wicdcmann talk sent to the Germans by 
Sir Alexander Cadogan (Permanent Under-Secretary of State) through 
Wiedemann. It mysteriously begins in the middle, as it were — “On the 

37 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 584-9, 598, 604, 615, 618. 38 Ibid., pp. 618-20. 

39 D. & M. t vol. II, p. 179. 40 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 588. 

41 B. E. Stein, Burjuaznye Falsifikatory Istorii (Moscow, 1951), p. 105. 


THF. MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


90 

other hand . . .”: and the editors say in a footnote that they were 
unable to find the first part in the archives. 42 But the part that is 
printed does contain, in its last paragraph, the statement that “it might 
be impossible to keep any such visit, especially if it were of an im- 
portant personage, secret”'. Yet the rest of the printed text of the 
summary does not contain any other reference to a visit. One can 
only assume that tliis was mentioned in the first section which con- 
tained the first part of the bargain, whatever it was — probably not 
only a record of the invitation to Hitler, but something more which 
it proved convenient for the Foreign Office to “lose” (the British 
newspapers at the time were very angry, because they learned of the 
proposed visit only through a “leak” in the foreign press). 

3. The Runciman Story 

One dung is certain— that on July 18 a definite decision was taken 
to send a “mediator” to Czechoslovakia. As early as April 9, Lord 
Halifax had first hinted that, in case of n ecessity, the British Govern- 
ment might offer a “special investigator”. 43 Tliis was again treated as 
a possibility at the end of May. 44 On June 18 he notified Mr. Newton 
that he was definitely considering the offer of “an independent British 
expert who would try to reconcile the two parties”, if there were 
a breakdown. 45 At that time Benes would not consider the sugges- 
tion; but hi the second week of July the German demands were 
becoming increasingly brazen. On July 13 The Times leading article 
once again proclaimed that “the wishes of the nationalities themselves 
ought to be the determining factor, and no solution should be con- 
sidered too drastic which is desired by an overwhelming majority”. 
That day and the next, the Hcnleinites certainly proposed some drastic 
“solutions”. On the 13 th, their leader Frank told British Legation 
officials that they wanted the right to maintain an armed self-defence 
corps in the autonomous region on which they were insisting, with 
freedom to display the Nazi flag and portraits of Hitler, and to have 
history teaching in the schools based on the Nazi “world-outlook”: 
while in the rest of Czechoslovakia German-speaking citizens were 
to have a special status. The next day Eisenlohr, the German Minister, 
repeated this demand— in the shape of “a corporate status” for their 
nationality— with a new one: that German should be a compulsory 
language taught in the schools, with Czech. 46 Evidently the open 
break was approaching. 

42 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 589. 43 ibid., p. 138. 

44 Ibid p. 401. 45 Ibid., p. 501. 46 ibid., pp . 555-6, 559 . 


“without war and without delay” 9 1 

On July 14, Lord Halifax discussed with the French Ambassador in 
London the idea of sending a mediator, and told Newton to warn 
Benes that tliis proposal might be made. 47 On the 16th, he added 
that Lord Runciman — a wealthy shipowner, President of the Board 
of Trade in the “National Government” of 1931 (in which Chamber- 
lain had been Chancellor of the Exchequer), experienced for that 
reason in dealing with industrial disputes, and hke Chamberlain totally 
ignorant of Czechoslovak affairs but predisposed, as a successful busi- 
ness man, to respect the Germans— had agreed to be an “independent 
mediator”. 48 Now, on the 18th, Lord Halifax instructed Newton to 
inform Benes that Runciman’s services were offered. He would be 
“quite independent of His Majesty’s Government”, and his work 
would be “by his advice and influence to maintain contact between 
the two parties or to restore it in the event of a breakdown”. 49 

Thus Runciman would have all the prestige of having been nomi- 
nated by the British Government, without the latter bearing the 
slightest responsibility for his actions or his suggestions. This was 
underlined again and again during the days after his going had been 
made public, hi Paris, where Lord Halifax discussed the matter with 
the French Premier and the Foreign Minister on the 20th, he stressed 
that his government’s responsibility would “begin and end . . . with 
turning him loose in Prague to make the best he could of the busi- 
ness”. 50 I11 the House of Lords, after the Czechoslovak Government 
had been bullied into accepting the proposal (on the 23rd) and the 
acceptance had been published (on the 25th), Lord Halifax quoted 
on the 27th, and answered in the affirmative, Runciman’s own words: 
“I quite understand. You are setting me adrift in a small boat in mid- 
Atlantic” — which did not prevent a senior member of the Foreign 
Office, Ashton-Gwatkin, being attached to Runciman’s mission and 
reporting regularly to the Foreign Office, through the British Lega- 
tion in Prague, during liis stay: or Runciman himself rendering his 
final report to the Prime Minister ! 

The word used just now was “bullied”. In fact, Benes on hearing 
of the proposal on the 20th, “seemed greatly taken aback and much 
upset” at such far-reaching intervention”. 61 But the British Govern- 
ment had a trump card. If the Czechoslovak Government did not 
accept the proposal, Newton was to say that, should negotiations later 
on seem about to break down, the offer and the refusal would be 

47 D.B.F.P., voL I, p. 559. 48 Ibid., p. 567- 49 Mid., pp. 581-3. 60 Ibid., pp. 601-3. 

61 Ibid., pp. 600-1. Mr. Whceler-Bennctt, who talked with President BeneS, writes 
that he “regarded as polite blackmail the manner in which he had been asked to receive 
Lord Runciman” ( Munich , Prologue to Tragedy, p. 81). 


WITHOUT WAR AND WITHOUT DELAY 


93 


92 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


published. That is, the British Government would ostentatiously draw 
its skirts aside from Czechoslovakia and— so far as it could— leave 
Czechoslovakia politically isolated. So confident was it that this threat 
would succeed, that Newton was told to crack the whip once more, 
and suggest that Prague should “bring themselves to request our help 
m tins matter”— with the insinuation that this would have a “favour- 
able effect on pubhc opinion”. Thus the Czechoslovak Government 
was itself to ask for the poison chahcc ! 

After this, Neville Chamberlain had the audacity to say in the House 
of Commons on July 26, when the Runciman mission was debated, 
that (1) it had been sent “in response to a request from the Govern- 
ment of Czechoslovakia”, («) Runciman would be “independent of 
His Majesty’s Government”, (in) there was “no truth” in “the rumour 
that we arc hustling the Czech Government”. 52 These three barefaced 
lies are some measure of the spirit in which the British Government 
was conducting itself in the summer of 1938. 

By this time (July 23), as a long message from Prague to the Con- 
servative Paris Temps put on record (July 24), the Czechoslovak 
Government had offered terms which gave the Henleinites 70 per 
cent, of their demands. The draft nationalities and administrative re- 
form bills established provincial diets, with special rights for the 
national groups within them, which “compared favourably with”— 
actually went far beyond — local government rights in Great Britain. 
The Henleinites, working on the principles agreed with Hitler in 
March, would in any case have rejected them and asked for more. 
But after the name and proposed mission of Lord Runciman had 
leaked out on the 24th, they had official British encouragement to do so. 

Then began the Runciman phase”, characterised, on the one hand, 
by the utmost precautions to veil in secrecy Lord Runciman’ s conver- 
sations with the various parties— which might have brought out before 
the whole world the insolent aggressiveness and unreasonableness of 
Henlcin and, on the other hand, by pubhc emphasising of Lord 
Runciman’s friendly feelings for the Nazis, in one week-end after 
another (or other period) spent at the castles of their titled supporters. 53 

62 pus had been made public, that very morning, in messages from the Prague corre- 
spondent of the Dady Telegraph and the Paris correspondent of the Mancheste^Guardian ; 
but the Prime Minister s brazen assurance disconcerted the Opposition critics. 

03 Among these were separate week-ends with Zdenko Kinsky and Ulrich Kinskv 
who had (as Mr. Wheeler-Bennett records, loc. dt. y p. 82) Henlcinite Storm-troopers guard! 

ZLZrJTT CeSC ™l A l S ™ 6 :md I3): and Frince Max von Hohcnlohe, whose 
ofX rCm r S , by mcmbers of the R unciman Mission “represented one 

of the most valuable political services rendered to the German Reich” (evidence of 
Frank at Nuremberg, quoted by Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 87). It was at his castle 


i < 


9 9 


At a dinner given by the British Legation in Prague (the German 
diplomatic documents record on August 18) Lady Runciman talked 
to Henlcinite officials of the “ Bolshevik influence in Czechoslovakia” 
and revealed her “remarkable understanding for the Sudeten Ger- 

99 54 

mans . 

Moreover incidents like the following constantly occurred. On 
August 24 Benes submitted his third plan to the Henleinites (providing 
for the “cantonisation” of Czechoslovakia, at least three cantons to 
be German-speaking: the cantons to be autonomous, security forces 
would include local police: and many other concessions). The plan 
won from the British Cabinet, according to The Times diplomatic 
correspondent on August 29, the tribute that it imposed on the other 
side “the obligation to show the same conciliatory spirit”; the Daily 
Telegraph and Morning Post political correspondent wrote that “in the 
opinion of leading members of the Cabinet, the latest offer of the 
Czechoslovak Government of a new basis for negotiations represents 
the final hope of arriving at a peaceful settlement. ... It is a real and 
constructive effort.” 55 But on the 28th Frank, who had just seen 
Hitler, conveyed to Runciman the latter’s insistence that the Karlovy 
Vary demands be accepted as the basis for a settlement. Halifax, on 
this being reported, expressed on the 29th his “surprise” at such an 
attitude, after Benes’ new proposals, and suggested that Benes should 
publish their terms “in a general and discursive form”. When Benes 
obediently submitted his draft of this to Lord Runciman on the 30th, 
however, the latter denounced it as “a nine-page memorandum 
covered with bolt-holes and qualifications” : and on the 31st Halifax, 
switching round completely, attacked Benes in a cable to Newton 
as “playing fast and loose” — urging extreme pressure on Benes once 
again! 56 

It is true that Kundt also completely changed his attitude that day, 

that Runciman twice met Henlein. The Czechoslovak Minister in London, talking to 
Sir Alexander Cadogan on April 5, had told him “that it was precisely the aristocracy 
that had always most shamefully blackened our State and that their (the British) Ambas- 
sador in Berlin received all his information unfavourable to us from this source” (D. & M., 
vol. I, p. X04). Thus, if Lord Runciman did not know what he was doing, Mr. Ashton- 
Gwatkin certainly did. 

5i D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 593. 

66 The German Chargd d’ Affaires in Prague, on the 30th, reported that Frank had 
admitted that the proposals “could not be rejected out of hand”, and Kundt had said 
that “their realisation could in actual fact mean the fulfilment of the eight Carlsbad 
demands” {ibid., pp. 660-1). The German Charge d’Affaires in London, on the same 
day, said he had heared that day “from the best British source” that the Cabinet had 
“unanimously agreed that they corresponded largely to the Carlsbad demands” {ibid., 
p. 661). 

06 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 177, 180, 193. 


94 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


in a talk with Runciman on Benes’ draft— no doubt because he, too, 
had belatedly discovered Hitler’s attitude. 67 

On September i, Henlein went to see Hitler to show him the 
latest Bencs plan, at Runciman’s request, and to ask him to be good 
enough to approve of continued negotiations. Newton expressed the 
opinion that this must lead gradually to full British support of the 
Karlovy Vary proposals— “but I believe this to be inevitable”. 58 Need- 
less to say, Hitler told Henlein on the 2nd to continue with the pres- 
sure for the full demands: though Henlein watered this down, in 
talking with Ashton-Gwatkin two days later, to saying that there 
was a “possible basis” for discussions in the Benes plan. 59 What was 
more to the point, the other Hcnleinite leaders had on the 2nd, at 
a meeting with Benes, rejected the plan— or rather, introduced such 
amendments to it as would, in Benes opinion, stated to Newton, 
“amount to destruction” of the Czechoslovak State. However, they 
agreed to resume negotiations on September 5, after Henlein re- 
turned. 60 

Without waiting for Hcnlein’s return, however, the British repre- 
sentatives had returned to “extreme pressure” on Benes. O11 Sept- 
ember 2 Runciman told him that “if it came to a choice between the 
Carlsbad programme or war, he should be under no illusion as to 
what the British choice would be”. On September 3 Newton told 
Benes that his plan— so recently approved by the British Govern- 
ment was scanty and unconvincing” (!) and warned him that 
concessions now should go beyond the Karlovy Vary points, if neces- 
sary! It behoved Benes “to make all sacrifices necessary to preserve 
the existence of his country”, Runciman instructed him. 61 Well might 
Benes have repeated to them what Newton had reported to his chiefs 
as Czechoslovak opinion a month before — that “it is a question of 
how the Western Powers can save their own skins at the expense of 
the Czechs”. 62 This was a long way from the “dignity of an inde- 
pendent State enjoying a democratic constitution” which the Anglo- 
French conversations of April 28 had promised. The difference had 
been created by the threat of German violence. 

However, the Czechoslovak Government once again yielded. On 
September 4 Benes secured from the reluctant Henleinitc leaders — 
by asking them to dictate to him what they wanted, and writing it 
down as they dictated— a statement of their full demands. 63 The next 


1 voL n * PP- 68 ML, p. 200. 69 ibid pp . 659-60. 

“ Ib ' d - P- « J- 61 Ibid., P . 228. 62 ibid., P . 34. 

As stated by Bend to Gedyc, Vienna correspondent of the Daily Herald (published 
by that paper on October 8, 1945). 


“without war and without delay’’ 95 


day he worked with Runciman, who had prepared his own “plan” 
(practically accepting the principle of nationalities having a “cor- 
porate existence”, wherever their members were, on which the Nazis 
were insisting). By the evening of the 5th the “Fourth Plan” had 
been worked out and accepted by the Czechoslovak Government, 
despite its admission of territorial autonomy which — in those circum- 
stances — infallibly meant that Hitler’s stage-by-stage conquest of the 
country was as certain as the conquest of Austria. Benes told Runciman 
on the 6th that this plan “amounted to capitulation, and would in 


future years be regretted by Great Britain and France”. 64 

While the details of the plan were not revealed, some of its guiding 
principles were: and its origin was not a secret for the world. “It 
was on the pressing advice of British diplomacy that the Government 
of Prague has made this new sacrifice to peace”, reported the Prague 
correspondent of the Temps (September 8). “The British Legation in 
Prague has apparently been exerting great pressure on the Czechs 
during the last few days”, cabled the Prague correspondent of the 
Manchester Guardian. The Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, 
the Social-Democrat Bechync, said that the plan had been adopted 
“under extraordinary pressure by the foreign friends of Czecho- 
slovakia”. “Both London and Paris have given the plan their blessing 
and advised both sides to agree on it”, the Prague correspondent of 
The Times cabled to his newspaper on September 6. 


4. A “ Times’ Editorial 

But there were decisive influences, on both sides of the North Sea, 
which had no intention of allowing the two sides in Czechoslovakia 
to agree on it. Already, as early as the 6th, “diplomatic circles” in 
London were questioning if Hitler would accept anything less than 
the “fundamental demand” for the full freedom of application of the 
Nazi doctrine in the border (Sudeten) districts, reported the Daily 
Telegraph and Morning Post (September 7). Their views found authori- 
tative and startling expression the same morning in a notorious edi- 
torial in The Times to which reference has already been made. While 
admitting that the Benes Plan was very far-reaching, it said that if 
the “Sudeten Germans” were found to be “not at ease” within the 
Czechoslovak Republic, it might be worth while for the Czecho- 
slovak Government “to consider whether they should exclude alto- 
gether the project, which has found favour in some quarters, of 

64 D.D.F.P., voL II, p. 254. 


WITHOUT WAR AND WITHOUT DELAY 


96 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous State by the secession 
of that fringe of an alien population who are contiguous to the nation 
with which they arc united by race. . . . The advantages to Czecho- 
slovakia of becoming a homogeneous State might conceivably out- 
weigh the obvious disadvantages of losing the Sudeten German 
districts of the borderland.” 

The significance of such a statement by the known organ of the 
Prime Minister’s friends — its general drift coinciding, too, with that 
of the Chamberlain interview ofMay 10 65 — could be judged, accurately 
enough, by the welcome which it met in Germany, Italy and Japan, 
and the anger it aroused in Britain and many other countries. The 
Daily Telegraph and Morning Post expressed a widely-felt view on the 
other side when it wrote in an editorial the next day: “No more 
sinister blow could have been struck at the chances of a settlement.” 
In reality, as will have been seen, there had been no chances of any 
settlement except one 100 per cent, favourable to Hitler, so far as 
the British Government could help it, for months past. For the record, 
it should be mentioned that die Daily Mail and Daily Express sup- 
ported The Times: most other newspapers attacked it. 

Thereafter events took the now regular course. The fate of the 
Fourth Plan was described in the preceding chapter. The “providen- 
tial” incident at Moravska-Ostrava, mentioned earlier, gave the Hen- 
leinitcs the suitable pretext for breaking off negotiations on the new 
plan. The German press redoubled its ridicule of the plan and its 
vituperation of the Czechoslovak Government. In private, the British 
Government continued its policy of restraining France from renewing 
its commitments to Czechoslovakia. On September 9, while instruct- 
ing Henderson to warn the German Government that Britain “could 
not stand aside” if there were a general conflict precipitated by “re- 
course to force , Lord Halifax refused the French Ambassador’s 
request for a joint warning to Germany, saying he had “never been 
able to feel any sympathy for the argument that, if aggression were 
allowed to pass unresisted now, their turn would come next— 
this was an argument “in favour of a certain war now, against the 

6,1 The German Charge? d’ Affaires in London reported to his Government that it was 
probably inspired by Chamberlain (D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 723). While this may not be 
literally true the historians of The Times make an unknown leader-writer who drafted 
the article, and the editor who revised and passed it, directly responsible (op. cit., pp. 
929-32) it is perfectly dear that the editor, a constant associate of Chamberlain’s, on 
this occasion precisely reflected his views. Moreover, in a letter to Col. Astor (co- 
proprietor of The Times with John Walter), a week later, the editor wrote that “the 
Secretary of State (Halifax), who was lunching with me next day, did not seem at all 
to dissent from my views himself” (ibid . , p. 935). 


possibility of war, perhaps in more unfavourable conditions, later” 
( D.B.F.P . , vol. II, pp. 276, 277-8). Even when, on the 10th, the French 
Foreign Minister told the British Ambassador in Paris that, if there 
were an attack on Czechoslovakia, France would mobilise, and asked 
what Britain would do, Halifax replied (on the 12th) that the British 
Government “are unable to make precise statements of the character 
of their future action, or the time at which it would be taken, in 
circumstances that they cannot at present foresee”. 66 

I11 the midst of this, and of inspired rumours in the British news- 
papers of warnings to Hitler, the British Cabinet met during the 
week-end of September 10-11, the United States Ambassador, Mr. 
Attlee, Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden being demonstratively 
called in for consultation at various times. The upshot of it all was 
a statement made by the Prime Minister himself to lobby journalists, 
for publication as from “an authoritative source”, in the newspapers 
on Monday morning, September 12. 67 This statement made even more 
certain the fate of Czechoslovakia, so far as the British Government 
could influence it. 

The statement proclaimed the Bcncs plan (like its predecessors) to 
be “a basis of negotiation” — instead of the uttermost limit of conces- 
sion which it had been declared to be hitherto. It might be “modified 
to some extent” — -which was a clear indication that the British Govern- 
ment accepted the possibility of either separating the border territories 
from Czechoslovakia, or granting the Germans “corporative auto- 
nomy”, or some other modification carrying the concessions beyond 
the limit of Czechoslovak security. Lord Runciman was still available 
to conduct the necessary negotiations, ran the statement. There was 
no justification for the use of force. If force were used, it might involve 
France, and in that case Germany should not count on Britain keeping 
out of the struggle. 68 

Briefly, the significance of the statement was that if Hitler would 
only refrain from giving battle, the British Government undertook 
to present him with all he wanted of Czechoslovakia — “on a silver 
plate”, as an American journalist remarked at Geneva. There, on the 
occasion of the League Assembly, the representatives of fifty States 
were, for want of other interesting occupation, engaged in endless 
and uneasy speculation as to what might happen to them, in their 

<50 D.D.F.P., vol. n, p. 303. 

0 7 Chamberlain himself revealed that it was he who had made this statement— although 
of course the fact was widely known by then — in the House of Commons on Sept- 
ember 28. 

08 Full text reproduced in D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 680-2. 



98 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

turn, when Great Britain needed small change for her dealings with 
Hitler, Mussolini or Japan. 69 

The final stage, that of the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, was 
now reached. Under the impression of Hitler’s speech on the 12th, 
and of the outbreaks in the border districts organised with the help 
of storm troopers and police formations from across the border, the 
British Cabinet met in repeated sessions on September 13 and 14: 
on the night of the 13th Chamberlain cabled to Hitler, and informed 
the Cabinet next morning. On September 14, a Downing Street 
communique announced that he was going to Berchtesgaden, “with 
a view to trying to find a peaceful solution”. He came back with 
plans for the separation of the Sudeten districts, irrespective of the 
fortifications situated thereon. 

It is not unimportant that the Cabinet had before it, on September 16 
and 17, not only the Prime Minister’s report of what Hitler wanted 
but also Lord Rundman’s recommendations — and the reader will not 
be surprised after all the foregoing to find the two coinciding in all 
essentials. Runciman proposed ( D.D.RP ., vol. II, pp. 675-9) that all 
frontier districts where the “Sudeten population” (i.e. German-speaking 
ritizens of Czechoslovakia, large numbers of whom were not Nazis) 
were in “an important majority” should be transferred at once, with- 
out plebiscite, to Germany. The remainder should have local autonomy, 
but in addition “a represen tative of the Sudeten German people” (after 
the Sudeten borderland had gone !) should have a permanent seat 
in the Czechoslovak Cabinet”. By this means Rumanian smuggled 
in the principles of “corporate national entity” and the national 
spokesman , on which the Henlcinites had been insisting — and in 
addition made certain that the future weakened Czechoslovakia should 
have its Seyss-Inquart too ! As though to underline this point, Runci- 
man proposed that “parties and persons” who had been “deliberately 
encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czechoslovakia’s neighbours” 
should have their “agitations” forbidden— and if necessary prohibited 
by law. In other words, anti-Nazi parties — whether Liberal, Socialist 
or Communist, and there were several to which Runciman’s words 
would apply, to a greater or less degree — should be closed down. 
Moreover, Czechoslovakia should “remodel” her foreign relations— to 
assure her neighbours that she would “in no circumstances” attack them, 
or join any aggressive action against them “arising from obligations 

69 Lord Cecil had already made in semi-private the remark which he later put in 
print ( A Great Experiment, 1941, p. 306), and I heard it more than once at Geneva in 
September: Paying Danegeld is usually bad enough. But it is far worse if the funds 
are taken from someone else.” 


“without WAR AND without delay’’ 99 

to other States”. In plainer language, the pacts of mutual assistance 
against aggression with France and the Soviet Union should be 
made null and void — and not only the pacts: the League of Nations 
Covenant provided just another such obligation, and this meant that 
Czechoslovakia should leave the League, like Germany, or reduce 
her membership to a fiction, like Hungary. 

Dismemberment, reduction to impotence, nazification from within 
as the preliminary to annexation by Germany— such were the pro- 
posals of the “mediator” Runciman, running ahead even of Hitler’s 
demands at the time. They were, of course, a powerful reinforcement 
for Chamberlain in the British Cabinet discussions. In these (accord- 
ing to reports) there was opposition on principle from some Ministers 
to some points of the Hitler-Runciman proposals; but as they did not 
press their opposition to the practical conclusion of resignation, their 
opposition was of no account, and the proposals were endorsed. 

Discussions then followed with Daladier and Bonnet on the 18th. 
By this time, as described elsewhere, all kinds of threatening prepara- 
tions were being ostentatiously made in Germany, and the German 
press was full of the most vile abuse of, and savage menaces against, 
the Czechs. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak Government was re- 
quested by both Governments to postpone the mobilisation it had 
intended to proclaim. 70 

The French Ministers agreed without much difficulty to the detach- 
ment of the border regions, securing only a face-saving promise to 
Czechoslovakia of a “general guarantee” of the new frontiers, in 
consideration of her abandoning existing treaties. No one discussed 
how such “guarantees” could be put into effect, or what likelihood 
there was of Powers who would not fulfil their obligations when 
Czechoslovakia was well-armed and fortified keeping their promises 
when she was defenceless against any strong invader. Both Cabinets 
discussed the terms proposed on the 19th, and after some opposition 
accepted them. It is noteworthy that the plans were endorsed by both 
the British and French Governments, without being submitted to 
Parliament in either case. 71 They were then presented to the Czecho- 
slovaks later that day. When the latter on the evening of September 20 
rejected the terms, and offered to submit to arbitration under the 
German-Czechoslovak treaty of October 1925 (the Germans had only 
a few months ago agreed that it was still in force), the British Minister 

70 D.B.F.P., vol. n, p. 372. 

71 Chamberlain on the 20th refused a request from Mr. Attlee, as leader of the Opposi- 
tion, for*an immediate meeting of Parliament. 


100 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


asked for authority to “deliver a kind of ultimatum to President Benei> 
on Wednesday (September 21)”, because then “he and his govern- 
ment will feel able to bow to force majeure ”. 72 This was given him, 
and accordingly the British and French ministers in Prague forced 
themselves upon the President of the Republic in the small hours of 
the morning, to insist on withdrawal of the Czechoslovak refusal; 
and — by direction of Halifax — Newton warned the President that, if 
the terms were rejected, the Czechoslovak Government “must of 
course be free to take any action tliat they think appropriate to meet 
the situation that may thereafter arise”, 78 one of the traditional diplo- 
matic formula: for threatening to leave a country in the lurch. A dif- 
ferent formula — that there would arise “a situation for which the 
British Government could take no responsibility” — was produced by 
Earl Stanhope in the House of Lords on October 5 : but it meant the 
same thing. Moreover, Benes asked for time to consult his Govern- 
ment, promising the reply by mid-day (by 6.30 a.m. Hodza had 
unofficially telephoned his acceptance to Newton) 74 — and already at 
mid-day Newton was warning that, if there were no reply at once, 
the British Government “would not be willing to accept any respon- 
sibility for the consequences”. 75 

Under this severe pressure, reinforced by the explicit threat of the 
French Government that it would not fulfil its treaty obligations, the 
Czechoslovak Government surrendered. 

The Czechoslovak acceptance was notified at 5 p.m. on the 21st, 
and next morning Chamberlain left by air for his second meeting 
with Hitler, at Godesbcrg on the Rhine, to report his success. 

The process repeated itself up to the aid. When Mr. Chamberlain 
arrived at Godesbcrg, he appealed for orderliness to “everyone con- 
cerned”: in Parliament, on the 28th, he admitted what was the general 
interpretation — that this was an appeal to the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment, not to Henlein’s “volunteers”, who were daily raiding Czecho- 
slovak posts from over the border. And this explains why, when faced 
with Hider’s falsehoods about Czech “terror” against the German- 
speaking population of the regions it was proposed to detach, Chamber- 
lain actually proposed that the Hcnleinites themselves should be charged 
to keep order, perhaps under neutral supervision, until the transfer 
was completed. 

However, the point of Hitler’s demand was that the transfer itself 
should take place immediately, in the shape of occupation by the 
German army, without destruction of fortifications, without any 

72 D.B.F.P., p. 425. 73 Ibid,, p. 438. 74 Ibid., pp. 438-9. 75 Ibid., p. 440. 


“WITHOUT WAR AND without delay” ioi 

withdrawal of State or private property and without giving those who 
objected any opportunity to leave except in disorderly flight— thus 
raising the prestige of German armed might. He had the, maps all 
ready (and in secret, the police, Gestapo and other “civil” admini- 

An exchange of letters between Chamberlain and Hitler the follow- 
ing day 76 revealed that the British Prime Minister was ready to drop 
everything he had promised to the Czechs— protection of private 
persons, careful delimitation of the new frontiers by an international 
commission before cession, time for them to arrange exchange of 
population — and to accept Hitler’s new demands (immediate satis- 
faction of Polish and Hungarian claims, exclusion of Czech settlers 
since 1918 from the proposed plebiscite), providing only that the 
German army did not march in immediately. 

It was only “an unnecessary display of force that Chamberlain 
objected to, and only the dismemberment and disarmament of Czecho- 
slovakia “in an orderly fashion and free from the threat of force” 
that he wanted. For that reason, on the evening of the 23rd, the British 
Government, with the French, withdrew its advice to the Czecho- 
slovak Government not to mobilise. And for that reason, too, when 
at a second interview the same evening, IT tier made the “concession 
of postponing evacuation of the border districts from September 28 
to October 1, Chamberlain overcame his disappointment and pro- 
mised to transmit the demands to Prague. This time, however, he 
underlined that the British Government was acting “solely as an 
intermediary” and not insisting on acceptance. 

However, it is clear that in fact, in the British Cabinet on the 24th 
and 25th, Chamberlain attempted to persuade his colleagues to accept 
the Godesberg terms: and he was backed by messages like those from 
Phipps, the British Ambassador at Paris, on the 24th, that all that is 
best in France is against war”, and from Henderson in Berlin on the 
25th, demanding an ultimatum to the Czechs to accept the plan or 
forfeit claims to further support from the Western Powers” (the word 
“further” was probably unintentional humour). 77 Indeed, Chamber- 
lain’s own first impulse was to throw responsibility on to the Czecho- 
slovak Government. When he was asked, on the night of the 23rd, 
if the situation were hopeless, he replied: “1 would not like to say 
that. It is up to the Czechs.” 78 

7 « D.B.F.P pp. 482-3, 485-7. 77 Ibid; pp. 509-13, SI5-I6- 

78 Exchange message, reproduced in The Times, September 24 It was adding insult 
to injury”, wrote a familiar of Tory Cabinet Ministers (Thomas Jones, op. at., p. 410). 



102 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

The Godesberg proposals were only rejected after “long and anxious 
discussions” in the British Cabinet (Mr. Duff Cooper’s speech in the 
House of Commons on October 3). Duff Cooper himself, First Lord 
of the Admiralty, threatened resignation at one point: and it has been 
asserted that others like Halifax changed their minds. 79 But the decisive 
event was the Czechoslovak Government’s rejection, the text of which 
reached Downing Street on the afternoon of the 25th. This made 
the possibility of both France and Britain being drawn in, should 
Hider attack, a real one. All the arguments about their military weak- 
ness were repeated at a meeting of French and British Ministers on 
the evening of the 25th and the morning of the 26th — in which 
Chamberlain and Halifax were reinforced by two other members of 
the Inner Cabinet, wholehearted sympathisers with their policy: Simon 
and Hoarc. Chamberlain did his best to frighten the French by pointed 
questions about their capacity to defend themselves, the state of the 
French aircraft industry, and the prospects of “a rain of bombs on 
Paris”: he also referred to “very disturbing news about the probable 
Russian attitude”, which he said had been received. At a private 
meeting with Daladier and General Gamelin, chief of the French 
General Staff, early the following morning, Mr. Chamberlain received 
a more positive picture. 80 But he informed them (and later the full 
meeting) that he was sending Sir Horace Wilson (the Government’s 
chief industrial adviser, who had accompanied him to Bcrchtesgaden) 
with a final warning and appeal to Hitler. This was approved by both 
sides. 81 


5. The Great Manoeuvre 

The French and British Ministers exchanged guarantees of mutual 
support on September 26, in the event of Czechoslovakia being attacked : 
and Britain called up anti-aircraft and coast defence units. The same 
evening a statement was issued from the Foreign Office— on the initia- 
tive of Winston Churchill (who had seen Chamberlain and Halifax 
earlier in the day) and submitted by the head of the Press Department 

70 E.g. Whceler-Bennctt, op. tit., p. 140. Lord Halifax, in his own reminiscences, gives 
no direct hint of this. 

80 Published British official documents contain no record of this conversation. But 
Gamelin’ s notes show that he pointed out to Chamberlain that (i) France would start 
with nearly a hundred divisions, (») Germany, while enjoying air superiority, had an 
imperfect and incomplete army and was short of petrol, (1/1) Czechoslovakia had thirty 
divisions, fully trained, at her fortifications to face a maximum of forty German divi- 
sions. He was also able to add that that morning, in reply to an enquiry of his own, his 
chief of staff had had a message from Voroshilov, Soviet Defence Minister, through the 
Soviet military attache in Paris, that very large Soviet forces were ready to attack 
(Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, 1946, pp. 350-2). 

81 An account of the Anglo-French conference is in the British documents, pp. 520-41. 


“without war and without df.lay’’ 103 

to Halifax personally— stating that, if Germany attacked Czecho- 
slovakia, France must come to her help, “and Great Britain and Russia 
will certainly stand by France”. 82 

But this statement was issued without the knowledge of, or con- 
sultation with, the Soviet Government (Litvinov at Geneva told the 
writer this without hesitation). The first and only approach to the 
U.S.S.R. about Czechoslovakia since March — at Moscow on Sept- 
ember 2— had produced definite Soviet propositions for immediate 
consultation which had been ignored (as a later chapter will show). 
Consequently the statement was merely a gambler’s or poker move 
—to talk about Soviet co-operation, without any intention of pro- 
curing it, but in the hope of impressing Hitler. That this was so, is 
confirmed (for once) by the French Foreign Minister at the time, who 
recorded that Phipps, the British Ambassador, told him to treat the 
statement only as an attempt to impress Hitler that he could get all 
he wanted by negotiation. 83 Indeed, this was the whole point of 
Chamberlain’s letter to Hitler, presented by Wilson the same even- 
ing. And there were big inducements offered — an Anglo-German 
agreement aimed at “improving the economic position all round”, 
and for the two countries to act “as bulwarks against disruption, 
particularly from the East”. 84 

At the same time, pressure was resumed, even at tins critical moment, 
on the Czechs. When Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had received 
the Czechoslovak reply from Masaryk on the 25th (the latter reported 
to his Government the following day), the British Prime Minister 
was “sincerely astonished at the fact that we do not intend to with- 
draw our troops from the frontier fortifications. I underlined that 
only yesterday those fortifications were occupied by the troops on 
the advice of Britain and France themselves, and that we cannot 
evacuate them again to-day. This Chamberlain cannot understand. 
It is simply a misfortune that this stupid, ignorant and insignificant 
man should be British Prime Minister.” 85 However, the Czechoslovak 
Government on the 26th accepted an offer from Chamberlain of 
participation in an international conference to consider the Anglo- 
French plan of September 19 and the best way of applying it. On the 

82 Churchill, op. tit., p. 242. 

88 Bonnet, De Washington au Quai d’Orsay (1946), p. 273. According to Wheeler- 
Bennett, op. tit., p. 150, the B.B.C. “for technical reasons” did not broadcast the state- 
ment in German : but of course it was cabled by the news agencies. 

6 *D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 565-6. Curiously enough, neither Wheeler-Bennett nor the 
Chatham House Survey mentions this offer of an Anglo-German pact against the U.S.S.R 

85 Quoted in Berber, Dokumentc des Deutschen Friedenswillen (Essen, 194°). a collection 
issued by the German Government which included Czechoslovak archives. 



104 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

27th Lord Halifax sent a message to Bencs conveying Hitler’s reply 
to the message sent by Wilson: unless by 2 p.m. on the 28th the 
Czechs accepted the Nazi terms, German forces would invade “almost 
immediately”. Of course he wouldn’t presume to advise them — but 
they should know that “nothing that any other Power can do will 
prevent this fate for your own country and people”. 86 On the same 
day he was pressing the French— even if Hitler did attack Czecho- 
slovakia— not to declare war or take other offensive measures, likely 
to start a world war, without previous consultation or agreement”. 87 
As in fact the Anglo-French conference of the 25th and 26th had been 
an occasion for consultation and agreement on that very eventuality, 
Lord Halifax’s message was simply an attempt to use any last possi- 
bility remaining of sowing doubts in the mind of the French Govern- 
ment as to whether Great Britain would support them. 

On the night of the 26th, Mr. Chamberlain had followed up his 
private message to Hitler by a public one, in a broadcast pledging 
that the British Government (since Hitler did not trust the Czecho- 
slovak Government) would undertake to sec that the pledges given 
by President Bencs and his government would be “carried out fairly 
and fully”. All that was needed was that Hitler should agree to “transfer 
by discussion and not by force”. The following evening he showed 
that he meant this, by sending the Czechoslovak Government a long 
series of new proposals— for a German token occupation of certain 
territories on October 1: for an Anglo-German-Czech Committee 
to sit in the border districts and arrange for withdrawal of Czecho- 
slovak troops and entry of German troops, safeguarding of minorities, 
etc. : for the entry of British Legion units and (possibly) British troops; 
for subsequent negotiations to “revise Czechoslovakia’s present treaty 
relationships , etc. Tire alternative, Czechoslovakia was told, was in- 
vasion and dismemberment— and that, even after a war, she “could 
not be reconstituted in her frontiers, whatever the result of the conflict 
may be”. This scheme was communicated to the German Government before 
the Czechoslovak Government had any opportunity to discuss it (they 
accepted it only under protest, thirty-six hours later). 88 Thus the 
Germans had a demonstration that the British Government no longer 
regarded itself as under any special obligation of friendship or League 
Covenant commitments to Czechoslovakia. Nor was this all. 

Mr. Chamberlain, the same evening, made a broadcast in which he 
assured the British public that the handing over of the Sudeten dis- 
tricts would not only settle a “quarrel in a far-away country between 

86 D.D.F.P., vol. n, p. 570. 87 Ibid., pp. 575-6. 88 Ibid., pp. 572-3. 


“WITHOUT WAR AND WITHOUT DELAY” 105 

people of whom we know nothing”, but would also mean, according 
to Hitler’s promise which he believed, “the end of Germany’s terri- 
torial claims in Europe”. He endorsed, by implication, Hitler’s “in- 
dignation that grievances have not been met before”. All he objected 
to was Hitler’s demand for immediate occupation of the territories, 
which he thought “unreasonable”. To Hitler, Chamberlain repeated 
the assurances of a British guarantee that promises would be carried 
out, and an offer “to pay even a third visit to Germany”. Thus publicly, 
no less than through diplomatic channels, the Prime Minister was 
already speaking of Czechoslovakia au bout des dents, as the French say 

as though it were something with an unpleasant smell, to be kept 

at arm’s length and treated as such, if only Hitler would observe the 
minimum proprieties. A.R.P. preparations and the evacuation of 
school children, and the mobilisation of the Fleet ordered the same 
evening, drove home the lesson to the British people. 

Hitler would not have been the astute adventurer that he was if 
he had not responded to such an offer. Continuing to rattle the sabre 
as loudly as he could, he sent Chamberlain, that evening, Iris subtly- 
worded “reasonable” letter which has already been described, seem- 
ing to reply to the Czechs by arguments instead of abuse, and ending 
with the invitation to Chamberlain to “continue your efforts ... at 
the very last hour”. 

At this moment there arose precisely the situation which Ncvile 
Henderson, the British Ambassador in Berlin, had foreseen on August 2, 
in a letter to Strang discussing the possibility of a Four-Power Con- 
ference being called in the event of a deadlock. Strang (on July 30) 
had feared that by including Italy it might stiffen Germany’s attitude 
and “might make it difficult to exclude Russia from the Conference”. 89 
If there were a real crisis, things would be different, said Henderson. 
“There would be no question then of stiffening the German attitude; 
Italy would be coming in of her own volition solely to reduce its 
stiffness and to avoid war. In the middle of a crisis, there might be 
no time to invite Russia’s participation, or Poland’s, nor have either 
of those Powers any responsibility in the creation of Czechoslovakia. 
Let me quote an example of what I mean. The stages of a deadlock 
are the following: 

(a) Both parties refuse to abandon their principles. 

(fc) The Sudeten break off negotiations. 

(c) Germany starts mobilising on the ground of protection of their 
88 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 614. 


io6 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Sudeten kinsfolk, who have organised a general strike or are in 
actual revolt. 

(d) France also begins mobilising. 

“At (b), or more probably (c) or (d), Italy as the friend of Germany 
proposes to Great Britain as the friend of France to offer Anglo- 
i Italian mediation. 

“That is the Four-Power Conference I mean. It will constitute a 
last resort, and the question of other participants should not be allowed 
to arise.” 90 And this is almost exactly what was done. 

Chamberlain himself had on the 25th proposed a conference in his 
message to the Czechoslovak Government: on the 27th Roosevelt 
had suggested one. Now, at 11.30 a.m. on the morning of the 28th, 
Chamberlain sent a message to Hitler: “After reading your letter I 
feel certain that you can get all essentials without war and without 
delay.” He was ready to come to Germany at once to discuss arrange- 
ments for transferring the Sudeten territory with Hitler and a Czecho- 
slovak representative, and with those of France and Italy, if Hitler 
desired. He was certain that agreement could be reached in a week. 
Surely Hitler would not start a world war “which may end civilisa- 
tion” for the sake of a few days’ delay in settling a long-standing 
problem. 91 He also telegraphed to Mussolini to support his proposal. 

Hitler replied by inviting Chamberlain, Daladier and Mussolini to 
Munich the following morning (he had already settled the details by 
telephone with Mussolini). The announcement in the House of 
Commons by Chamberlain, on the afternoon of the 28th— after he 
had read his own appeals to Hider and Mussolini— produced a hys- 
terical scene, members cheering, shouting, weeping and throwing 
their papers in the air. It is said that Anthony Eden walked out, and 
that one other Government supporter remained seated. Churchill too 
was silent. What is certain is that, of the five speeches which followed 
—Clement Attlee, Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Liberal leader, James 
Maxton (I.L.P.), George Lansbury, the Socialist pacifist, and William 
Gallacher, the only Communist M.P.— the first four all supported 
Chamberlain. Only Gallacher (having to shout to make himself heard) 
said: “No one desires peace more than I and my party, but peace 
based on freedom and democracy and not on the dismemberment 
and destruction of a small State. It is the policy of the National Govern- 
ment that has led us into this situation (cries of ‘No’). Yes, and if we 
get peace, it is the determination of the people that has saved it. What- 
ever the outcome, the National Government will have to account 
90 D.D.F.P., vol. n, p. 36. 31 Ibid., p. 587. 


“without war and without delay’’ 107 

for its policy. I am no party to what is going on here. There arc as 
many Fascists on the other side of the House as in Germany. I object 
to the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia.” 

The proceedings at Munich, and the decisions adopted, have already 
been described. Chamberlain had hitherto promised all consideration 
and equality of treatment for Czechoslovakia (subject, of course, to 
her accepting dismemberment). Now, at the conference itself, the 
detailed record shows that he accepted Hitler’s refusal even to admit 
its representative to its deliberations — pleading only that it would be 
convenient to have such a representative in a neighbouring room, to 
give any assurance that might be necessary. When Hitler objected 
even to this, the proposal was dropped. 92 A member of the Czecho- 
slovak delegation which did nevertheless fly to Munich has described 
how they were kept waiting many hours, until Sir Horace Wilson 
at 10 p.m. gave them even the first outlines of what was proposed, 
with a map showing the areas to be occupied at once; and took not 
the slightest interest in what they had to say. Only at 1.30 a.m. was 
the delegation admitted to the presence of the British and French 
delegations (the Germans and Italians having already left)— to be 
handed the agreement and to be told by Chamberlain that “there 
was no question except of applying a plan which we had already 
accepted”. During enquiries which were made about details of the 
agreement, “Mr. Chamberlain yawned without ceasing and with no 
show of embarrassment”. 93 

It was in keeping with the spirit of the occasion that, in a conversa- 
tion at Hitler’s flat, later that morning, held at Chamberlain’s re- 
quest, the latter mentioned that he and Mussolini had agreed during 
the Conference that the four Powers represented should offer their 
services to France in order to try and arrange a truce in Spain. FTitler 
agreed to consider the idea — which meant British and French recogni- 
tion of the rebel Fascist general (with his Italian troops and German 
armaments and advisers), and ignoring their official diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Spanish Repubhc: an obvious preliminary to imposing 
a Hitler-Mussolini settlement on Spain as -well as Czechoslovakia. 

The main purpose of the talk, however, was to secure from Hider 
a joint statement declaring “the desire of our two peoples never to 
go to war with one another again”, and pledging both sides to use 
“the method of consultation” on any other questions that might “con- 
cern our two countries”. A Four-Power agreement which settled the 

93 D. & M., vol. I, pp. 237-40. 

93 Report by Dr. H. Masarik, printed in Ripka, op. cit., pp. 224-7. 


io8 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

fate of Europe without the U.S.S.R., followed by an Anglo-German 
agreement which, if applied, would determine how the four Powers 
would act — Hitler and Chamberlain, each for his own reasons, could 
wish for nothing better. 

From that time onwards, as was remarked at the League Assembly 
on the evening of the 30th by one of the bitter wits always to hand 
on such occasions, the uppermost thought in the min ds of other 
States was that “you may at any time become someone’s Czecho- 
slovakia” — and that in their dealings with Great Britain in particular, 
they must above all avoid becoming a victim of the British Govern- 
ment’s transactions in the name of peace. 

But a particularly important aspect of this was the fact that, except 
for one occasion on September 23, at Geneva (of which more later), 
the British Government kept the Soviet Union at arm’s length dur- 
ing the whole period from March to the end of September. So much 
was clear to the public, and it was commented on more than once 
in the House of Commons. But the publication of the diplomatic 
papers since the war, and particularly those of the British Foreign 
Office, has underlined that the interest of the British Government 
and its officials throughout was to avoid contact with the Soviet 
Government as much as possible, to reject its suggestions where 
offered, and to spread as much distrust of and hostility to the idea of 
co-operating with the U.S.S.R. as it could. A brief calendar will 
suffice : 

March 23. Halifax tells French Ambassador that the Soviet Note 
of March 17 had no “great value”. 

He tells Maisky that the British Government rejects the 
Soviet proposals (March 24). 

April 19. British Ambassador reports from Moscow that there is 
no reason “for doubting the possibility of a revolution if this 
country were to become involved in war”. The economic 
system would not be likely “to stand up to the strain”. There 
would be “a complete breakdown of all supplies and com- 
munications”. Any defeats “could not fail to produce a col- 
lapse which might well overturn the regime”. 

The military attache produces even more idiotic “informa- 
tion” (e.g. that “there might be a danger to the regime in 
mobilisation”, and that he doubts “whether there arc now 
available men who are capable of commanding armies in the 
event of war”). 


“without war and without delay’’ 109 

April 29. Lord Halifax duly reports in this sense at the conference 
with French Ministers, doubting if the U.S.S.R. “could make 
any contribution at all to the protection of Czechoslovakia”. 

May 15. British Charge d’ Affaires in Moscow expatiates at length 
on the same lines as on April 19 (e.g. that the Soviet General 
Staff and High Command are in “appalling chaos and dis- 
organisation”), with this gem: “The Russians arc Asiatics, more 
so now than at any period since Peter the Great.” 

May 22. He follows this up by forecasting that “the Soviet Union 
is unlikely to go to war in defence of Czechoslovakia”. 

May 27. Halifax suggests that the Charge d’ Affaires should try and 
get Litvinov to exercise pressure on the Czechoslovak Com- 
munists: the Charge d’ Affaires prudently declines, saying it 
would be rejected. 

May 31. British military attache in Moscow reports that the Soviet 
Government “will find any pretext to avoid the necessity of 
having to fulfil its engagements to Czechoslovakia and France”. 

June 14. British Minister in Warsaw reports that the Chief of the 
Polish Staff has informed the British military attache (with a 
wealth of detail) that “Russia would very soon reach a crisis 
which would put her out of action not for months but for 

99 

years . 

July 16. Bonnet tells British Ambassador Phipps— and Phipps agrees 
— that Bcne§ asking him to sound Russia about help, in the 
event of war with Germany, showed “what a dangerous frame 
of mind he is in”. 

September 2. Phipps reports that Bonnet has been “pestered lately 
by the Soviet Ambassador, acting on instructions from M. 
Litvinoff, to show more firmness in Czechoslovakia and to 
urge greater firmness on the part of His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment”. 

Bonnet asked what help the Soviets would give if the Ger- 
mans attacked Czechoslovakia, “but so far there is no reply” 
(in fact it had been given that very day — the first time it was 
asked). 

September 6. Bonnet tells Phipps that Litvinov’s reply is that the 
U.S.S.R. will (/) wait until France begins to fulfil her obliga- 
tions, (ii) then bring the matter before Geneva. Meanwhile he 
proposes a joint Anglo-Franco-Soviet declaration “that they 
will keep the peace, if necessary by force” (an impudent tra- 
vesty, as will be seen later). 


no 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


September 8. Halifax “notes” Litvinov’s real proposals, reported 
on September 3 by Churchill, who thought them “of the 
first importance” (op. cit., p. 229). 

September 10. British Minister in Warsaw urges that France should 
make every effort in Moscow “to prevent the Soviet Union 
taking any measure which might determine Poland to throw 
herself into the German camp”. 

September n. Bonnet rejects Litvinov’s proposal of discussions at 
Geneva: British Government agrees. 

September 23. Halifax instructs British delegation at Geneva to 
ask the Soviet delegation about what they would do if Czecho- 
slovakia were at war with Germany (the first such enquiry). 
Litvinov tells them (elaborating on proposals he had made 
publicly, in the Assembly, on September 21). Nothing more 
ever heard. Churchill calls it “indeed astonishing” that “the 
Soviet offer was in effect ignored” (op. cit., p. 239). 

September 29. Halifax calls in Maisky to tell him. that the U.S.S.R. 
was not invited to Munich because Hitler and Mussolini would 
refuse to sit down with its representatives. 

That is all — a proud record of diplomacy: sixteen occasions in seven 
months of 1938 (nearly half of them in September) on which the 
Soviet Union’s attitude was discussed by British diplomats, in a form 
thought suitable for publication by the editors of Documents on British 
Foreign Policy ! Most of the sixteen occasions were for the purpose of 
recording or spreading imbecile and malicious tittle-tattle. On only 
three of the sixteen occasions was there direct discussion with repre- 
sentatives of the Soviet Government — two of them formally to reject 
Soviet offers of co-operation, the third (despite promises to keep in 
touch) amounting to the same thing. Not once was it thought worth 
while to invite a leading member of the Soviet Government to 
London, or to send a member of the Inner Cabinet to Moscow — if 
only to clear up alleged doubts as to where the Soviet Government 
stood. 

This was quite an important aspect of the Chamberlain Govern- 
ment’s diplomacy during the months from March to September, 
1938; although an assessment of its meaning must be reserved for 
a later chapter. 


CHAPTER VI 

AN INCONVENIENT PACT 

1. The Pledges of France 

T HE Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry official whose report was 
quoted earlier was particularly moved by the fact that it was a 
Frenchman who confirmed to him that a sentence of death, from 
which there was no appeal, had been passed on the independent and 
democratic republic of Czechoslovakia. He was impressed also by the 
evident confusion of the French Prime Minister. He wrote: “The 
French were obviously ashamed, and seemingly realised the conse- 
quences which that sentence would have for French prestige. Mr. 
Chamberlain, after a short introduction, mentioned the agreement 
which had just been concluded, and then handed to our Minister 
Mastny the text of the agreement to be read aloud. ... I asked MM. 
Daladier and Leger whether they expected our Government to make 
a statement in reply to the agreement with which they had presented 
us. M. Daladier, visibly confused, did not reply. M. Leger, on the 
contrary, replied that the four statesmen had very little time at their 
disposal. He then added quite definitely that they do not now await 
any reply on our part, but they naturally consider the plan already 
adopted, and that our Government must this very day, not later than 
5 p.m., send its delegate to Berlin to a session of the International 
Commission. . . . The atmosphere was becoming positively unbear- 
able for everyone. 

“We were told in a sufficiently brutal way, and by a Frenchman 
at that, that it was a sentence from which there was no appeal, and 
in which there was no possibility whatsoever of making any altera- 
tions.” 

Mr. Masarik’s anger was understandable. The Franco-Czechoslovak 
Treaty concluded on January 25, 1924, was quite clear. It ran: 

“Article 1. The Government of the French Republic and of the 
Czechoslovak Republic undertake to act in concert on external 
questions calculated to endanger their security and to disturb the 
order established by the peace treaties of which they are both 
signatories. 


1 12 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


“Article 2. The high contracting parties will come to an agree- 
ment as to the measures proper to the safeguarding of their common 
interests, should the latter be menaced. ...” 

In the further Treaty signed between the two countries at Locarno 
on October 16, 1935, Article 1 ran: 

“In the event of Czechoslovakia or France suffering from a 
failure to observe the undertakings arrived at tins day between 
them and Germany with a view to the maintenance of general 
peace, France, and reciprocally Czechoslovakia, acting in applica- 
tion of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, under- 
take to lend each other immediate aid and assistance, if such a failure 
is accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms. 

“In the event of the Council of the League of Nations, when 
dealing with a question brought before it in accordance with the 
said undertakings, being unable to succeed in making its reports 
accepted by all its members other than the representatives of the 
parties to the dispute, and in the event of Czechoslovakia or France 
being attacked without provocation, France or reciprocally Czecho- 
slovakia, acting in application of Article 15, paragraph 7 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, will immediately lend aid and 
assistance.” 

There could be no doubt as to the threat to the security of Czecho- 
slovakia and to the interests of both countries which existed in the 
spring and summer of 1938. The French Government’s idea of acting 
in concert with Czechoslovakia turned out to be to demand con- 
tinually, under threat of being left alone to face invasion, that Czecho- 
slovakia should voluntarily accept the complete destruction of the 
order established by the Peace Treaties (and incidentally, as regards the 
mountain frontiers of Bohemia, the order established by a thousand 
years of history). 

There could be no doubt that Germany, in August and September, 
1938, was fading to observe her undertakings of 1925 to maintain 
general peace, and was threatening to have recourse to arms in order 
to bring this about — which France, as a signatory of the Peace Treaties, 
could hardly fail to regard as an unprovoked attack. It turned out 
that the French Government’s idea of preparing to render immediate 
assistance was to conclude an agreement with Germany without con- 
sulting Czechoslovakia, to ensure tliat the German army should march 
in without meeting any resistance, and then to present Czechoslovakia 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 


113 

with the alternative either of accepting this occupation or of waging 
a bloody struggle without France lifting a finger. 

Yet neither emotion nor confusion at this particular aspect of the 
Munich decisions were, strictly speaking, justified. The experience of 
recent years (summarised in chapter II) should have reminded both 
sides that the breaking of treaty obligations had become a tradition, 
and co-operation with the aggressor an established custom, with suc- 
cessive governments of the French Republic. 

The part played by Pierre Laval, Prime Minister in 1935 , in 
encouraging Italian aggression against Ethiopia and in resisting the 
application of sanctions against Italy, has already been referred to. It 
is not without interest that one of the few States which had direct 
contractual obligations with Ethiopia, apart from the League Covenant, 
was France, which "was obliged to keep open the one railway which 
connected Ethiopia with the sea, and by means of winch she could 
import munitions. The first act of the French Government, when 
Italian aggression began, was to close the railway. 

Unlike Great Britain again, France was bound to Spain by a com- 
mercial treaty, under which the closing of the Pyrenees to Spanish 
trade during peaceful relations between the two countries was an 
impossibility. This did not prevent the French Government, in July, 
1936, closing the French market for Spanish purchases of arms, and 
the French frontier to their transit— a blockade winch had already 
indicted grave injury on the Spanish Republic in its desperate struggle 
against the Italo-German invasion and Fascist rebellion. To-day we 
know that the blockade proved fatal: but in any case it was still in 
force, after occasional intermissions, in the autumn of 1938. 

In the summer of 1936, also, the Little Entente — Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania and Yugoslavia — twice proposed to France that she should 
offer to sign, with Germany and themselves, a mutual assistance pact, 
directed against aggression by any State whether outside the pact or 
a signatory to it. What this meant in effect was the reinforcement of 
the pact which France already had with Czechoslovakia — in a form, 
moreover, which would oblige Germany to reveal whether she in- 
tended to follow up her breach of the Versailles Treaty and of the 
Locarno Pact, in remilitarising the Rhineland a few months before, 
by direct aggression. The French Government twice refused — for fear 
of antagonising the British Government, then anxiously wooing 
Hidcr. 1 Tliis episode, which was known to the Czechoslovak 

1 An account was first printed by Robert Dell, op. cit., pp. 254-5; since the war, it has 
been confirmed by J. Paul-Boncour, Entre Deux Guerres, vol. Ill (1946), pp. 62-5. 



H 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


1 14 

Government though not to the general public, must have caused 
doubts in its mind as to whether France intended to honour its 
obligations. 

The French railway through Indo-China was one of the very rare 
channels of trade into China which could not be interrupted by 
Japanese warships, troops or aeroplanes, without direct aggression 
against France. The French Government was bound to China, not 
only by the Covenant of the League of Nations, but — since the League 
Assembly of Septembcr-October, 1937 — by a resolution to which 
France subscribed, and which pledged all members of the League to 
do nothing which would in any way impede Chinese resistance to 
the Japanese invader. Neither Covenant nor resolution, however, had 
prevented the French Government in 1938 from closing, and keeping 
closed, the railway in question, so far as concerned consignments of 
munitions for China. 

What neither the general public nor, possibly, the Czechoslovak 
Government knew was the background to 1938 so far as the Franco- 
Soviet pact of mutual assistance was concerned. It was Czechoslovakia 
which was the immediate beneficiary of that pact, since Germany was 
less likely to attack either of its signatories than her southern neigh- 
bour, if she had the free choice. The fact that the signature of the pact 
was followed immediately by one between the U.S.S.R. and Czecho- 
slovakia (May 2, 1935, and May 16, 1935) was a simple recognition 
of this fact. But after the Franco-Soviet pact was signed, successive 
French Governments refused to make the necessary preparations to 
implement it by arranging for staff agreements between the military 
authorities of the two countries— such as their predecessors, in 1892 
and 1912, had concluded with the Tsarist Government of Russia, and 
as had been agreed when the pact was signed in Paris. 

Post-war French memoirs of men who held high office leave no doubts. 

General Gamelin records how, on May 4, 1935 — two days after 
the pact had been signed — Alexis Leger, permanent head of the French 
Foreign Ministry, said to him: “There will be no question for the 
moment of the methods of Franco-Russian military co-operation.” 
This would be a matter for general staff talks, “when the Govern- 
ments consider it useful”. 2 Clearly the French Government did not 
consider it useful that summer. Col. Fabry, War Minister from June, 
1935. to January, 193b, stated in a book he published under the Ger- 
man occupation that in July, 1935, the Soviet Ambassador came 
to offer him a military convention (like that of 1892, said Fabry). 

2 Gamelin, op. cit., vol. 0 , p. 166. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 115 

But without consulting the Supreme National Defence Council, 
Fabry rejected the offer, because “the Soviet Government seemed 
to accept, without being frightened, the hypothesis of a European 
conflict”. 3 

In 1936, when Robert Coulondre went to Moscow as French 
Ambassador, President Kalinin complained to him, on his presenting 
his credentials, of the obstructive attitude of French officials. “I know 
only too well how well-founded are his complaints. Our technical 
departments acted, as it turned out, with much irresponsibility. After 
having given the representatives of the Soviet army a list of the war 
material which could be supplied to them, they went back on most 
of the offers made. The Ministry of Marine, notably, vetoed the 
delivery of naval guns which had been provided for, and the War 
Ministry itself reduced the possible deliveries of land guns to those 
of an old model.” 4 

He records how later, in April, 1937, while in Paris, Blum, then 
Prime Minister, told him of talks between the French General Staff 
and the Soviet Military attache. As a result, the Ministry' for Foreign 
Affairs gave him “the draft of a very' interesting preliminary military 
agreement, bearing the date April 15 . 1 was never to hear of it again .” 5 
Just before this, on April 10, Gamelin had prepared a memorandum, 
in reply to a Soviet enquiry about French aid, couched in general 
terms — that France if she were not herself attacked, was ready to 
act offensively according to the circumstances of the moment, in the 
framework of the conditions provided by the pacts of mutual assist- 
ance which bind her to various interested countries, and of the obliga- 
tions upon the League Covenant. All French forces could be used 
for this offensive action, to the extent that they were not detained on 
other fronts or in external possessions .” 6 This flowery piece of evasive- 
ness explains why Coulondre saw no more of his draft. 

Later that year, apparently, Coulondre got the Soviet air authori- 
ties to give him plans and specifications of a small fighter plane his 
air attache had asked for; the Air Ministry in France said it was in- 
teresting but refused to adopt it. Gamelin told him that the chief of 
the section concerned said: “Never such a humiliation! Coulondre 
asked Gamelin: “When an officer replies to you like that, don’t you 
have him arrested?” — but does not record the reply. 

When Litvinov was in Paris, in May, 1937, he raised the question 

3 Quoted by Rcynaud, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 1 16-18. 

4 Coulondre, De Staline a Hitler, p. 34 - 6 Ibid -< P- 4 8 ‘ 

8 Gamelin, op. cit., p. 286. 7 Coulondre, op. cit., pp. 126-7. 


ii 6 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


of staff talks with Foreign Minister Delbos. The latter told him that 
the Ministries of Air and Marine were ready, but not the Ministry 
of War. 8 It never proved ready. 

Pierre Cot, who was Minister for Air until January, 1938, states 
in his memoirs that, after negotiations in 1937, a Franco-Soviet- 
Czechoslovak air pact, to operate subject to the League Covenant, 
was ready for signature when he lost his post. 9 It was never con- 
cluded. In November, 1937, too, Stalin and Voroshilov spoke to the 
French trade union leader Jouhaux, during the latter’s visit to Moscow, 
about the failure of the French Government to proceed with a mili- 
tary convention. If the French Government appointed a delegation 
to negotiate such a convention, it could study for itself the state of 
the Soviet armed forces. When Jouhaux (as he told Paul Reynaud 
wliile they were both in German captivity) reported this to the French 
Premier, Chautemps, the latter replied: “Have you seen the Russian 
army yourself?” — and that was all. 10 

These various occasions may or may not have been all known to 
the Czechoslovak authorities (though their military chiefs were in 
very close relations with the French General Staff). But the result at 
any rate was obvious — no military agreement between France and 
the U.S.S.R., hence nothing practical done to ensure that the treaty 
of 1935 would operate in case of German aggression. That being so, 
was it likely that the treaties with Czechoslovakia were intended to 
operate? 

These, then, were the traditions established between 1935 and 1938 
by the governments of MM. Laval, Flandin, Blum, Chautemps and 
Daladier. Therefore professional diplomats should not have been sur- 
prised. The peoples were another matter: they had no access to State 
papers, international negotiations or diplomatic gossip. For the majority 
of the common people the events of 1938 came with bewildering 
suddenness. 

In the case of France the position to-day, when we come to examine 
those events more closely, is complicated by the fact that its Foreign 
Office archives nearly all perished during the war. It is said that they 
have been partly reconstituted with the help of the files kept in French 
Embassies abroad; in any case, there have been no such collections 
of documents published on French foreign policy as those on British 
or German. It is from the latter archives — to the extent that the 
British editors (and American, in the case of the captured German 

8 Coulondre, op. tit., p. 127. 8 P. Cot, Triumph of Treason (1944), pp. 359-63. 

10 Reynaud, op. tit., pp. 129-30. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 


117 

documents) have made it possible — that we have to draw our informa- 
tion on French diplomacy in 1938: coupled with press information at 
the time, and memoirs of varying value mostly (not all) published 
since 1945- 

2. Imposing Surrender 

What picture emerges? Above all, one of complete co-operation 
with the British Government in imposing surrender of Czechoslovakia 
to Hitler — in spite of the programme of isolating and destroying 
France outlined in Mein Kampf. 

Even before the seizure of Austria, important voices were raised 
in France in favour of changing French foreign policy, and denoun- 
cing the idea that “France should fight Germany for the sake of 
Czechoslovakia”. Outstanding among these voices was that of Pierre- 
Etienne Flandin, who had been Prime Minister in 1934-5 and Foreign 
Minister at the time of Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland. At 
the meeting of the Senate Commission for National Defence on 
February 23, 1938, and the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission on 
February 25 — both meetings held in private — the view was advanced 
(«) that French obligations to Czechoslovakia no longer held, since 
the Locarno Pact under which the treaty of October, 1925, was con- 
cluded had been tom up by the Germans in March, 1936, and never 
vindicated by the other signatories, Britain and France, and (ii) that 
France could not give effective help to Czechoslovakia, for geo- 
graphical reasons, and in any case she could not act without Britain. 
When Osusky, the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, told Berangcr 
(chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission who had attended both 
meetings) that it was not a question of how France was technically 
to render aid, but whether she would declare w r ar as in duty bound 
by her 1924 treaty, before Locarno, if Germany attacked Czecho- 
slovakia, and that Britain could never stand aside if France said that 
an attack on Czechoslovakia meant war, Beranger was quite surprised. 
He hadn’t thought of these arguments. 

This alone showed how far even supporters of collective security 
had moved towards a purely defensive position in face of the pro- 
Nazis. The same was demonstrated at another meeting of the Foreign 
Affairs Commission on March 2, at which Laval directly challenged 
the idea that France was under any obligation to Czechoslovakia. 
He was not successful; but the Foreign Minister Yvon Delbos tried 
to prevent any mention, of loyalty to France’s obligations appearing 
in the communique of the meeting. All he wanted was a promise 



ii8 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


that France “in alliance with England” would pursue a policy of 
“national security and European peace”. 11 Seeing that the two govern- 
ments’ interpretation of that policy had already, for over eighteen 
months, led them to assist Mussolini and Hitler in strangling the 
Spanish Republic, Delbos’ opposition to declarations of loyalty to 
France’s obligations (of which that to Czechoslovakia was outstanding) 
was particularly ominous. 

These issues also arose, publicly and sharply, in a debate of the 
Chamber of Deputies on February 25 and 26, 1938 — after Hitler by 
threats had largely secured the nazification of Austria from within, 
but before his troops marched in. Alexander Wcrth has recorded a 
vivid and documented account. It was all there — would not Czecho- 
slovakia be next: was France, under pressure from Chamberlain, 
changing her foreign policy (this after “non-intervention” in Spain!) : 
would she carry out her treaty obligations: if she had to fight, would 
she not be fighting for herself, not only for Czechoslovakia: yes, but 
was she strong enough, must she not be cautious, should she not listen 
to Chamberlain? Flandin and others preached agreement with Hitler. 
The Government spokesmen — Premier Chautcmps and Delbos — twice 
pledged loyalty to Czechoslovakia, and got their vote of confidence: 
but there were about 150 abstentions, a quarter of the deputies — which 
“included a great many people who were already Munichois at heart”. 12 

The diplomatic and other documents, however, reveal that these 
people already had a profound, and very soon a decisive, influence on 
government policy. A discussion on March 15, on how to help Czecho- 
slovakia, was held by the Standing Committee on National Defence 
(the leading Ministers and service chiefs attending). It was prompted 
by an enquiry from Lord Halifax on the 12th; and showed general 
agreement that the only way for France to help, if Czechoslovakia 
were attacked, was to mobilise, and to attack Germany herself. But 
already all sorts of doubts were expressed as to whether the U.S.S.R. 
could or would do anything to help (obstruction by Poland and 
Rumania; had the Czechs adequate airfields? and so on). The farthest 
that anyone went to resolve this difficulty was when Blum said that 
they must urge the British to “act at Bucharest”. 13 No one suggested 
holding immediate staff talks with the U.S.S.R., to find out at first 
hand what it could do. And even Litvinov’s proposals, two days later, 

11 An account of all these proceedings was given in a dispatch by Osusky (D. & M., 
vol. I, pp. 68-80). 

12 Wcrth, France and Munich (1939), pp. 45-62. 

13 Gamclin, op. cit., pp. 322-5. See also the account (clearly of the same meeting) 
in Paul-Boncour, op. cit., pp. 87-9. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 


lip 

of a consultation between interested Powers left the French Govern- 
ment unmoved. It was more impressed by Lord Halifax’s memor- 
andum on the 22nd, saying that Britain would not add to her existing 
obligations — to support France against an unprovoked attack by Gcr- 
many — and that no help to Czechoslovakia could prevent its military 
occupation; so that the best tiling was to bring pressure to bear on 
Czechoslovakia to satisfy Hitler on the German minority question. 

True, there was one short-lived attempt to pursue a different policy. 
On the 24th Paul-Boncour, Foreign Minister for a few days, told the 
British Ambassador that a joint warning should go to Germany, and 
that France would act under the League Covenant if Czechoslovakia 
were attacked — even though, as he hints in his memoirs, some of 
Chamberlain’s “representatives in Paris” were trying to arrange matters 
with the politicians so that the French Government itself should “re- 
lieve him” of this obligation. Among these was the late Charles 
Mcndl, the British Ambassador’s press attache, says Paul-Boncour. 14 
During the first week of April the French representatives in Moscow, 
Warsaw, Berlin, Budapest and the Little Entente were called to Paris, 
to discuss the question of military assistance to Czechoslovakia with 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But on April 8, the Government 
was overthrown: and Alexander Werth — then Manchester Guardian 
correspondent in Paris, and well acquainted with what was going on 
between the British Embassy and French politicians — writes that 
“there is good reason for saying that . . . the British Government 
made it very plain to M. Daladicr, the prospective new Premier, 
that it would consider the reappointment of M. Paul-Boncour to the 
Quai d’Orsay as eminently undesirable”. Paul-Boncour himself claims 
to have developed this point of view — the necessity of defending 
Czechoslovakia in France’s own interest— in a talk with Daladier on 
April 10: and that the latter rejected it, and appointed Bonnet as the 
new Foreign Minister instead, because “we are not in a position to 
pursue your policy”. 15 

Be that as it may, it is a fact that on April it, Lord Halifax was 
already increasing the pressure on the new French Government to 
drive the Czechoslovak Government in the way desired — by under- 
lining that it should not count too much on British support; 16 and 
this was being supported even beforehand by an unrestrained cam- 
paign in the press — first right-wing, then Radical. Werth quotes some 

14 Paul-Boncour, op. cit., pp. 84, 90-1. 

15 Werth, op. cit., p. 131; Paul-Boncour, op. cit., pp. 96-101. 

10 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 140-3- 



120 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

of the typical attacks — “Will you fight for the Czechs?”: Czecho- 
slovakia was “not a country at all, a heap of nationalities, a country 
that looks like the Republic of San Marino”: “the bones of a little 
French soldier are worth more to us than all the Czechoslovaks in 
the world”: “We are literally encircled.” 17 A leading constitutional 
lawyer, Barthelemy, published an article in the Temps on April 12 
repeating the argument that the Locarno Pacts had been tom up, 
that the alliance with Czechoslovakia no longer existed, and that it 
was not worth while “setting fire to the world” and three million 
Frenchmen perishing, “to save the Czechoslovak State”. It was 
natural in these circumstances that, already some days before, the 
German Ambassador in Paris was reporting with satisfaction the sar- 
castic comments on the idea of helping Czechoslovakia, and looking 
forward to her “gradual isolation”. 18 He had many more reasons for 
such satisfaction to come. 

Before the visit of the French Minister to London on April 28 
and 29, Gamelin, as Chief of the General Staff, presented to Daladier 
(April 24) a note on how Czechoslovakia could be defended. As in 
duty bound, he pointed out how much the effectiveness would de- 
pend on action by other members of the Little Entente, the U.S.S.R., 
Poland and the British Empire: nevertheless, general mobilisation and 
an offensive against Germany were by no means excluded. 19 There 
was some trace of this memorandum in the first attitude of Daladier 
at the meeting with the British Ministers (as was shown earlier) : but 
it did not survive for very long, and pressure on Prague, not a clear 
“hands off!” to Berlin, was the agreed outcome. 

After this visit of Daladier and Bonnet to London, the French 
Minister in Prague joined with his British colleague at the beginning 
of May in pressing upon the Czechoslovak Government the advice 
to make concessions which had been decided upon. This pressure 
continued throughout the next five months. In their indignation at 
the Czech mobilisation of May 20-21; in their demand thereafter (on 
May 27-28) that the reservists should be sent home; in their com- 
plaint after Captain Wiedemann’s visit to London and Lord Halifax’s 
visit to Paris, in July, that the Czechoslovak Government was not 
making concessions “resolutely enough”; in their hearty agreement, 
in mid-July, to sending Lord Runciman to Prague; in their pressure 
on the Czechoslovak Government in August to make further conces- 
sions, when the Nazis had rejected out of hand the further offers of 

17 Worth, op. cit., pp. 118-19, 121-2. 18 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 2x7-23. 

19 Gamelin, op. cit., p. 318. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 121 

the Czechoslovak Government; in the virtual ultimatum to BcneS 
on September 3, which forced the final “Fourth Plan” out of the 
Prague Government— at all stages the French Cabinet acted in per- 
fect unison with the British, and its Minister in Prague with the 
British Minister. True, as a precautionary measure, once the Czecho- 
slovak Government had accepted the principles of the “Fourth Plan”, 
300,000 men of the French reserve were called up. Garrisons along 
the' eastern frontier had their leave stopped (September 4) and the 
Maginot Line -was manned by all its teclmical troops (September 5). 
But this was solely because German forces were concentrating on the 
French border as well as that of Czechoslovakia, as the French military 
authorities impressed on the Germans on September 2 and 3. 

The keynote of the attitude of the French Government throughout 
tins period, so to speak, had been struck by the remark of Bomict to 
the German Ambassador in Paris on April 30, just after returning 
from London, in urging him to impress on his Government not to 
act violently: “Any arrangement was better than a world war, in 
the event of which all Europe would perish, and both victor and van- 
quished would fall victims to world Communism”: and the assurance 
(mentioned earlier) which was given by de Brinon, a friend of Daladier, 
to a German Embassy agent that the French Government had decided 
to “put to sleep” the Franco-Soviet Pact. 20 

At the time of Czechoslovak mobilisation on May 20 — the very 
same day, in fact — Coulondre, the French Ambassador in Moscow, 
on leave in Paris, agreed with Bonnet that there should now be staff 
conversations in Moscow between France, the U.S.S.R. and Czecho- 
slovakia: Bonnet told him that at Geneva this had been Litvinov s 
suggestion. After discussing the matter with Gamelin, Coulondre drew 
up a paper setting forth the procedure to be followed, which was 
approved by high officials of the Foreign Ministry. When he saw 
Bonnet with it on the 23rd, however, he found the Minister “hesi- 
tant” and was told to show it to Daladier. The latter after some dis- 
cussion agreed, but told him that he had bad information on the 
Soviet army”. Bonnet, the same evening, was still hesitant, but finally 
confirmed his agreement. The Ambassador left for Moscow a few 
days later, feeling that at last he had got a little further forward. But 
the next few weeks undeceived him. 

He was surprised to hear his Polish colleague in Moscow, Grzy- 
bowski, on the 27th, expressing his conviction that France would 
avoid resorting to arms “in the pursuit of a chimera”— trying to save 
20 D.G.F.P., voL n, pp. 254, 258. 


122 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Czechoslovakia. Coulondre noticed that Potemkin, Deputy People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, did not comment when he referred 
to the coming staff talks: “Had he had bad news from Paris?” As for 
Litvinov, the Ambassador found him wondering what France would 
do if the U.S.S.R. went to the help of a Czechoslovakia attacked by 
Poland as well as Germany! Coulondre began anxiously pressing 
Paris for those urgent staff talks again — and “I was not long in dis- 
covering that, once more, I had been rolling one of the rocks of 
Sisyphus”. Fear had swept away, like so many others, “the sheet of 
paper I had brought back from Paris”. 21 

Coulondre evidently was unaware that, on the afternoon of May 22, 
not only had Lord Llalifax again given one of his periodic warnings 
that France should not rely on British help if the Czechoslovak mobi- 
lisation led to war, 22 but Daladicr at a private house had spoken to 
the German Ambassador Welczcck (according to the latter’s reports 
to Berlin) in the most violent terms against the Soviet Union, and 
declared that war must be prevented, “even if it entailed great sacri- 
fices”. 23 The German, of course, heartily agreed. Nor did Coulondre, 
evidently, know that on the 24th Bonnet and the British Ambassador 
were telling each other what a “reasonable attitude” the German 
Government was taking up: 24 and that on the 25th Bonnet had had 
the conversation, mentioned previously, with the German Ambas- 
sador — in which the latter had the pleasure of learning from the 
French Foreign Minister that his colleagues would threaten the Czecho- 
slovak Government with “review of their obligations” if it continued 
“unyielding”. 26 Perhaps it was only a coincidence: but on the very 
day of Coulondre’ s talk with Grzybowski, the Polish Ambassador in 
Paris reported a conversation with Bomict in which the latter informed 
him that the Franco-Soviet Pact was very “vague”, and the French 
Government was not at all inclined to rely upon it. He himself (Bonnet) 
was not personally an adherent of co-operation with Communism. 
He would be very glad to tell the Russians that their help was not 
wanted. However, if there were war with Germany it might come in 
useful, in order to get war material, etc., from Moscow'. 26 

Had Coulondre known, in short, that the French Government was 
serious in its desire to co-operate with Germany against Czechoslovakia 

21 Coulondre, op. cit., pp. 142-3, 145-6, 150-153. 22 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 346. 

23 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 327. 24 d.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 366-7. 

25 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 344. It was therefore quite unnecessary for Lord Halifax, on 
May 31, to press Bonnet to do that very tiling (D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 419). 

26 D. & M., vol. I, p. 113. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 123 

provided only that Hitler did not create difficulties prematurely for 

it, in face of its people, by kicking over the traces and invading 
Czechoslovakia too soon — lie would not have been so “surprised” 
and “saddened”, as he put it himself, when the Czechoslovak Minister 
in Moscow on July 1 gave him a report from his Paris colleague to 
read. It ran: “The French Government is not proceeding at the 
moment with the plans for Franco-Soviet military conversations, in 
order not to arouse the susceptibilities of the British Conservatives.” 27 
It could not have been put better — but we have seen enough of the 
inner thoughts of both Bonnet and Daladier to be sure that behind 
this was the feeling that the U.S.S.R. was a bigger enemy than Hitler 
and must be kept at arm’s length. How could they possibly, therefore, 
sit dov'n with it and discuss practical means of mutual assistance? 
Time enough for that when they found themselves in a desperate 
situation, and there w 7 as no other way out ! 

And so the French Government continued to keep in step with 
the British— though, in view 7 of its treaty with Czechoslovakia and 
the political alertness of its Opposition, it had to perform greater 
contortions from time to time than did its British counterpart. Thus, 
on July 12, Daladier in a public speech declared that the undertakings 
to Czechoslovakia “arc sacred and cannot be evaded”. But in private 
Bonnet at that very time w'as doing Iris best to make the Czechoslovak 
Government feel completely isolated, by telling it that the Rumanians 
had said in Berlin that they would never allow the passage of Soviet 
troops to help them. As the Rumanians w r erc allies in the Litde Entente, 
the Czechoslovak Government cabled its surprise to Bucharest — and 
got back a flat denial! 28 Rumania was in an extremely delicate posi- 
tion, in face of the Germans, and both the British and French Govern- 
ments repeatedly took advantage in this w’ay of the Rumanian 
Government’s unwillingness to commit itself beforehand. Yet if they 
themselves had not been playing fast and loose with their obligations, 
they could have cleared up its position by raising the question of aid 
to Czechoslovakia, if attacked, at the League of Nations. Then, under 
Article 1 6, paragraph 3, of the League Covenant, Rumania would 
have been not only entitled, but bound, to grant passage to Soviet 
troops on their way to aid a victim of aggression. 

With the adoption by the Czechoslovak Government of the “Fourth 
Plan”, however, it was as clear in France as in Great Britain that the 
decisive stage had been reached. Just as that stage, on September 7, 
produced The Times leading article once again — but at the most 
27 Coulondre, op. cit., p. 153- 28 D. & M., vol. I, pp. 139-40. 



124 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

critical moment — advocating annexation of Czechoslovakia’s fortified 
borders to Germany, so on September 6, it produced an editorial by 
Emile Roche, president of the Radicals in the industrial north of 
France, and a close friend of Bonnet, advocating the same thing. “Can 
Prague still persist in counting 3,200,000 Germans among its loyal 
subjects? If so, all will be well. But if not, the two races which cannot 
agree to live together within a framework of the centralised Czech 
State must be separated. Neither of them would die as a result, nor 
would Central Europe.” 29 

More and more openly, this now became the slogan of the French 
Government, after having been that of the bulk of the right-wing 
press for months past. As late as September 8, Daladier was telling 
the British Ambassador of the weakness of the German fortifications, 
Soviet concentrations on the Rumanian frontier, and so forth: and 
the following day the French Ambassador in London made his repre- 
sentations in favour of a joint warning to Hitler which produced the 
lecture, already quoted from Lord Halifax, about accepting aggres- 
sion to-day because it might not happen to-morrow. But after Hitler’s 
Nuremberg speech on the 12th this show of resistance was dropped, 
and Daladier (Ambassador Phipps reported to London) was “quite 
a different one to (!) the Daladier of September 8”, while Bonnet 
was now demanding peace “at any price”. 30 

At a Cabinet meeting that day, Bomict had told the Ministers that 
the Russians and Rumanians in Geneva the day before had “wrapped 
themselves up in League procedure” and liad shown “little eagerness 
to help”, and that according to the Soviet Ambassador in Paris, the 
U.S.S.R. was only thinking of putting up the question for discussion 
at the League. 31 Whether this bore any resemblance to the truth, will 
be seen later. It is significant that Gamclin in a discussion with Daladier 
had once again emphasised that, even if Czechoslovakia were tempor- 
arily defeated, it was the outcome of the war which counted: the 
practical question was that of a direct attack on the German fortifica- 
tions in the event of war. Germany could dispose 50 divisions there 
while attacking Czechoslovakia, but taking the overall strength of 
the two sides, he was sure that “the democratic nations would dictate 
the peace”. 32 (It was some time after tills conversation that Gamelin 
sent a message through the Soviet military attache which brought 
the assurance from Voroshilov, mentioned earlier.) 

29 La Re'publique, quoted in Werth, op. cit., p. 240. 

30 D.B.F.P., vol. H, pp. 269, 270, 310, 312. 

31 Werth, op. cit., p. 248; Gamelin, op. cit., p. 348. Bonnet told much the same story 

to Phipps: D.B.F.P., vol. n, p. 323. 32 Gamelin, op. cit., pp. 344-5. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 125 

However, by this time these military arguments counted for very 
little. The Cabinet meeting in Paris on the 13 th after discussing Hitler’s 
speech took no decisive action (it is said that a minority of the Ministers 

Reynaud, Mandcl, and some others — wanted a partial mobilisation 

but were overruled). 33 That evening Daladier sent a message to 
Chamberlain by the British Embassy, suggesting that Hitler be offered 
a three-Power conference to discuss the situation. 34 But instead, 
Chamberlain offered to go himself, and the series of visits to Hitler 
began which ended at Munich. 

Now that the time had seemingly come to throw off the mask, it 
was the Temps which, on the afternoon of September 14 — before Mr. 
Chamberlain had gone to Berchtesgadcn — published an editorial which 
was all the more significant because, as was well known, the Temps 
front-page editorials were the subject of a standing special arrange- 
ment with the permanent officials of the French Foreign Office. 

The Czechoslovak leaders learnt from it that, after all their sacri- 
fices, most of them directly suggested by their foreign friends, and 
the last scries fully approved beforehand by Lord Runciman, they 
had “not acted fast enough”. The world was informed of a crying 
falsehood — tliat three million Sudeten Germans were “practically in 
a state of rebellion”. There was now a danger of German intervention 
— the very contingency provided for by the treaty of 1925. But the 
most influential conservative and semi-official organ in France drew 
the conclusion that the Czechoslovaks must not take “untimely coer- 
cive measures”; while Germany was assured that, if she for her part 
did not do so, and did “not risk her very existence on a throw of the 
dice”, she had obtained, or was on the point of obtaining, “all that 
was essential”. 

It will be seen that, in this leading article, the Temps not only 
brought the French semi-official attitude into line with that explained, 
equally semi-officially, by Mr. Neville Chamberlain on Sunday night, 
September 11— that Germany could get all she wanted without war— 
but actually hastened to anticipate the results of Berchtesgadcn. 

5. Bonnet at Work 

Then came the second Anglo-French conference of Ministers. When 
Daladier and Bonnet left for London after Berchtesgaden, on Sept- 
ember 18, there were already fears in Paris, according to the corre- 
spondent of the Daily Herald (September 19) that, in his anxiety to 

33 Werth, op. cit., pp. 251-4. 34 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 313-14- 


126 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


shake off treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, the French Foreign 
Minister might conceal in London the opinion of the French General 
Staff. This was that, although the air forces of France were far from 
what might be desired, they were capable, with the army and fleet 
and the possibilities of wartime construction, of “meeting any eventu- 
ality successfully”. These fears proved fully justified: the question of 
resistance to Hitler’s demands now played no part at all in the dis- 
cussion. Daladier agreed that it was now primarily a question of 
“friendly pressure” on Czechoslovakia to get her to cede the territory 
which Hitler demanded: how to “prevent France being forced into 
war as a result of her obligations, at the same time to preserve Czecho- 
slovakia and save as much of that country as was humanly possible”. 35 
How this problem was solved, we already know. 

Again, it is certain that Bonnet gave a pledge at the French Cabinet 
on returning from London (September 19) that no pressure would be 
exerted on the Czechoslovak government to accept the new Anglo- 
French proposals. This also turned out to be a delusion, as wc know. 
Bonnet warned the Czechoslovak Government, on September 20, 
that for them to invoke their arbitration treaty with Germany would 
be “folly”: he accepted Phipps’ suggestion the same day that, if they 
did not accept the terms, they should be warned that France and Great 
Britain “might wash their hands” of it all: 36 and he sent instructions, 
that night, to Lacroix, the French. Minister in Prague, to join with 
Newton in using precisely that threat to Benes. 37 

During these fatal twenty-four hours there occurred a particularly 
disreputable incident. When the minority Ministers in the French 
Cabinet were protesting, at a meeting on the 21st, at the pressure 
which had been put on Czechoslovakia contrary to an express promise 
which had been given them, they were confronted by Bonnet with 
a telegram from Lacroix, sent on the evening of the 20th after a talk 
with the Czechoslovak Prime Minister Hodza. The latter had allegedly 
asked Lacroix to get his Government to send an ultimatum to Czecho- 
slovakia threatening to abandon her to German conquest in the event 
of war, should she not accept the Anglo-French terms. Tins was 
needed, Hodza was supposed to have said (not only for himself but 
for Benes) if the Czechoslovak leaders were to get the terms accepted. 
And this was why, Bonnet explained, the ultimatum had been sent, 
and was presented to Benes at 1.30 a.m. on the 21st. 

3B D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 387. 36 Ibid., pp. 420, 422. 

37 The phrase which Lacroix used was that, if war broke out as a consequence of 
Prague’s refusal it would be the fault of the Czechoslovak Government, and France 
“will take no part in it” (Ripka, op. cit., p. 80). 







This story silenced the critics. Yet it was only a characteristic and 
cunning fraud — more dramatic in its immediate consequences, yet no 
different in substance from the way in which, two months earlier, 
Mr. Chamberlain had boldly asserted that the sending of Lord Runci- 
man was at the request of the Czechoslovak Government itself, and 
not due to any pressure from London. 

What had happened on the 20th was that the British and French 
Ministers in Prague, on receiving the Czechoslovak Government’s 
rejection of the terms, had already begun threatening it with abandon- 
ment: this is clear from Newton’s own cable. 38 Hodza, however, de- 
manded from Lacroix — who was in a different position from Newton, 
because France was bound by her treaties of 1924 and 1925 — formal 
confirmation in writing that France intended to dishonour her obliga- 
tions. 39 This was so obvious a demand that Benes himself repeated 
it after the visit paid him by the two Ministers during the night. 40 
In fact, the message sent on the 21st by Bomiet (publicised already 
in 1939) corresponded very closely with the ultimatum read out by 
Lacroix to Benes earlier that day. 41 

It was Flodza’s request for a formal statement which Lacroix chose 
to interpret as a plea for an ultimatum. This was not a chance thought 
on his part: as we have seen. Newton was already asking on the after- 
noon of the 20th for the right to deliver “a kind of ultimatum”, 
which would enable Benes “to bow to force majeure”. He did not 
attempt, however, to father this brilliant idea on either Benes or 
Hodza. That was an entirely original contribution of French diplomacy. 

On the 22nd, Chamberlain left for Godesberg. The French Parlia- 
ment was on holiday ; only the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party, its paper Humanite and two or three other papers denounced 
the terms forced on Czechoslovakia. Probably to avoid public dis- 
cussion of the new line French policy was taking, all public meetings 
on foreign affairs had been prohibited early in September. This ban 
would not have been effective, however, had a political crisis been 
precipitated by the resignation of the three members of the French 
Cabinet — Mandcl, Reynaud and Champcticr de Ribes — who offered 
it on the 22nd, when they saw how Bonnet had kept his promises. 
But they were nonplussed by the Lacroix telegram, persuaded by 
Daladier to suspend the resignations during the subsequent Hitler- 
Chamberlain talks at Godesberg, then hesitated, and finally . . . did 


38 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 426-7. 39 Ripka, op. cit., p. 89. 

40 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 440; and Wcrth, op. cit., p. 80. 

41 Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators (1939). P- 67, and Ripka, op. cit., p. 80. 


128 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

nothing at all. The solitary protest of a French official — that of the 
head of the French Military Mission in Prague, General Faucher — 
who resigned his post and his commission to offer his services to the 
Czechoslovak army on September 23, was not sufficient to affect 
internal French politics, even had it been given wide publicity in the 
French press : which it certainly did not receive. 

However, disquiet grew as the news of the armed attacks on the 
Czechoslovak frontier came through. However great the willingness 
to placate Hitler, it might after all not succeed. On the evening of 
September 22 six French divisions were moved up to the German 
frontier. 42 The following evening, Czechoslovakia mobilised: and the 
British delegation at Geneva made its “gesture” of an approach to 
Litvinov (under the eyes of the journalists and diplomats of many 
countries). Earlier had come the news of the Soviet warning to Poland 
not to proceed with what looked like an imminent invasion of Czecho- 
slovakia. Later still on the night of the 23rd, after news of how 
Chamberlain’s talks had gone at Godesberg, the French Government 
called up two categories of reservists, about 600,000 men, and sent 
another fourteen divisions to the frontier to which a total of 800,000 
men had now been directed. 43 Wcrth has recorded (with many inci- 
dents here omitted) that “there were no protests and no attacks on 
the Government. . . . One felt an undercurrent of anger against Ger- 
many Obviously nobody was enjoying it; but there was no terrible 

gloom and depression at the Gare de l’Est (There) that day nearly 

everybody spoke of les Bodies. . . . One was impressed by the deep 
unity of the French people in a moment of danger. The people were 
certainly showing an infinitely better spirit than either the newspapers 
or the politicians.” He mentions how the Paris building workers and 
the miners of the Northern coalfields called off their strikes. 44 

The newspapers and the politicians were not entirely repressed dur- 
ing these days. Werth quotes the example of Paris-Midi, which on 
the 23 rd printed a dispatch from its correspondent at Godesberg fore- 
casting a conference, to which at least France and Italy would be 
invited, for which technical preparations were being made during 
the Hitler-Chamberlain talks. There is no record of such preparations; 
but Bomict and Daladier had had similar ideas on September 13. 
Again, at this time, Daladier carried out a political sleight-of-hand 
trick which would have been amusing in other circumstances. He 
told an anxious meeting of his own Radical-Socialist Parliamentary 
Party that France would fight if Czechoslovakia were attacked on 

42 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 461. 43 Ibid., p. 509. 44 Werth, op. cit., pp. 275-8. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 129 

account of refusal to accept the Godesberg terms — but he flew into 
a rage when someone asked him if he meant Czechoslovakia in her 
old frontiers, or in those created by the amputation of the frontier 
districts. “He did not conduct his policy on the market-place”, de- 
clared Daladier indignantly, thereby avoiding a plain reply to this 
crucial question. 45 The results of the Munich conference showed why. 

At the third Anglo-French meeting of Ministers, on September 25 
and 26, as we have seen, Chamberlain’s basic strategy had been to 
strike at Daladier’ s nerves with searching questions about the alleged 
weakness of France in defence, as compared with Germany. At first 
Daladier held out, saying that if Hitler insisted on immediate annexa- 
tion and there was war, the French army would attempt to invade 
Germany. It was at this stage of the discussion, answering the British 
Ministers’ doubts about the weakness of the French air force, that 
Daladier made a statement about the Soviet air strength on the basis 
of information which, most probably, had been supplied to him by 
the French general staff. It is worth recording: “Russia had 5000 
planes. At least 800 had been sent to Spain, and whenever they had 
arrived they had always put the Italian and German planes out of 
action. The front of the Spanish war had recently been stabilised 
largely owing to the arrival of 300 Russian planes which had pre- 
vented German and Italian air action. 200 Russian planes had been 
sent to Czechoslovakia from Russia, flown by Czech pilots and ordered 
by the Czechoslovak Government. French observers had seen these 
planes and thought them good.” 16 

It is reported, too, that Gamelin — called in during the conference 
on the 26th — gave an encouraging assessment of the military pros- 
pects if there were war (the main points of his statement have been 
mentioned earlier); and, when Bonnet recalled the report of the chief 
of the air staff, General Vuillemin, on the weakness of the French air 
force, Gamelin retorted that “the whole should not be confused with 
the part”. 47 But Gamelin himself noticed that his reports on the readi- 
ness of the Soviet Union to take support action were coldly met. From 
his talk with the British sen-ice chiefs that morning, “it is evident that 
the hypothesis of seeing Russia invade Poland hardly attracts our 
Allies” (it was by now clear — since the 23 rd — that a German attack 
on Czechoslovakia would be accompanied by one from Poland). 48 

48 L’CEuvre , , September 24, 1938. 40 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 533. 

47 Pertinax, op. cit., vol. I, p. II. 

48 Gamelin, op. cit., p. 352. Lord Halifax on the 26th set on foot joint representations 
of the Polish Government to stave off such an attack ( D.B.F.P. , vol. II, p. 545). 


130 THE MUNICH CONSPIHACY 

And, as we know, the main decision of the conference, while prepar- 
ing for possible war, was to continue with pressure on Prague for 
fulfilment of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th. 

It speaks eloquently to the real spirit in which the French Govern- 
ment was preparing that no sooner had Bonnet returned to Paris 
than he, in his turn, began bombarding the British Govcnnnent with 
“searching” questions about whether it would introduce conscription 
immediately, mobilise at the same time as France, pool its economic 
resources, etc. The purpose of these questions was obvious: to supply 
him with ammunition for internal use, in order, if possible, to break 
down enthusiasm for resistance to Hitler. It was for the same reason, 
no doubt, and not without collusion, that the same afternoon the 
Temps came out with these very demands to Great Britain, in the 
shape of a letter from Flandin. 49 And still for the same reason, when 
the famous Foreign Office communique about Britain and Russia 
standing by France reached Paris, in the evening, Bonnet told journ- 
alists that it was of “no importance” and “lacked confirmation”: 
while the newspapers which he was able to influence (and there were 
many) denounced it as a forger)’. 50 

That morning, also, the monarchist Charles Maurras, in V Action 
Francaise, had denounced those who preached standing up to Hitler 
(unless he directly attacked France) as serving “but one cause, that of 
a new Commune under the colours of Moscow”. 51 And the same 
day, Lord I Ialifax having enquired of the British Ambassador whom 
he had had in mind when referring to the “small but noisy and cor- 
rupt war group”, Sir Eric Pliipps replied: “I meant the Communists 
who are paid by Moscow and have been working for war for 
months.” 52 Evidently the contacts between “Mr. Chamberlain’s 
friends” in Paris and certain quarters in French politics, of which 
Paul-Boncour as we have seen had complained in March, were still 
strong. 

However, French mobilisation continued, and the partial evacua- 
tion of Paris began — most of the children (French people in the big 
towns still had relatives in the country), about 600,000 people in all 
by the 28th, a little over a fifth of the population of two and three- 
quarter million. This was not a “fear-crazed exodus” in which “a 

119 Ibid., pp. 558-9. The Temps always bore the elate of the day after it had appeared: 
the writer well remembers the sarcastic comments at Geneva, on the morning of the 
27th, at Flandin’s sudden attack of “bellicosity”, the purpose of which was only too 
obvious. 

60 Werth summarises the material on this, op. cit., pp. 288-91. 

61 Quoted by Ripka, op. cit., p. 187. 52 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 544. 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 13* 

tliird of the population fled the city”— to quote the insulting passage 
in Mr. Wheelcr-Bennett’s account, which loftily ignores the fact that, 
unlike the Londoner, the Parisian knew that his country had been 
invaded twice, in less than seventy years. By the 28th nearly one and 
a half million men were with the colours in France, and as many 
(thirty-five divisions, over one and a half millions) in Czechoslovakia. 
The British Fleet was also mobilised. The British military attache in 
Paris was told by Gamclin’s “most confidential staff officer” that in 
their opinion Germany “would not succeed in overcoming the 
country (Czechoslovakia) without hard fighting and great losses, nor 
did he think that it would be done very quickly”. 53 All objective 
French reports on the strength of Czechoslovakia— a highly indus- 
trialised country, able to maintain a mechanised and motorised army 
— had for months said the same. 

However, this did not deter — on the contrary, it seemed to stimu- 
late — the determination of the French Government to force on Czecho- 
slovakia the capitulation it had planned. While Chamberlain had been 
considering his final message to Hitler, Bonnet on the early morning 
of the 28th proposed to the British Government the convening of 
a Four-Power conference, including Italy. The British Government 
had taken steps in Rome to procure the same result, and later that 
mor nin g Chamberlain sent his appeal to Berlin. In the afternoon, 
Daladier received his invitation to Munich. In the evening, Bonnet 
told the British Ambassador that an agreement over the “Sudeten 
question” was essential, “almost at any price” — and the next morning 
(as they were seeing Daladier off at the airport) that, as the Treaty of 
Versailles had collapsed, “many existing frontiers” would have to be 
changed in Europe. 54 

Of the three changes mentioned by Lord Halifax in his talk with 
Hitler on November 19, 1937, two— Austria and Czechoslovakia- 
had now taken place. The tliird — -Danzig — was still to come: and 
like Czechoslovakia, it involved a treaty signed by France. The con- 
clusion that Poland must come after Czechoslovakia, as surely as the 
latter came after Austria, occurred to many. This makes all the more 
interesting one of the most remarkable features of the situation in 
France which was now to make itself felt. It has already been men- 
tioned that no French Ministers resigned in protest against the de- 
struction of Czechoslovakia’s security and independence; whereas in 
Great Britain one Cabinet Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
Mr. Duff Cooper, had had the political courage to do so. A more 
“ d.b.f.p., vol. rr, pp. 609-10. 64 jnd. t P . 613. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


AN INCONVENIENT PACT 


132 

striking contrast was that, whereas the Munich settlement led in Great 
Britain to a four days’ Parliamentary debate, and to votes in which 
nearly one-third of the Members of Parliament declared (after the 
event, it is true) their disapproval of the Government’s foreign policy, 
in France there was barely any debate at all. The Communist Peri 
and the Nationalist dc Kerillis alone attacked the Government in the 
solitary session of Parliament held after Munich, on October 4 and 5 : 
all parties, with the exception of the Communists, together with one 
Socialist and one Nationalist, decided on the Government’s request 
to adjourn the debate (the voting was 543 to 75). 

Why was this? 

On October 2, Jean Mistier, the Radical-Socialist Chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber and a close friend of 
Bonnet’s, said in an interview with Paris-Soir: “We must carefully 
re-examine the nature and extent of all our obligations. We must 
estimate the credit and debit, and distinguish between those which 
contain mutual and effective guarantees, and those which represent 
only risks.” One thing stood out from this series of veiled allusions— 
that the pact with Czechoslovakia had certainly not been proved to 
contain '‘effective guarantees”, and must therefore be classed on the 
debit side. Were there others? Yes — and they were specified. 

Immediately afterwards, the Temps printed an editorial likewise 
dealing with the need for changing French policy. France had in the 
past been misled, said the article, by the League of Nations and by 
her pacts concluded with the Powers of Eastern and Central Europe. 
These pacts “present the inconvenience of being sometimes contra- 
dictory” (like the pacts which France concluded with Czechoslovakia 
and Poland — whose Government joined in the grab for Czechoslovak 
territory) “and also of automatically associating the risks of France 
with those of countries more exposed than she is. The recent crisis 
made the seriousness of this inconvenience strikingly clear. What the 
French have for a long time considered a protection has been revealed 
as a peril.” 

No more remarkable statement of the old idea attributed to French 
diplomacy — that collective security means, in its eyes, security for 
France alone — could have been drawn up. 

France, it seemed, had long ago considered the Czechoslovak Pact 
as a protection for itself — a means of automatically associating Czecho- 
slovakia with any risks and perils that France might incur — but not 
at all as a means of protecting Czechoslovakia. Any such pacts, in the 
eyes of people who thought like the Temps (and the Temps in its 


133 

foreign affairs leaders spoke for the Quai d’Orsay), must naturally be 
regarded as a “serious inconvenience”. 

But of course Hitler, too, considered them an “inconvenience”, as 
appeared before many months were over. The dismemberment of 
Czechoslovakia opened the w r ay to the “Polish problem” — in which 
a French treaty 7 also stood in the way. 


CHAPTER VII 

“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND 
AND FRANCE” 

l. The Internal Struggle 

O NE day, shortly after the sponsoring by the British and French 
Governments of the Berchtesgaden terms, there was a remark- 
able scene in the best-known club in Prague. Men of all sorts and 
conditions, from high officers in the army to village schoolmasters, 
all from forty to sixty years of age, were assembled in the largest hall 
of the club. All had the carriage of old soldiers, all bore pinned to 
their breast one or more French or British decorations, dating back 
to the first world war. They ranged themselves in lines across the hall. 
Several large waste-paper baskets were brought in and placed on the 
dais. One by one each stepped forward and tore the orders and medals 
from his coat, throwing them into the basket. As the baskets were 
filled, they were taken out and the contents thrown into the refuse bins. 

This symbolic act of the old Czechoslovak Legionaries, gathered 
specially for the purpose from all parts of the country, spoke a little 
of the humiliation and impotent rage universally felt in Czecho- 
slovakia, by all among its citizens who valued its independence and 
its past. For, as was shown earlier, Czechoslovakia was no chance or 
artificial creation. The revolt of its people, at the end of 1918, had 
moreover been carefully encouraged by Great Britain and France: 

“In February, 1918, when we were engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle with Germany, the Government . . . had to decide between 
two policies. One was to try and make a separate peace with Austria- 
Hungary; the other, as it was described to the Cabinet by Lord North- 
cliffe, was to try to break the power of Austria-Hungary, as the 
weakest link in the chain of enemy States, by supporting all anti- 
German and pro- Ally peoples and tendencies. The second policy was 
adopted. In consequence, a congress of the subject races of Austria- 
Hungary was held in Rome, and the propaganda employed in the 
Austrian Army contributed to the failure of the Austrian offensive. 
President Wilson amiounccd his lively sympathy with the national 


“we MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” 135 

aspirations of the Czechoslovaks and Jugo-Slavs on May 28, and the 
Entente Powers endorsed this a week later. At the end of June the 
French Government, and at the beginning of August the British, 
recognised the Czech National Council as the trustees of the future 
Czechoslovak Government, and its army as a regular belligerent. 

“Thus, in order to defeat Germany, we decided to break up Austria- 
Hungary and set up these national States. President Wilson threw 
himself warmly into the project in the name of self-determination. If 
the Archbishop of Canterbury now says we have no obligations to 
Czechoslovakia, it must be that he does not recognise the principles 
of the League of Nations, and also that he is entirely ignorant of the 
responsible part we took in those momentous transactions. But when 
Lord Mottistone, a member of the Government that took that part, 
disclaims responsibility, he leaves us to suppose that a man does not 
forfeit the title of gentleman if he uses a weak State for his own con- 
venience one day, and throws it over for his own convenience on 
another. Would it not be better for him to admit that in 1919 he gave 
Czechoslovakia the fatal gift of her recent frontiers because Germany 
was weak, and it suited the Allies, and that now he approves of their 
violent alteration, with all the consequences of violence, because Ger- 
many is powerful?” 

The leading article in the Manchester Guardian (October 5, 1938) 
which gave this compact account, and asked the last pertinent 
question, also asked: “Do we make that treatment look better by 
calling it justice?” There were not many in Great Britain and France 
who ventured to call it justice, however else they apologised for it. 
In Czechoslovakia there were none at all, apart from the Nazis and 
their supporters. Whether they profited or lost by the situation created 
in Czechoslovakia, all parties were agreed that President Benes and 
the entire people were paying dearly for the confidence which its 
rulers had placed in Britain and France. 

For years, it is true, certain elements — the Agrarian Party in parti- 
cular — had been pressing for an agreement with Hitler. The Agrarians 
were the organisation of the rich peasantry and businessmen who had 
rallied the rest of the peasants under their leadership, when small pro- 
prietors took the place of German and Hungarian landowners after 
the war. But as the capitalist development of Czechoslovakia ad- 
vanced, within the framework of an independent State, internal mar- 
kets and export possibilities increased, co-operative selling agencies 
and an Agrarian Bank facilitated the concentration of capital, and the 
Agrarians came to represent more and more the interests of a class 


CONSPIRACY 

of exporting merchants, manufacturers, financiers, large brokers of 
agricultural produce and substantial farmers who employed hired 
labour. Less and less their political programme corresponded even in 
general outline to that of the bourgeois democratic parties — the middle- 
class Radicals known in Czechoslovakia as “National Socialists” (fol- 
lowers of Benes), the German and Czech Social-Democrats, etc. — 
not to speak of the Communists, of course. More and more they were 
interested in the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a State governed 
exclusively in the interests of big business — -which involved the sup- 
pression of democracy inside the country, and reliance upon the 
nearest anti-democratic forces outside. 

They had been given a good start because, after the counter- 
revolutionary use to which the Western Alhes put the Czechoslovak 
Legions in Russia in 1918-19, many officers and senior N.C.O.s re- 
turned with violently anti-Socialist and anti-democratic views. More- 
over, Czechoslovakia became a haven of refuge for Russian White 
officers and politicians; and although political differentiation rapidly 
developed, once the Legions were home, early struggles with organised 
labour, and particularly with the Communists, kept the Agrarians and 
the ruling Benes party in close alliance. While France was governed 
in the main by the Right parties, the question of a new foreign orienta- 
tion did not arise. But when the growth of Hitler’s power was followed 
by the entry into office of the Left parties in France in 1936, the 
Agrarians began openly pressing for an agreement with Hitler. 

This they did irrespective of the question of the German-speaking 
minority. Then that question became acute as the result of Hitler’s 
threats; and the Agrarians began pressing for agreement with Ger- 
many even at the expense of the historic frontiers, i.e. of Czecho- 
slovak independence. The reason was not far to seek: Germany was 
a boundless and favourable market for agricultural produce, and the 
Nazi power a reliable ally in the fight against democracy. 

In February, 1938, the German diplomatic documents show Eisen- 
lohr, the German Minister in Prague, busily intriguing w'ith Hodza 
himself and with Rudolf Beran, Secretary-General of the Agrarian 
Party, to deepen disunity on this question between themselves and 
the other Czech parties: and to promote if possible the detachment of 
Czechoslovakia from France and die U.S.S.R. 1 On March 27 we find 
Beran promising Eisenlohr his help in “liquidating” the German 
Social-Democrats and Marxism in Czechoslovakia, and in securing 
entry of the Henlcinitcs into the government. 2 

1 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 137-41, 141-6. 2 Ibid., p. 195. 




“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENCLAND AND FRANCE” 137 

Every attempt to restrain the freedom of action of the Henlcin 
party, whether in the Government or by the people of the Sudeten 
districts themselves, was resisted by the Agrarian Cerny, who held 
the post of Minister of the Interior, and by the Agrarian Prime Mini- 
ster Flodza. On May 18, according to a report of the Havas Agency, 
Beran in a speech at an election meeting, outlined the following pro- 
gramme for which his party stood: (i) “no compromise with the 
Communist Party” (which apparendy meant that there should be no 
Popular Front in face of the German menace), («) a “courageous under- 
standing” with the Henlein party (privately Beran was in fact advocat- 
ing the latter’s entry into the Government coalition, even at the price 
of shedding the Social-Democratic and Catholic Parties), (iii) an under- 
standing on foreign policy with Germany, Poland and Hungary, (iv) 
closer relations with Italy, (u) appointment of a diplomatic repre- 
sentadve to Franco (this demand was accepted by the Czechoslovak 
Govermcnt within the next fortnight), (vi) normalisation of relations 
with Portugal (where deliveries of armaments from Czechoslovakia 
had been interrupted during the Spanish Civil War, with the con- 
sequent rupture of diplomatic reladons by the Portuguese Government, 
which was co-operating with Franco). 

Thus there were powerful forces working to adapt Czechoslovakia 
to Hitler’s requirements, long before Munich, among the Czecho- 
slovak parties themselves. 

This needs to be borne constantly in mind, if the final outcome of 
the Anglo-Franco-Gcrman pressure on Czechoslovakia is to be under- 
stood. In particular, Benes had not thrown aside the anti-Soviet ideas 
and anti-Communist policies of the past: although they were no 
longer dominant, they continued to exist and to exercise influence 
on his practical activity. 

As early as the summer of 1936 — barely twelve months after the 
signature of the Czechoslovak- Soviet Pact — Benes had sent a memor- 
andum to Gamelin underlining that he had expressly refused guarantees 
from the U.S.S.R. against an attack by Poland: nor would Czecho- 
slovakia “assume any engagement to the neighbours of Poland against 
Poland”. 3 It was not, of course, that Benes then feared an attack 
by Poland: he was leaving open the door (the terms of the Soviet- 
Czechoslovak treaty are not open to doubt) to an attack by Poland 
(of course not alone) on the U.S.S.R.— which, if France did not sup- 
port the U.S.S.R., freed Czechoslovakia from any obligations. 

This was at the time of the Franco rebellion in Spain, in which the 
3 Gamelin, op. cit., vol. II, p. 236. 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



138 


Polish Government supported the rebels, i.e. Mussolini and Hitler. 

In October, 1937, the Henleinites had opened negotiations with 
Hodza about their demands. The German Minister began talks him- 
self with Bencs. According to Eisenlohr’s report, Bencs pointed out 
to him on November 9 that he had arranged for pohcc collaboration 
between Czechoslovakia and Germany “last spring”. Thereby he had 
shown that “he had entered into no engagement whatever with the 
Communists, but had rejected it in the most decisive manner”. 4 

The previous day Mastny, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, 
had at the Nazi Foreign Ministry also pointed out the contacts made 
by the pohcc authorities of his country with those of Germany, “for 
defensive measures against Communism”. Moreover, after a recent 
talk of his with Goebbels, German emigre (i.e. anti-Nazi) newspapers 
had been refused a licence for street sales, and further restrictions were 
being considered. On the 10th he told the Secretary of State that 
more emigre journals were being suppressed in the next few weeks 
(in fact, the Neue Vorwaerts, the chief newspaper of the German Social- 
Democrats in exile, had to be transferred to Paris early in 193 8). 5 

Bencs, of course, could not know at the time that on November 5 
Hitler had already decided to put an end to his country. Yet the ex- 
perience of Spain, if nothing else, should by now have shown him 
that, by concerting action with Hitler against the Communists — who 
had behind them a considerable section of the working class — he was 
striking at the forces of resistance to Hitler’s plans of conquest. So 
far from seeing this, he evidently extended his attempts to placate 
Hitler (at his own country’s expense) into the field of foreign affairs. 
On February 16, 1938, we find Eisenlohr reporting, after another talk 
with Bencs: “His pact with Russia was the rchc of a former epoch, 
but he could not just throw it into the wastepaper basket. He did not 
permit Communist propaganda, and he was willing to allow regular 
collaboration between his security pohee and ours, in order to dis- 
cover and suppress such propaganda.” 6 

This was four days after Schuscbnigg’s visit to Hitler at Bcrchtes- 
gaden, which showed what “collaboration” with the Nazis meant. 
But it was not by chance that on January 12, making his annual report 
to the Berlin Foreign Ministry, Eisenlohr had noted: “The anti- 
Bolshevist propaganda put out by Germany and Italy has resulted in 
a disinclination to appear arm-in-arm with such a compromising ally.” 7 

4 D.G.F.P., Vol. II, p. 40. This was not a special gesture for the benefit of the Nazis. 
On May 6, 1938, the Czechoslovak Government offered Poland joint action against 
Communists. 

5 Ibid., pp. 34, 68. 0 Ibid., p. 132. 7 Ibid., p. 99. 




“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” 139 

Of course Benes had not been entirely unaware of the danger to 
his country. As we have seen, he had resisted Hitler’s attempts in 1936 
to get him to permit unrestrained Nazi propaganda within Czecho- 
slovakia, and to give up the pacts with France and the U.S.S.R. in 
exchange for a German “guarantee”. After the occupation of Austria 
on March 11-12, of course, Bene? drew further conclusions. On 
March 29 the British military attache in Prague reported that the 
general staff there were preparing for war, “because no terms accept- 
able to both parties are possible”: and the nation was “very well 
organised for war”. 8 The attache was surprised that French and Soviet 
assurances of support were not being “seriously doubted”. One reason 
for this confidence was that, when the Czechoslovak Minister in Mos- 
cow had, that month, raised the question of air assistance, “he had 
obtained immediate delivery of sixty bombers; twenty had already 
landed at Uzhgorod”, he told the French Ambassador Coulondre. 9 

For all that, the anxious assurances which Bencs had given could 
not but reveal, to his Nazi opponents, a conflict of opinion within 
the leadership of the Czechoslovak State on which they could play, 
as Eisenlohr’s dispatch of January 12 showed — a conflict not only be- 
tween anti-German party and pro-German party, but within the 
minds of the bourgeois leaders of Czechoslovakia themselves. This 
cleavage was to show itself again and again in later months. While 
encouraging the Nazis, it increasingly paralysed the defence of the 
country or reduced its effectiveness— just because it led the Govern- 
ment as a rule to decide on action if the British and French Governments 
approved of it, and reject it if they disapproved. 

Such, for example, was the decision to recognise the Italian conquest 
of Ethiopia on April 20: it was approved by the British and French 
Governments, and that was enough. Yet this could only be encour- 
agement to further aggression — of which the Czechs knew that they 
were marked out as the next victim. At the end of April, too, Benes 
told Noel, the French Ambassador in Warsaw, that he had no inten- 
tion of concluding a military convention with the Soviet Union be- 
fore France and Great Britain did so 10 — a gesture calculated, if nothing 
else did, to give confidence, for a further deal with Hitler at Czecho- 
slovakia’s expense, to those who had already made deals with Hitler 
and his associates at the expense of Ethiopia, Spain, China and lately 
Austria. 

On May 17, Benes told the British Minister as, in substance, he had 

8 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 104-5, 107. 9 Coulondre, op. cit., p. 136. 

10 L. Noel, V Agression Allctnande contre la Pologne (1946), p. 200. 





140 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

three months before told Eisenlohr, that “if Western Europe dis- 
interested herself in Russia, Czechoslovakia would also be disinterested. 
His country would always follow and be bound to Western Europe, 
and never to Eastern Europe”. Those had always been Masaryk’s 
principles, and they would stand. Britain and France, however, needed 
Russia as a “balancing factor”, and it would be disastrous to try and 
exclude her. 11 

Three days later, the military situation on Czechoslovakia’s fron- 
tiers became so menacing that the Government without warning 
ordered the famous mobilisation of May 20-21. It was at that moment 
that Czechoslovakia, had the peril developed, needed the absolute 
certainty of quick and massive help. She received the necessary assur- 
ances, as we shall see, only from the Soviet Union, publicly as well 
as privately: from Western Europe she cliiefly received signs of ex- 
treme irritation — even though, accompanied by warnings to Germany 
to “lay off”, for fear that w'orse might befall. 

For the part played by the Czechoslovak Government at the sub- 
sequent stages of the negotiations at her expense by Germany on the 
one side, and Britain with France on the other, this internal division 
and conflict of purpose was decisive. O11 one hand, the Czechoslovak 
leaders wanted to maintain their country’s independence: on the other, 
they were ready in practice to watch Hitler undermining it from 
within under the guise of “resistance to Communism” (as had already 
happened to Spain in one form and to Austria in another). On the 
one hand they knew that the real “balance” (or in plainer language 
resistance) to Hitler in their part of the world could come only from 
the Soviet Union — which had already shown where it stood, by the 
practical help it had given Spain and China. On the other hand, they 
knew that the British and French Governments w r cre opposed to re- 
liance on the Soviet Union — the Western Powers too had shown their 
position on this, particularly as regards Spain, but also after the Anschluss 
of Austria — and they wanted always “to follow and be bound to 
Western Europe”. Such a combination of contradictor)' wishes and 
intentions in practice paralysed the Czechoslovak Government again 
and again, at critical moments. 

2. Secret Paralysis 

It was this paralysis that explains their acceptance of the barefaced 
interference in their internal affairs, both by the Germans and by the 


13 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 314-15. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND TRANCE” I 4 I 

British and French Governments: the anxious preparation of the first, 
second, third and fourth “plans” between April and September— only 
almost immediately to abandon them: the meek acceptance of the 
Runciman mission in July and August: the fear, when the final crisis 
came, even of appealing to the League of Nations, where much pub- 
licity could have helped to restrain the zeal at least of their tormentors 
in Western Europe, if not of Hitler. 

In this connection the case of the German-speaking population of 
the border districts — the so-called “Sudeten Germans” — is particularly 
interesting. Their grievances, although they existed, were certainly 
less than those of any national minority anywhere else in Europe. 
Their rights, and the effective use they were able to make of them, 
have already been described. It is worth reiterating that, so far as that 
of using their language is concerned, they were better ofi than the 
Bretons in France, or the Welsh hi the United Kingdom. Months 
after the “Sudeten Germans” had been transferred to the rule of 
Hitler in the name of justice and self-determination, large bodies of 
Welshmen were vainly collecting signatures to a petition for the 
repeal of an English Act passed in the 16th century, prohibiting the 
use of Welsh in courts of law (it was only repealed in 1942). 

Since the first months of the German Republic, in 1919, in fact — 
when the overthrow of the Kaiser had seemed to herald a period of 
the widest democracy in that country — there had been no movement 
in these districts for attachment to Germany. And even in 1938, 
before the Henlein party was allowed to spread terror far and wide, 
there was no popular demand for leaving Czechoslovakia and coming 
under Nazi rule. 

Foreigners who were in Czechoslovakia during 1938 have left 
reports demonstrating this beyond all reasonable doubt. The French 
Minister in Prague reported on May 22: “The Sudeten had been duly 
answering the call to the colours, and had been making no difficulties 
about it.” 

On May 30, a special correspondent of The Times cabled to his 
paper: “During a tour of 180 miles to-day, I was unable to find 
evidence of tension or strained nerves among the Sudeten German 
population.” This was the time of renewed German propaganda acti- 
vities after the mobilisation of May 21; yet in the large town of 
Gablonz, with a mixed population, just as in the country districts, 
he found freedom for the Henlein propaganda everywhere. 

On August 30, at the height of the German propaganda about 
Czech “terrorism”, The Times Prague correspondent cabled: “Among 


142 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

the Sudeten Germans there is little of the jingoism portrayed in some 
foreign newspapers.” They were mostly heartily sick of the dispute, 
and they feared that the brunt of any war would fall on them. 

The disgust of the Nazi Embassy officials and others, between 
September 16 and 20, at finding that the population of the country 
districts had heaved a sigh of relief when the Hcnleinist “putsch” 
collapsed, and its leaders had fled, has already been described in 
Chapter IV. 

On October 2, after the settlement of Munich, the Daily Telegraph 
and Morning Post correspondent at Prague wrote that thousands of 
pro-Henlein Germans had felt themselves betrayed by the annexation 
of the frontier districts, and gave interviews with businessmen and 
others to support liis statement. In addition, of course, there were the 
scores of thousands of Social-Democrats, Communists and members 
of other anti-Nazi organisations, for whom annexation of the terri- 
tories meant torture, death or the concentration camp. 12 

Where, then, was the secret of the immense popularity' of Henlcin 
and his party, of the fact that these districts were plastered with posters 
and banners and portraits of Henlein for months before the annexa- 
tion? The answer is simple, yet can be vouched for by every non-Nazi 
observer who visited the country between April and September, 1938. 

The Henlein organisation was allowed by the Prague authorities 
to build up unchecked a complete machinery of dual authority in 
the German-speaking districts, to reinforce the prestige of that machine 
by moral terrorism without any counter-campaign by the Czecho- 
slovak Government, and to follow up the moral terrorism by economic 
terrorism in the factories and other places of work. 

Anti-Nazi shopkeepers were boycotted, anti-Nazi workers dismissed, 
non-political workers found leaflets threatening them with dire penal- 
ties if they did not join the Henlein party, lying at their place of work 
in the mornings — leaflets which could only have been distributed with 
the management’s sanction — children of anti-Nazi parents were per- 
secuted in the schools, threatening demonstrations were held at night 
outside the houses of known anti-Nazis, anonymous letters threaten- 
ing death to Henlein’ s opponents were thrust through letter-boxes 
under cover of darkness, gangs in Henlein uniform (which was nomin- 
ally prohibited) roused Czech workmen at night to warn them to 
leave the territory. In short, any foreigner might well have been 
excused for thinking, in the months of June, July and August, that 

12 The books by Mr. Gcdye and Mr. Henderson, already mentioned, publish much 
other evidence on all these aspects, observed personally by the writer also. 



“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” 143 
he was not in Czechoslovakia, but in some territory conquered by 
Germany. 

Side by side with this was the open flauntin g of the machinery of dual 
power built up by the Henlein party, on resources which must par- 
tially have come from Germany, and in any case on lines which every- 
one knew were closely co-ordinated with those of similar services in 
Germany. Already in May and June one could not enter the smallest 
village hi the German-speaking districts, or go through the streets 
of quiet country towns, without seeing at every street corner, at the 
entrance to the village, one or more young men in the black and 
grey uniform which thinly camouflaged the dress of the future storm- 
troopers, watching for any unusual occurrence, taking the numbers 
of unfamiliar motor-cars, being replaced at regular intervals by reliefs, 
and so forth. As one approached the frontier, one met or was passed 
by young men in black leather uniforms, mounted on powerful red 
motor-cycles, with dispatch pouches and map cases strapped across 
their chests, hastening to and from the German frontier — which they 
could cross on the simple production of their passport or other papers, 
without let or hindrance from the Czechoslovak frontier officials. 

The latter were strictly forbidden to interfere. Similarly the police 
prefects had equally strict instructions to ignore the activities of the 
Henlein storm-troopers, and the local police had rigid orders not to 
notice the provocative wearing of prohibited uniforms and display 
of the Hitler salute. The commanders of local garrisons were instructed 
that their men, even if assaulted in the public streets, must not resist, 
but should for preference be kept in barracks. 

Already by July n the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post Prague 
correspondent could report that “camouflaged storm-troop organisa- 
tions” were maintaining day and night patrols in the border districts, 
as before May 21. The Havas Agency reported on August 23 that at 
Marianskc Lazne (Marienbad), when Henlein held a conference of his 
principal supporters, the streets were guarded in broad daylight by 
uniformed “protection squads” — who, the same Agency reported 
on August 30, had black breeches, ties and heavy boots like the Ger- 
man S.S., a badge like that of the S.S., and marched through the 
streets performing the gooscstep. 

To-day we know more. For example, we know that about August 1 
the German air attache in Prague, by direction of the Luftwaffe head- 
quarters in Berlin, reconnoitred the countryside round Freudenthal 
to select possible sites for airfields. He himself, of course, was in mufti, 
but he was accompanied by the local leader of Henlein’ s “Freikorps”, 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



144 

a reservist on leave in the uniform of the Czechoslovak army — which, 
he noted, was excellent camouflage. 13 Or again, we know now that 
on August 23, the German authorities had before them a record 
showing that since 1935 the “Sudeten German Party” had had 15,000 
marks a month from the Berlin Foreign Ministry for its activities, of 
which 12,000 marks came to it from the German Legation and 3000 
marks came direct to its representative in Berlin : and the latter now 
had his allowance raised to 5500 marks a month. 14 

Is it surprising, and does it need any explanation of outraged national 
feeling, that the local population should have come to the conclusion 
that force and power were on the side of the Nazis whose agents they 
could see in their midst, and whose dire threats against Czechoslovakia 
they could hear all day long on their wireless ; and not on the side of 
a government at Prague which, to all intents and purposes, did not 
exist except in name, so far as local daily life was concerned? Is it 
surprising that the vast majority of non-political people should have 
come to the conclusion that support and cheers for Henlein were the 
safer part, whatever their own personal inclinations? 

Yet on two crucial occasions the population of the Sudeten districts 
gave a clear manifestation of its lack of any real enthusiasm for the 
Henlein cause. One already mentioned was after the mobilisation of 
May 2i, in which the young German-speaking reservists answered 
the call cheerfully, with an infinitesimal number of exceptions, and 
all foreign eye-witnesses testified to the relief of the local population. 
The second was after the concerted attacks by Hcnlcinist storm- 
troopers, supported by shock groups from across the frontier, in 
approximately forty towns and villages along the border on the night 
of September 12, after Hitler’s speech at Nuremberg. The experience 
of every other popular movement in history shows that this w T ould 
have been the occasion, if ever there was one, for a mass outbreak of 
the population behind the sheltered shock-troops which actually seized 
police stations and other public buildings on that night. Yet no such 
movement occurred, and the people remained passive and unsym- 
pathetic spectators of the murder and arson committed by the raiders, 
notwithstanding the fact that, as the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post 
correspondent wrote from Karlovy Vary in his graphic description 
(September 14) of the outbreaks which he had personally witnessed, 
orders had been given by the Czechoslovak Government to offer no 
resistance to the terrorists. At Falkenau, for example, “it seemed to 
be carrying self-restraint on the part of the Czechs to the limit when 
13 Trial, part II, p. 33. 14 D.G.F.P., voL II, pp. 594-5. 



“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” I45 

they” (two gendarmes attacked by the Henleinites) “discovered on 
leaving the town that the barracks on the outskirts were full of troops 
who were not allowed to go out”. 

The fact is that the middle-class Radicals who stood at the helm 
of Czechoslovak democracy in the party of President Benes, in alli- 
ance with the leaders of the Catholic Party and the Social-Democratic 
Parties, were bent up to the very end on tolerating this open terrorism, 
and made other sweeping concessions to Germany, not only because 
of Agrarian pressure, but above all for fear of alienating the sympathy 
of the British and French Governments. In the message which has 
just been quoted, the w r ell-known British journalist wiio marvelled 
at the passivity of the Czechoslovak authorities remarked that it w'as 
“apparently in accordance with the wishes of their foreign advisers . 

Not only was it that, but it provided those advisers with the very 
material they needed to build up their case for presenting the dis- 
memberment of Czechoslovakia as a matter of self-determination. As 
one turns nowadays over the hundreds of pages of the Documents on 
British Foreign Policy for this period, one hears a ceaseless lament over 
the hard fate of the “Sudeten Germans” and the “obstinacy” of the 
Czechs who w r on’t let them go: more well-bred in tone, perhaps, 
tlian the unrestrained screeching and grotesque lies of the similar 
volumes on German Foreign Policy, but equally unscrupulous. Particu- 
larly when it came from men who would never have dreamed of 
giving, say, Cypriots or Algerians — or at that time Indians and Egyp- 
tians — the rights they were demanding for the “Sudetens”. 

The extraordinary liberality of which Czechoslovakia’s “foreign 
advisers” took advantage went very far. High officers of the army 
would privately tell the foreigner what iron self-restraint they had to 
impose on their men and themselves, to ensure the fulfilment of War 
Office instructions, although they could see the building up of a “fifth 
column” before their very eyes. A symptom of the complete im- 
punity which the friends of w'hat was virtually an enemy Powder felt 
in Czechoslovakia was the incident, reported by the Prague corre- 
spondent of the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post on June 2, in which 
a well-known British friend of the German Chancellor’s, Miss Unity 
Mitford, w ? as allowed to travel throughout the border districts with 
a portrait of Hitler prominently displayed on her car, together with 
swastika badges, and was only stopped by a crowd acting on its own, 
the intervention of authority being limited to a request by a police 
official to produce her papers. 

The attitude in the highest quarters, when journalists of many 





K 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



146 

nationalities expressed their surprise at such a state of affairs, was in- 
variably the same. “Yes, you tell us what everyone tells us, we know 
that if we were to arrest Hcnlein and a couple of dozen of his prin- 
cipal assistants, his movement would be ready to collapse. We agree 
that the Henlein machine is an alien apparatus, built up by foreign 
organisers on foreign money, and lias no real roots among the mass 
of the German-speaking population. But if we were to touch it, the 
English and French Governments would be displeased with us. And 
you see we must not quarrel if possible with England and France. 
We rely on them for help, if matters become critical.” 15 
Even responsible members of the Agrarian Party did not conceal — 
in private conversation 16 — that there was ample evidence available for 
the prosecution of Henlein on grounds of high treason, and that such 
a blow would be decisive for his organisation. But the mere idea of 
such proceedings caused them the greatest alarm, partly because it 
would “provoke Hider” but mainly and above all because it would 
“alienate the British and French”: on whom, they explained, even 
the “moderate” elements in Czechoslovakia must rely, to resist too 
great demands from Germany in the fmal settlement. 

It was this attitude on the part of both Right and “Left” sections 
of the Government coalition that explained such facts as the constant 
toleration shown to the Henlein paper published in Prague itself, the 
Zeit. Day by day it reprinted extracts from the abusive leading articles 
of the Berlin newspapers — although the latter were prohibited in 
Czechoslovakia by reason of those very articles — while the mildest 
cridcism of the German Government was visited with the penalties 
of last-minute deletions by the press censors, blank spaces on the front 
pages of the Left newspapers, and threats of suppression (the rule 
was: suppression after three “warnings” from the Agrarian Minister 
of the Interior). On the night of September 21-22 — when the people 
were demonstrating in the streets against the acceptance of dismember- 
ment — the police occupied the printing works of Rude Pravo, the 
Communist paper. It came out in the morning with its front page 
blank, except for two headings: “Let Parliament and the people de- 
cide! The Soviet Union is with us in all circumstances !” 17 
If this was the price paid in policy at home for the hope of ultimate 
Anglo-French support, it is scarcely to be wondered at that the 

16 Benes himself said this to the writer in June, 1938, in his study in Prague Castle. 

16 Such as the writer had, within a few days of the talk with BcncS, with the head of 
the Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency and a responsible official of the President’s staff. 

17 Matveyev, Proval Miunhenskoi Politiki, 1938-39 (Moscow, 1955), P- 8 5- 



“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND PRANCE” I47 

Czechoslovak Government needed very little persuasion from its 
“foreign advisers” to go a very long way in its concessions to demands 
from abroad. 

The closer the final crisis approached, the more inconsequential 
appears the policy which the Government pursued. 

Right up to the beginning of September, as Litvinov revealed pub- 
licly in his speech at the League Assembly, 18 the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment had not even enquired at Moscow whether the Soviet Union 
would fulfil its obligations under the pact: much less arranged for 
staff talks. In private, Benes at the time (August 24 and 25) was assur- 
ing the Henleinite leaders that if there were a modus vivendi with 
Germany, “in practice the question of the pact with Russia would 
lose all actuality”. He was only afraid of two tilings, he told them — 
“a war and, after it, a Bolshevik revolution”: and then again followed 
the reminiscences intended to placate the determined assassins of his 
country. “Masaryk and he had been the first to make anti-Bolshevik 
speeches. His first speech after the Peace Conference had attacked the 
Bolshevists.” 19 

Only on September 19 (Litvinov revealed in the same speech) — 
i.e. when presented by the British and French Governments with the 
demand that it should commit suicide — did the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment overcome its hesitations for a brief moment, and formally en- 
quire whether the U.S.S.R. would fulfil its obligations under the pact. 
The reply received was completely positive. But by then, as we now 
know, the foreign friends had settled, in full session at Downing Street, 
the fate of Czechoslovakia. “When at last B.-W.” (Barrington Ward, 
assistant editor of The Times) “met Hoarc” (First Lord of the Ad- 
miralty, who had spent all day with Chamberlain, Halifax and Simon 
on the 1 6th, and now had been in the Cabinet all day on the 17th) 
“he learnt that . . . after discussion, the Cabinet had agreed that 
Czechoslovakia was disintegrating already and it was not worth a 
war to stop the process”. 20 

3. Thwarting the People’s Will 

In reality, there was no disintegration. Not only had the Henleinite 
rising fizzled out, but in the days immediately following the Govern- 
ment had had a series of assurances of loyalty from important sections 
of the German-speaking population : the Social-Democrats, the smaller 

18 Litvinov, Against Aggression (London, 1939), p. 129. 

19 D.G.F.P., voL II, pp. 640-2. 20 History of “The Times’', vol. IV, part 2, p. 938. 




148 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

bourgeois parties which earlier had been swept into the Henleinite 
net, the joint body representing democratic youth organisations of 
many creeds, and finally even the ex-Austrian nobility. The people 
of the Czech regions — Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia — had already demon- 
strated in many scores of thousands throughout the country, in protest 
against foreign interference, during the first days of June and again 
at the beginning of August. 21 It was at the time of the two mobilisa- 
tions, however, that the contrast between people and Government 
was sharpest. 

On the night of May 20-21 and during the following days the 
common people responded to the call for mobilisation, and for self- 
defence if need be, with genuine enthusiasm. Moreover, this enthu- 
siasm was not limited to the reservists or to their families. Responsible 
army officers, trained in a school of hostility to politics, and particularly 
to the working-class organisations, were moved to tears by the spon- 
taneous offers that poured in upon them, from trade union branches, 
unemployed organisations, local units of the Social-Democratic and 
Communist Parties, to dig trenches, supply guards for undefended 
outposts, provide comforts for the troops in the frontier fortifications 
and so on. 

At the important garrison town of Liberec (Reichenberg), for ex- 
ample, where the local unemployed organisation had supplied extra 
labour for work on fortifications after May 21 — the garrison com- 
mander could not appeal to the Nazi-controlled labour exchange — 
the labourers, by unanimous vote at a mass meeting held on completion 
of the work, decided not to accept a penny of the pay which the 
garrison treasurer had prepared, but to content themselves with their 
usual unemployment benefit: on the ground that tins was work for 
the defence of the Republic. In the same district, on the night of 
May 21, the local Communists and Socialists organised a voluntary 
guard, armed with a few odd weapons they had secured, which 
manned on their own initiative one frontier position of some import- 
ance, left unoccupied by the military. They reported to the garrison 
commander the following morning, earnestly pressing him to send 
a small detachment of troops there in future, but affirming their 
complete willingness to go on bearing the burden themselves if there 
were not enough troops. 

“You know, I am a professional officer. I have been in the army 
more than twenty years. I fought against the Russians in 1918. I 
had no idea that the Communists were like that,” said the garrison 


21 Matveyev, op. cit., p. 79. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” 149 

commander, tears in his eyes, to me a few weeks after these events. 

The same kind of thing occurred in other border areas. 

It must be remembered, too, that from May onwards the people 
of Czechoslovakia were increasingly buoyed up by the news which 
began to percolate of the arrivals of Soviet war material that could 
not be hidden. One sunny morning early in June, 1938, the writer 
(who had arrived a few hours earlier from Geneva) was being given 
coffee at Barrandov, on a hill above Prague, overlooking a river valley 
where thousands of people were bathing and taking the sun. Suddenly 
a distant murmur began, rolling rapidly towards us and becoming 
a roar of cheering. All in the restaurant rushed to the glassed-in terrace. 
Three huge four-engined Soviet bombers — no one who had ever seen 
them could be mistaken — with the colours of the Czechoslovak Re- 
public on the wings, were flying up the valley. On the grassy slopes 
beneath every man, woman and child was on his or her feet, waving, 
cheering and — some — dancing. It was an exciting experience for one’s 
first morning in Prague, particularly for a fellow-citizen of Mr. 
Chamberlain’s — and also of William Gallachcr’s. 

Nor did the spirit of the people diminish as the danger became more 
manifest. On September 9, for example, the Daily Telegraph and Morn- 
ing Post printed a dispatch from its Prague correspondent describing 
the huge demonstrations of protest all over the country when the 
terms of the Belies plan became known: and the avalanche of tele- 
grams which poured in upon Government leaders from thousands of 
organisations and meetings, protesting their readiness to defend the 
country against all odds. Two days later, while Goering was uttering 
his threats and describing the irresistible might of German arms, great 
demonstrations of loyalty to the Republic were held by Czechs and 
Germans alike all over the Sudeten districts, in which scores of thou- 
sands participated. 

When the news that the Hodza Government had accepted the Berch- 
tesgaden terms became known on the evening of September 21, what 
one British Conservative journalist called a “tide of national indigna- 
tion” broke out, which drove the Government out of office. Spon- 
taneous demonstrations, in which hundreds of thousands took part, 
had formed in the central streets of Prague and had continued far 
into the night, to demand: “Arms for the people ! Defend the frontiers ! 
Down with the capitulators!” A political general strike of 250,000 
workmen broke out on the morning of September 22 at all the big 
factories. “Bearing the national colours, the workers marched into 
Prague in disciplined columns. At 10 a.m. a number of Deputies of 





THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



150 

all parties, except the Agrarians, 22 appeared on the balcony, and the 
announcement of resignation was made through loud-speakers. The 
scene of enthusiasm that ensued was indescribable. There have been 
no such demonstrations in the Republic’s history since those which 
accompanied the restoration of national liberty in 1918. 

“The announcement took the form of a statement that the Hodza 
Government would be succeeded by a Government of National 
Defence on a broad basis, with a strong military admixture. The news 
enabled the Czech people to breathe again. The burden of restraint 
on their freedom to defend themselves, which had weighed upon 
them ever since the arrival of the Runciman mission, and the endless 
series of concessions which in consequence they were forced to make 
to Germany — only to find that each was made a stepping-stone for 
still more far-reaching demands — seemed to them to have been lifted 
from their shoulders. 

“The cheers for the Army and for the idea of defending the fron tiers 
seemed as though they would never end” ( Daily Telegraph and Morning 
Post, September 23). Similar strikes and demonstrations took place 
in many towns throughout Czechoslovakia. 

The announcement of general mobilisation (all men up to 40, or 
thirty-five out of forty-five divisions available) — issued by radio in 
the five languages of Czechoslovakia on the evening of September 23 
(the writer heard it in Geneva, the most unexpected and the most 
thrilling broadcast since the description of the entry of the International 
Brigade to defend Madrid, by the radio of the Spanish Republic on 
November 8, 1936) — was met by the people with an immense demon- 
stration of enthusiasm. Men were pouring from houses and cinemas, 
from work and from cafes, the trams were packed with them (the 
conductors calling on non-reservists to get off), taxis and private cars 
were filled with men hurrying to the call-up points — all within a few 
minutes. 23 Coming after the protest demonstrations of the 21st and 
22nd, this was an unequalled demonstration of the people against the 
foreign enemies of their Republic, of their readiness and their well- 
deserved confidence in their strength, which astounded their false 
friends once again. By the 24th mobilisation of the four armies of the 
Republic was complete. The Czech general staff estimated that Ger- 
many could not spare more than about seventy-five divisions to attack 

22 A Communist deputy had to appeal for a hearing for the spokesman of the Slovak 
Agrarians. 

23 The description of these scenes in Gedye’s Fallen Bastions (pp. 470-3) is one of the 
most politically enlightening passages in the book — as well as brilliant eye-witness 
journalism. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” I5I 

them if the French co-operated — Newton reports on September 27, 
a superiority of 2 to 1 “which is not excessive” 24 — (in reality, the 
Germans had substantially less, as will be shown later). The military 
attache on whose opinion he relied “does not consider the morale 
of the Czechoslovak army is low”: the head of the Intelligence services 
of the French army had told the British military attache in Paris, 
about the same time, that it was “high”. 25 

The people were united, the danger from the “Sudctcns” grossly 
exaggerated, the army was determined, its training and mechanisation 
were far beyond those of any other army in Central Europe, 26 the 
economic resources of the country, particularly in heavy industry, 
were (for its size but also absolutely) very great, its mountain fortifi- 
cations gave good opportunities for a defensive war, the Soviet Union 
at any rate was willing to come to its aid from the first shot. British 
and French opposition was to be expected at first — that was obvious : 
but the spectacle of the struggle, an immediate appeal to world 
opinion at the League of Nations under more favourable conditions 
than the Spanish Republic had had, and worldwide hatred of the 
Nazis, might overcome the Chamberlains and Daladiers. 

What was lacking? Determination of the national leaders. 

First, there was the fear of treason from the Agrarians. That there 
was ground for this in previous experience is now not to be doubted. 
Informed testimony is unanimous that it reappeared at the critical 
moment— when the Czechoslovak Government on September 21 had 
to make up its mind what to do about the Anglo-French terms. “The 
Cabinet wants to reject and to rely on Russia and Rumania, but some 
of the extreme Right Agrarians threaten if Russian help is demanded 
to invite Hitler to march in”, Gedye heard at the ancient Hradschin 
(Castle) of Prague in the early hours of the 21st, while waiting for the 
Cabinet decision. 27 “Dr. Hodza and the Ministers of the Interior and 
Defence, all members of the Agrarian Party, were opposed to resist- 
ance with Russia as a sole ally, and the Bureau of the Agrarian Party 
was strongly of the same opinion”, writes Wheeler-Bennctt, who was 
also in Prague at the time. 28 Benes in his memoirs refers to “the pre- 
parations for open treason by some elements in the homeland, and 
my serious doubts about the attitude of some of our Agrarians”. 29 

24 D.B.F.P., vol. n, p. 567. 25 Ibid., pp. 581-2, 609-10. 

26 “The motorised equipment of the Czechoslovak Army is greatly superior to that 
possessed by the Germans. Knowledgeable Czechs expressed the deepest contempt for 
the German material which rolled into Prague last week”, wrote The Times corre- 
spondent on March 24, 1939 — nine days after the Germans had occupied Prague. 

27 Fallen Bastions, pp. 462-3. 26 Munich, Prologue to Tragedy, p. 128. 

29 Memoirs (English edition, 1954), p. 273. 



152 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

But this treasonable “attitude”, and the threats to “call in Hitler” — 
were they really so dangerous that they could not have been disposed 
of by arresting a dozen or so of those Agrarian leaders who were 
responsible for them? Let the reader set these “threats” against the 
spirit of the people on the 21st and 22nd, described by the journalists 
who were on the spot. It can hardly be doubted that, if the Govern- 
ment had announced that it had rejected the Anglo-French terms, 
was appealing to the U.S.S.R. and to France to stand by their treaties 
and had requested an emergency meeting of the League Council 
forthwith under Article 11 of the Covenant, providing for action in 
case of a “threat of war” : and at the same time that it had arrested a group 
of politicians and others who had threatened high treason : the people of 
Czechoslovakia would have welcomed the news. Where were Hodza 
and his Agrarian politicians twenty-four hours later, after the great 
demonstrations and general strike of September 21-22? How was it 
that the crowds would not listen to the Agrarians? What would they 
have done if Benes, or someone on his behalf, had announced, not 
only that a new Government of National Defence was being formed, 
but that such-and-such politicians had been excluded from it because 
they had opposed resistance out of hatred for the U.S.S.R.? 

But the tragic truth was that among those ruling politicians who 
were not Agrarians the will to resist — if it meant resisting with the 
Soviet Union at their side — was long since dead as well. Of this, too, 
there has been some evidence in previous pages. In the days of deci- 
sion it played the decisive part. The evidence is unmistakable. 

General Syrovy, Inspector-General of the army, had been one of 
the organisers of the Czechoslovak insurrection against the young 
Soviet power in 1918. He told Whecler-Bcnnett in August: “We 
shall fight the Germans, cither alone, or with you and the French, 
but we don’t want the Russians in here. We should never get them 
out.” 30 

It is at this time, too, that General Gamelin instructed Faucher, 
head of the French military mission in Prague, to advise the Czecho- 
slovak high command to “study the question of Soviet aid”, in which 
Gamelin promised Iris good services. But, he writes, Faucher on 
August 29 met considerable hesitation on the part of Krcjci, the chief 
of the Czechoslovak general staff. He realised the necessity of Russian 
co-operation, but “feared that this gesture, if it were known, would 
serve as a pretext for the Germans”. One might have expected that 


30 Munich, Prologue to Tragedy, pp. 81-2. The Soviet troops left Czechoslovakia in 
December, 1945, within a very few months of the end of the second world war. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” 153 

men thinking of real resistance to invasion would not have worried 
about that, at such a time. 31 

But although Syrovy was invested by Benes with the Premiership 
in place of Hodza, in the early morning of September 21 — a BeneSite 
in place of an Agrarian — he did not fight the Germans, either alone 
or with the Western Allies: he became their collaborator during the 
occupation, and in 1947 got a twenty-year sentence. The official ex- 
planation by Benes and his followers was a different one. “It would 
have been more than dangerous to ask Russia to help us independently 
of France and the League of Nations, for Britain and France, who 
were supporting German claims in the dispute, and who were there- 
fore opposing us, would have considered such Russian intervention 
on our behalf as a dangerous expansion of ‘Bolshevism’ in Europe. 
In the ‘ideological war’ which might have ensued — for that is how it 
would immediately have been described in the German propaganda 
— the Powers of the West would have undoubtedly sympathised with 
the Berlin-Rome axis, as the defenders of ‘order and European civili- 
sation’ against ‘Bolshevik disruption and decay’. . . . (The Czecho- 
slovak Government) did not want to make it possible for Germany 
to declare a ‘crusade against Bolshevism’. The Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment realised that, should this happen, the Western Powers, whose 
relations with Soviet Russia had been a trifle cold of late, might decide 
to adopt a passive attitude or perhaps even an attitude actively hostile 
to the Czechoslovak Republic. This attitude, we considered, might 
be adopted by Britain and France with Soviet Russia our only ally”, 
wrote one of Benes’ closest associates, Hubert Ripka, a few months 
later. 32 

But the Czechoslovak Government had known of this hostility to 
the U.S.S.R. all along. “A trifle cold” is a curious expression to use 
of the British and French Governments’ attitude to the U.S.S.R. in 
the years 1936 to 1938. If this hostility was to be their sole guide, 
these words could only mean that the independence and vital interests 
of their own people had long ago been put second in the Czechoslovak 
Government’s eyes to getting the approval of Chamberlain and 
Daladier. And indeed certain documents quoted earlier bear tins out. 
One may leave aside the question of whether the disapproval of the 
British and French Governments would count for very much if the 
whole power of the Soviet Union came into play against Nazi Ger- 
many, including its possible satellites. But all Ripka’s argument docs 
not explain why, long before matters reached this point, his friends 
31 Gamelin, op. cit., p. 341. 32 Munich, Before and After, pp. 83, 146. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


154 

were busily explaining both to the British and French and to the 
Germans that they, too, wanted no truck with “Communism” or 
with “Russia”. Yet they did not tell this to their people — or even to 
the Soviet Union. 

The conclusion is irresistible. On the one hand, they wanted to 
use the threat of Soviet support for diplomatic bargaining with the 
Germans, as long as they could, and to keep up the morale of their 
people for as long as was necessary. But on the other hand, actually 
safeguarding the independence of their people with the help of the 
Soviet Union (in war, if needs be) was contrary to their intentions, 
and they preferred to see their people go under Hitler’s yoke to such a 
way out. Where then was the difference in substance — as opposed to 
difference in words — between their position and that of the Agrarians? 

One can hardly take seriously Bcncs’ final argument that “above 
all”, or what weighed with him, was “the inevitable and foreseeable 
complications for the Soviet Union, as well as ourselves, if we had 
gone to war against the express wishes of Great Britain and France !” 33 
After all, the Soviet Union had moved near to going to war in Spain, 
and again in China, very much against the “express wishes” of those 
two Powers in the first case and — -judging by their behaviour hi 1937 
and 1938 — against their unexpressed wishes in the second. . . . One 
must imagine that from May to September, 1938, it was not very 
difficult to realise (in Moscow no more so than in Prague) the con- 
sequences for the Soviet Union if it carried out its pledges of support 
for Czechoslovakia, in the teeth of both the express threats of Hider 
and the express wishes of the British and French Governments. 

Winston Churchill's opinion is of interest here: “I have always be- 
lieved that Benes was wrong to yield. He should have defended his 
fortress line. Once fighting had begun, in my opinion at that time, 
France would have moved to his aid in a surge of national passion, 
and Britain would have rallied to France almost immediately.” 
Churchill does not mention the U.S.S.R.: but he does describe how 
a meeting of his Tory friends on September 26 “focused on the 
point, ‘We must get Russia in’ ”. 34 Unfortunately, he does not give 
a single quotation from any statement of his own between May and 
September, 1938, i.e. from before the Czechoslovak mobilisation right 
up to Chamberlain’s departure for Berchtesgadcn, in which he publicly 
expressed such a view — which, coming from such an imperialist and 
old enemy of the U.S.S.R., would have weighed very much with the 
Czechs. Nor docs he attempt to explain this omission. 

33 BencS, op. cit., p. 273. 34 Churchill, op. cit., pp. 237, 242. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE 155 

Meanwhile, everything was done to frighten the people with this 
“danger”, and at the same time to make sure that the people did 
nothing to raise the question of co-operation with the U.S.S.R. 
During the critical hours of September 21-22, the Communists were 
again refused admission to the new Government, and an approach 
by the Communist leader Gottwald to the Social-Democrats for a 
working-class alliance to become its nucleus was rejected. At first 
the Government had recourse to deliberate misrepresentation. In its 
broadcast at 7 p.m. on the 21st it declared that “we were left alone”, 
because the Soviet Union could only help if France did so, “or alter- 
natively not until Germany had been declared an aggressor by the 
League of Nations”. This was untrue — since the Soviet Union had 
months before stated precisely, and had recently renewed the promise, 
that it would help immediately if Czechoslovakia fought: no other 
condition was laid down. Immediately afterwards the untruth was 
repeated, in a broadcast by Vavrecka, Minister of Propaganda, which 
said that Czechoslovakia’s allies “left us alone and unsupported . 35 
When the crowds on the night of the 21st were shouting: “We will 
not surrender our frontiers!”, “Mobilise!”, Syrovy replied to them: 
“You do not know the causes which forced the Government to make 
its decisions. We cannot lead the nation to suicide” 36 — statements 
calculated to deepen the impression that Czechoslovakia had been 
abandoned by the Soviet Union as well. But the manceuvre was 
carried further. 

The new Government formed the following morning represented 
no change of political leadership or of policy, Ripka points out. “The 
only importance of the change of Government lay in its psychological 
influence on the public,” he admits 37 — that is, to keep the people 
quiet. This was not what the people thought it meant, of course — 
but their wrong impression was heightened by Syrovy s first declara- 
tion to the huge crowd before the Parliament building — a document 
which Ripka does not print. 38 “I guarantee that the Army stands and 
will stand on our frontiers to defend our liberty to the last. Do not 
let any internal enemies inspire the idea that the army could change 
its attitude. I may soon call upon you here to take an active part in 
the defence of our country in which we all long to join.” Now every- 
one could join in “the last preparations to meet the inevitable on- 
slaught of a mighty enemy”, Gedye comments — and so no doubt 

36 Quoted in Ripka, op. cit., pp. 106, 108. 

36 Ibid., p. 109. 37 Ibid., p. no. 

38 Gedye, op. cit., p. 467: and Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, September 23, 1938. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


156 

did the people. Benes heightened the impression in his broadcast that 
night by mysterious and encouraging phrases: “I have no fear now 
for the future of our State. I have made plans for all eventualities. . . . 
If it should be necessary to fight, we will know how to do so to the 
last breath.” 39 What could any Czechoslovak citizen understand by 
these words, but that — now that the Hodza Government had gone — 
his Government was prepared to lead him in war, if necessary (the 
mobilisation on the evening of the 23rd seemed to confirm this), and 
with at any rate (after the Soviet warning to the Poles on the morning 
of the 23rd) support assured from the Soviet Union? 

This support had been further assured by Litvinov’s speeches at 
Geneva, on the 21st and 23rd — with their precise reiteration of Soviet 
pledges, and the public hint, to those who studied it (and significantly 
enough, Ripka in his book leaves out the sentence containing the 
liint), that it might come to the aid of Czechoslovakia “in virtue of 
a voluntary decision on its part”. 40 Could any rank-and-file Czecho- 
slovak citizen suppose that this assistance was being rejected? It is not 
surprising that, as late as September 28th, the foreign military experts 
quoted earlier found that the morale of the Czechoslovak armed 
forces was high. 

But in reality the offer of Soviet help was being rejected. This forced 
the leaders on September 30th out into the open — though very re- 
luctantly. In any case, the younger and most vigorous elements of 
the nation, including the working class which had risen up so effec- 
tively on September 22, were now' scattered far and wide, in their 
military units, either at the frontiers or in the strategic reserves massed 
at different points within the country. The German troops were to 
begin their march into Czechoslovakia next day, when argument 
would be too late. 

4. Soviet Aid Rejected 

At first the Government, in its afternoon communique announcing 
acceptance of the Munich decisions, did not go beyond emphasising 
that “the responsible factors of the political parties” were unanimous 
in tins (they did not of course count the Communists), that this was 
done “to preserve the nation”, and that “any other decision is to-day 
impossible”. Later in the afternoon, Syrovy spoke, first repeating the 
he that “we stood alone”, promising that “the territories which will 
remain to us will give us the possibility of further cultural and 

39 Ripka, op. cit., p. ill. 

40 League of Nations Official Journal. Special Supplement No. 189 (Geneva, 1938), 
p. 34. In private, as will be seen, the Soviet offer was more than a hint. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” I57 

economic progress” (which every Czech knew to be a He) and appeal- 
ing that “there should be no conflict within our ranks”. An army order 
from Krejci, chief of the general staff, then added that “Western 
Europe has asked this sacrifice from us categorically, in order to pre- 
vent world war”. 41 

Gedye has recorded that “the army, standing to its guns with 
splendid spirit out on the frontier, had . . . not the faintest idea that 
such a blow could fall. Within an hour from the reading of this 
order, and the further detailed orders for evacuation, the morale of 
the splendid and unweakened force had gone. . . . For a while at least, 
discipline broke down.” 42 Only when this had happened did the 
Government at last feel strong enough to give its true reasons to 
the people. 

Derer, the Minister of Justice up to September 22, was given time 
on the radio to say: “Betrayed by all who promised us help, relying 
solely upon Soviet Russia, wc should be placed in great danger by 
the outbreak of war. Czechoslovakia could be accused of being the 
tool of Soviet Russia, and our neighbours, including the Western 
States, would regard this w r ar as a war of Communism against Euro- 
pean civilisation. We should have been faced with the open hostility 
of the whole of the West.” And Vavrecka, now Minister without 
Portfolio, said on the radio on October 2 (according to a Havas mess- 
age from Prague of the same date): “Soviet Russia was without any 
doubt ready to go to war. But our war by the side of Russia would 
have been not only a war against Germany. All Europe, including 
France and Britain, would have considered it as a war of Bolshevism 
against Europe. Perhaps all Europe would have gone to war against 
Russia and against us.” 

Without returning to the earlier discussion of these arguments, it 
is sufficient to say that the Czechoslovak Government was now quite 
safe in using them, because there was scarcely anyone in a position 
now openly to contradict. In fact, however, the mass of the working 
class, the peasantry and the “man in the street” generally, had shown 
themselves more than once quite prepared to dare these dangers, real 
or imaginary. The recently-opened archives of the Ministry of National 
Defence show that the mass of the army, only a week before called 
from its civilian jobs, was ready to dare them too, and bitterly re- 
sented the surrender of their country’s great defences to the enemy. 43 

41 Ripka, op. cit., pp. 231-3. 42 Gedye, op. cit., pp. 487-8. 

43 Krai, op. dt., pp. 268-9, quotes confidential reports by military commanders bear- 
ing witness to these feelings. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


158 

Even in the wave of defeatism, capitulation, and abjuring of past 
faiths, which swept through all the bourgeois political parties of 
Czechoslovakia after Munich and which led immediately to the 
triumph of the pro-Nazi Agrarians (in Slovakia, of open Fascists), 
one remarkable phenomenon showed that, under the surface, a dif- 
ferent process was going on. This was the establishment of trade union 
unity in the principal factories, by pressure from the workers them- 
selves for the establishment of united factory committees — an end 
which twenty years of Czechoslovak democracy had seemed power- 
less to accomplish, and which had left the important Czechoslovak 
working class divided between Social-Democratic, Revolutionary, 
National-Socialist (Bcnesite), Catholic and Agrarian unions at the 
critical period of its existence. Had it been able earlier to speak with 
a united voice, and with the machinery of trade unionism at its dis- 
posal, it might have changed the entire political situation, at all events 
after September 21. 

This movement began on the initiative of tire Communist Party — 
“the only Party which was consistently opposed to capitulation to 
Germany”, by the reluctant testimony of one of its opponents. 44 On 
October n, 1938, speaking in the National Assembly on the real 
reasons for Munich, its leader Klement Gottwald stated them as 
follows : 

“They were the class interests of the reactionary big bourgeoisie 
of Britain and France, for which the Hitlerite regime was saved at 
Munich at the expense of Czechoslovakia. They were the reactionary 
forces of the big bourgeoisie of Czechoslovakia, at the dictation of 
which capitulation took place, and the interests of the State and the 
Republic were sacrificed to its class interests. We are dealing here 
with a large-scale conspiracy against the people, against the Republic 
and against democracy.” 43 

Ten days later the new pro-Nazi Government of Czechoslovakia 
prohibited all activity by the Communist Party. 


A Note on American Policy 

“Hitler was perfectly safe in discounting the influence of the United 
States”, is a typical verdict by United States historians on American 

44 Ripka, op. cit., p. 190. 

45 Quoted in Grachev, Pomoshch S.S.S.R. Narodam Chehoslovakii v ih Borbe za Svobodu 
i Nezavisimost (Moscow, 1953), pp- 20-1. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” 159 

policy in 1938. 1 “We could have taken a stiffer and more resolute 
attitude against Hider’s encroachments and provocations”, writes 
George F. Kcnnan. Firmness when he re-occupied the Rhineland 
might have forced him to be more circumspect, firmness at the time 
of Munich “might have resulted in Hitler’s overthrow”. 2 

The conclusion which the reader is clearly intended to draw from 
these and similar reflections is that United States policy during 1938 
was a passive one, and if concerned about Hider’s aggression, unable 
to make up its mind to take action against them. At the very outset, 
on March 14, Sumner Welles told the Czechoslovak Minister “that 
this Government had taken no action, had made no representations 
and intended to make none”. 3 

In reality United States policy was not at all passive; and far from 
wavering in the choice between merely condemning Hider’s aggres- 
sions and taking action against them, it gave constant encouragement 
to them in practice, and only hesitated and drew back when it showed 
its hand too openly. And its general line of encouragement to Hitler 
was to say: don’t pursue your conquest by violence if you can achieve 
it by negotiation. While the documents published by the State Depart- 
ment are more than usually “trimmed” and expurgated, so much is 
obvious. 4 

On May 12 the British Ambassador in Berlin submitted an aide- 
memoire telling the Germans that the British Government was using 
urgent pressure in Prague to make the Czechs “go to the limit” in 
seeking a setdement with Henlein (incidentally, by revealing this to 
the Germans directly disobeying instructions from London). The 
Germans, naturally, were pleased to hear this — but did not give any 
intelligible response to his request that they in their turn should 
exercise pressure on Henlein. Yet the next day Henderson cabled 
that Hugh Wilson, the American Ambassador — with whom he had 
obviously discussed the matter — agreed with him in thinking the 
German reaction “as quite as satisfactory as I anticipated” — and that 
“all depends now on Belies”. 5 Hugh Wilson had interpreted the 
American attitude correctly: Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, stated 
publicly that the U.S.A. should not undertake any action against 

1 Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (i95 2 )> P- 37- 

2 George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (1952), PP- 79*8o. 

3 Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1938 (referred to further as 
F.R.U.S.), vol. I (1955), P- 486. 

4 I am indebted for two of the references which follow, from works not easily avail- 
able in this country, to an article, Rol Amerikanskoi Diplomatii v Organizatsii Miunhenskoi 
Konferencii 1938 goda, by Y. V. Arutiunyan, in Voprosy Istorii, No. 2, 1958. 

6 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 282, 290. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


160 

Hitler. 6 And when the Czechoslovak Government mobilised, a week 
later, Ambassador Bullitt cabled from Paris on May 21 and 22 his 
dissatisfaction that the Czechs and Slovaks preferred to fight rather 
than to make concessions — and his opinion that the U.S.A. should 
“attempt to find some way which will let the French out of their 
moral commitment” — otherwise there would be “the establishment 
of Bolshevism from one end of the Continent to the other”. 7 

In London Ambassador Kennedy was going further. The German 
Ambassador Dirkscn cabled to Berlin on June 13, after a talk with 
him the same day, that “he had learned from the most varied sources 
that the present government had done great things for Germany, and 
that the Germans were satisfied and enjoyed good living conditions. . . . 
It was not so much the fact that we wanted to get rid of the Jews that 
was so harmful to us, but rather the loud clamour with which we 
accompanied this purpose. He himself understood our Jewish policy 
completely; he was from Boston, and there, in one golf club and in 
other clubs, no Jews had been admitted for the past fifty years. . . . 
Ambassador Kennedy repeatedly expressed his conviction that in 
economic matters Germany had to have a free hand in the cast as 
well as in the south-east.” 8 

It is not to be wondered at that Benes wrote in after years of these 
Ambassadors: “Joseph Kennedy stood expressly and consistently be- 
hind Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement. . . . Chamberlain more 
than once took advantage of Kennedy’s attitude. . . . Hugh Wilson 
fully believed even in August, 1938, that a peaceful orientation of 
German policy was not impossible. . . . His nai ve belief in the peaceful 
intentions of the Berlin government amazed me. He told me expressly 
that Goering did not want a war. . . . William Bullitt did not at first 
express himself publicly in favour of ‘appeasement’ like J. Kennedy, 
but he worked for it incessantly. His attitude towards us during the 
crisis of September, 1938, was wholly negative. . . . Bullitt’s own 
policy at that time and later was mainly dictated by liis dislike — his 
personal dislike — of the Soviet Union. . . . His actions were directed 
principally against the Soviets.” Moreover, Bene? saw that a section 
of official circles in Washington “were essentially entangled in the 
Munich policy and had a certain responsibility for it”. 9 

6 Bendiner, The Riddle of the State Department (1942), p. 58. 

7 F.R.U.S., vol. I, pp. 509-11. 8 D.G.F.P., vol. I, pp. 714-15. 718. 

9 Baies, op. cit., pp. 172-3. It was not only the U.S.S.R. that Bullitt objected to: on 
May 24 he cabled to the State Department that in France the Communists were “affected 
by Jews of all classes who are unanimously eager for war against Hitler” (F.R.U.S., 
voL I, p. 519). 



“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” l6l 

When the Runciman mission was being forced on the Czechs, 
Hugh Wilson told Henderson on July 22 that he thought a plebiscite 
in the border territories was “the only possible solution”, and sug- 
gested that Neville Chamberlain should state publicly that which way 
the sympathies of the British people would go depended on Benes 
displaying genuine readiness to compromise. 10 In a talk with the 
Polish Ambassador in Berlin, during the second week in August, 
Wilson deplored the fact that, unlike the authorities in Prague, “the 
broad mass of the (Czechoslovak) people underrated the danger” (i.e. 
the necessity of surrendering the borderlands). 11 

An official account of Ambassador Wilson’s conversation with 
Benes on August 6 in fact shows that he stressed to the President 
that (/') he did not “believe that Hitler contemplated a military attack 
on Czechoslovakia”, (ti) "there was no ground for the belief that the 
people of the United States would support any policy of military aid 
to any country of Europe”, ( iii ) the Germans on Germany’s side of 
the border were better off than those in Czechoslovakia. In short, 
Wilson cautiously did his best to make Benes feel isolated and in 
danger of being represented as responsible for war, should it break out, 
and as an oppressor of the German-speaking population. On August 13 
Wilson was pressing for a plebiscite in the border districts, advising the 
State Department that it “might reduce this particular problem to a 
local issue rather than to one which threatens the peace of Europe”. 12 

On August 16 and 18, Cordell Hull and Roosevelt made speeches 
warning the Germans against violence on precisely the lines followed 
by Chamberlain — that “we cannot when there is trouble elsewhere 
expect to remain unaffected” and when “armies take the field no one 
of us can be sure that his country, or even his home, is safe” (Hull): 
and that “we in the Americas are no longer a far-away continent. . . . 
The vast amount of our resources, and the vigour of our commerce, 
and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in world peace, 
whether we choose or not” (Roosevelt). 13 The German Embassy in 
Washington reported on September 1 that, while the U.S.A. was 
not preparing for war, its “leading political circles” would advocate 
it if Britain and France were involved in a war with Germany. 14 
On September 4, unveiling a monument connnemorating the arrival 
of American troops in France in 1917, Bullitt made a speech confirm- 
ing this in Chamberlain’s favourite words: “If war breaks out in 

i°D.B.F.P., Vol. n, p. 615. 

12 F.R.U.S., vol. I, pp. 541-3, 545 - 

14 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. < 58 o-i. 





L 


11 D. & M., vol. I, pp. 146, 149. 

13 Quoted by Werth, op. cit., p. 21 1. 


1 62 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Europe once again, no man can say or predict whether or not the 
United States would be involved in such a war.” 16 

But two days before, in a private talk with the British Ambassador 
at Paris, the same Bullitt had expressed warm approval of the Runci- 
man mission, saying that it now had “the last word”: and went on 
to a long disquisition about Russia wishing to provoke “a general 
conflagration”, from which she would “arise like a phoenix, but out 
of all our ashes, and bring about a world revolution”. 16 

These two statements, public and private, have to be taken together 
to see the two facets of United States policy at the moment when 
the Czechoslovak Government, under the relentless pressure from all 
sides, was producing the “Fourth Plan”. The threat of United States 
participation in war was intended, not as a defence of Czechoslovakia 
against demands which w’ould, if granted, leave her defenceless there- 
after, but on the contrary', to impel Germany to go on making these 
demands without resorting to war — and with the assurance that she 
would be successful. Ambassador Wilson, in fact, told Weizsacker on 
September i that “all counsels would prevent the (German) Govern- 
ment from military action . . . when patience would produce so 
many advantageous results”. 17 

As though to underline this point, President Roosevelt himself said 
at his press conference on September 9 that it was “about 100 per 
cent, incorrect” to interpret his policy as associating the United States 
with France and Great Britain in a front against Hitler, that Bullitt’s 
speech did not represent a moral obligation, and that the U.S.A. did 
not give their support to an anti-Hitler front of the democracies. 18 
This was all the more striking because, as Bonnet has pointed out, 
Bullitt’s phrase had been submitted to Washington before he used 
it. But the apparent contradiction was not a contradiction at all: the 
two statements represented two sides of the same policy, which had 
to be taken as a whole. 

The anti-Soviet undercurrent of this policy continued from time 
to time to rise to the surface — as, for example, when the rupture of 
negotiations by the Henlcinites and the concentration of German 
forces near the Czechoslovak frontier were followed by the renewal 
on September 8 of the Soviet proposals for a joint note to Germany 
by Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Commenting on the 

16 Werth, op. cit., p. 235. re D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 219. 

17 F.R.U.S., vol. I, p. 567. 

18 Survey, p. 273, gives only the first sentence: the rest, circulated by the agencies, is 
quoted by Bonnet, op. cit., p. 21 x. 


“WE MUST NOT QUARREL WITH ENGLAND AND FRANCE” 163 

situation, the American Ambassador in London on the 10th suggested 
to Lord Halifax that the Soviet Government “make some move that 
would compel attention, such as the concentration of planes near her 
frontier”. 19 This, at a time when the only preparations in the West 
had been certain naval precautions by Great Britain, which could not 
directly threaten the Germans, and the day after Roosevelt’s press 
statement, would have been a provocation comparable with that 
attempted, in November the previous year, at the Brussels conference 
on China. The British Government, conscious that it had only a few 
days before thrown cold water on a Soviet proposal, made in Moscow 
and London, for military as well as political co-operation with the 
Western Powers, did not take up Mr. Kennedy’s suggestion. 20 A cable 
from Bullitt on September 14, in the meantime, shows him and 
Phipps agreeing that “the trouble maker in the present situation 
was Benes” — on the ground that the Czechoslovak Government 
had reinforced their troops in the border areas after the Henlcin 
rising! 21 

Kennedy’s provocation was underlined by the fact that about the 
20th (according to Bonnet) the French Government was informed in 
writing by' the United States Government that, in the event of war, 
the aircraft it had ordered in the U.S.A. in May could not, under the 
Neutrality Act, be delivered. 22 This, of course, was one way of apply- 
ing the policy of helping France to free herself from her obligations 
to Czechoslovakia. It must be added, as a pendant to this, that the 
United States Minister in Prague (as the archives of the President’s 
Chancery have shown) 23 was among those who urged the Czecho- 
slovak Government on September 20 to accept the Anglo-French 
terms. 

While Chamberlain was in Godesberg, Kennedy on the 23 rd “sup- 
ported all that the ‘old man’ was doing”. 24 When the question of an 
international conference on Czechoslovakia was already being dis- 
cussed behind the scenes, Bullitt told the State Department on the 
24th (while pressing for Roosevelt to invite Britain, France, Germany, 
Italy and Poland) that it was “essential not to include the Soviet 
Russian Government” — and on the 27th he had the satisfaction of 
hearing by telephone from Sumner Welles that Iris wish had been 
fulfilled — that only “the ones you were talking about” had been 
suggested. 25 In fact, the proposal which Roosevelt made that day for 

19 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 278. 20 Churchill, op. cit., pp. 229-32. 

21 F.R.U.S., vol. I, p. 595. 22 Bonnet, op. cit., p. 2x2. 

23 Bcrnasck, Bez slavy a bez ilusi, Prague, 1956, p. 202. 

24 Wrench, op. cit., p. 377. 25 F.R.U.S., vol. I, pp. 642, 675. 


164 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

an international conference— though it left open which were “the 
nations directly interested in the present controversy” — was sent only 
to Hitler: 26 his appeal the previous day, to continue negotiations, had 
been sent to Hitler, Benes, Chamberlain and Daladicr. Thus in this 
respect, too, United States policy fitted perfectly into that of Chamber- 
lain — and Hitler. For on the 24th the German Charge d’ Affaires in 
Washington had cabled home that the leading authorities of the 
United States army were showing “understanding” for Germany and 
“a pronounced antipathy towards Russia”. 27 

When it came to Munich, there were no bones about it. The 
United States Government was wholeheartedly behind Munich. 
Roosevelt later told Halifax that he had sent Chamberlain “the shortest 
telegram I ever sent, two words ‘good man’ ”. 28 Ambassador Kennedy 
on the 29th expressed to Lord Halifax his entire approval of, and 
sympathy with, Chamberlain’s action. 29 After Munich he told people 
that Britain would one day erect a statue to Chamberlain for saving 
her. 30 

Whether it is true, as American historians have asserted, that 
Roosevelt had “persuaded himself that the Munich agreement opened 
vistas to a new and better order”, 31 must be left to future research 
to determine. What is incontestable is that the idea of a passive 
America, playing no active part in the policies that brought about 
Munich, is a myth. 

28 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 983-5. 27 Ibid., p. 922. 

28 The Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days (1957). P- 195 ; F-R-U.S., vol. I, p. 688. 

20 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 625. 30 G. Bilainkin, Maisky (1944), p. 224. 

31 Langer and Gleason, op. cit., p. 35. 


CHAPTER VIII 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 

1. Helping Victims of Aggression 

W HEN the U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations in 1934, it 
did so in the belief that, in Stalin’s words, the League might 
be a “stumbling block” in the way of war. The Soviet Government 
had no special illusions about the loyalty of Great Powers in 193 4 to 
ideals to which they had subscribed in 1919. This would have been 
strange, after the history of the intervening years; and all the more 
because, at the very time they were subscribing to those ideals, the 
Great Powers were engaged in an invasion of Russia which set the 
ideals at defiance. The Soviet Government, however, did believe that, 
in their own interests, Powers with the most varied social systems 
might combine to protect their interests against the threat of aggres- 
sion, and that tliis would serve the cause of peace generally: which 
the U.S.S.R. needed for its socialist construction. As the League 
machinery now provided one means of bringing about such a com- 
bination (owing to changes in international alignments since 1919)— 
one moreover which had the merit of commanding the support of 
millions of people in many countries — the League was worth while 
supporting and maintaining. 

So much had several times been publicly proclaimed between 1933 
and 1938 by Soviet spokesmen. 1 The U.S.S.R. had in addition demon- 
strated its readiness more than once to join in collective action which 
could restrain an aggressor, or, if he would not be restrained, crush 
him. 

The Soviet Government had not been a member of the League for 
twelve months when the Italian aggression against Ethiopia began. 
It imposed sanctions against Italy in respect of all the commodities 
decided upon at Geneva, and in the fullest measure, thereby injuring 
interests of long standing in a profitable trade, for the sake of a League 

1 Stalin’s talk with Walter Duranty on December 25, 1933; Molotov’s speeches at 
the Central Executive Committee of Soviets, December 28, 1933. and at “C 7th Ail- 
Union Congress of Soviets, January 28, 1935 ; Litvinov’s speeches at Geneva on the 
Soviet entry into the League, September 18, 1934. and on the winding up of sanctions 
against Italy, July, 193b. 


166 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

member with which it had neither diplomatic nor any commercial 
relations. Furthermore, at the critical stage of the conflict, in Decem- 
ber, 1935, and January, 1936, particularly, its People’s Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs Litvinov made clear to Anthony Eden and other 
representatives of the British and French Governments that, while 
the U.S.S.R. had no intention of supporting sanctions merely to 
secure better terms for Great Britain on the Sudanese frontier or for 
France in the management of the Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway, it was 
prepared to join with them in imposing those oil sanctions which 
would have been fatal for Mussolini, and to stand by them in all the 
possible consequences. 

Shortly after the end of sanctions against Italy, the rebellion of 
General Franco began hi Spain, and the Powers which had prepared 
and planned it — Germany and Italy — were soon engaged hi active 
intervention, particularly by the supply of aeroplanes. The Soviet 
Government protested from the first against the so-called “non- 
intervention” scheme, as a flagrant breach of the principle of col- 
lective security embodied hi the League Covenant. It joined the 
Non-Intervention Committee, when there was nothing else for it, 
hi order (as Litvinov said at the League Assembly in September, 1938) 
to provide a “Soviet brake” on the tendencies, which showed them- 
selves from the outset, to make the Non-Intervention Committee the 
nucleus of a coalition against the Spanish Republic. From October, 
1936, onwards, the attitude of the Soviet Government was that it 
was henceforth bound by the obligations of “non-intervention” 
exactly as much as those Powers which had been sending aeroplanes, 
tanks, munitions and men to Franco during the previous two months. 
Thereafter, the Soviet Government was as good as its word. It sent 
tanks, guns, planes, raw materials, and volunteer pilots, technicians 
and advisers. 2 It pursued this policy although it was almost alone in 
doing so, under considerable practical difficulties, and in the teeth of 
undisguised official hostility in Great Britain and France. Furthermore, 
it supported the Spanish Government in all its appeals at the League 
of Nations for the restoration of fair play by the abolition of the 
Non-In ten' en ti on Committee, to the great anger of the British and 
French delegations. 

2 Some account of this assistance can be found in the reminiscences of a Soviet pilot, 
Boris Smirnov, Ispcmski Veter, in the Soviet Writers’ Union journal, Novy Mir, January, 
1957 - Alvarez del Vayo, the Spanish Republic’s Foreign Minister, writes: “In the last 
week of October Russian war material reached us. On October 29 Russian artillery 
made their first appearance on our front. O11 November n the first Russian plane 
appeared in Spanish skies. . . . From October 29 right on until the end of the war we 
received Russian aid” ( Freedom’s Battle, London, 1940, p. 67). 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 167 

The Soviet Government not only supported the appeal of the 
Chinese Government to the League against Japanese aggression (in 
September, 1937), but loyally carried out the Assembly’s decision in 
favour of helping China. This loyalty had taken the form of first, an 
agreement to provide a credit of §100 million, when the non-aggression 
pact with China was being signed, 3 and then a declaration, at the 
Brussels conference in November, 1937, that the Soviet Government 
was prepared to go to the uttermost limit in collective action to defend 
China and repel the aggressor, and that it supported in their entirety 
the comparatively moderate demands put forward by the Chinese 
delegation at the conference— for the granting of a loan to China 
to buy arms, and for the imposition of an embargo against the aggressor. 
The Soviet supplies of munitions of war to the Chinese Government 4 
played no inconsiderable part in enabling the Chinese to continue their 
resistance, and to make preparations for a long war of attrition against 
Japan. The same could not be said of Britain, France and the U.S.A., 
as was shown earlier. 

It is necessary to recall these elementary facts of international life 
in the years immediately preceding 1938, partly because they explain 
why the Soviet attitude on the Czechoslovakian question was a natural 
development of its general policy, and partly because an extraordinary 
feature of subsequent discussion of the So wet attitude has been the 
calm assumption that it was the readiness and ability of the U.S.S.R. 
to help victims of aggression which was in doubt, not the readiness 
and ability of the Governments of Great Britain and France. 

Furthermore, while anxious for obvious reasons to preserve peace 
on its borders, the U.S.S.R. never hesitated to strike as hard as it 
could at the aggressor who overstepped the mark and infringed its 
vital interests. In the case of the sinking of its ships and the imprison- 
ment and torture of its seamen by Italian submarines and Spanish 
rebels, the Soviet Government was prevented from direct reprisals 
by the lack of a modem battle fleet of sufficient dimensions. But where 
it could act, and particularly on the borders of the Chinese territories 

a Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow (New York, 1941), p. 248. Davies, who was 
U.S. Ambassador in Moscow at the time, noted in his diary on November n, 1937 , 
that deliveries from the U.S.S.R. had already “far exceeded that amount”: 400 of the 
best Soviet bomber and pursuit planes had already been shipped overland to China, 
accompanied by at least forty Soviet instructors. In 1942 he wrote: “The Soviet Urnon 
was helping China during all those years when we were selling oil and scrap metal to 
Japan” (ibid., p. 545). 

4 The Times Peking correspondent (January 28, 1938) confirmed reports “that Soviet 
arms are reaching China in large quantities Up to a fairly recent date careful ob- 

servers had seen at least 600 armoured cars passing, through Sinkiang into Kansu, and 
over 200 aeroplanes . . . mostly of fast fighter types.” 


i68 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


seized by the Japanese, it replied without hesitation to their provoca- 
tion. In the spring of 1936, it annihilated a well-equipped corps of 
several thousand Japanese and Manchurian troops who ventured over 
the Soviet border. In the summer of 1937, when by a sudden attack 
the Japanese succeeded in sinking a Soviet gunboat on the Amur, 
a Soviet counter-attack resulted in the capture of a Japanese gunboat 
and in the inflicting of heavy losses on the Japanese. 

Soviet aid to China, after the Japanese war on her began, enraged 
the Tokyo Government, and on April 4, 1938, its Ambassador form- 
ally protested to Litvinov. The latter replied that Soviet-Cliinese trade 
was no concern of Japan’s, but that “the sale of arms, including air- 
craft, to China is entirely in accord with the standard procedure of 
international law”. 

Failing to intimidate, the Japanese tried the effect of direct aggres- 
sion. At the end of July, 1938, a surprise concentration of approxi- 
mately a division of Japanese troops, heavily reinforced by aircraft, 
at Lake Hassan, in the extreme Far East, was able for a few days to 
drive back the small Soviet frontier detachment a distance of three or 
four miles from the border. But in the course of the subsequent week, 
in spite of considerable tactical difficulties imposed by the instructions 
to the Soviet troops that they must not cross the frontier for the sake 
of taking the Japanese in flank, the Red Army drove the Japanese 
completely from Soviet territory, and restored its control along the 
actual line of the whole frontier, as it had been delimited nearly half 
a century before. 

The Soviet Government had not been guided in its foreign policy 
by ideological sympathies. The principle that the Soviet Government, 
bom as a Socialist babe, so to speak, into a world where capitalism 
was a going concern, must find ways and means of peacefully coexist- 
ing with the capitalist States — or at least with as many of them as 
were willing to maintain peaceful relations — was laid down by Lenin 
between 1917 and 1923. 5 He applied it in a number of different ways 
in Iris daily policy. It was proclaimed by the Soviet delegate Chicherin 
at the Genoa Conference in 1922. The U.S.S.R. traded and main- 
tained diplomatic relations with Fascist Italy as with democratic 
France, with Imperial Japan as with Republican United States. It 
could not apply any other principle in its foreign relations, or attempt 
to discriminate between States according to its Ekes or dislikes of their 
social and political systems unless, as Lenin once said, it was prepared 


6 Examples of his statements on this subject are given in the writer’s History of he 
U.S.S.R. (1950), pp. 74 - 7 , an< i Peaceful Coexistence (i 95 S), pp. 28-35. 



WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 169 

“to emigrate to the moon”. Furthermore, the task of discrimination, 
were it ever attempted, would have imposed impossible difficulties. 
Thus, for example, the British Empire, when viewed at its London 
end, might seem the seat of a considerable measure of democracy, 
and in any case of a popularly limited and constitutional monarchy. 
Viewed, on the other hand, from the colonial end in 1938 — say, from 
Bombay or Cairo, with the peoples of whom the Soviet Union had 
unmistakable ideological sympathy — the British Empire might seem 
a very different institution. Discrimination would consequently be 
difficult. 

Even in the case of the victims of aggression for whom the Soviet 
Union displayed its practical support after its entry into the League 
(it had helped countries struggling against colonialism, like Turkey, 
Iran and Afghanistan, long before) there could be no question of 
ideological sympathy as a determining factor. True, in the case of 
Spain — while the Republican Government of 1936 was very far from 
“red” — there was at any rate a popular movement in defence of the 
bourgeois type of democracy against the attacks of the Fascist generals, 
which commanded the affection of the U.S.S.R. as it did that of all 
progressive people throughout the world. But in the case of China, 
the Government to which the U.S.S.R. granted aid was a long way 
removed from even bourgeois democracy, had very strong elements 
of feudalism still grouped around it, and in any case, for a number 
of years, had been engaged in the most pitiless repression of all popular 
movements in its territory. As for Ethiopia, here it "was the case of 
a monarchy in the very first stage of attempted emergence from a 
feudalism of the kind that prevailed in England under, say, King 
Stephen 800 years before. 

In supporting these victims of Fascist aggression, and in pressing 
for a combination of forces to make resistance more effective, the 
Soviet Government was not therefore — as was asserted for many 
months, on inspiration which can be traced directly back to the Ger- 
man Propaganda Ministry — seeking to establish an “ideological bloc”. 
Common ideology between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the British Empire, the democratic Republic of Czechoslovakia, the 
semi-Fascist regime of Lithuania — to take only four examples — would 
be very hard to discover. Yet all four of them might be interested in 
mutual protection against an aggressor. That was precisely the principle 
on which the Covenant of the League of Nations was built. The bloc 
for resisting an aggressor which the Soviet Union sought was none 
other than the bloc provided under the preamble and the various clauses 




THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



170 

of the League Covenant, drawn up without consulting the U.S.S.R., 
and long years before it was invited to join the League of Nations. 6 

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R. was bound to the 
potential victim of aggression by closer ties than with cither China or 
Spain. With neither of these countries had it any special treaty rela- 
tions for mutual defence; in the case of Spain, even normal diplo- 
matic relations did not exist when the rebellion broke out. In the 
case of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union had signed a pact of mutual 
assistance, on May 16, 1935, which provided in its essentials (i) that 
should either country “be threatened with or in danger of an attack 
on the part of any European State whatsoever”, the two signatories 
would consult immediately with a view to measures provided under 
article 10 of the League Covenant (preservation of the territorial in- 
tegrity and existing political independence of League members against 
external aggression), (») that should either country “be the object of 
an unprovoked attack on the part of any European State whatsoever”, 
and the League Council fail to reach a unanimous report, the two 
States would immediately render one another assistance and support. 

A protocol, signed at the same time, restricted the application of 
the treaty to occasions on which “aid will be accorded by France to 
the party which is the victim of aggression”. 7 

This reservation, it must be pointed out, was not demanded by the 
Soviet Government, but by Czechoslovakia. The latter in 1935 and 
subsequently feared, as was shown earlier, that Poland might one day 
be involved in war with the U.S.S.R., while still nominally an ally 
of France, just as Czechoslovakia was. 8 The Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment did not wish in such circumstances to be obliged to attack a 
fellow-ally of France. The Soviet Government would have preferred 
the pact to be applicable to all circumstances, but the Czechoslovak 
Government gained its point. 9 It is not true, therefore, that the Soviet 
Government made this reservation because it foresaw a convenient 
opportunity arising to evade its obligations. In point of fact, as will 
be seen later, the Soviet Government was prepared not to allow even 

6 Litvinov’s speech at the 17th League Assembly, September 28, 1936 ( Against Aggres- 
sion, p. 50). 

7 The protocol also provided that both States would act in concert to ensure that the 
League Council issued its recommendations “with all the speed required”, and that 
if it failed to do so, “for whatever reason", the obligation to render assistance would nevertheless 
be put into effect. This has been often overlooked. 

8 This was one of the main eventualities discussed between Germany and the Western 
Powers as far back as the Locarno meetings in October, 1925 (Dirksen’s notes of the dis- 
cussions printed in Istoricheski Arhiv, Moscow, 1956, Nos. 4 and 5). 

9 Litvinov’s speech at the League Assembly (Sixth Committee), September 23, 1938 
(see above, p. 156). 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 171 

this important reservation to stand in the way of aiding Czecho- 
slovakia. The point is, however, that this could not really surprise 
any Government, since— as has already been shown — the U.S.S.R. 
had shown that it would do as much for countries with whom it 
had no such relations. 

The concealment from world public opinion, both before and after 
Munich, of the full facts about the Soviet Union’s readiness to assist 
Czechoslovakia, was one of the least attractive features of the policy 
of co-operation with Hitler against the U.S.S.R. which, after Munich, 
was disguised under the title of “appeasement”. 

The Czechoslovak question first became acute as we know after 
the seizure of Austria by Germany on March 11-12, 1938. A few days 
later, on March 15, a high official in Moscow, than whom “no one 
could speak with greater authority” ( Daily Telegraph and Morning 
Post Moscow correspondent, March 17), received a number of foreign 
journalists whom he told that the Soviet Union would fulfil all its 
pledges to Czechoslovakia, on condition that France did the same. 
This could be accepted, he said, as the expression of a decision “finally 
and irrevocably reached”. When Litvinov (for it was he) was re- 
minded that the U.S.S.R. had no common frontier with Czecho- 
slovakia, being separated from her by Rumanian or Polish territory, 
he replied in English: “Where there’s a will, there’s a way.” 

In reality, it was well known that the attitude of Rumania and even 
of Poland, formally dependent upon their membership of the League 
(article 16, paragraph 3, of the Covenant stated that League members 
“will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory 
to the forces of any of the members of the League which are co- 
operating to protect the Covenant of the League ), would in fact 
depend on the attitude taken up by France, at any rate in the first 
instance. If France really intended to carry out her obligations, there- 
fore, she would naturally arrange with the countries concerned to 
get the matter of passage for Soviet troops raised at the League at the 
proper time— and make all the necessary preliminary arrangements 
privately with the U.S.S.R. 

In fact, there was at least one Western Ambassador who reported 
home that “the implication generally accepted here was that the 
U.S.S.R. was serving notice on Poland in particular, and possibly on 
Rumania as well, that if necessary the Soviets would violate terri- 
torial boundaries to go to the aid of Czechoslovakia”. 10 

10 Report to the State Department, Washington, by Joseph E. Davies, March 26, 
1938 (op. cit., pp. 292-3). 


172 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


2. The Soviet Offers 

On March 17, the Soviet Ambassadors in London, Paris and 
Washington, and the Soviet Minister in Prague, presented to the 
Governments to which they were accredited a statement (given to 
the press in Moscow as well) drawing attention to the serious threat 
to peace created by the annexation of Austria, and in the first place 
to the menace to Czechoslovakia. 11 The note proceeded: 

“The present international situation puts before the peace-loving 
countries, and in particular before the big Powers, the question of 
their responsibility for the future fate of the peoples of Europe and 
elsewhere. The Soviet Government being conscious of the obliga- 
tions devolving upon it from the Covenant of the League, the Brian d- 
Kellogg Pact and from its treaties of mutual assistance concluded with 
France and Czechoslovakia, I am in a position to state on its behalf 
that the Soviet Government is on its part as heretofore prepared to 
participate in collective actions the scope of which should be decided 
in conjunction with the Soviet Government, and which should have 
as their aim the stopping of the further development of aggression 
and the elimination of the increased danger of a new world slaughter. 

“The Soviet Government is prepared to commence immediately, 
together with other States in the League of Nations or outside of it, 
the consideration of practical measures called for by the present cir- 
cumstances. To-morrow it may be too late, but to-day the time has 
not yet passed, if all the States and especially the great Powers will 
adopt a firm and unequivocal stand in regard to the problems of the 
collective saving of peace.” 

The purpose of this statement was to find out straight away what 
the other great Powers on whom, in the long run, the fate of Czecho- 
slovakia depended were prepared to do. There was no doubt about 
the value of the procedure suggested — if they were prepared to do 
anytliing. As a British statesman with wide experience of foreign 
affairs wrote: “If instead of snubbing the Russian Government by 
curtly saying that their proposal was inopportune, we had welcomed 
it and had summoned a meeting of the League Assembly, we could 
then have announced that the British, French and Russian Govern- 
ments regarded as of vital importance the maintenance of the principle 
that no country must resort to war in breach of the Covenant, and 
were ready to take all measures necessary to enforce it. I do not believe 

11 The text (differing slightly from that used here) is printed in Litvinov’s Against 
Aggression (1939), pp. 114-16; and in D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 62-4. 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 


173 

that any member of the League of any importance would have op- 
posed such a movement. But if they did so, that would not technically 
have made any difference. ... In practice the only important thing 
was to know whether we should have been supported by sufficient 
strength to make it impossible for Germany to have persisted in her 
policy.” 12 

That no doubt is the very reason why the Soviet proposal was 
rejected, in the terms quoted earlier. As Ambassador Davies com- 
mented, in his dispatch to Mr. Sunnier Welles on March 26, two 
days after Chamberlain’s speech in Parliament announcing the rejec- 
tion: “For some reason, or lack of reason, there seems to be no pur- 
pose on the part of the democracies of Europe to fortify their position 
realistically by availing themselves of such strength as there is here, 
as part of their common front in working out a modus vivendi vis-a-vis 
Mussolini and Hitler. England and France seemed to be doing exactly 
the opposite here, and have been playing into the hands of the Nazi 
and the Fascist aims.” 13 In reality, Mr. Davies was (as we have seen) 
underestimating the perfect understanding of, and sympathy with, 
the aims of Britain and France which existed in his own State Depart- 
ment. 

Elowever, the Soviet Union continued publicly and privately to 
make its position known. 

A few days after the statement of March 17, 1938, the Soviet 
Ambassador in France informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Paul-Boncour, that the U.S.S.R. was ready to render Czechoslovakia 
the aid provided by the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty, if required. 14 

On April 23, 1938, Fierlingcr, Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow, 
reported to Prague: “The Soviet Union, if required, is ready in agree- 
ment with France and Czechoslovakia to take all steps for the security 
of Czechoslovakia.” 15 By this time, as pointed out earlier, the French 
Ambassador had had from the Minister practical evidence of this 
readiness. 

On April 2 6, President Kalinin in a review of the international 
situation at a meeting of agitators and propagandists in Moscow re- 
called the obligations of the Soviet treaty with Czechoslovakia and 
their dependence on France fulfilling hers, adding: “Of course, the 
pact does not prohibit either side coming to the aid of the other 

12 Viscount Cecil, op. cit., pp. 3 ”- 12 - 13 Davies, op. cit., p. 297. 

14 A. Y. Popov, S.Sh.A. — Organizator i Aktivny Uchastnik Miunhenskogo Sgouora 
(1952), p. 27; and D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 197 - 

16 I. Dolezal, Otnoshenie Sovetskogo Soyuza k Chchoshvakii v period Miunhena (1951), 
pp. 86-7; quoted in Voprosy Istorii, loc. cit., p. 80. 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 


174 

without waiting for France.” This speech was republished as a 
pamphlet. 16 

On May 8, 1938, President Kalinin received foreign workers’ dele- 
gations which were in Moscow for the May Day celebrations. In 
reply to a question by a Czechoslovak trade unionist, Kalinin said: 
“The Soviet Union has always and without reserve honoured the 
treaties concluded with other nations; she would do the same in this 
case, too, and if necessary would fulfil all her obligations towards 
Czechoslovakia and France to the last letter. . . . The Soviet Union 
has minerals, iron, oil, foodstuffs, cotton and in fact every tiling neces- 
sary for conducting a war. And France does not possess all this in 
the same measure. If the treaty of friendship between the Soviet 
Union, France and Czechoslovakia were as strong as we wish it to 
be, it would influence Britain also to choose other directions for her 
policy than those so far pursued, and the treaty would have greater 
international significance and weight.” The interview was published 
in Moscow News, mentioned in messages from Moscow by several 
correspondents and given great prominence in the Czechoslovak 
press, as Newton reported from Prague. 17 

On May 12, 1938, at Geneva, Litvinov told Bonnet (in an informal 
conversation) that the Soviet Union would fulfil her obligations to 
Czechoslovakia, if France did the same, and proposed talks between 
the Soviet and French general staffs on the technical requirements — 
including the question of transit for Soviet troops through Rumania 
and Poland. 18 Bonnet promised to report the proposal: but nothing 
more was heard of it — we have seen why, in Coulondrc s account of 
his talks with Bonnet and Daladier (Chapter VI) — and on the con- 
trary, false reports were “leaked” into the French press. It was because 
of this — as the writer has the best of reasons to know — that Robert 
Dell, the Manchester Guardian correspondent at the League, was made 
aware of the facts, and published them. 

In the middle of May, Stalin asked Gottwald, the leader of the 
Czechoslovak Communists, to come and see him. “In a prolonged 
conversation we discussed the position of Czechoslovakia, and the 
question of Soviet aid in the event of an attack on her by Hitlerite 
Germany. Then Stalin told me plainly that the Soviet Union was 
ready to give military aid to Czechoslovakia even if France did not 
do so (which was the condition for Soviet aid), and even in the event 

16 M. L Kalinin, O mejdunarodnom potojenii, Moscow, 1938, p. IS- 

17 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 268-9, and D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 288-9. Kalinin’s assurances 
are also mentioned by Gedye, op. cit., p. 399, and Whceler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 3 2 - 

I s Manchester Guardian, May 18, 1938. 


175 

of Beck’s Poland or Boyar Rumania, as they were then, refusing pass- 
age to Soviet troops. 19 Of course, Stalin underlined, the Soviet Union 
can come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia on one condition — if 
Czechoslovakia herself resists and askes for Soviet aid. I asked com- 
rade Stalin whether I could transmit this promise to responsible persons 
in the Czechoslovak Republic. In reply to this, Stalin directly com- 
missioned me to transmit the content of the conversation to the then 
President Benes. And this I did.” 20 

Benes never revealed this offer, e.g. in Iris Diary — although he more 
than once admitted in general terms that the U.S.S.R. had offered 
to come to Czechoslovakia’s aid even if France were disloyal to her 
obligations. 

On May 25, 1938, A. A. Troyanovsky, the Soviet Ambassador in 
Washington, repeated, in a public speech, that “our people, in a mili- 
tary sense and psychologically, are prepared to repulse any foreign 
invasion, and the aggressors probably would prepare to take many 
preliminary steps before attacking the Soviet Union. . . . But, though 
our country docs not appear to be menaced by immediate danger, 
we cannot wash our hands of the present European situation. We 
have our principles and w r c arc tied by our treaties. We will be faithful 
to those principles and those treaties. Wc arc ready with France to 
defend Czechoslovakia in the event of an aggression. . . . The attitude 
of the Czechs is an encouraging factor, which shows the way to deal 
with those aggressors.” 21 

During the next few days the Soviet newspaper Izvestia (May 26), 
Krasnaya Zvezda (May 30), Pravda (June 3), and others published 
articles in the same sense. The last sentence quoted from Troyanovsky’s 
remarks referred to the Czechoslovak mobilisation of five days be- 
fore. The Soviet Legation in Prague was the only mission of a Great 
Power at the end of the month which was not urging the Govern- 
ment there to demobilise. 

On May 30, 1938, the British military attache in Moscow reported 
that his Czechoslovak colleague had told him of officers from his 
country’s army already attached to certain Red Army units, and of 

19 Col. Beck, withdrawn from his diplomatic post in Paris in 1923 because the French 
Government had reason to consider him a spy, was now Foreign Minister of Poland. 
The “boyars” were the great feudal landowners of Rumania. 

20 K. Gottwald’ s article in Pravda, December 21, 1949 (the date is made precise in 
the collection of his articles published in Prague, vol. 8, 1953, p. 289: I am indebted 
for this fact, not mentioned in the article, to Y. V. Arutiunyan, loc. cit.). 

21 This statement, circulated by the B.U.P. and other news agencies throughout the 
world, is printed in the Royal Institute of International Affairs’ Documents for 1938, 
vol. I, p. 315. 


176 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

reinforcements sent to the Kiev and possibly the Belorussian com- 
mands (i.e. to the Soviet Western borders). 22 

These declarations were taken quite seriously by at any rate 
Rumania, no doubt in consequence of further explanations which were 
given privately. At the end of May, a delegation of the Rumanian 
general staff was sent to Warsaw, and on this occasion a Reuter 
message from Bucharest stated: “Moscow has repeatedly asked 
Rumania to allow Soviet warplanes to pass over Rumanian territory in 
case Czechoslovakia should be seriously menaced by Germany” (May 
30). But at that very time Coulondrc was informed by Litvinov that 
a staff agreement was being negotiated (between the two countries, 
Coulondre says, but then goes on to make it quite obvious that it 
was the Polish Government which was pressing the Rumanians to 
sign one) to oppose the passage of Soviet troops, which the French 
Ambassador calls “betrayal” by Poland. Litvinov asked him: “What 
would France, ally of Poland, do in the event of the latter, having 
attacked Czechoslovakia, being attacked herself by the U.S.S.R.?” 
The Ambassador, a partisan of Franco-Soviet staff' talks as we have 
seen, could not even imagine such a situation as an attack by one of 
France’s allies upon another. But he was very worried by Bonnet’s 
reply to the Soviet Charge d’ Affaires in Paris, who put the same 
question a week later — that “the question would be studied”. And 
when he informed Litvinov of the opinion expressed by the legal 
department of the French Foreign Ministry — that Soviet obligations 
to Czechoslovakia only began when France intervened — the People’s 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs replied: “Quite so, but there is another 
hypothesis — that in which for one reason or another, the U.S.S.R. 
intervened without France having budged.” 2 " 1 

Thus it is quite clear that at the end of May the Soviet Government 
was following up in practice Stalin’s assurance to Gottwald, that it 
might go to the help of Czechoslovakia in spite of the defection or 
betrayal of the latter’s supposed allies — and was making the pre- 
liminary soundings accordingly. 24 

On June 23, 1938, Litvinov made an election speech in Leningrad 
which was reported in all the Soviet newspapers. In it, after an analysis 
of world events in recent years, of the encouragement given by the 
Western Powers to German aggression and of the latest threat to 

22 D.B.F.P., vol. I, pp. 420 ct seqq. 23 Coulondrc, op. cit., pp. 152-3. 

24 On May 23, according to the German Legation at Bucharest some weeks later, 
the Soviet Minister there had suggested to the Rumanian Government that they should 
discuss “those measures which must be taken by the U.S.S.R. to fulfil its treaty obliga- 
tions” (D.G.P.P., vol. II, p. 428). 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 177 

Czechoslovakia, he underlined that “apart from rendering assistance 
in the event of war”, the pacts with France and Czechoslovakia were 
also aimed at averting or diminishing the very danger of war. The 
pact with Czechoslovakia was at the moment “the chief, if not the 
sole, major factor in relieving the tension around Czechoslovakia”. 
But the Soviet Government was not using its promise to assist the 
victim of aggression ‘ ‘as a means of bringing pressure to bear on this 
victim, in order to urge it to capitulate to the aggressor and act in 
such a way that any assistance would be superfluous”. If Czecho- 
slovakia were attacked, she would be “the country defending herself” 
— and the responsibility for the consequences would be borne by the 
attacking side. 26 

A direct warning was given to Germany by Litvinov in his inter- 
view with the German Ambassador, von der Schulenburg, on August 
22, 1938, which the latter had sought, as instructed by Ribbentrop, 
to say that “Germany would only invade Czechoslovakia in the event 
of an act of provocation on the part of the Czechs”. Instead of sym- 
pathising with him as the British Ambassador in Berlin was incessantly 
doing, Litvinov replied that “an act of provocation on the part of the 
Czechs was unthinkable, and that the Germans would certainly be 
the aggressor in any conflict which might arise”. 26 “You desire the 
destruction of Czechoslovakia, you want to conquer the country. 
Naturally you prefer to attain your goal by peaceful means. War is 
always a risk. Everyone will try to avoid war if he can gain his ends 
without it.” The Soviet Union “had promised Czechoslovakia her 
support; she would keep her word and do her best”. Schulenburg 
asked how this would be managed, but naturally Litvinov did not 
tell him! 27 

Litvinov informed the British and French Embassies and Czecho- 
slovak Legation of this interview. Nor did it remain a secret for the 
world’s press. Litvinov’s reply to Schulenburg was very definite (said 
the Prague correspondent of the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post 
on August 27, 1938), “and left no room for doubt as to the con- 
sequences of any such action on Germany’s part. Any military move 
against the Czechoslovak Republic, the Ambassador was informed, 
would bring into force at once the guarantees given by the Soviet. 
The treaty, the German Ambassador was told, would be fulfilled by 
the Soviet immediately and to the letter.” 

The German Foreign Office, apparently taken aback by the nature 

25 Moscow News, July 5, 1938. 26 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 140-1* 

27 D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 604, 630. 




M 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


178 

of the Soviet reply and by the publicity given to it, attempted to 
deny that any official approach had been made in Moscow. It was 
forced, however, to admit that “German diplomatic representatives 
abroad have naturally discussed the Czechoslovak question with the 
governments to which they arc accredited”. 

A broad and quite public hint had already been conveyed at the 
highest Soviet level, two days before — for those who wanted to listen 
— that what had been said in May still held good. On August 20, 
reporting to the Soviet of Nationalities (one of the two chambers 
of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.), Professor Otto Schmidt (the 
eminent scientist and Arctic explorer) recalled that article 49, clause k, 
of the Soviet Constitution provided that the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet, between sessions of the latter, declares a state of war “in the 
event of the necessity arising for carrying out international treaty 
obligations concerning mutual defence against aggression”. The Soviet 
Union carried out and would carry out its obligations, declared Pro- 
fessor Schmidt amidst great applause. “An international treaty signed 
and ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
is not a scrap of paper. . . . The treaties we sign arc inviolable. . . . 
Our mighty Red Army, beloved of all the people, will be able to 
impose respect for treaties ratified by the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet” ( Pravda , August 21). 

On September 2, Litvinov was formally asked by M. Payart, the 
French Charge d’ Affaires in Moscow, for the first time, what would 
be the Soviet attitude in the event of an attack on Czechoslovakia. 
“I gave in the name of my Government the following perfectly clear 
and unambiguous reply. 

“We intend to fulfil our obligations under the Pact and, together 
with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia by the ways open 
to us. Our War Department is ready immediately to participate in 
a conference with representatives of the French and Czechoslovak 
War Departments, in order to discuss the measures appropriate to the 
moment. Independently of this, we should consider desirable that the 
question be raised at the League of Nations, if only as yet under 
Article 11, with the object, first, of mobilising public opinion and, 
secondly, of ascertaining the position of certain other States, whose 
passive aid might be extremely valuable. It was necessary, however, to 
exhaust all means of averting an armed conflict, and we considered 
one such method to be an immediate consultation between the Great 
Powers of Europe and other interested States, in order if possible to 
decide on the terms of a collective demarche” 


WHERE TIIE SOVIET UNION STOOD 


179 




In the speech at the League of Nations Assembly in which he re- 
ported this reply, Litvinov prefaced it by the remark that the Soviet 
Union had abstained from any intervention in the negotiations of 
the Czechoslovak Government with the Henleinites, considering them 
to be an internal Czechoslovak affair. “We valued very highly the 
tact of the Czechoslovak Government, which did not even enquire 
of us whether we should fulfil our obligations under the pact, since 
obviously it had no doubt of this, and had no grounds for doubt. 

Thus the U.S.S.R. (1) renewed its pledge of assistance, on the under- 
standing that France did the same, (ii) renewed its frequent proposals 
for military staff conversations, (tit) renewed its proposal of March 17 
for a consultation of interested Powers, with a view to exercising 
moral restraint on Germany, (tv) proposed that at the forthcoming 
meetings of the League (the Council on September 9 and the Assembly 
on September 12) the question should be raised as one which was 
“a matter of concern to the whole League”, of a “war or threat of 
war”, or of a circumstance “affecting international relations which 
threaten to disturb international peace”, as provided under article 11 
of the League Covenant, (t») pointed out that tliis would give the 
opportunity of securing the passive aid of other States — among whom, 
no doubt, first place would be taken by those whose membership of 
the League imposed on them the duty of allowing the passage of 
League troops, such as Rumania and Poland, Belgium and Holland. 

The full terms of this clear, unambiguous and precise proposal — 
recapitulating those which had been made during the preceding five 
months — were communicated on the same day by Maisky, Soviet 
Ambassador in London, to Winston Churchill: obviously (Churchill 
thought) because a direct offer to the Foreign Office “might have 
encountered a rebuff”. Maisky added a detail, which it would not be 
convenient for Litvinov to mention in public: that the best way to 
overcome the reluctance of Rumania in regard to the passage of 
Soviet troops and air forces was through the agency of the League, 
since a majority decision on the League Council would be sufficient 
for Rumania to associate herself with the proposed action. 29 It will 
be remembered that such a majority decision would be one of the 
ways of setting the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact in motion, in the event 
of an attack. 

Churchill communicated tliis information to Lord Halifax on 

28 Verbatim Record of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of 
Nations, 7th Plenary Meeting, September 21, 1938, pp. 12-13. 

29 Churchill, op. cit., pp. 229-30, 232. 


i8o 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 


181 


September 3 . That day the Foreign Secretary had a message from the 
British Minister in Prague, indicating that the statement made to 
Payart had been repeated to the Czechoslovak Minister in Moscow. 30 

But Maisky’s anticipations were justified. Just as in Paris, Litvinov’s 
offer met in London with a rebuff. Halifax replied to Churchill on 
September 5 that the action would not at present be “helpful”. 

On September 8 Maisky raised the matter again with Halifax, 
who “noted” his remarks. 31 Of course, as we know, Halifax that very 
day “did not seem in any way to dissent” from Geoffrey Dawson, the 
editor of The Times, who at luncheon with the Foreign Secretary 
was defending his notorious leading article of September 7, advocat- 
ing the dismemberment, not the defence, of Czechoslovakia ! 

These communications did not prevent several newspapers during 
the first week of September from repeatedly asserting, without any 
official contradiction, that nothing was known of Soviet intentions. But 
the Manchester Guardian diplomatic correspondent learned on Sept- 
ember 9 that “it is believed both here and in Paris that Russia would 
go to war almost automatically as soon as Czechoslovakia was at- 
tacked”. 

On September 11 Bonnet paid a flying visit to Geneva, and saw 
Litvinov. The latter repeated that the U.S.S.R. would fight if France 
did, and asked for the French Government’s reply to the offer of 
staff talks on September 2. He again pressed Bonnet to agree to the 
League Council discussing the danger of war under article 11, so as 
to ensure that Rumania had general approval if she allowed Soviet 
troops to pass. 32 

Bonnet replied with vague generalities, promising to look into the 
matter, and the next day seems not “to have given quite that picture” 
to the French Cabinet (as Werth puts it). In fact, lie gave an entirely 
false picture of Litvinov having sheltered beliind the League in order 
to avoid committing the U.S.S.R.: the latter, he said, “wanted war 
to break out between the Western Powers and Germany but would 
take care to keep out”. He did not say one word of Litvinov’s real 
proposals. 33 

On September 12 or 13 Gamelin asked the Soviet mili tary attache 
in Paris to inform Voroshilov (then Defence Minister of the U.S.S.R.) 
of the discussion which he had had with Daladier of plans for a direct 
attack on Germany. The attache replied that there were chances that 

30 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 229. 31 Ibid., p. 273. 

32 Dell, op. cit., p. 272, gives what the writer knows to have been the points made by 
Litvinov : since he was present when Dell received precise information. 

33 Pcrtinax, Les Fossoyeurs, vol. II, p. 106. 


Poland would join the Germans in attacking Czechoslovakia, in which 
case “the problem for Russia would be to settle Poland rapidly”. 34 

This statement is too reminiscent of Stalin’s assurance to Gottwald 
of mid-May, and of Litvinov’s talks with Coulondre at the end of 
May and the beginning of June, not to be authentic. Once again the 
French Government, like that of Czechoslovakia, had the assurance 
that if they resisted Hitler’s attack, no obstruction by Hitler’s jackal 
Beck would be allowed to stand in the way. 

Chamberlain’s flight to Bcrchtesgaden on the 15th produced a close 
and destructive analysis of his purposes — and a forecast corresponding 
uncannily w 7 ith what happened — in Pravda of September 17. Almost 
at the beginning of the article, the central organ of the Soviet Com- 
munist Party said: “There can be no doubt that, if Mr. Chamberlain 
wished to declare in the name of his Government that Great Britain, 
together with other peace-loving countries, would not permit the viola- 
tion of the independence and integrity of the Czechoslovak Republic, 
there w 7 ould be no need for the ‘dramatic gesture’ to which the British 
Prime Minister has had recourse. . . . The days of May showed that 
only a lasting front of the peace-loving Powers can halt the aggressor.” 35 
Pravda thus made it quite plain to the world that the underlying prin- 
ciple of the Soviet Union’s proposals since March 17 still held good. 

The first official approach by the Czechoslovak Government to the 
Soviet Government came on September 19, when for the first time 
(in Litvinov’s words at the League Assembly on September 21) it 
addressed “a formal enquiry to my Govermncnt as to whether the 
Soviet Union is prepared, in accordance with the Soviet-Czech Pact, 
to render Czechoslovakia immediate and effective aid if France, loyal 
to her obligations, will render similar assistance; to which my Govern- 
ment gave a clear answer in the affirmative”. This was all the world 
knew (though it was adequate) for ten years. I11 1948 the Soviet 
Government published the questions which Benes had asked, and the 
answers which Litvinov sent to Alexandrovsky, the Soviet Minister 
in Czechoslovakia, on September 20, 1938, for communication to 
President Benes: 

“To Benes’ question, whether the U.S.S.R. will, in accordance with 
the treaty, render immediate and effective aid to Czechoslovakia if 
France remains loyal to it and also renders aid, you may in the name 
of the Government of the Soviet Union give an affirmative answer. 

34 Gamelin, Servir, vol. n, p. 348. 

35 Text of the article reproduced in English by M. BelofF, The Foreign Policy of Soviet 
Russia, vol. II (1949), pp. 148-50. 


i 82 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


“You may also give an affirmative answer to Benes’ second ques- 
tion: Will the U.S.S.R. assist Czechoslovakia, as a member of the 
League of Nations, in accordance with Articles 16 and 17, if, in the 
event of attack by Germany, Benes requests the Council of the League 
to apply the above-mentioned articles? 

“Inform Benes that we are simultaneously advising the French 
Government of our answer to his two questions.” 36 

It will be noticed that the answer to the second question made no 
mention of France. Soviet help — as had been indicated previously — 
was available even if Czechoslovakia’s other ally let her down. Mr. 
Gedye has described, on the strength of information from “a friend 
of Dr. Benes”, an interview between Benes and Alexandrovsky on 
September 18, in which the latter is supposed to have invited Benes 
to put a third question, “regarding Russia’s action should an appeal 
to the League be made impossible by some trickery or other”. Benes, 
according to this account, remained silent. 37 This may or may not 
be true: but (as the reader knows) Benes was in possession, at that 
moment, of Stalin’s personal assurance, ever since the middle of May, 
that the Soviet Union was prepared to come to the help of Czecho- 
slovakia under all circumstances — if she resisted Germany. And Gottwald 
at this time reminded Benes of the promise: 38 while Alexandrovsky in 
fact did inform the Czechoslovak Government that, should it ask for 
Soviet support, the U.S.S.R. would give it independently of France. 39 

Thus, so far as Czechoslovakia and France were concerned, the 
readiness of the Soviet Union to fight for the first-named if need be — 
with or without the assistance of the French, and in spite of all ob- 
stacles — w'as once again reaffirmed. 

But the Soviet Government went further. On the morning of Sep- 
tember 21 — within a few' hours of the scene in Prague Castle, when 
the British and French Ministers presented their ultimatum to Benes 
— it published for the world to know, its proposals to France of Sept- 
ember 2, for practical preparations to help Czechoslovakia, and its 
reaffirmation of support given to the Czechoslovak Government two 
days previously. The publication was made in the form of Litvinov’s 

36 D. & M., vol. I, pp. 203-4. Under article 17, Germany would be called before 
the League Council, as a non-member, for discussion of her action (the Council institut- 
ing an enquiry without waiting for a reply) : and if she refused and went on with the attack, 
the sanctions— economic, financial and military— provided under article 16 would be 
applicable against her. 

37 Gedye, Fallen Bastions, pp. 425-6. 

38 K. Gottwald’s collected articles, vol. 8, p. 293: quoted by Y. V. Arutiunyan, loc. 
cif., p. 90. 

39 I. Dolezal, op. cit., p. 89: quoted by Y. V. Arutiunyan, loc. cit., p. 90. 



WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 183 


speech already quoted, w'hich stated the facts (as the historian of the 
League has said) “with complete clarity”. 40 

3. September 23 

September 23 w r as a day full of energetic assertion by the Soviet 
Government of its fundamental attitude. At 4 a.m. in the morning 
it had undertaken unilateral action to restrain Poland from an attack 
on Czechoslovakia. Ever since Mr. Chamberlain’s visit to Hitler at 
Berchtesgaden, the Polish Government had been more and more 
threatening in its attitude towards Czechoslovakia, and had concen- 
trated large forces on the frontier to support its demand for the cession 
of districts inhabited by Polish-speaking minorities — arousing protests 
even from the British Government. 41 Poland’s ally, France — so active 
in utilising its alliance with Czechoslovakia for pressure on the latter 
to commit suicide — took only the most formal of diplomatic action 
to dissuade Poland, and its representative in Warsaw w r as treated w'ith 
barely-concealed ridicule for his pains. On the morning referred to, 
how r ever, the Polish Charge d’ Affaires in Moscow was informed by 
the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. P. Potemkin, 
that the entry of Polish troops into Czechoslovakia W'ould be an act 
of unprovoked aggression, and w'ould automatically cancel the Polish- 
Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression of July 25, 1932. 42 This, of course, 
was on the surface only a threat to a document. But in spite of the 
gentle character of the warning, its meaning w'as well understood: 
and in spite also of violent language in the Polish press, supported 
generously from Berlin, not a single Polish soldier ventured openly 
to cross the frontier until after Munich. 

The second important event of September 23 came at the end of 
the afternoon, in Geneva, at the public session of the Sixth Committee 
(political questions) of the League Assembly. On top of the excite- 
ment caused by the mass upheaval in Prague, the previous day, which 
had forced a change of government in favour of one pledged — so it 
seemed — to resistance, the new r s of the Soviet warning to the Poles 
had begun privately to circulate through the “diplomatic channels”. 
Although the subject under discussion at the Committee was that of 
the “reform” (in reality, emasculating) of the Covenant, and Litvinov 
was due to speak, it W'as not the certainty of hearing some bitter home 


40 F. P. Walters, op. cit., vol. II, p. 783. 41 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 459. 

42 The second clause of this treaty provided : “In the event of one of the Contracting 
Parties committing an aggression against a third State, the other Party should be entitled 
to denounce the present Treaty without giving any notice” (text in Litvinov’s Against 
Aggression, 1939, pp. 156-9). 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


I84 

truths from him on that subject that made the session as crowded as 
those of a full Assembly. All were certain that some important state- 
ment would be made on the central international issue which was 
being decided so far from Geneva. They were not disappointed. After 
making mincemeat of the arguments for making sanctions under 
article 16 voluntary — opening the door wide “for every kind of secret 
negotiations between the aggressors and League members”, and 
thereby for terrorisation of smaller States by “international highway- 
men” — Litvinov said he would “venture on a digression which never- 
theless had some bearing on the subject”. Referring to the various 
reservations inserted in the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty on the insist- 
ence of the Czechoslovak Government itself, he went on: 

“The Soviet Government had no obligations to Czechoslovakia in 
the event of French indifference to an attack on her. In that event the 
Soviet Government might come to the aid of Czechoslovakia only 
in virtue of a voluntary decision on its part” (my italics. A.R.) “or in 
virtue of a decision by the League of Nations. But no one could insist 
on that help as a duty, and in fact the Czechoslovak Government — • 
not only out of formal, but also out of practical considerations — had 
not raised the question of Soviet assistance independently of assistance 
by France. Czechoslovakia, after she had already accepted the German- 
British-French ultimatum, had asked the Soviet Government what 
would its attitude be; in other words, would it still consider itself 
bound by the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact if Germany presented new 
demands, if the Anglo-German negotiations were unsuccessful and 
Czechoslovakia decided to defend her frontiers with arms? 

“That second enquiry was quite comprehensible since, after Czecho- 
slovakia had accepted an ultimatum which included the eventual de- 
nunciation of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact, the Soviet Government 
had undoubtedly also had the moral right to renounce that Pact. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Government, which, for its part, did not 
seek pretexts for evading the fulfilment of its obligations, had replied 
to Prague that in the event of France granting assistance under the 
conditions mentioned in the Czechoslovak enquiry, the Soviet- 
Czechoslovak Pact would again enter into force.” 

By this declaration the Soviet Government deprived the friends of 
Hitler in the Western countries, should he throw them over and 
attack Czechoslovakia in spite of everything, of the excuse that they 
could not come to her defence because Soviet help was now missing. 
But it was now public, still more definitely than before, that the 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 



185 

Soviet Union might come to Czechoslovakia’s aid — in spite of French 
defection — “in virtue of a voluntary decision on its part”. That 
possibility was, as Benes and his government well knew for four 
months already, a certainty — if they wanted it. But now the general 
public would know at least that such a thing was possible. 

The tliird event of the day followed immediately, at the end of 
the meeting, when Mr. R. A. Butler, M.P., the British delegate, very 
publicly went over to M. M. Litvinov and engaged him in earnest 
conversation for a few minutes. The floodgates of speculation were 
at once burst open — although it was some time before it became 
generally known that, later in the evening, Litvinov had been inter- 
viewed by Lord dc la Warr (Lord Privy Seal and leader of the British 
delegation to the Assembly) accompanied by Butler. 

The British representatives asked him what the Soviet attitude would 
be if Chamberlain’s talks at Godesberg broke down, and Hitler 
attacked. Litvinov repeated what he had said at the Committee: the 
Soviet Union would act if the French came to the aid of Czecho- 
slovakia, it might raise the matter at the League, but “the Pact would 
come into force”. He welcomed tins approach, one which he had 
long been expecting. When asked what else he would suggest, Litvinov 
said there ought to be a thrcc-Powcr meeting — Britain, the Soviet 
Union and France — at once, together with Rumania and any other 
smaller Powers who could be trusted. The meeting should be in Paris, 
not Geneva — to show the Germans that “we mean business”. The 
British delegates asked Litvinov what military preparations could be 
made (there was an idiotic rumour circulating in Geneva that Litvinov 
had come with “twenty high Red Army officers” in his delegation: 
in reality, there was not one). Litvinov replied that he was not a mili- 
tary man, but military and air experts could come, ready for staff 
talks, when the Three-Power meeting was held. He also informed the 
British delegates more fully about the straight talk with the Poles 
that morning. Lord de la Warr promised to report this “very im- 
portant information” to London, and to “keep in touch”. 

This is what passed between the three delegates, as recorded in 
British official dispatches 43 — amplified a little by what became known 
shortly afterwards to one or two correspondents at Geneva. Nothing 
whatever that could help Czechoslovakia came of the conversation, 
and Litvinov never heard any more (cither of this talk or, indeed, 
any tiling else from the British Government before Munich). Chamber- 
lain and Halifax had obviously not intended the meeting to lead to 
43 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 497-8. 




i86 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


any practical results, since they themselves were pursuing quite a dif- 
ferent policy. Their only purpose was to strengthen their hand in 
bargaining with Hitler 44 — and tliis was show'll in a very characteristic 
way, three days later. 

On the evening of the 26th, as described in a previous chapter, there 
was a high state of tension in Europe. Negotiations with Hitler had 
broken down. Czechoslovakia had mobilised, some preparatory 
measures were being taken in Britain and France: Germany had of 
course concentrated large armies round the frontiers of Czechoslovakia 
long ago. At this moment, as Winston Churchill lias described, he 
had a long discussion in the afternoon with the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary 45 — it is very unfortunate that he has not revealed 
any hint of what passed between them — as a result of which the 
famous communique, drafted by a Foreign Office official, was ap- 
proved by Lord Halifax and issued soon after 8 p.m. The essential 
passage in it stated that “if in spite of the efforts made by the British 
Prime Minister, a German attack is made upon Czechoslovakia, the 
immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her 
assistance, and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France”. 
Broadcast the same evening, it was printed in the newspapers of 
the 27th. 

This statement was issued (as was stated earlier) without the slightest 
consultation with Litvinov or any other Soviet representative — al- 
though there was ample time to have done so, if this had been desired. 
It was as great a surprise to Litvinov as to anyone else — all the more 
because it is entirely untrue that he had been in touch with “French 
and British officials at Geneva on September 25 and 26”, as some have 
written. 46 In reality, none of them had been near him since the talk 
with the British delegates three days before. The reason for tliis was 
obvious: he would never have agreed to the words, “in spite of the 
efforts made by the British Prime Minister”, with their implication 
that they made for peace. On the contrary, the Soviet view of these 
“efforts” — as was explicitly stated in the Pravda article quoted above 
— was that their aim was “to deceive world opinion, to deceive the 
people, and beneath the flag of peace-bringing gestures to bring off 
an agreement with the aggressors”; and this only brought war nearer. 

44 On Litvinov’s arrival in Geneva, nearly three weeks before, the writer asked him 
what he thought the prospects were. He replied concisely: “The British and French 
will sell the Czechs.” 

45 Churchill, op. cit., p. 242. 

46 E.g. S. H. Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European History (Princeton University Press, 
1943), pp. 345~<5- 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 187 

Litvinov’s opinion therefore was that the communique was intended 
— like the de la Warr interview — to create the appearance of unity 
between the three Powers, without the slightest intention of really 
creating it. And this could only be for the purpose of impressing 
Hitler sufficiently to get him to accept the surrender of Czechoslovakia 
without war. 

The next few days proved that Litvinov was right. 

In the meantime, the Soviet Union continued to prepare for real 
defence of Czechoslovakia, if it were called upon to furnish it. It was 
during the 26th that, as mentioned earlier, Gamclin’s chief of staff 
received the message from Voroshilov — many infantry divisions, a 
mass of cavalry, numerous tank formations and the bulk of the Soviet 
Air Force, ready to take the field. The Soviet armed forces were “put 
into a state of battle preparedness” : air squadrons were ready, not only 
for co-operation with the divisions on the western frontier, mentioned 
in the message to Gamelin, but to fly to Czechoslovakia. 47 The New 
York Times Riga correspondent, and The Times Warsaw correspondent, 
reported on the 26th that near its western frontiers the Soviet Union 
had concentrated 330,000 infantry, five corps of cavalry, 2000 planes 
and 2000 tanks. So certain of these concentrations was Gamelin that 
on the 28th he asked that the Soviet armies should “not take the offen- 
sive against Poland without giving us warning beforehand”. 48 A Havas 
message printed in the French papers of the 27th had repeated not 
only that the Soviet Government was ready for immediate discus- 
sions on “close military collaboration” with Britain and France, but 
that various preparatory measures for civilian mobilisation were being 
taken. 

Even as late as September 28, when Alexander Kirk, the U.S. 
Charge d’ Affaires, presented President Roosevelt’s proposal that the 
U.S.S.R. should send appeals to continue negotiations to Germany, 
Britain, France and Czechoslovakia (!), Potemkin replied that an 
international conference — such as the United States had in the mean- 
time proposed to Hitler — “would prove more effective in the present 
circumstances than the mediation of France and Great Britain”. The 
U.S.S.R. was ready to take part in such a conference, just as it had 
been at the annexation of Austria, when it proposed one. 49 

47 Istoria Mejdunarodnykh Otnoshenii i vneshnei poUtiki S.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1957), 
p. 243. Z. Fierlinger, Na Slujbe Chchoslovakii, quoted by Voprosy Istorii, loc. cit., p. 90. 

48 Gamelin, op. cit., p. 357. 

49 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 617: the text of Potemkin’s statement was published in Izvestia 
of September 29. 



i88 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


That was the last the U.S.S.R. — or anyone — heard of an inter- 
national conference. 

It was also the only contact with a “Munichite” Power between 
September 23 and September 29, when Chamberlain set out for the 
meeting with Hitler. On that day Lord Halifax invited Maisky to 
come and see him, to try and persuade the Soviet Ambassador that 
the only reason why the Soviet Union was not invited to Munich 
was that Hidcr and Mussolini would not sit down with its repre- 
sentative — and even that the de la Warr interview on September 23, 
the only case in six months, showed that “we were fully alive to the 
importance of working as closely as we might with his Government 
at this juncture”. The Foreign Secretary was evasive when Maisky 
asked whether the Czechoslovak Government would be represented 
at Munich. In short, Lord Halifax had good reason for the melancholy 
remark, at the end of his note of the meeting, that Maisky’s “general 
attitude seemed to me, as indeed it was likely to be, one of some 
suspicion”. 50 

The Ambassador’s suspicion was justified. In reality, this interview 
prepared the way for the untrue assertions endorsed a few days 
later by Sir Samuel Hoare in the House of Commons (October 3), 
that consultation with the U.S.S.R. had been “adequate”, and by 
Earl Wintcrton, another member of the Government (October 10), 
in a speech at Shoreham, that the Soviet Union did not offer help 
during the Czechoslovak crisis, but “only made very vague promises 
owing to her military weakness”. The purpose of these untruths 
was obvious — to try and shift the blame from the real culprits to the 
U.S.S.R. 

The reply to Hoare (and to simultaneous assertions in the French 
press inspired by the Quai d’Orsay, about the Soviet Union being 
fully consulted), 51 was given in a Tass communique on October 4. 
It said that in the interviews of Bonnet with Souritz, and of Lord 
Halifax with Maisky, during the fmal period, the two Soviet Ambas- 
sadors “were given no information other than what had appeared 
in the daily press”. There was neither conference nor agreement with 
the Soviet Government. France and Britain had “confined themselves 
merely to informing the Soviet Government of what had already 
happened”. The reply to Winterton came in a statement from the 
Soviet Embassy in London (October 11), recalling Litvinov’s speech 
at Geneva on September 21, and describing Wintcrton’s assertions as 
“a complete perversion”. On November 14, the Soviet Embassy’s 
60 D.B.F.P., voL II, pp. 623-5. 51 Wcrth, op. cit., p. 334. 


WHERE THE SOVIET UNION STOOD 


189 

charge was fully supported by Labour leaders in the House of Com- 
mons — but both Chamberlain and Wintcrton characteristically avoided 
either retraction or apology, making use of Maisky’s statement in a 
private talk with Wintcrton that “the incident was closed”. However, 
the fact that members of the Government had been so embarrassed 
by the truth about Munich that they had to resort to such methods 
spoke for itself. 

One may draw up a little summary. During the six months follow- 
ing its statement of March 17, authoritative Soviet spokesmen or news- 
papers on at least ten public occasions declared explicitly that the 
Soviet Union would fulfil its pledges to Czechoslovakia. Private 
assurances of the most definite character were in addition given six 
times to France (on three of these occasions with the proposal of mili- 
tary staff talks), four times to Czechoslovakia (apart from practical 
measures of military co-operation) and three times to the United 
Kingdom (including once with a proposal of staff talks) — although it 
had no treaty of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. All the pro- 
posals and statements made to France and Czechoslovakia, so far as 
the Soviet Government knew, went to Great Britain more or less 
automatically. In addition, Litvinov informed all three governments 
of the explicit reply given to the German Ambassador on August 22. 
Ten public, and a minimum of fourteen private, assurances in six 
months — with a number of proposals for staff talks — could really 
leave no doubt in the minds of anyone not determined to be deaf 
and blind. 

Moreover, the Soviet Union had actually been engaged in successful 
combat with one member of the aggressor bloc— Japan — during this 
period, and had shown its readiness to defy all three aggressors by 
supplying munitions and technical aid to their victims, Spain and 
China — knowing that the British and French Governments would 
hardly shed a tear, much less give any help, if the Soviet Union were 
attacked. Thus no one could really doubt the readiness of the Soviet 
Government to fit words with deeds. 52 

By contrast, the farthest the British Government ever went in 
public to commit itself before September 26 (when there was no 

52 Which did not prevent various subsequent writers asserting that the Soviet Govern- 
ment could have “made their position clearer to the French and British Governments” 
(as though that was what was lacking) and displayed “reticence about the possibility of 
their being involved in war” (Beloff): that the Soviet Government “got by without 
having had to show their hand” and its attitude “was by no means unequivocal” ( Survey 
of International Affairs): and that “Moscow never attempted to define the exact manner 
in which assistance would be made effective” (Seton- Watson) — five distinct offers of 
staff talks (one of them public), to do just that, evidently not being counted. 













THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



190 

longer any question of defending Czechoslovakia but of dismember- 
ing her peaceably and quietly, if Hitler would agree) was the type 
of statement that war was like a fire: if it broke out, “who can say 
how far it would spread, or how many may be called upon to beat 
it out?” 53 In private, vriicn the French were desperately trying to 
find out whether they would or would not get help if attacked, the 
British Government delivered itself of such pearls of great price as 
the following, on September 12: “So far as I am in a position to give 
any answer at this stage to M. Bonnet’s question, it would have to 
be that while His Majesty’s Government would never allow the 
security of France to be threatened, they'- are unable to make precise 
statements of the character of their future action, or the time at which 
it would be taken, in circumstances that they cannot at present fore- 
see.” 54 

As for the French Government, its spokesmen several times talked 
in public of the binding and indeed sacred character of their obliga- 
tions to Czechoslovakia. But in private, as we know, they did their 
utmost to threaten and terrorise the Czechoslovak Government into 
surrendering that which the obligations had been intended to pre- 
serve — the territorial integrity and, in. this case, independent existence 
of their country. The attitude of the French Government throughout 
could not be characterised better than by the note of what Lord 
Halifax told the British Cabinet after the May, 1938, meeting of the 
Council of the League of Nations at Geneva which he had attended. 
Bonnet had made it clear to him that he wanted His Majesty’s Govern- 
ment to put as much pressure as possible on Bencs, “to save France 
from the cruel dilemma of dishonouring her agreements or becoming 
involved in war”. 55 

This contrast between the Soviet attitude and that of the British 
and French Governments was not accidental, or one of different 
psychologies: it reflected fundamentally opposite policies — resisting 
Hitler, or co-operating with him. 

53 Sir John Simon’s speech at Lanark, August 27, 1938. 

64 Facsimile printed in Bonnet, De Washington an Quai d'Orsay, pp. 360-1. 

65 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 299. 


CHAPTER IX 





COULD GERMANY HAVE FOUGHT? 

1. Strong or Weak? 

M ANY foreign correspondents in Germany, during the months 
before Munich, were struck by the contrast between the threat- 
ening speeches of the Nazi leaders, supported by the shouts of their 
followers at Nazi rallies, and the moods of the German people. 

On August 3, 1938, the Petit Parisien printed a message from its 
Berlin correspondent, saying: “Lord Runciman’s mission in Czecho- 
slovakia is well received by the mass of the German population, which 
for several months has sincerely wished for an amicable solution, since 
it also felt that serious threats of war were hanging over Europe. This 
desire is the more explicable because, in spite of the daily efforts of 
propaganda, public opinion is in no way convinced of the existence 
of a Sudeto-Czech ‘problem’, and because for twenty years the Ger- 
man Reich maintained correct and even cordial relations with Prague. 
But it is not public opinion which decides here.” 

The Petit Parisien was a strongly conservative newspaper, the regular 
channel for “semi-official” expressions of opinion in France: and its 
correspondents abroad were not men of Radical opinions cither (as 
for that matter, in this case, can be seen by the reference to the Runci- 
man mission). The same summing up of the situation was presented 
in numerous other dispatches from Germany from newspaper corre- 
spondents of varied schools of thought. 

The Times of August 1 6 published a dispatch from its Berlin corre- 
spondent, who had at midnight witnessed the departure of a special 
train for Trier with 500 men who had been mobilised, like hundreds 
of thousands more, for “special duty”. Most of them were labourers, 
but many belonged to the white-collar class. “It was evident that 
many of them, suddenly called away from their daily work, were 
by no means sure what might be required of them when they reached 
their destinations, and were being launched into an unknown adven- 
ture for an indefinite time. It could be seen that many left with very 
mixed feelings.” The effect of conscription was weighing heavily 
upon the economic life of the country, the correspondent reported: 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


192 

not only were jobs closing down, but tlic strain was also shown by 
“a sudden shortage of certain kinds of food in Berlin”. 

A fortnight later, the Reuter correspondent in Berlin reported: “The 
constant alarm in the inspired German press over Czechoslovakia has 
given the man in the street in Germany a bad fit of nerves. Profoundly 
uninterested as the majority arc in the future of the Sudeten Germans, 
and dreading the barest possibility of war, the German public fear 
that without being consulted in any way they may see the Fatherland 
plunged into deep waters. This political uneasiness comes on top of 
serious economic misgivings and the sense of personal hardship, especi- 
ally among the working classes, where long hours and inadequate 
pay arc often the rule. . . . There is no doubt that the German authori- 
ties arc keenly alive to the unsatisfactory state of public opinion, 
especially in the capital and the large industrial districts.” 

It must be emphasised that this telegram described the feelings on 
August 30, long before the speeches at Nuremberg, before even the 
“Fourth Plan” of President Belies. Soon the same uneasy mood 
reached very influential quarters. On September 9 the Daily Telegraph 
and Morning Post printed a statement of its diplomatic correspondent 
that “information reached the British Government yesterday concern- 
ing the attitude of the German General Staff towards the policy being 
advocated by the radicals of the Nazi Party. The earlier reports that 
the generals arc exerting their utmost influence to dissuade the Fiihrcr 
from ordering action which might precipitate a general war were 
fully confirmed.” Later, when reports were published that General 
Beck, the Chief of the German General Staff, had resigned in the 
summer, but had been induced to suspend his resignation until after 
the crisis, repeated denials were issued in Berlin. As soon as the crisis 
was over, however, and events had shown that once again Hitler had 
been right in his anticipation of what the British and French Govern- 
ments would do in defence of treaty obligations, Beck’s resignation, 
and that of a group of generals who supported him, were accepted. 

On the evening of September 11, when Goering had made a mena- 
cing speech describing Germany’s perfect readiness for war, the Daily 
7 'elegraph and Morning Post correspondent in Berlin wrote to his paper: 
“It may be very much doubted whether the attempt to make the 
prospect of war palatable will succeed with the mass of the people, 
as distinct from the Party enthusiasts now gathered at Nuremberg. 
The gravity of the situation is not fully appreciated here, but there 
is not the slightest doubt that a war, in circumstances as they arc at 
present, would be extremely unpopular. The protective guards, whose 


COULD GERMANY HAVE EOUGIIT? 193 

specific duty it is to maintain the morale of the civilian population, 
would find themselves faced from the outset by literally millions of 
people in a mood of latent disaffection. Although warlike utterances 
are taken at their face value in Nuremberg, the atmosphere elsewhere 
is completely different from that of 1914. . . . From other parts of 
Germany come telephonic reports from correspondents who confirm 
my observations in Berlin. The man in the street, they say, has no 
desire for w r ar and is not even particularly hostile to Czechoslovakia. 
. . . The general impression is that the German people as a whole, 
as distinct from the younger members of the Nazi Party, does not 
place 100 per cent, confidence in its leaders.” 

On September 14 and 15, Keitel, the Commander-in-Chief, was 
urging caution on Hitler, reported a special correspondent recently 
in Germany, in the same newspaper. So much might have been 
exaggerated or highly-coloured gossip. But the correspondent could 
speak of what he had seen himself when he w T rote: "I can state that 
there is little war enthusiasm anywhere in Germany. In Bavaria, mur- 
murs against Herr Flitlcr’s preparations are now' swelling into a tide 
of open criticism of the Nazi regime. In Wiirtemberg and Baden, 
disapproval of T-Terr Hitler’s policy, though less vocal, is just as in- 
tense. The most significant fact of all, perhaps, is that this opposition 
does not come from former Communist or other radical elements, 
but has its roots now in the middle class and the most Conservative 
sections of the German population.” 

On the same day an English correspondent in Berlin remarked how 
“ranks of silent, anxious spectators” had watched lorry-loads of troops 
racing for three hours through the streets: “Not a single cheer was 
sent up as they passed through Untcr den Linden.” 

It might be objected that the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post took 
up a critical attitude towards Chamberlain’s policy. But the following 
appeared on September 29 in a newspaper which, more than any 
other, reflected the view's of Chamberlain’s closest friends — The Times 
— from its Berlin correspondent: 

“There remains a large question mark in the back of every German 
mind, and a latent suspicion that all may not be as simple as the Party 
leaders w'ould have the people believe. If it should be true that Czecho- 
slovakia would not fight her w r ar alone against German aggression, 
that the German people should find themselves irrevocably engaged 
in a general war, the moral shock v'ould be tremendous. The fear 
of another great w r ar lies deep in the German people.” It was the 
young men in the army and the Party who were shouting loudest. 


N 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


194 

“The great majority who cluster quietly round the public loud- 
speakers in the streets, or sit gravely in cafes or at home to hear Herr 
Hitler’s voice on the wireless, do not share this fervent confidence. 
On the contrary, their one prayer and hope is for peace. . . . The 
German people, moreover, are not merely fearful of war and anxious 
for peace. They appear to be positively apathetic towards the whole 
Sudeten German question, in spite of the violently exaggerated propa- 
ganda to which they have been subjected during recent months. This 
propaganda lias been to a great extent a failure. . . . The Germans are 
a warrior race and will fight, and fight well, if ordered to do so; but 
there is bewilderment in Germany to-day which had no place in the 
Germany of 1914.” 

And after Munich the same correspondent wrote, on October 2: 
“The Reich has not yet exhausted its emotional relief at the last- 
minute salvation from a European war which, in the opinion of most 
sections of the population, it would almost certainly have lost.” 

This accumulation of contemporary opinion 1 docs not prove, of 
course, that Hitler might not, by some unguarded or over-confident 
gesture, have precipitated a war even had there been a closed front 
of the Powers against him ; nor yet that, had such a w ar been started, 
there would have been an instant revolution; nor yet again that, in 
the first wrecks of the war, the German army would not have fought, 
or that the German population would not have submitted to war-time 
measures. But it docs show that the internal condition of Germany 
was far more unfavourable for a large-scale war than it had been in 
1914, in spite of the extreme efforts of Nazi propaganda, and that 
the German Government would have had to reckon very seriously 
with this undeniable fact, had an invasion of Czechoslovakia involved 
it in war with a formal coalition of the great and small Powers. 

These considerations were the more telling because, from a strictly 
military point of view, Germany was far from the position of crush- 
ing superiority winch its rulers would fain have had believed. Of this 
we have evidence, revealed by diplomatic archives and the documents 
of the Nuremberg trial of major war criminals in 1946, which the 
journalists of 1938 did not possess. 

On April 4, 1938 — General Keitel stated in evidence at the Nurem- 
berg trial — Germany possessed twenty-four infantry divisions, one 
armoured division, one mountain division and one cavalry division: 

1 Much the same opinions were recorded by the American journalist William L. 

Shirer, Berlin Diary (New York, 1941), pp. T42-3; and, remarkably enough, by King 

Boris of Bulgaria ( D.B.F.P. , vol. Ill, pp. 142-6). 


COULD GERMANY HAVE FOUGHT? 


195 

ten infantry divisions and one armoured division were being formed: 
and seven or eight reserve divisions, in the process of formation, 
would (it was expected) be complete by October that year. 2 This 
made a total of well under fifty divisions — and what state of training 
would they be in, to attack the forty well-armed and trained Czecho- 
slovak divisions, not to speak of nearly a hundred divisions of the 
French army and the far greater armed forces of the U.S.S.R.? Yet 
throughout 1938 (he said) Germany kept no more than five divisions 
in the West. 3 It was all she could spare. She was never in 1938 in a 
position to withstand a concentrated attack by Poland, France and 
Czechoslovakia together, said Jodi. 4 “It was out of the question that 
with five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions we should 
have held the western fortifications, which were nothing but a large 
construction site, against a hundred French divisions. That was milit- 
arily impossible,” Jodi said in evidence 5 on June 4, 1946. 

It is hardly surprising that, in a conversation with the Czechoslovak 
Minister in London at tins time (April 5, 1938), Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, said that “not- 
withstanding all assurances, Germany was afraid of Russia”. 6 

Keitel admitted (April 4, 1946) that on April 21, T938, he had 
“heard suggestions about preparations for war against Czechoslovakia” : 
but he had considered that “this operation could not be carried out 
by the Army, in view of the military strength which I knew to be 
ours at the time”. 7 In reality (as is shown in the memorandum by 
Hitler’s aide-de-camp Schmundt) these “suggestions” had been made 
by Hitler on the day mentioned, in the instructions for “Operation 
Green” against Czechoslovakia, which were drawn up the following 
day. The plan bore unmistakable traces of the anxiety about the 
military position: it laid down that “outstanding military successes” 
must be won within the first four days — by concentric motorised 
attacks from various directions— otherwise there would be a European 
war. 8 The danger of involving the major Powers was again under- 
lined in the revised and expanded directive submitted by Keitel to 
Hitler on May 20. 9 

“The German Army is still very far short of completing its organi- 
sation and armament”, the British military attache in Berlin, Col. 
Mason-Macfarlane, had noted on May 9. 10 There was “little doubt ’ 
that it was “not ready for a European war” — he evidently told 

2 Trial, part XI, p. 49. 3 Ibid., p. 10. 4 Trial, part XV, p. 320. 

6 Ibid., p. 368. 0 D. & M., vol. I, p. 103. 7 Trial, part XI, p. 1. 

» D.G.F.P., vol. II, pp. 239-40. 8 Ibid., pp. 299-303. 10 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 271. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


196 

William Strang, who visited the Berlin Embassy on behalf of the 
Foreign Office, on May 28 and 29. 11 

But on May 30, as we know. Hitler gave directions for the revision 
of “Operation Green” so as to provide for an attack on Czechoslovakia 
“in the near future”. The entry in Jodi’s diary shows what fears this 
aroused: “The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the 
Fiihrcr’s intention that we must do it this year and the opinion in the 
Army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western 
Powers will interfere and we are not yet equal to them.” 12 

Preparations were now energetically pushed ahead. But it is note- 
worthy that on July 27, nearly two months later, Mason-Macfarlane 
was reporting: “I am continually coining across evidence that Ger- 
many as a whole is not ready for war this autumn”; and even Nevile 
Henderson, his chief, confessing to Halifax 011 August 6: “If we really 
showed our teeth, Hitler would not dare to make war to-day.” 13 
That this was an accurate assessment of the situation is shown by 
a memorandum submitted by General Beck, then Chief of Staff, to 
von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief, on July 16, protesting 
against the decision to attack Czechoslovakia “until the military situa- 
tion is basically changed”. At present, he said, “I consider it hopeless, 
and this view is shared by all my Quartermasters — General and depart- 
mental chiefs of the General Staff who would have to deal with the 
preparation and execution of a war against Czechoslovakia.” 14 Fading 
to get any change, Beck resigned at the beginning of August. A similar 
current of opinion to Beck’s showed itself at a staff conference held 
by Hitler on August 10. The generals were by no means enthusiastic 
about the defences in the west, and Jodi noted that this opinion was 
“held very widely within the Army General Staff”: one of them even 
said the fortifications could only be held for three weeks. This made 
Hitler -very angry : but Jodi wrote that the opposition between Hitler’s 
opinions and those of the generals might “cause immense political 
damage” and was “common talk”. 15 

This common talk spread pretty far. An indication that by the be- 
ginning of September it had reached London was given by the diplo- 
matic journalist, quoted earlier. None but a handful knew that it was 
brought by a representative of the generals, Ewald von Kleist, who 
at great personal risk came to London on August 18 to say that they 

11 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 413. 12 Trial, part II, p. it. 13 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 16, 58. 

14 Memorandum printed in W. Foerster, Ein General Kampft gegen den Krieg (Munich, 
1949), quoted in Namier, In the Nazi Era (1952), p. 30. 

16 Trial, part III, p. 325. 


COULD GERMANY HAVE FOUGHT? 197 

were all against war, but wanted help from outside: either by Great 
Britain stating plainly that she would fight with France if Czecho- 
slovakia were invaded, or by promises of support for a military and 
monarchist coup d’etat against Flitler. (He saw Vansittart and Churchill, 
who reported to Chamberlain and Halifax respectively: but got no 
tangible encouragement.) 16 

Information about the German fortifications was also reaching 
France. “The Siegfried Line was not comparable to the Maginot 
Line”, Daladier told the British Ambassador in Paris on September 8. 
There was very little concrete. It mostly consisted of field-works. 
Work on it had been unduly hasty. 17 (Jodi’s evidence at Nuremberg, 
that the German fortifications in the west were only a large “con- 
struction site”, has already been quoted.) On that very day Jodi noted 
in his diary that he, like General Stiilpnagcl, the chief of staff of the 
future army of invasion, was “worrying” about Hidcr’s recent state- 
ment implying that he was ready to fight the Western Powers. The 
only consolation Jodi had was that perhaps those Powers were only 
bluffing. 18 

What was the position on the eve of Munich? Here are two entirely 
independent testimonies. One from the inside: by the late autumn of 
1938, after all the new and intensive efforts decided upon by Hitler 
at the end of May, Germany disposed of fifty-five divisions, includ- 
ing reserve divisions, and some “only poorly equipped”. 19 Thus the 
April estimate had been exceeded by only nine or ten divisions: and 
of the fifty-five, five fighting divisions and seven reserve divisions 
were kept in the west — leaving forty-three divisions for Czecho- 
slovakia and elsewhere. The other estimate is that of the Intelligence 
Department of the French army, on which Gamelin based Iris report 
to Chamberlain on September 26. France would begin with a hun- 
dred divisions. Germany had an imperfect and incomplete army, a 
shortage of petrol, and only air superiority on her side. Czechoslovakia 
would have thirty divisions (actually a considerable underestimate) 
against forty German divisions. 20 And this other disparity (if the Ger- 
man “lightning offensive” against Czechoslovakia was intended to 
succeed) took no account of the U.S.S.R. 

After Munich the general staff of the Czechoslovak army, which 
had several officers of the German general staff in its service through- 
out, drew up a secret memorandum on the state of the German army 

16 D.B.F.P., vol. n, pp. 683-9. 17 D.B.F.P., vol. II, p. 269. 

I® Trial, part II, p. 18. 1 9 Jodi’s evidence at Nuremberg, Trial, part XV, p. 369. 

29 Gamelin, Servir, vol. II, pp. 351-2. 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



198 

in 1938, which has been published after the war. “The German army 
at the end of September, i.c. in the sixth week of its intensified mobili- 
sation, had in the majority of its regiments two battalions. The units 
consisted of insufficiently trained reservists. In many battalions there 
were no machine-gun companies, there was a shortage of heavy artillery 
for active use against our fortifications. While the German army did 
have a considerable superiority in aircraft over ours, the majority of 
the pilots had had only three or four months’ training. As regards 
the morale of the soldiers, the spirit of the army, as the Germans 
themselves put it, was similar to that which predominated in the 
German army during its retreat in 1918. Our army was well equipped, 
its reservists well trained, its permanent fortifications reliable, its morale 
excellent. In these circumstances our army had all the conditions for 
a successful struggle with the German army.” 21 

Was this a self-consoling exaggeration? In fact, even a year later, 
when Germany was entering the second world war in September, 
1939, she had only seventy-five divisions, with a “ridiculously low” 
supply of munitions, Jodi said at Nuremberg. 22 Hitler himself ad- 
mitted to Inis military commanders 011 November 23, 1939, that it 
was after Munich that “the Western fortifications had to be finished”. 23 
Keitel said in evidence about Munich: “We were extremely glad that 
it had not come to a military operation, because throughout the time 
of preparation we had always been of the opinion that our means of 
attack against the frontier fortifications of Czechoslovakia were inad- 
equate. From a purely military point of view we were not strong 
enough to stage an attack which would involve the piercing of the 
frontier fortifications: we lacked material for such an attack.” 24 
With such a picture at the back of their minds, the general staff 
presented a memorandum to Hitler on September 27 which (although 
reported only in the French press after Munich) has been accepted as 
probably genuine by a number of writers. 25 

It referred to the low morale of the German people; many cases of 
indiscipline and insubordination in the Rcichswehr ; the unsatisfactory 
condition of the Siegfried Line, and the absence of fortifications in 
the Aachen and Saarbriicken sectors; the shortage of officers and 
N.C.O.s (eighteen divisions would be without any at all, in the event 

21 Quoted by Krai, op. cit., pp. 224-5. The exact reference to the archives of the Mini- 
stry of National Defence is: MNO.hl.st. 1-7 odd.,cj. 1313/1939. 

22 Trial, part XV, pp. 320 et seqq. 23 Trial, part II, p. 73. 

24 Trial, part XI, p. 2. 

25 Ripka, op. cit. (1939), pp. 212-14; Churchill, op. cit. (1948), pp. 245-6; Survey of 
International Affairs, 1938, vol. II (1951), p. 415; Namier, In the Nazi Era {1952), p. 157. 


COULD GERMANY HAVE FOUGHT? 





199 


of a general mobilisation) ; the military effects of defeat; and its prob- 
ability, in any but a strictly local war. The account in a French journal 
which printed a summary of the memorandum went on to say that 
on the evening of the 27th Admiral Raeder added his warning in a 
personal interview with Hitler — a warning reinforced by the mobili- 
sation of the British Fleet, announced later in the night. 

Thus there is sufficient evidence to show that Germany was by no 
means as powerful as Hitler’s speeches tried to make the world be- 
lieve, and that both popular alarm and disquiet among the generals 
really existed, and with good grounds. The lessons of the Austrian 
“campaign” of March 11-12 — when at one time “70 per cent, of all 
the armoured vehicles and cars were stranded on the road from Salz- 
burg and Passau to Vienna, because the drivers had been hurriedly 
taken from their driving course to be given this task”, 26 were fairly 
widely known too. 

Indeed, all the foregoing is contained within Keitel’s reply to Col. 
Eger, of the Czechoslovak army, at Nuremberg: “The purpose of 
the agreement of Munich was to eliminate Russia from Europe, gain 
time and complete our armaments.” 

2. The Forces of Resistance 

What of the other side? 

So far as Czechoslovakia is concerned, something has been said 
already, in Chapter VII. Even hostile observers had to admit the 
strength, morale, good training and good equipment of its forces: 
1,500,000 of its soldiers (thirty-five divisions, or 75 per cent, of the 
available trained effectives) were under arms at the end of September. 
It had the usual troubles of a State where armaments, hkc everything 
else involving public expenditure, are a question of business contracts 
— delays in deliveries, competition of foreign customers, and conse- 
quent shortages or inadequacy of certain equipment. 27 This notably 
applied to the lack of battalion motor transport for carrying the sol- 
diers’ equipment, as compared with the German army. But taken as 
a whole, the armed forces compared favourably with those of any 
hi Europe. They had several hundred tanks and upwards of 1500 
planes: moreover, behind them stood a heavy industry which put 
Czechoslovakia among the seven most industrialised countries of 

26 Jodi’s evidence at Nuremberg (Trial, part XV, p. 323). 

27 Krai, op. cit., pp. 232-42, 250-2, gives a number of instances drawn from the Czecho- 
slovak archives. 


200 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Europe. 28 Her steel industry had a higher output than that of Italy. 
A military correspondent of the Manchester Guardian (September 15) 
was impressed, after a tour of inspection, by the blockhouses and latest 
mountain artillery in the frontier mountains. We are told that the 
British and Italian military attaches in Berlin, who accompanied the 
German forces moving into Czechoslovakia after Munich, noticed 
the “unmistakable astonishment and awe on the faces of the German 
officers as they encountered defence after defence which did not appear 
on the carefully prepared maps provided by their Military Intelli- 
gence” — and the still deeper impression on the German generals when 
they came to the basic defence line, “formidable fortifications on which 
an assault might well have been held up for a considerable period”. 29 

Moreover, during the months before Munich the Germans had 
noticed that the steady reinforcement of the air force with Soviet 
bomber planes had begun: their military attache in Moscow reported 
on August 1 8 on his information, through Italians who had watched 
the operation, that for several months past the same ten Czechoslovak 
pilots had been arriving at Odessa, by rail through Rumania, every 
week — evidently flying as many planes back to Czechoslovakia, he 
concluded. 80 Many aerodromes had been built against the contingency 
of a rapid increase in the number of fighting planes; and it would be 
ridiculous to suppose that, if incredible geographical difficulties were 
overcome in ensuring the supply of aeroplanes to Spain and to China, 
there were insuperable obstacles in the way of a more adequate and 
regular supply to Czechoslovakia. 

There is hardly any need to dwell on the complete contrast between 
the spirit of the German people, indicated by the reports quoted above, 
and the spirit with which the people of Czechoslovakia would have 
entered the war, had it been forced on them. The explosions of feeling 
throughout the country' on May' 21, and again after the Berchtesgaden 
terms became known on September 21, are sufficient evidence. 

The military strength of France lay in her close on a hundred divi- 
sions : and the ability of her army at that time to break through the 
still unsettled fortifications of Germany in the west — defended by a 
force effectively less than a quarter of the size of a French attacking 
force, even allowing for heavy reserves to guard the Italian and Spanish 
frontiers — could hardly be doubted. If the unsatisfactory state of the 
French air force, compared with that of Germany, has to be taken into 


28 Recognised expressly as such by their permanent seats on the Governing Body of 
die International Labour Office. 

28 Wheeler-Bcnnctt, op. cit., p. 333. 30 D.C.F.P., vol. n, pp. 587-8. 


COULD GERMANY HAVE FOUGHT? 


201 


account, it must be remembered that in tanks the German army in 
1938 was nothing like what it was a year later, after taking over the 
600 tanks of Czechoslovakia and turning the Skoda works — the biggest 
in Central Europe — exclusively to armaments manufacture for their 
purposes. 

Had the French Government made clear that it would throw its 
sword into the scale beside that of Czechoslovakia, to defend the 
latter’s territorial integrity, there is evidence enough that the German 
military leaders would have been given pause. 

How much more, then, when they already knew that the forces 
of the Soviet Union were pledged in that case to support Czecho- 
slovakia by the terms of the Soviet-Czcchoslovak and Soviet-French 
mutual assistance treaties. The Soviet Government has not published 
any details of the forces it had ready for the field in September, 1938, 
similar to those it issued after the war for September, 1939. 31 But 
apart from the evidence — true, at second hand — provided by General 
Gamelin of the offer he received from Voroshilov on September 26, 
1938, which was quoted in a previous chapter, there is another esti- 
mate, drawn up by- experienced hands, which cannot have erred on 
the side of optimism. This is the one given by Ambassador Davies to 
Secretary of State Hull on June 6, 1938, in his Brief on the Facts, sum- 
marising the situation in the U.S.S.R. as he saw it. The military figures 
were based primarily on those collected by his military' attache. They 
estimated, under arms, 1,300,000 men and about 5,000,000 trained 
reserves; 4000 tanks available for immediate use; 4500 planes in service, 
with an annual output of 4800. 32 It is interesting that, when the French 
military attache reported, in. the autumn of the same year, much the 
same figures (1,300,000 men, 4500 tanks, 3500 planes — of these 400 
heavy' bombers in the western districts — and 150,000 pilots trained 
or training), the French War Ministry (which had earlier refused a 
Soviet light fighter) invited him “to be more moderate in his appre- 
ciation of the Soviet military forces”. 33 

But could the U.S.S.R. have rendered immediate and effective 
military assistance? Such a question could only be asked because the 
public in the Western countries — and not only the public, but as we 
have seal, the Governments also — were still a prey to fantastic dis- 
tortions of the real situation in the U.S.S.R. It was a significant mess- 
age from the Riga correspondent of The Times on September 7 (the 
day of the sinister leading article previously mentioned) — both the 

31 Falsifiers of History (Soviet Information Bureau, 1938), Section 3. 

32 Davies, op. cit., pp. 408-9. 33 CouJondre, op. cit., pp. 128-9. 


202 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


newspaper and the correspondent, be it noted, singularly unprejudiced 
in favour of the U.S.S.R. — that gave as the view prevailing in Moscow 
“that the Red Army, especially the air fleet, will intervene if Czecho- 
slovakia asks for help. The reorganisation of the Kiev and White 
Russian military districts is interpreted as preparation for this, especi- 
ally as these commands have been strengthened to nearly a war basis, 
and all frontier garrisons have been reinforced.” 

Nor did this apply only to these frontier districts. On the same day, 
the Soviet newspapers received from a special correspondent of the 
Tass Agency an account of the closing day of the military manoeuvres 
in the Moscow district, which had been conducted on a full war-time 
basis, with the participation of all arms, and in the presence of Marshal 
Voroshilov, the People’s Commissar for Defence. “The training de- 
monstrated that the units of the Moscow military district, like the 
whole Red Army, arc in a state of mobilised preparedness, and arc 
capable at any moment of levelling a heavy blow at the enemy”, 
concluded the report. This conclusion, with its use of the unusual and 
significant term, “mobilised preparedness”, was the first item on the 
wireless news in Russian from Moscow that night; but the circles 
which were at that time specialising in hearing “revelations” on the 
Soviet wireless discreditable to the U.S.S.R. missed this important 
occasion completely. 

The messages in the New York Times and London Times on Sept- 
ember 26, about the heavy Soviet forces available in the western 
commands of the Soviet Union for immediate action, have been men- 
tioned earlier. The figures given are in keeping with the message 
given to Gamelin’s assistant on that day by the Soviet military attache 
in Paris. 

It is relevant to point out that on November 7 that year there took 
part, in the Soviet anniversary celebration parades, and only in those 
towns where figures were given by the newspapers, 1991 up-to-date 
fighter and bomber planes. 

So far as the spirit of the Soviet people is concerned (contrary to the 
ludicrous secret reports sent in by the British Embassy), visitors from 
the U.S.S.R. who were in Western Europe during the crisis spoke in 
private conversation of the spirit of quiet determination in which 
factory workers in Moscow and collective farmers, at various places 
which they had had occasion to visit in the provinces, met the increas- 
ingly grave news from Central Europe during the summer and autumn ; 
as well as their deep sympathy for Czechoslovakia. There can be no 
doubt that they would have fought with the same determination that 


COULD GERMANY HAVE FOUGHT? 203 

they were prepared to show in resistance to the Japanese, at the begin- 
ning of August. During the last ten days of August, when the 1917 
and half of 1918 classes were called up for military training, the 
People’s Commissariat for Defence was inundated with thousands of 
requests from young people, to be called up ahead of their time. 

The spirit of the army was shown, at the very time when the Ger- 
man forces were demonstratively gathering around Czechoslovakia, 
by the operations of the Special Far Eastern Red Army against the 
Japanese, in exceptionally difficult terrain, around Lake Hassan. 

But were there not difficulties ahead with transit of the Soviet 
forces going to the help of Czechoslovakia? The collections of diplo- 
matic papers published after the war, and a number of commentaries 
011 them — particularly, in French, those of Georges Bonnet, who was 
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1938 (De Washington au Quai d’Orsay) 
and, in English, those of Professor Arnold J. Toynbee and his co- 
authors of the Chatham House Survey of International Affairs (vol. II 
for 1938) — have made much of these difficulties and contradictions, 
so far as Rumania is concerned. Yet attentive examination of the 
documents (apart from post-war apologetics by men anxious to curry 
favour, in the years when the “cold war” was beginning) reveal a 
perfectly clear and understandable picture. Rumania was ruled by an 
extremely reactionary class of landowners and financial adventurers: 
but a large section of them realised very well what Rumania’s com- 
plete absorption by Germany would mean for themselves. Moreover, 
there were substantial terrorist organisations already in existence in 
Rumania, in the pay of Germany, which had already secured the 
elimination from the Government of Nicolae Titulescu, one of the 
most capable and far-sighted European diplomats and supporters of 
collective security. Rumania’s interest was to join in any measures 
that would effectively check Nazi Germany’s advance to the Black 
Sea by peaceful methods or, failing that, in war. 

But the point was that they must be effective ; and, up to the very 
end, the Rumanian Government could see what everyone else in 
Europe could see — that, most of the time, the British and French 
Governments appeared to be more anxious to come to an agreement 
with Hider, at any cost to everyone except themselves, rather than 
to resist him: and to carve Czechoslovakia up peacefully, rather than 
to protect her. To take up too definite a position, in these circum- 
stances, meant that Rumania might find herself alone, “out on a 
limb” facing the dread Hitler, at a critical moment. On the other 
hand there were moments when it seemed as though resistance might 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


204 

nevertheless be attempted. And so the Rumanian Government adopted 
a fluid, perpetually changing and seemingly contradictory position 
on the question of the right of passage of Soviet armed forces — yet 
one that falls into a distinct pattern. 

The Germans were always suspecting Rumania of having definitely 
agreed to the passage of Soviet troops or planes, and even taxing 
them with it. In such cases the Rumanians flatly denied that anything 
of the kind was taking place. The Documents on German Foreign Policy 
for 1938 (vol. II) contain a number of such occasions. On June 3 
the German Minister in Rumania cabled that he had learned that the 
general staff had agreed to Soviet planes flying non-stop over their 
country (p. 383); we have already seen that a report apparently con- 
firming this came from the Moscow Embassy on August 18; on the 
30th Eiscnlohr reported from Prague that the Czechs were negotiat- 
ing with Rumania the right of passage for 100,000 Soviet troops 
(p. 660). On September 26 the Rumanian Minister in Rome told the 
Italian Government that this request had been "emphatically refused” 
(p. 936); and on September 28 Comnen, the Rumanian Foreign 
Minister, told the German Minister that the right of passage had not 
even been discussed with Litvinov at Geneva, a fortnight before 

(p. 981). 

The Rumanians were equally careful when dealing with people 
whom they suspected of being close friends of the Nazis, like Bonnet, 
or Ambassador Nevile Henderson, or the Polish Government. Thus 
Henderson, early in May, was given to understand in Berlin that they 
would not allow the passage of Soviet troops ( Documents on British 
Foreign Policy, vol. I, p. 257). On May 2 Comnen, in Geneva, gave 
Bonnet a similar reply (De Washington au Quai d’Orsay, p. 126); which 
was repeated to Thierry the French Ambassador at Bucharest, as he 
cabled on July 7 (Bonnet, op. cit., p. 163). Bonnet’s manoeuvre with 
a reported anti-Czech declaration by the Rumanians at Berlin, about 
the same time — calculated to intimidate the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment ( Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World 
War, vol. I, pp. 139-40) has been described earlier. On August 13 
the Polish Ambassador in Berlin told Goering that Comnen had 
assured the Hungarians of Rumania’s refusal and “Goering was 
pleased to hear this” (ibid., p. 149). On September 11, in Geneva 
once again, Comnen again denied to Bonnet that Rumania would 
admit Soviet forces (Bonnet, op. cit., pp. 201-3). And so on. The 
reports of United States diplomats at first contain several similar denials. 

But on August 17 the German military attache in Prague, in con- 


COULD CERMANY HAVE FOUGHT? 


205 


versation with the British, claimed to have discovered that Rumania 
would allow the passage of Soviet planes to Czechoslovakia in war- 
time ( Documents on British Foreign Policy, vol. II, p. 144). On the 31st, 
Thierry reported that planes would be allowed — a decision which 
Comnen confirmed to him on September 6 (this is reported not only 
by Bonnet, but in the German documents too, pp. 710-11 of the 
second volume). About September 12 or 13, the Rumanian Minister 
in Moscow told the French Ambassador that he would like to discuss 
military co-operation with the Russians (Coulondre, op. cit., p. 158); 
and Thierry confirmed to Bonnet on September 12 and 16 that the 
Rumanians had now agreed to passage of aircraft (the ex-Minister 
published this in a letter to the Paris Monde on November 18, 1947). 
In short, as there appeared at last a chance that someone might pos- 
sibly stand by Czechoslovakia, the Rumanian Government felt a little 
more secure. On September 18 the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister 
told the American Minister at Prague that “all was prepared for the 
passage of Soviet Russian troops over Rumania” (F.R.U.S., vol. I, 
p. 615). And on September 19, at Geneva, Comnen told de la Warr, 
too, that in the event of war supplies, particularly planes, would be 
allowed to cross from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia (vol. II 
of the British Documents, p. 355). 

The situation was summed up quite clearly by Ripka in 1939 (op. 
cit.) — that the official policy of Rumania “was in all respects that of 
a loyal ally, who did not wish merely to confine herself to a narrow 
interpretation of the legal obligations of the treaty which bound her 
to Czechoslovakia (p. 144). . . . There is no object in puzzling over 
the question of which route Soviet Russia would have chosen in 
going to the assistance of Czechoslovakia; since those who under- 
stood the situation are well aware that a route would have been found 
(P- 300 ).” 

Obviously when Great Powers like France and Britain were play- 
ing fast-and-loose with their direct treaty and League Covenant obli- 
gations, such manoeuvring by a small country like Rumania was to 
be expected. And it was precisely in consideration of this that the 
Soviet Union, both before September and during it, pressed for a 
discussion at the League, or at least in an international conference, 
which would strengthen Rumania’s hand. 

The mood of the third partner in the Little Entente, Yugoslavia — 
and that notwithstanding the pro-German policy of her Prime Mini- 
ster, Stoyadinovitch — could be gauged from the Belgrade telegram 
in the Temps of September 15, to the effect that the Czechoslovak 









Legation there had already registered 100,000 Yugoslav volunteers to 
serve with the Czechoslovak army in the event of war. On Sept- 
ember 24 the German Minister in Belgrade reported that street 
demonstrations in support of Czechoslovakia were having to be held 
back by the police. 34 

There was also the question of Poland. Had she ventured to attack 
Czechoslovakia, with or without Germany, we have already seen the 
serious consequences which this would have brought her from the 
east. 

But no one who was among international diplomats during the 
month of crisis, whether at Geneva or in the great capitals, seriously 
believed that even the then Polish Government would have ventured 
on such a course, or would have remained neutral, had a war broken 
out in which Germany found ranged against her Great Britain, France, 
Czechoslovakia, the other States of the Little Entente, and the U.S.S.R. 
And this must have brought with it the application of the right of 
passage provided under Article 16 of the League Covenant. 

In this connection it is important to realise what a powerful means 
of pressure on Poland the French and British Governments possessed 
— -which they used against Czechoslovakia, without scruple or 
hesitation. That was to leave her defenceless to the Germans. “France 
should have demanded that Poland should submit to her obligations 
under the Covenant, and threatened to resume her liberty if Poland 
was obstinate”, wrote Paul Rcynaud in 1947, pointing out that this 
was done successfully when Poland was getting an armaments loan 
from France in 1936. 35 There should have been (in Warsaw') “a joint 
and solemn intervention” by France and Great Britain, wrote Robert 
Coulondrc in 1950. “Was it not rather for Poland to choose between 
fidelity to a treaty which had registered her resurrection, and an 
isolation which would be fatal for her; and had we not the duty of 
putting her under the obligation to declare herself?” 36 

Wise words indeed — had the British and French Governments in- 
tended for one moment themselves to observe fidelity to the Covenant 
or to the Franco-Czechoslovak treaty ! 

To sum up. An act of madness might occur with anyone, and it 
might have occurred with Hitler. But Hitler s policy, hitherto, had 
not been distinguished by madness, whatever “acts” he might put 
on for the benefit of statesmen who needed the excuse. On the con- 
trary, it had shown cold and deliberate calculation, and above all 


sensitive appraisal of the degree to which his apparent adversaries 
were wishing to co-operate. When they showed that they were not 
co-operating — as on the occasion of the German fortifications on the 
Moroccan coast in Franco territory, directed against France (January, 
1937) and of the Nyon Conference against German and Italian “un- 
known submarines” which had begun attacking British warships 
(September, 1937) — Hitler had shown that he was very accessible to 
reason. 

There is every ground for thinking that on this occasion, too, had 
the Powers interested in peace stood together in defence of inter- 
national security, Ilidcr would have listened to reason rather than 
launch a general war, in which the defeat of Germany would have 
been certain and overwhelming. 


34 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 923- 
3 ® De Staline a Hitler, p. 154. 


35 La Frame a sauve I’ Europe, vol. I, p. 126. 




CHAPTER X 

LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 

E XAMINATION of the record of the Socialist parties in Great 
Britain and France during the maturing of Hitler’s plans against 
Czechoslovakia shows that in both cases their leaders presented no 
effective resistance whatsoever to the plans of their respective govern- 
ments; and the most charitable judgment that can be passed is that 
they failed until the very last stage to realise what issues were involved 
(though it is hard to believe). 

In Britain 

In the case of the British Labour Party, its leaders, up to Sept- 
ember, 1938, refused to give whole-hearted support to the Czecho- 
slovaks, and tolerated ambiguous pronouncements by those who would 
be universally interpreted as speaking on their behalf— which could 
only have the effect of encouraging Nazi ambitions. In its practical 
results, such a policy did not differ so very much from that of the 
British Government itself: though no doubt the motives were very 
different. 

The first official response to the Soviet Note was favourable. The 
Daily Herald on March 18 called it “precisely the kind of practical 
lead which millions of British people have been hoping for years 
would come from their own Government”, and urged “welcome 
and support” for the Soviet initiative. But evidently this did not 
please the Labour Party leadership. 

During the House of Commons debate on the annexation of Aus- 
tria, on March 24, the Labour leaders made no attempt to support 
the Soviet Note, and tacitly supported the British Government’s 
refusal. The Note itself was mentioned only very cursorily in the 
debate. Mr. Attlee’s criticism of the Government’s policy was that 
it was dangerous because of “weakness, drift and uncertainty” (al- 
though Ethiopians, Spaniards and Chinese could have told him that 
they were quite certain of its “drift”). The Speakers’ Note sent out 
to its propagandists and spokesmen by the head office of the Labour 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


209 

Party, on March 18, did not even mention Czechoslovakia or the 
Soviet proposal ! 

That this was not a chance omission was shown by the editorial 
of the Daily Herald on March 22, which congratulated the Czecho- 
slovak Government on a first promise of concessions to the Sudeten 
Germans, and expressed the hope that it would “pursue the policy 
of equality for minorities to the very limit”. This would strengthen 
the chance of “securing sufficient European co-operation to safeguard 
peace in Central Europe”, since the denial of equality to minorities 
was “a constant threat to peace”. 

The striking omission in tins editorial was its failure to point out 
that the real threat to peace came from Hitler. By its suggestion that 
peace could be safeguarded through concessions to the Hitlerites it 
not only failed to point out that a common front of peace-loving 
Powers was the only way to restrain Hitler, i.e. to maintain its pre- 
vious endorsement of Litvinov’s proposals, but also took its stand in 
principle with the Tory Prime Minister. To that extent the Labour 
newspaper actually facilitated Hitler’s task. And, in keeping with tins 
attitude (and after an interview between Chamberlain and the General 
Council of the Trades Union Congress on March 26), the Labour 
Party Executive rejected on April 13 the proposal of a United Peace 
Alliance first put forward by Reynolds News, based on co-operation 
to overthrow the Government in the interests of resistance to Fascist 
aggression. 

So also after the critical day of May 21. Only a few days before, 
Arthur Henderson, on behalf of the Labour Party, had asked the 
Government to give an assurance that it would not support any con- 
cessions “which would destroy any of the effective defences of Czecho- 
slovakia against the Germans”. This question, which the Government 
representative evaded in his reply, hit the real nail on the head, as 
subsequent events proved. But when Chamberlain came to Parliament 
to give an interim statement on negotiations (May 23), all Attlee could 
do was to express the hope that the settlement would not injure “the 
just rights of the Czech people”— an elastic phrase that could mean 
anything. 

The Daily Herald next day, commenting on the crisis, also forgot 
all about the key issue raised by Henderson. It congratulated the 
Czechs on their coolness and the British and French Governments on 
their firmness. But it hastened to add that there was “no question of 
diplomatic victory or diplomatic defeat” — a soothing assurance which 
obscured what had happened, and once again, therefore, diverted 


o 


210 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


attention from the real nature of the danger. As though to make 
doubly sure, the paper went on to explain that “both Germany and 
Czechoslovakia have been reminded of the far-rcaching consequences 
of any rash use of force”. As Czechoslovakia could hardly have been 
thought to contemplate an armed attack on Germany, this phrase 
could only have referred in her case to the possibility that she would 
take stern measures to suppress the “fifth column” of treason, espion- 
age and civil war, which was being openly organised by the Hcn- 
lcinites. Thus Hitler, who knew that the British and French warnings 
to him had been belatedly precipitated by the Czech determination 
to resist, now could also conclude that the leadership, at any rate, of 
the British Labour Party was at one with its Government in depre- 
cating any drastic action against Henlein. 

In mid-May the Labour Party leaders, while admitting that a people’s 
front against Fascism and the Chamberlain Government might be 
necessary if this was “the sole condition for the preservation of peace 
and democracy”, once again rejected the idea, proclaiming that “the 
road to peace lies through Socialism”. In the meantime, therefore, 
Chamberlain could continue in his policy of “firmness”. 

On May 26 Henlein had given his notorious interview to the corre- 
spondent of the Daily Mail, threatening civil war and German inter- 
vention miles s his demands were granted. In an interview which the 
Daily Herald correspondent in Prague was accorded by the Czecho- 
slovak Foreign Minister, the correspondent actually suggested that the 
Hcnleinites might not only live peaceably in Czechoslovakia, practis- 
ing the Nazi creed, but might be included in the Cabinet; a suggestion 
to which the Foreign Minister adroitly avoided replying. He em- 
phasised instead the desire of the Czechoslovak Government for a fair 
understanding. In its editorial comment, nevertheless, the Daily Herald 
(May 27) found it possible to declare that the two interviews taken 
together “suggest that, given only good will, a solution inside the 
framework of a democratic Czechoslovak Republic is possible”. Thus 
the organ of the Labour Party strengthened the impression that there 
was no real danger from the very nature of the Henleinite demands, 
and from what lay behind them. Four months later, the Labour Party 
leaders were wiser. In a Speakers’ Note issued on September 16, they 
analysed the Henleinite memorandum presented on June 7, which 
“incorporated in more circumspect language” the Karlovy Vary 
speech of April 24. And they pointed out that this more “circumspect” 
document was “not in reality concerned with the alleged grievances of 
the Sudeten Germans, but aimed at the destruction of tire Czechoslovak 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


21 1 


State in its present democratic form, and at bringing it within the orbit 
of German domination”. Unfortunately, this recognition came too late. 

At the end of May, therefore, the Labour Party had been repre- 
sented (without contradiction on their part) as considering the Henlein 
demands susceptible of forming at any rate part of the basis of an 
agreed settlement. To emphasise this, the Daily Herald’s diplomatic 
correspondent wrote on May 28 that “there seems no irreconcilable 
opposition between the Sudeten and Czech positions”, so far as local 
autonomy is concerned — a statement which was flagrantly at vari- 
ance with everything that was known of Henlein and his source of 
inspiration. 

In spite of growing uneasiness among the rank and file, and the 
information published about Lord Halifax’s visit to Paris, the Labour 
Party’s next pronouncement on the question of Czechoslovakia again 
came through the mouthpiece of the Daily Herald, and then only at 
the end of July. It was to express its qualified approval of Lord Runci- 
man’s mission, provided he were a genuinely independent counsellor, 
and not used as a means of intimidating the Czechoslovak Govern- 
ment ! Such a statement of the position took no account of the pre- 
ceding policy of the British Government, and implied that — contrary 
to that policy — Lord Runciman might be used for some purpose 
other than that of intimidating Czechoslovakia. By diverting attention 
from that real danger, the Daily Herald once again tranquillised public 
opinion in the Labour movement, and to that extent made smoother 
the path selected by Neville Chamberlain. 

On August 29, the German Charge d’ Affaires in London was able 
to report that “for a whole week the attacks on Chamberlain had 
completely ceased”. Lie thought this was because “a feeling of solid- 
arity” was growing up. 1 For this feeling — reinforcing the pressure on 
Czechoslovakia — the Labour leaders of course bore prime responsi- 
bility. Looking back over the period as a whole in September, 1939, 
the German Ambassador von Dirksen also considered that in the 
months after the Czechoslovak mobilisation of May 21, the Czecho- 
slovak question “lost its extreme acuteness”, except for the “politically- 
minded public”. 2 

The first public pronouncement by an official Labour organisation 
in Great Britain which broke completely with the policy of the 
Government came only when the game played in Czechoslovakia by 
the Runciman mission was suddenly exposed by the events of Sept- 
ember 6-7. A manifesto was approved by a joint meeting of the 
1 D. & M., vol. II, p. 40. 2 Ibid., p. 154. 


212 


THF. MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


General Council of the Trades Union Congress and the executives 
of the Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party, held at 
Blackpool on September 7, and adopted by the Trades Union Con- 
gress itself the next day. The manifesto reads in its essential passages : 
“The whole world stands to-day upon the brink of war. Appalling 
and irreparable disaster threatens the foundations of our civilisation, 
because of the unrestrained violence and display of military force by 
the aggressor States in these last seven years. 

“In so grave and imminent a crisis, the British Labour movement 
is compelled to place on record its regret that so heavy a responsibility 
for this situation rests upon the indecisive and misdirected policy of 
the British Government. It is this weakness that has helped to under- 
mine the authority and the prestige of the League of Nations.” After 
a passage dealing with Spain, the manifesto proceeded: 

“The failure to recognise the indivisibility of peace is emphasised 
anew in the threat to Czechoslovakia. The Lite of the world is in- 
volved in its outcome. No State in the post-war epoch has a better 
record of ordered democratic government than Czechoslovakia. No 
State has treated its nationalities more honourably. It is making a 
generous offer to satisfy their fullest aspirations. The acceptance of 
its offer would remove any legitimate grievances that arc now under 
discussion. 

“Should the German Government, in spite of this, make war upon 
Czechoslovakia, it will brand itself as a traitor to humanity. Its pro- 
vocative mobilisations and untruthful press campaigns impede the 
recovery of industry and trade, and poison international relationships. 

“The German Government has demanded that Czechoslovakia 
yield its democracy to force and admit a totalitarian system within 
its boundaries. These demands are incompatible with the integrity 
and independence of Czechoslovakia. Every consideration of demo- 
cracy forbids the dismemberment of the Czechoslovakian State by 
the subjection of the Sudeten German regions to Nazi Government 
control. British Labour emphatically repudiates the right of the 
British or any other government to use diplomatic or other pressure 
to compel an acceptance of such a humiliation. . . . 

“The British Government must leave no doubt in the mind of the 
German Government that it will unite with the French and Soviet 
Governments to resist any attack upon Czechoslovakia. The Labour 
movement urges the British Government to give this lead, confident 

that such policy would have the solid support of the British people 

“Peaceful change can only come through friendly negotiations. 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 213 

Labour caimot acquiesce in the destruction of the rule of law by savage 
aggression. The British Labour movement, therefore, demands the 
immediate summoning of Parliament. It is in that historic assembly 
of our democratic State that these principles should be reaffirmed 
with the utmost energy and determination. Whatever the risk in- 
volved, Britain must make its stand against aggression. There is now 
no room for doubts or hesitation.” 

Although tliis manifesto represented fundamentally a break with 
previous good-humoured tolerance of Chamberlain’s policy towards 
Czechoslovakia, it contained, nevertheless, certain passages which 
might still give room for doubts and hesitation about Labour policy. 
It treated the British Government’s policy, once again, as one of in- 
decision and “weakness”, when there were sufficient facts available — 
first and foremost, the experiences of the Czechoslovak Government 
at the hands of the British Minister in Prague and Lord Runciman — 
to show that British policy was very firm and strong where Dr. 
Bencs was concerned, and weak only towards Hitler. This policy, in 
ordinary language, would rather be called one of co-operation with 
Germany tlian of indecision. The manifesto repudiated the right of 
the British Government to use diplomatic pressure on Czechoslovakia, 
as though it were a question of some abstract principle: and was silent 
about the notorious examples of that pressure, which had culminated 
only two days before in the ultimatums resulting in the “Fourth 
Plan” of President Belies. It did not take up the one weapon which 
might have caused the British Government to hesitate — the threat to 
combine with other political groupings critical of Chamberlain in a 
national campaign for the overthrow of the Government. 3 Nor did 
it mark the opening of a national campaign pursued by the Labour 
movement itself. It was not until September 16, nine days later — days 
every one of which counted for a month of “normal” times — that 
the Labour Party headquarters ordered the holding of 3000 meetings 
against the Government’s policy, and issued their first Speakers’ Note 
on the Czechoslovak problem. 

But in the interval there had been, first, the visit of Mr. Chamberlain 
to Berchtesgaden. The Labour Party’s leader, Mr. Attlee, had in Par- 
liament on September 14 expressed his approval of a journey which, 
any student of British policy up to that time should have seen, could 
only lead to acceptance of Hitler’s fundamental aim — the annexation 
of the frontier districts, which in its turn meant laying Czechoslovakia 


3 On the contrary, local Labour Parties showing an inclination to do so were sharply 
called to order by their National Executive Committee. 


2T4 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

prostrate at the feet of Germany. Even if this vital point had been 
missed previously, the declaration made to the press by an “authori- 
tative spokesman” on the night of September n made it perfectly 
clear. That Mr. Attlee’s statement was not due to a sudden access of 
unaccountable emotion could be seen by the editorial in the Daily 
Herald next day (September 15) under the eloquent heading: “Good 
Luck, Chamberlain !” Chamberlain’s dramatic intervention was needed 
at this moment, said the paper, and he would receive “general sup- 
port”. It must “win the sympathy of opinion everywhere, irrespective 
of party”. Whatever subsequent criticism the disillusioned Labour 
Party leaders levelled at the results which Chamberlain brought back 
from Berchtesgaden, that blank cheque, given him in advance, and 
in full knowledge of his previous policy, left them very little ground 
to stand upon. 

The editorial declared that Britain must act with France and keep 
the U.S.S.R. fully informed. “Anything which in any way lessened 
that close co-operation would be disastrous” — an unmistakable sugges- 
tion that close co-operation existed already, which was not only 
utterly false, but widely known among journalists to be false, and 
therefore doubly dangerous. The readers of the Daily Herald were 
thus inspired with unjustifiable confidence upon the very point which, 
if the true facts were stated, would have caused them most alarm, and 
would have roused them to bring their influence to bear most effec- 
tively. 

The editorial gave Chamberlain further blank cheques. The British 
people’s attitude was to resist attempts by Germany “to settle what 
can and should be a matter of reasonable negotiation by an act of 
deliberate and unprovoked aggression”. This was the very attitude 
of the “authoritative statement” on September 11, and of Chamber- 
lain’s later appeals to Hitler. It slurred over the essential principle that 
there could be no “reasonable negotiation” about further concessions 
after the “Fourth Plan”, since they would involve finally destroying 
Czechoslovak integrity and independence: whereas the Government 
had deliberately held out the hope of such further concessions. It 
represented matters as though Hitler were threatening war over a 
demand which he could get by negotiation: which could only be a 
true reflection of the situation — as it was in the mouth of Mr. Chamber- 
lain — if its author had in mind already the cession of the frontier dis- 
tricts. This the Blackpool manifesto had repudiated. 

It could not be a question of committing the British people, the 
editorial stated — as though Chamberlain had not been committing 




LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 215 

the British people, all through the long months of pressure on the 
Czechs. Chamberlain was going only to “report back”, as the first 
stage in further discussions — as though he had not already given ample 
evidence that he would “report back” only after achieving his object. 
In those further negotiations “Czechoslovakia must clearly participate” 
— although Chamberlain had given ample proof already that his idea 
of Czechoslovak “participation” was that the British Minister or Lord 
Runciman should demand and that Czechoslovakia, threatened with 
desertion in face of the enemy, should yield. Only on such a basis 
might this personal meeting between Messrs. Chamberlain and Hitler 
“achieve memorable results”, concluded the editorial — failing to warn 
the Labour movement, which had subscribed whole-heartedly to the 
Blackpool manifesto a week before, that no such basis as that mani- 
festo demanded, and the editorial implied, existed. 

This article has been described at such length because it was pub- 
lished at a crucial moment, when a public declaration of lack of con- 
fidence in Mr. Chamberlain, and a warning against liis purpose in 
going to Berchtesgaden, would have completely changed the situa- 
tion. hi its actual form, it summed up all the peculiar features of the 
official Labour Party policy since March, and it pre-determined the 
complete impotence of Labour criticism thereafter. For whoever 
willed the Berchtesgaden meeting, knowing what was generally 
known of Chamberlain’s policy, assumed a grave measure of respon- 
sibility for its result— the forcing of Czechoslovakia to give up its 
frontier districts: and thereby for Munich itself. 

Thereafter, there was a conflict of policies visible in the leadership 
of the Labour Party; but for the time being it was of secondary 
importance. 

It is not without interest that on September 17, while Cabinet dis- 
cussions of Chamberlain’s Berchtesgaden visit were in progress, Ambas- 
sador Kennedy cabled to Washington that “the Labor people up to 
now have played along very well, but Cadogan is not sure what will 
happen”. Later that evening he met Sir Samuel Hoare — who had 
spent the last two and a half hours seeing editors, finishing with the 
Daily Herald and News-Chronicle, to have them “strong on the side 
of peace”. Kennedy said: “He (Hoare) felt that the Herald would 
play ball” ( F.R.U.S. , vol. I, pp. 608, 61 1). 

On September 19, sure enough, a Daily Herald editorial, in the full 
Chamberlain vein, declared that negotiations must go on, and they 
must be based on reality. The Sudetens wanted secession, said the 
Labour paper, in defiance of facts. “In the past it has seemed that 



21 6 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


two-thirds of the Sudetens are willing to follow Henlein’s leadership” — 
an ambiguous statement which left out of account altogether the 
known circumstances of Nazi terror prevailing in the Sudeten dis- 
tricts. The Czechoslovak Government must be “realistic and cour- 
ageous” — not, of course, in the sense of defending its independence 
and liberty by preparing to fight for the integrity of its territory, but 
by handing over the frontier districts to Hitler (was the implication). 

When the Government announced that it was proposing those very 
terms that day, the National Joint Council of Labour issued a mani- 
festo denouncing them (“the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia under 
the brutal threat of armed force by Nazi Germany”) as a “shameful 
betrayal”. But the only practical conclusion it drew from this, and 
from an expression of sympathy with the Czechs, was a demand for 
the “re-establishment of the rule of law”. An accusation that the 
Premier had committed a shameful betrayal, which did not lead to 
the conclusion that the Labour leaders were prepared to join with 
anyone to get rid of its author, left matters exactly where they were. 
This was shown by the scant interest shown by Mr. Chamberlain in 
the Labour Party’s demand next day that Parliament should be sum- 
moned (September 20). 

On September 21 a joint meeting of the General Council of the 
Trades Union Congress, the Executive Committee of the Labour 
Party and the Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party, issued a second joint manifesto expressing their “profound 
humiliation” at the “shameful surrender” involved in the Anglo- 
French terms, which had been accepted that morning by the Czecho- 
slovak Government. They represented a sacrifice of vital British 
interests, said the manifesto. The conclusions that it drew were: 
(i) an expression of sympathy with Czechoslovakia, (it) the launching 
of a national campaign, 4 and (iii) the demand — apparently addressed 
to the Chamberlain Government which had carried through the terms 
denounced — that “the peace-loving nations must make an immediate 
and concerted effort to restore the rule of law”. That this was no 
chance omission of a more forcible lead against the National Govern- 
ment, could be seen from the remark of the secretary of the Scottish 
Labour Party, at a conference of the Transport and General Workers’ 
Union in Scotland, that “everyone welcomes the possibility of war 
being prevented by Mr. Chamberlain’s visit to Hitler”. 

Then occurred Chamberlain’s visit to Godesberg, and the unex- 
pected hitch caused by the extensive character of the German demands 

4 The 3000 meetings of protest, mentioned earlier, were held this week-end. 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 2 IJ 

presented to him there. The Daily Herald, in its editorial of Sept- 
ember 24, announced that Chamberlain had been forced to adopt a 
firmer attitude than on the previous occasion. In what did this firmer 
attitude consist, in the view of the paper? In the fact that he was asking 
for no immediate invasion, but a peaceful transfer: it was impossible 
to conduct negotiations under the threat of force, still less to secure 
an ordered transfer. 

But this was the very view which Chamberlain himself was urging 
upon Hitler at Godesberg. The distinction between his position and 
that of the official Labour Party organ had once again become in- 
finitesimal. What had been a “shameful surrender” only three days 
before, in the view of the supreme authority of the British Labour 
movement, had now become a question involving merely the struggle 
for ordered transfer, instead of immediate invasion. 

The point was driven home on the 27th. In an editorial, the news- 
paper threatened war should Hitler invade Czechoslovakia. He ought 
to accept the “sweeping offer of full satisfaction” made by the Czechs. 
The diplomatic correspondent was even more explicit in his echo of 
the Prime Minister’s position. “All the territories Hitler claims he can 
have peaceably. But he insists on armed invasion.” Thus the terms 
themselves had ceased to be a subject of dispute ! 

After further meetings of the National Joint Council of Labour on 
September 26 and 27, Mr. Attlee wrote to the Prime Minister, urging 
that Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. should stand together to resist 
any possible attack on Czechoslovakia. In this, too (in the absence of 
any demand to renounce the ultimatum to the Czechs of September 
21, and return to the defence of Czechoslovakia’s territorial integrity') 
the Labour leaders’ position was no different from that taken up by 
the Foreign Office itself, in the statement given to the press on the 
evening of September 26. 

When the Prime Minister, on September 28, announced in the 
House of Commons that he was leaving for Munich immediately, 
the Labour Party' leaders once again hastened to give him a blank 
cheque. Mr. Attlee welcomed the Prime Minister’s statement, saying 
that the Labour Party wished to give him every opportunity of follow- 
ing up this new move: “We agree to adjourn now, and hope that 
when the House reassembles the war clouds may have lifted”, he 
said. Of any hint that the Government’s policy was ensuring their 
return, there was no word. Mr. Maxton expressed the full agreement 
of the Independent Labour Party. Mr. Lansbury wished the Prime 
Minister “Godspeed”, and said millions were grateful to him for his 



218 


THF. MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


initiative. The Daily Herald, in its editorial the next day, forgot all 
about the denunciation issued eight days before. It referred to the 
efforts of the British and French Governments "to secure a just and 
honourable peace”. It was unfortunate that Russia and Czechoslovakia 
were not represented at Munich: but anything which enabled “nego- 
tiations for a reasonable settlement of differences” to continue was 
desirable. Thus what had been a matter of shame and dishonour a 
week before, was now just, reasonable and honourable, provided it 
could be achieved peaceably. That distinctive Labour policy which 
had come into view for a moment in the Blackpool resolution was 
now completely submerged, and in its place was adaptation of 
Labour’s position to that of the Tory Government. 

Nor was the editorial remarkable only in this. It declared that the 
German threat of war had “brought into being the close co-operation 
of Britain, France and Russia in defence of the principle of negotia- 
tion” — close co-operation which “must continue”. We have seen that 
tliis picture, drawn for the readers of the Daily Herald, was completely 
false: no such co-operation existed, and to suggest that the U.S.S.R. 
was only interested in defending “the principle of negotiation” was 
closely akin to the manoeuvre of Georges Bonnet suggesting that the 
French Government had some kind of a “mandate to speak for the 
U.S.S.R.” at Munich: and of Sir Samuel Hoare, who denied after 
Munich that Russia had been “cold-shouldered”. 

Not content with tliis, the Daily Herald published a further editorial 
on September 30 — the day of the Munich settlement itself— plainly 
declaring that the principal concern must be to see that “the dis- 
memberment is done decently and orderly”. For good or ill, the 
Labour paper consoled its readers, it was now settled that the Sudeten 
districts would be transferred. The Czechs had agreed to tliis under 
irresistible pressure (we have seen already the contribution made by 
the Daily Herald itself to that pressure), and no section of British 
opinion had the right to be “more Czech than the Czechs”. As if 
fearing that some section of British opinion might not be satisfied 
with this logic, the paper went on to declare that “to tell the Czechs 
now to go back on their words would be fair neither to them nor 
to anyone else”. 

Thus at the final moment of possible Czechoslovak resistance, while 
the army of the Czechoslovak Republic was still standing guard over 
its immense fortifications, and when the U.S.S.R. had made it clear 
that it would support resistance to the aggressor, the official organ 
of the British Labour Party sent out the message to the Czechoslovak 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


219 

people that, if they rejected terms which had been forced on them 
by British and French pressure, it would not be “fair”, i.e. that the 
British Labour movement, too, would not support them. 

On October 1 and October 3, the British press was reporting that 
the Labour Party attitude towards the Munich settlement was still 
in doubt, and that the leaders were in a dilemma. Not so the Daily 
Herald. True, in its editorial of October 1, it advised its readers to 
suspend final judgment on Munich. But it proceeded nevertheless to 
advance the very arguments which subsequently were the basis of 
the Prime Minister’s case in the Parliamentary debate on October 4 
— that Plitler had been forced to “abandon the most brutal terms”, 
that the territory demanded was less than that required at Godesberg, 
that an international commission (and not Germany alone), would 
work out details, that it was an "enormously significant fact” that 
the German population had been cheering Mr. Chamberlain, and that 
in any case the Czechs had no option but to accept. 

After tliis handsome endorsement in advance of Chamberlain’s 
apologia, it is scarcely surprising that, so late as October 3, the Labour 
Party' leaders were refusing to accept the proposition of a motion of 
censure on Mr. Chamberlain, and instead adopted a manifesto ex- 
pressing the world’s gratitude to the Czechoslovaks, and urging the 
provision of economic assistance, defence for their refugees, etc. In 
the debate which opened on October 4, the Labour amendment ex- 
pressed relief that war had been averted, disapproved the policy which 
had led to the “sacrifice of Czechoslovakia” and merely demanded 
that Great Britain take the initiative in calling a world conference. 

But if Benes’ notes in his char)' for 1939 are to be trusted, the con- 
tradictions in the Labour Party leaders’ policy were due to the fact 
that among them were people who definitely approved the Munich 
agreement, on the ground that England “was not yet ready or suffi- 
ciently united internally to undertake war against Hitlerite Germany” 
and that there might have been “a European war directed only against 
the Soviet Union”. Thus (i) they accepted Chamberlain’s argument 
that the alternative to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was 
war, (») they were more concerned about the Soviet Union than that 
country was itself— since it was prepared to help Czechoslovakia 
single-handed, if need be, ( iii ) they ruled out the possibility of Labour 
fighting against an anti-Soviet war. The leaders hi question were, 
according to Benes, Arthur Greenwood (Hon. Treasurer) and Arthur 
Henderson, jun. 5 Nor was this the only group which had accepted 
5 Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Benes (English edn.), p. 99. 



220 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Munich beforehand. On August 27 the New Statesman, which had 
a considerable hold on the Labour Party’s intellectuals, suddenly made 
itself (as on some other crucial occasions) the mouthpiece of Foreign 
Office influences. If a settlement (with Hidcr’s tools !) could not be 
reached on the basis of the historic frontiers, then “the question of 
frontier revision, difficult though it is, should at once be tackled. The 
strategical value of the Bohemian frontier should not be made the 
occasion of a world war. We should not guarantee the status quo” 
As yet we do not know whether this view (anticipating The Times 
editorial of September 7 by nearly a fortnight) was also reflected in 
the discussions of the Labour Party Executive. 

The reader will judge for himself how far, in the light of the facts 
set forth, the Labour Party leaders were qualified to express their 
disapproval of a policy against which they did nothing to mobilise 
public opinion until the decisive moment — the Bcrchtesgaden Con- 
ference — had been passed: and then only with the reservations and 
contradictions described. 

In France 

The French Socialist Party, although in a stronger position than 
its British colleagues — since it was a constituent part of the Govern- 
ment majority — was not distinguished by any stronger policy; rather 
the contrary. 

At the beginning of June its Congress at Royan, on the insistence 
of Leon Blum, the Socialist leader, adopted a resolution approving the 
foreign policy of the French Government. 

When German army manoeuvres on the Czechoslovak and 
French frontiers — manoeuvres heavily reinforced by big call-ups of 
reservists — were alarming all Europe in mid-August, Blum wrote 
soothingly : 

“I believe that reflection and critical analysis of the facts lead to 
the dismissal of the hypothesis of a sudden act of aggression by Hitler 
against Czechoslovakia, even during the weeks when he will have 
ready in his hand an army whose exact strength is unknown. The 
most plausible conjecture is that Hitler is employing this menace to 
settle the Sudeten question peacefully, but nevertheless in his own 
way. The menace is suspended over France and England more than 
over Czechoslovakia. By making French and British opinion, which 
desire peace, aware of the war danger. Hitler reckons without doubt 
upon making London and Paris put a new turn of the screw upon 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


221 


Prague. . . . Nevertheless I remain confident that neither London nor 
Paris will consent to be the instruments of Hitler’s manceuvre.” 6 

Rarely has confidence been so misplaced. But this did not change 
Blum’s policy. 

On the occasion of Chamberlain’s flight to Berchtesgadcn, Blum 
welcomed his “generous and courageous act”, which was saluted by 
the “enthusiastic hope of pacific France”. Should it fail, perhaps a 
“more distant and still higher intervention might take place”. 7 On 
the following day, to silence ribald guesses as to whether M. Blum 
was referring to the Pope or to some supernatural power, he explained 
that he had in mind President Roosevelt. 

When the generous and courageous act had produced what M. 
Blum then 8 called a “far from honourable settlement”, all he could 
urge was that it must not be forced on Czechoslovakia. The next 
day, when he found that tliis very thing was being done, he expressed 
his regret that the French Government had not honoured its obliga- 
tions. But he said that as a result “war has probably been averted”, 
and admitted: “I feel myself divided between cowardly relief and 
shame.” It must be emphasised that these articles, printed very pro- 
minently on the front page of the official Socialist newspaper, were 
the sole and authoritative voice of the French Socialist Party during 
these critical days (public meetings, in spite of the protests of the 
Communists, were prohibited). 

On September 21, the day that the Anglo-French ultimatum was 
forced on the Czechs, the first of a scries of characteristic incidents 
took place in the anterooms of the French Chamber. The Socialist 
M.P.s decided to demand the immediate recall of parliament, and 
passed a resolution saying they could not associate themselves with 
the diplomatic policy of the last few days. This meant the repudia- 
tion of Daladier’s policy. At a meeting of the Left parties at 4 p.m., 
the Communists moved the dispatch of a delegation to Czechoslovakia, 
with an address of solidarity: a resolution in favour of maintaining 
the integrity of Czechoslovakia: a protest against the French Govern- 
ment’s prohibition of public meetings: and a demand for the sum- 
moning of parliament. This scries of proposals were a logical application 
of the Socialists’ own decision. Yet when the Radical-Socialists moved 
the previous question, the Socialist delegates voted with them, and 
the Communist proposals were rejected by four to one! 

That evening, Blum sadly recorded the fact that Czechoslovakia 

6 Populaire, August 17, 1938 (quoted by Wcrth, op. cit., p. 26). 

7 Populaire, September 17, 1938. 8 Ibid., September 19, 1938. 


222 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


had “yielded to its cruel destiny”. 9 The Socialist Party, he said the 
next day, was asking parliament to reassemble, but “puts itself above 
all ministerial intrigue” — in other words, had no intention of pressing 
for Daladicr’s overthrow on account of a policy which it had first 
repudiated and then tacitly endorsed: since that policy was “cruel 
destiny”. But there was still a danger that Hitler might attack Czecho- 
slovakia, he wrote on the 24th, and then the Pacts would operate: 
he therefore appealed to President Roosevelt, “the greatest authority 
in the temporal world”, to intervene. To intervene, that is, not in 
order to preserve the integrity of Czechoslovakia, but to prevent its 
dismemberment by war when this could be done in peace. 

This became amply clear the same evening, at another meeting of 
the Left parties. Daladicr had told a delegation of the Radical-Socialists 
that the French pacts of mutual assistance would certainly function 
if Czechoslovakia were attacked, but (as mentioned earlier) refused 
to specify whether he meant Czechoslovakia in her old frontiers, or 
in those determined by the Anglo-French ultimatum. Knowing this, 
the Socialists nevertheless voted with the Radical-Socialists and the 
independent groups, against a Communist proposal to repudiate the 
Berchtesgaden terms and to demand the summoning of parliament 
immediately ! 

Blum explained why, in a further article. 10 Britain and France had 
imposed the abandonment of Sudeten territory. “The fact is accom- 
plished. God himself, as a philosopher has said, can change nothing 
in the past.” The philosopher still feared that some untimely action 
by Hitler might precipitate war, and he again pressed President 
Roosevelt to intervene. “The portion of the dispute still existing be- 
tween Germany and Czechoslovakia can and must be regulated by 
an honourable and equitable agreement”, said Blum 11 — referring, of 
course, to the question of whether Czechoslovakia should be dis- 
membered hastily or in tranquil deliberation. 

It is hardly surprising, after the foregoing, that Mr. Chamberlain’s 
announcement aroused in Blum “an immense movement of joy and 
hope”, and to break off negotiations or render them impossible — i.e. 
to announce that Czechoslovakia would not accept dismemberment 
— would in his eyes have been “a criminal error against humanity”. 
Reason could not conceive or tolerate that an honourable and equit- 
able settlement was impossible on what Blum called — no doubt inad- 
vertently — “the methods of execution”, once agreement had been 

9 Populate, September 22, 1938. 10 Populate, September 26, 1938. 

11 Populate, September 27, 1938. 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 223 

received on principles. And, in a final lyrical outburst, Blum wrote 12 
that the Munich meeting was “an armful of twigs cast on the sacred 
hearth, at the moment when the flame was dying”. 

This was no chance excess. On October 1, the Populaire proclaimed, 
in large letters: “International Detente. Munich Agreement Accepted 
by Czechoslovakia. Pathetic Appeal of General Syrovy. Daladier 
Warmly Acclaimed by Large Crowd on Arrival in Paris. ’ And Blum 
himself, in a leading article, asserted that no man or woman in France 
would refuse Chamberlain and Daladier a “just tribute of gratitude . 
War had been avoided. The flail was departing. Life again was 
becoming natural, concluded Blum, in a scarcely pardonable for- 
getfulness of Czechoslovakia, Spain, China, the “Axis and Mein 
Katnpf. 

The Seine Federation of the Socialist Party issued a placard the 
same day, announcing that peace was saved, and that a nightmare 
which weighed down millions of human beings had been “eliminated . 
The Socialist M.P.s, by a unanimous vote, expressed their rejoicing 
likewise, and announced that they “await from the Entente of peace- 
able Powers measures for consolidating peace and settling all problems 
which affect it”. The Socialist Youth of the Seine Department rejoiced 
at the Munich settlement “which permits European governments to 
address themselves seriously to the organisation of peace and disarma- 
ment, and the peaceful revision of treaties”. 13 

Two months later, the nightmare was once again present, the 
Deputies were still waiting, and European governments were not 
doing that which the Socialist youth organisation had permitted them 
to do. But the hundreds of thousands of French citizens who followed 
the call of the Socialist Party had been very effectively rallied in sup- 
port of Daladicr and Munich, at a critical turning point in European 
liistory. In order to make assurance doubly sure, the Socialist Party 
organisation began mobilising the opinion of its membership, and the 
pages of Populaire during the following days were filled with resolu- 
tions of the controlling bodies of Socialist district Federations, and 
of trade unions favourable to the Socialist leaders viewpoint, express- 
ing their homage to Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier, explaining 
that liberty cannot be won by the force of bayonets, denouncing 
attempts to set up “two ideological blocs”, and in other ways ranging 
public opinion, to the best of their ability, on the side of the Munich 
settlement and its authors. 

It is interesting that, at a session of the Young Socialist International 
12 Populaire, September 29, 1938. 13 Populate, October 2, T93 8 - 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 




224 

held about this time, the French Young Socialists found themselves 
in effective isolation when they denounced “ideological crusades” as 
an argument for defending the Munich settlement. 

In view of this campaign, it was only natural that, when parliament 
reassembled on October 4, the Socialist Party joined the Government 
majority of 543 in voting approval of Munich. If similar incidents had 
not been recorded earlier, it would be less easy to understand why 
the Socialist M.P.s first decided, at midnight, by 97 to 43, to vote 
against the Government on the question of full powers to issue finan- 
cial decrees, and then, at 2 a.m., decided to abstain when Daladier 
promised, through the medium of Herriot, to limit the period of full- 
powers to November 15, and to call parliament again in mid- 
November. 14 M. Daladier did not call parliament for another three 
weeks after the promised date, and managed in the interim to pro- 
voke the one-day General Strike on November 30 which gave him 
the opportunity for a vast display of military force against Frenchmen, 
such as he had not thought possible to use in defence of France’s allies 
in September. 

In the governing bodies of the General Confederation of Labour, 
a temporary alliance between Socialists, Syndicalists, Pacifists and 
Trotskyists succeeded all through the crisis in preventing the publica- 
tion of any statement, on behalf of the five million trade unionists 
of France, in denunciation of the policy of the French Government or 
of the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. This, even more than the 
policy of the Socialists alone, ensured the absence of any effective 
challenge to Daladier within the ranks of the Popular Front. The 
quite special significance of the attitude of the C.G.T. leadership can 
be seen when, on examining the respective industrial pages of the 
Sociahst Populaire and the Communist Humanite , we find that the 
“Munichite” policy of the majority of the C.G.T. leaders was 
supported by the executives of such unions as the clothing workers, the 
clerks, the tobacco and match workers, the pharmacists, the hat 
workers, the teachers, the maritime officers : with only the miners as 
represen tatives of the unions in the basic industries of the country. The 
minority were supported by the executives of the great productive 
unions — metallurgical workers, engineers, aircraft workers, textile 
workers, chemical workers, transport workers, and so on. 

Reviewing the activity of the leaders and controlling bodies of the 
Labour Party in Great Britain and the Socialist Party in France, dur- 
ing the period of preparation for the transfer of the Czechoslovak 
14 Temps, October 6, 1938. 


LABOUR LEADERS AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 225 

fortifications to Hitler, we therefore find that in neither country did 
the Labour leaders attempt to arouse public opinion against that 
transfer. On the contrary, even where they did not welcome the dic- 
tated settlement which embodied it, they facilitated (each in their own 
way) the successive steps by which that settlement was reached. 




CHAPTER XI 



THE PEOPLES AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 

L OOK, Mother,” said a girl on an historic occasion. “Everyone’s 
i out of step but our Jock!” The reader may perhaps have re- 
called the story, and have gamed the impression that there was none 
but the U.S.S.R. ready to go to the help of the Czechoslovak people. 
Such an impression would be mistaken. What is true, however, is 
that for several months the mass of the people in Britain and France 
were, as usual, bewildered and left without leadership. They were 
deprived of the means of expressing, in any very tangible form, their 
sympathy with the people of Czechoslovakia. It was only gradually — 
towards the end of the summer of 1938 — that they began to find the 
means. The subject would repay further research. But there is much 
already available. 

In Great Britain, within the official bodies of the Labour move- 
ment itself, there were many in September who took a radically dif- 
ferent line from that of their leaders. Two million votes were cast at 
the Co-operative Party conference for the policy of a United Peace 
Alliance. Such appeals as that of Miss Ellen Wilkinson, M.P., at a 
gigantic demonstration in Trafalgar Square to “fight against Chamber- 
lain, the friend of Fascism at home” (September 18); of Mr. D. N. 
Pritt, K.C., M.P., that the Government had been acting “not from 
folly or cowardice, but because it hates Socialism”; of Colonel Wedg- 
wood, M.P., at Peterborough, that the Prime Minister “must be 
against democracy and for tyranny, otherwise surely he would have 
called on Russia, on America, and on the people and Parliament of 
this land”; of Lord Strabolgi at Crayford that “Hitler would be 
stopped now if we turned Chamberlain out, mobilised, stood by 
France, Russia and Czechoslovakia and said the limit was reached”; 
of Mr. Emanuel Shinwcll, M.P., at Seaham, that an emergency seemed 
to have arisen which justified joint action by the Labour Party with 
other progressive forces, against the Government (September 25) — 
these and similar declarations of well-known Labour leaders could be 
paralleled by the appeals and speeches of many local active members 
of the Labour Party, of which one heard at the time, but which were 


THE PEOPLES AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


227 

recorded only in local newspapers, branch or trades council minutes, 
and the like. 

Another distinguishing feature of the resistance to a policy of capi- 
tulation in Great Britain, particularly during the months of August 
and September, was that it began to be felt very soon outside the 
framework of the Labour Party. Within the Conservative ranks, 
Winston Churchill drew attention to the real nature of Hitler’s policy, 
to the inevitable effect of a policy of perpetual conciliation without 
regard to circumstances, and to the need for an explicit agreement 
and military consultations between Great Britain, France, and the 
U.S.S.R., if a forcible repartitioning of the world in the interests of 
the aggressors were not to begin with Czechoslovakia. Especially after 
the Godcsbcrg visit, letters poured into the offices of Conservative 
newspapers like the Daily Telegraph, Times and Yorkshire Post, many 
of them published, demanding that a stand be made against Hitler. 
If nevertheless there were others hi the Conservative Party who did 
not venture so openly to criticise their Government’s policy before 
M uni ch, events afterwards showed that they were quite numerous, 
and it was only hesitancy about the possibility of Ending allies that 
held them back. 

The majority of the Liberal Party rank and file rapidly recovered 
from the enthusiasm which had led its leaders in Parliament, on 
September 14, to join in the applause for the Prime Minister’s announce- 
ment of his visit to Berchtesgadcn. Thus, the Manchester Guardian on 
September 22 reported that, upon a consideration of the Bcrchtes- 
gaden terms, the General Committee of the Manchester Liberal 
Federation had unanimously resolved to demand the immediate sum- 
moning of Parliament and the resignation of the Government. On 
September 27 the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, M.P., sent 
a message to the French Radical-Socialists urging upon them the 
immediate initiation of diplomatic and staff talks between Britain, 
France and the U.S.S.R. In the case of the Liberals, also, there were 
scores of local spokesmen whose protests against the policy which 
led to Munich can be found recorded in the columns of local news- 
papers, but were not reflected in the news printed by the national press. 

Among the leaders of trade unionism, departure from official policy 
was less noticeable in Great Britain than in France, before the middle 
of September. Immediately the Berchtesgadcn terms became known 
in their broad outline, however, the Executive Council of the South 
Wales Miners’ Federation sent a telegram to the National Council of 
Labour, calling upon the latter to repudiate “this betrayal”, and urging 





228 


TIIE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


demonstrations and meetings against it. Before Chamberlain left 
for Munich, Mr. J. Marchbank, the General Secretary of the National 
Union of Railwaymen, wrote in the Railway Review : “I am more 
than ever convinced that the turn of events last week marked the 
culmination of Britain’s present rulers’ efforts to evade the implica- 
tions and obligations of Soviet Russia’s alliance with France and 
Czechoslovakia” (this was the day before the Daily Herald assured its 
readers that there was “close co-operation” between Britain, France 
and the U.S.S.R.). Marchbank went on to express the hope that 
Labour’s voice in Parliament would be “clear and strong”, demand- 
ing the reversal of “the Government’s policy of betrayal and retreat” 
and urging a firm alliance with countries prepared to resist aggression, 
including the U.S.S.R. In the upshot, as has been seen, Labour’s voice 
in Parliament was heard instead encouraging Chamberlain to go to 
Munich. 

In France, on the other hand, where a number of important indus- 
trial unions were led by Communists and their supporters, a far 
greater volume of trade union denunciation of the Bcrchtesgaden 
terms made itself felt. Faced with the Government’s prohibition of 
public meetings on foreign affairs, the trade unions of the Seine, with 
1,250,000 workers in their ranks, organised on September 23 hun- 
dreds of meetings within the factory gates, which passed resolutions 
demanding solidarity with Czechoslovakia, and sent innumerable re- 
presentatives to the Czechoslovak Legation with assurances of their 
support. The executive committee of the metallurgical workers’ union 
— to take but one out of many examples — passed a resolution by a 
large majority on September 24, denouncing the Anglo-French terms 
to Czechoslovakia as a betrayal, demanding their repudiation and a 
meeting of all the Powers interested in maintaining peace against the 
aggressor, and insisting on the arrest of those responsible for spread- 
ing defeatist propaganda in France. Significant, too, of the difference 
between the mood of the workers and that of the Socialist leaders 
and of the majority in the governing body of the C.G.T., was the 
announcement on September 30 that the aircraft workers, who had 
agreed to work on Saturday, October 1, as a mark of their readiness 
to defend security and democracy, refused this extra day on learning 
of the Munich conference, “in view of the useless and dangerous 
capitulations before the Fascist policy of intimidation”. 

In Great Britain there was a large volume of protest not merely 
against the terms imposed on Czechoslovakia, but against the con- 
tinued existence of the government responsible for the terms, on the 


THE PEOPLES AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 229 

part of local organisations, primarily those of the working class but 
in great number also of other sections of the people. It would be 
vain, however, to look for traces of this protest in the majority of 
the London newspapers. The few score resolutions winch were noted 
by the Left press themselves represent but a small proportion of those 
which were passed all over the country', as could be verified on refer- 
ence to trade union journals, local newspapers and the archives of 
Labour organisations. 

The following are typical examples. The 1/362 (Watford) branch 
of the Transport and General Workers’ Union sent a resolution to 
the Prime Minister demanding that Britain should join with France 
and the U.S.S.R. in preserving the integrity of Czechoslovakia: further 
concessions to Hitler only led to further demands on his part. “We 
would remind you that one million Britishers died in the 1914-18 
war to prevent this, and we regard the attitude of the National Govern- 
ment towards the Fascist Powers of Germany and Italy as a direct 
betrayal of the dead and of democracy.” 

In Birmingham a meeting of shop stewards of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, representing 11,000 skilled men in the factories 
of that important city, passed a resolution calling on all democratic 
people “to repudiate tliis vile betrayal of democracy” by Mr. Chamber- 
lain, whose association with Hitler revealed “his pro-Fascist policy”. 
The resolution called for a powerful movement to force the resigna- 
tion of the Government. 

The Sheffield Trades and Labour Council passed a resolution de- 
nouncing the Anglo-French terms and demanding the immediate 
recall of Parliament. Similar demands were adopted by hundreds of 
trade union branches, peace councils and local Labour organisations. 

The Shop Stewards’ Committee at the DeHavilland Aircraft Com- 
pany (Edgwaxc), decided to send a letter to the metal workers’ union 
in Prague, stating that the 1500 organised workers represented by the 
committee were “aghast at the gross betrayal of the democratic and 
peace-loving people of Czechoslovakia by the Chamberlain Govern- 
ment”. The committee also sent a delegate to No. 10 Downing Street 
with a letter to the Prime Minister, protesting against the Anglo- 
French terms. 

One characteristic demand which runs through a very large number 
of the resolutions adopted by these organisations — for a campaign to 
drive from office the “National” Government — was the very con- 
clusion which, as has been noted earlier, was not drawn by the respon- 
sible authorities of the Labour movement even from their most bitter 



23 1 


230 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

criticism of the Government’s action. Among the varied bodies which 
passed such resolutions, hi addition to those mentioned, were the 
London Central Committee of the Electrical Trades Union (represent- 
ing 25,000 workers), a very large meeting of London printing workers 
at the Memorial Hall, a deputation to No. 10 Downing Street repre- 
senting all sections of the 1500 building workers engaged on the new 
Air Ministry building in Berkeley Square, an immense demonstration 
—the largest since the General Strike of 1926— in the Yorkshire mining 
centre of Barnsley, the Sheffield branch of the National Union of 
Railwaymcn, and the Ogmore and Garvv Urban District Council 
(South Wales). 

An equally representative list could be made of the activity hi all 
parts of the country of people and organisations which normally re- 
frained from active intervention in political affairs. The Cambridge 
Peace Council, for example, with the support of a great number of 
local organisations, convened a large meeting at which it presented 
a resolution declaring that the Anglo-French plan, “far from being 
a peace plan, is a proposal which hicreases the danger of war in the 
future, by giving yet further sanction to aggression”. It called for an 
international guarantee of support for Czechoslovak territorial in- 
tegrity. In Glasgow^, a university professor took part hi chalking the 
streets with protests against the concessions to Germany. The Uni- 
versity Labour Federation, on behalf of 3000 students, wrote to the 
Prime Minister demanding that he should approach the Governments 
of France, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. with a view to concerting 
defence of Czechoslovakia and the principles of collective security. 

Perhaps more significant of the greater political activity of the 
middle classes in Great Britain was the remarkable part played hi the 
crisis by the Left Book Clubs. Nothing could be more expressive of 
the situation which prevailed in Great Britain during September, 
J 93 8, when the three largest political parties represented in Parhament 
wer e either actively or passively co-operating in the Government’s 
policy of secret connivance with Hitler, and when as a consequence 
public opinion w^as at one stroke, as it were, deprived of its usual 
sounding-boards of expression. The trade union and Labour organisa- 
tions appealed primarily to the working class, and in actual fact— 
apart from the mass meetings which were held at particular moments 
— had the active services of only a minority of their members attend- 
ing branch meetings. The Communist Party could not, with its 16,000 
members, command the attention of many sections of middle-class 
opinion, hi this situation the 1000 local Left Book Club groups with 


THE PEOPLES AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 

their 50,000 members of whom the overwhelming majority were 
non-Communist (though many Communists were active in the 
L.B.C.), and certainly a majority were people hi more comfortable 
circumstances than those of the industrial workers, played a unique 
part. Their leaflet explaining the inner meaning of the crisis over 
Czechoslovakia, and calling for action to overthrow' the National 
Government, was distributed in 2,500,000 copies, mainly among 
people who were not ordinarily reached by the organisations men- 
tioned earlier; their reproductions of the leaflet, as two-column ad- 
vertisements in the leading London newspapers, fulfilled the same 
purpose. The distribution of the leaflets in very many cases led to the 
holding of successful mass meetings, either under the auspices of the 
Left Book Club or jointly with other organisations. Meetings were 
held in such typical areas for the middle strata of society as Torquay, 
Bournemouth, Hampstead, Taunton, as well as in more industrial 
centres like Accrington, Liverpool, Leeds. It is hardly to be questioned 
that the immense demonstrations which were held in Whitehall, at 
the height of the crisis, found much of their inspiration in the w'ork 
of the members of the Left Book Club. 

The Communist Parties hi France and Great Britain had long been 
war nin g the public of the tendency to sacrifice Czechoslovakia in the 
interests of what the British and French Governments considered 
appeasement. 

On March 26, 1938, the British Communist Party commented on 
Chamberlain’s rejection of the Soviet proposals of March 17: “Faced 
as we are with a Fascist war alliance which is busily engaged in seizing 
strategic points for a swoop on European democracy and peace, 
Chamberlain’s policy can only be regarded as a deliberate encourage- 
ment to Hitler to annex the great steel industry and arsenals of Czecho- 
slovakia, to add to the essential war materials which Fascism lias 
grabbed in Austria and Spain.” • 

Tw'o days after the Czechoslovak mobilisation, the Communist 
Party on May 23 called the pressure imposed by Chamberlain on 
Czechoslovakia “one of the most shameful episodes in British his- 
tory”. Does anyone believe that Hitler or Henlcin are really con- 
cerned with the unity of German-speaking people? “Not at all! The 
aims of Hitler and Henlein are directed at making Czechoslovakia a 
vassal State of Germany, to break its peace pact with France and the 
Soviet Union and clear the way for Hitler’s war aims in Europe as 
a whole. These amis, summed up, are the conquest of Europe, and 
that means Britain as w'ell as Czechoslovakia and France, as well as 


THE PEOPLES AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


232 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

the Balkan countries and the Soviet Union.” Czechoslovakia was “a 
long way oft” — it had “a foreign-sounding name which the Rother- 
meres and the Beaverbrooks, the Chamberlains and the Mosleys are 
not slow to play upon”. But its fate would determine the future of 
the British people. The United Peace Alliance, an emergency con- 
ference of the Labour Party “which has been so insistently demanded 
during past weeks by Labour and trade union organisations through- 
out the country”, were essential. 

“Britain, united with democratic France, Spain, Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union, could easily put a stop to German and Ita lia n 
Fascist aggression”, said a further statement on May 30. 1 

Some of the pronouncements of the Communist Parties read later 
like inspired prophecies. Such, for example, was the statement in the 
Paris Humamte of July 24, that Mr. Chamberlain’s policy aimed at 
detaching the Sudeten districts from Czechoslovakia, the reduction 
of the Czechoslovak army to the status of a police force, the nullifica- 
tion of the Czechoslovak pacts with France and the U.S.S.R., and 
the provision of a Four-Power guarantee— by Germany, Italy, France 
and Great Britain — for Czechoslovakia in its truncated form. The 
French Communist Party’s manifesto after the Anglo-French terms 
of September 19 were adopted declared: “Obeying the orders of 
Hitler, Chamberlain has secured the agreement of the British and 
French Ministers to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, the in- 
tegrity of which is inseparable from the security of France and the 
peace of Europe. . . . The Daladier Government have agreed to this 
new surrender to international Fascism. After this, Hitler will be able 
to demand French colonies and Alsace-Lorraine, while Mussolini will 
ask for Tunisia, Corsica, Nice and Savoy.” Almost, too, like a draft 
of Mr. Chamberlain’s last-minute message to Hitler on September 28, 
reads the sarcastic remark of the diplomatic correspondent of the 
Daily Worker, on August 26: “If Hitler will kindly consent to avoid 
an armed attack for a few weeks more, the British Government will 
throw its whole weight into trying to extract from the Czechs by 
diplomatic pressure everything that Hitler demands.” 

In an equally striking example of the Communist reading of the 
situation, at the Congress of the Communist Party of Great Britain 
at Birmingham, immediately after the Bcrchtesgaden meeting (but 
before the Anglo-French terms had been forced on Czechoslovakia), 
one of the Party leaders, R. P. Dutt, said: 

1 Report of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Great Britain, to the 15th 

Party Congress (September 16-19, 1938), pp. 121, 129-32, 134. 


233 

“No one who has followed the events of the past week can fail 
to see that the Government has been deliberately encouraging a 
certain war atmosphere, an atmosphere similar to that of 1914. 
The war crisis is real enough. The Government is playing a double 
game in this. It is using the war crisis to stage a deception, in order 
to build up the strength of Chamberlain in Britain. They are 
spreading everywhere a picture that the issue of war is the issue, 
that to-morrow we may find Britain, France and the Soviet Union 
at war with Germany. That is the picture being put in the minds 
of the people. Speculation spreads as to what we will do then, and 
has also affected members of our Party. Why is the Government 
concerned to spread this? Is it because they intend to make such 
a united stand? That is the last thing they mean to do if they can 
help it. It is the last tiring Hitler wants to put himself up against. 
If there were such a united stand, that would not mean war but 
peace. But their aim is on this basis to smash, the idea of the peace 
front, by associating it in the minds of the people with war. Their 
aim is on this basis to put across their policy of breaking the peace 
front, betraying Czechoslovakia, betraying peace, and to put it 
across in such a way that it is received as a triumph for peace, that 
Chamberlain is the saviour of peace.” 

Harry Pollitt, in Iris report to the Congress as General Secretary, 
also stressed that Chamberlain’s Government, in surrendering strategic 
positions to the Fascist State, was waiting for the moment “when the 
vigilance of the people has been lulled, and its hopes of detaching 
France from her allies have succeeded”. Then Hitler would be told 
he could strike. The Government hoped ultimately to turn the Fascist 
advance against the Soviet Union: but in reality, by turning Britain’s 
back on the peace bloc, “Chamberlain is leading Britain into war”. 
But unless a united mass movement forced changes now in Govern- 
ment policy, “Britain will be isolated in her hour of need”. 2 

The French and British Communists, in their press and their leaflets 
(in Britain at public meetings) drew the conclusion that all those who 
wished for collective resistance to the attack on Czechoslovak inde- 
pendence and integrity should combine their forces, irrespective of 
party affiliation, in a national effort to substitute, for the governments 
of Chamberlain and Daladier, other governments pledged to co- 
operate with each other and with the U.S.S.R. in the formation of 
a “peace bloc” of Powers. Thus — to take one moment out of a chain 

2 H. Pollitt, Selected Articles and Speeches, vol. II (1954), pp- 65-7. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


THE PEOPLES AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA 


234 

of events — the Communist Party of Great Britain on September 23 
(the day of the “hitch” at Godcsbcrg) sent letters to the leaders of the 
Liberal and Labour parties, pressing for joint action against the 
National Government in defence of Czechoslovakia; while the fol- 
lowing day the Temps was recording in shocked terms the fact that 
the Communist leader, Peri, was, in a leading article in Humaniti, 
“demanding at these grave hours the overthrow of the Government”. 
Again: “This is not just a question of the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, 
it is not a question of the betrayal of peace. It is the betrayal of 
Britain. . . . The National Government are not isolating Soviet Russia. 
They arc isolating Britain,” said W. Gallacher, the British Communist 
M.P., in the Parliamentary debate on October 4. “Up to the dictated 
peace of Munich, one could believe that the Czechoslovak barrier, 
guarding the road to the Balkans, would also protect if necessary the 
breast of France. That barrier has been overthrown. You have de- 
stroyed at that same moment the confidence of the peoples in France; 
you have demonstrated to the world that it was dangerous to be a 
friend of France. . . .You have signed defeat on the mutilated body 
of a free people; it is against you that we shall win the victory of 
peace”, said Gabriel Peri, the French Communist Party’s spokesman, 
in the Chamber on October 5. 

But would the peoples have followed a policy in line with these 
appeals from opponents of the policy of Chamberlain and Daladicr? 
In answering this question, one must reckon perforce with the fact 
that their audience was a limited one, whether we think of Churchill 
or of the Daily Worker. The ordinary sounding-board of Parliament 
was closed in both countries throughout the height of the crisis; the 
vast majority of the newspapers, privately owned, was equally closed 
except for letters from correspondents accustomed to putting their 
thoughts on paper; it was an open secret in Fleet Street that Chamber- 
lain was putting personal pressure on their editors; in France public 
meetings on foreign pohey were prohibited, in Great Britain the same 
leaders who were urging Chamberlain to convene Parliament would 
not convene a special conference of their own party. Bearing in mind, 
therefore, that the opponents of Government policy could only reach 
a small part of their respective nations, and that part frequently more 
by accident than by plan, one must consider it extremely significant 
that, on September 18, the International Peace Campaign succeeded 
in assembling one of the most gigantic demonstrations ever seen, up 
to that time, in Trafalgar Square. On September 21 the largest meet- 
ing seen for many years was held in Manchester to protest against the 


235 

Anglo-French terms. On September 23 many thousands of Paris fac- 
tory workers marched to the Czechoslovak Legation, as mass deputa- 
tions, with addresses of solidarity. Starting with September 18, when 
the Trafalgar Square demonstration was followed by thousands of 
people thronging into Whitehall crying : “Stand by the Czechs!”, 
the demonstrations in Whitehall and in Downing Street itself grew 
almost nightly, until on the 26th tens of thousands were passing slowly 
past the seat of government of the British Empire, with such cries as 
“Stand by the Czechs ! Concessions mean war ! Chamberlain must go !” 
It would be a great mistake to imagine that those who took part in 
these demonstrations were convinced followers of the Labour Party, 
the Communist Party or any other political organisation. For the most 
part they were the same Londoners and Parisians who, in 1934, had 
marched in their hundreds of thousands in the campaign against the 
French Fascist leader De la Rocque, in February, and his British counter- 
part Sir Oswald Mosley in September. Nor could the dockers at 
King’s Lynn who, on September 27, refused to load a cargo of one 
hundred tons of pig-iron on a German ship bound for Hamburg be 
thought particularly grounded in “advanced politics”, for winch their 
town had not been specially or outstandingly noted. These actions 
and expressions of opinion must be taken as characteristic of that 
section of the people who, for one reason or another, had been driven 
to think about the case against the policy of “appeasement”. In a 
broader way, the readiness and calmness with which the great mass 
of the people responded, in all countries directly affected, when the 
possibility arose of an armed conflict — the rush to enlist, and of the 
“lower classes” to enrol in the A.R.P. organisation, in Great Britain: 
the willing answer of the mobilised reservists, in France: the vast 
number of volunteers who enrolled at the Czechoslovak Legation in 
Yugoslavia: among similar volunteers, the divisional general of the 
Rumanian army who offered his services to Czechoslovakia : and other 
similar signs — which have been recorded earlier — showed the instinc- 
tive popular appreciation that the issues involved in the negotiations 
with Hitler, and bound up with the fate of Czechoslovakia, went 
deeper than could be solved by a personal meeting between the 
British Prime Minister and the Fiihrer. As Alexander Werth wrote: 
“The French people were in reality far better than cither their press 
or their politicians.” 3 Of the British people it was not only Churchill 
who observed that they “never flinched” in the days before Munich. 4 

The peoples would have supported collective resistance to the 
3 Op. cit., p. 231. 4 Op. dt., p. 256. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 




236 

aggressor, not primarily because of democratic Czechoslovakia, but 
because they felt that continual co-operation with the aggressor “axis” 
had brought the world to the point at which the establishment of 
German domination began. Tins was the lesson of the fragmentary 
and partial expressions of opinion which political, police, financial and 
property restrictions allowed to the mass of the people during the 
critical days of September, 1938. This, measured in heads or votes, 
might seem only a repetition of similar demonstrations of feeling, even 
larger in character — for example, the Peace Ballot in England in 1935, 
in which over 11,000,000 people declared for collective security: or 
the great Popular Front demonstrations in France in 1935 - 6 , in which 
millions participated. But qualitatively the repetition of such demon- 
strations in the circumstances of September, 1938, meant something 
much greater, because they came when war had been brought nearer. 
The questions of who was responsible and what was the way out 
had become matters of life and death for millions of people. 


CHAPTER XII 

THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 

A NUMBER of arguments were put forward after Munich (some 
of them as late as 1944) 1 to justify the decisions taken there. 
Answering them will serve to recapitulate much of the evidence in 
previous chapters. 

I 

One was the assertion that the Sudeten Germans wanted to “join 
the Reich ... a natural development in the circumstances”, 2 and that 
the British people would not have supported a war to prevent them 
doing so; 3 or, in the words of Mr. H. Ramsbotham, M.P., the British 
Minister of Pensions on October 31, that “we should have been 
fighting to prevent some 3,500,000 Germans living on the borders 
between Germany and Czechoslovakia from joining their own kith 
and kin”. 

One reply is, of course, the historical fact that the Germans of 
Hidcr’s Reich were not the kith, and kin of the Sudeten Germans, who 
were a mixed population of German and Czech origin — including 
great numbers of Czechs (as their names show) Germanised imder 
the Austro-Hungarian regime before the war. Their ancestors in the 
Middle Ages had been part of the Holy Roman Empire: they and 
their forebears for 300 years had been the subjects of Austria. More- 
over, the demand for transfer to Germany was never put forward 
by Henlein himself 4 until September 15, when it was already clear 
that Mr. Chamberlain not only favoured this, but was prepared to 
facilitate the annexation, provided it was done by “peaceful” methods. 

This reminds us of the real reply to the talk about kith and kin: 
that it had nothing at all to do with the case. The fact that there were 
German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia was — as has been shown 

1 W. W. Hadley, Munich: Before and After (London, 1944), and Viscount Maugham, 
The Truth About the Munich Crisis (London, 1944). 

2 Lord Runciman in his final report to Mr. Chamberlain, September 21, 1938 ( D.B.F.P. , 
vol. II, pp. 675 et seqq.). 

8 Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons, October 6, 1938. 

4 Accounts of the quarrels between German and Czech bourgeois nationalists can be 
found (in English) in R. W. Scton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, 1943, 
Chapters 13, 16 and 17. 




238 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

from the secret documents of the Nazis themselves — merely a con- 
venient pretext for disrupting from within, dismembering and ulti- 
mately annexing the Czechoslovak Republic. At Munich itself some 
380,000 Germans were left within the borders of mutilated Czecho- 
slovakia, to provide the necessary means of still further disrupting 
the country. Moreover, about 720,000 Czechs were annexed to Ger- 
many at Munich — “overlooked” by its apologists, and immediately 
subjected to atrocious ill-treatment by the Nazis, such as the “Sudeten 
Germans” had never experienced. 6 

As for what the people of the annexed districts thought, there is 
the eloquent testimony of the special correspondents of The Times 
and Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, whose messages were printed 
in those newspapers on October 3 and 4. People of all classes told 
them that they had worked for autonomy, not for annexation : they 
seemed “almost stunned” and their principal feeling was one of “be- 
wilderment and uneasiness”. A big manufacturer who had voted for 
Henlcin told the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph and Morning 
Post: “Never was the question of our annexation by Germany put 
before us, and we would never have voted for it. In all the confidential 
conferences of German industrialists . . . wc never considered for a 
moment the possibility of the destruction of our thousand years 
common life with the Czechoslovaks.” The same was the testimony 
of a German-speaking reservist of the Czechoslovak army, who, with 
all his family, had voted for Ilcnlcin “because wc believed that he 
would help us to get more employment”. Only “half-grown lads” 
were rejoicing at the announcement of annexation to Germany. 

It was significant, too, that the first instinct of tens of thousands of 
Sudeten Germans on hearing the news was to escape into Bohemia — 
where they were turned back by the Czech police and troops, under 
orders from the Czech General Syrovy ; who had served as the agent 
of the British and French invaders of Soviet Russia in 1918, was 
appointed Premier under false pretence of organising resistance on 
September 22, 1938, and now had turned Nazi agent. 6 It is equally 
pertinent to remark that the first act of the German “kith and kin” 
was to flood the area with Gestapo, Black Guards and Storm Troopers 
from Germany, who carried out a mass “clean-up” of the area with the 
indispensable atrocities against Jews, active trade unionists, Socialists 
and Communists, and established at least three concentration camps. 

5 Ripka, op. cit., pp. 269-70. Societies were dissolved: 80 per cent, of their schools 
closed down: shopkeepers forced out of business, and of course political terror raged. 

6 A speaking likeness of this man is given by Wlieeler-Bcnnett, op. cit., pp. 198-9. 
In 1947 he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment as a collaborator. 




THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 


239 


2 

Another argument, also put forward by Neville Chamberlain in 
the Parliamentary debate, was that the terms secured at Munich re- 
presented an improvement on Hitler’s original demands, laid down 
at Godesberg. The Daily Herald had supported this in advance, on 
September 15, declaring that Hitler “has had to abandon the most 
brutal of his Godesberg terms”. 

This plea does not bear closer examination. True, the area was 
occupied by the German army, under the Munich settlement, in ten 
days instead of in one: but this only meant that the German army 
was enabled peacefully to occupy the area, instead of having to fight, 
as would certainly have been the case had it attempted occupation 
in one day. So much was clear from the Czechoslovak flat rejection 
of the Godesberg terms, and from the mood of the army itself. But 
in all other essentials the outcome of Munich and the demands of 
Godesberg proved as like as two peas. 

Thus, the territorial arrangements, instead of being “dictated”, were 
to be made by an international commission — said the apologists. In 
reality, as shown in preceding chapters, the Germans simply dictated 
to the so-called “international commission”, which never functioned 
as such at all. In territory, as a result, the settlement in some respects 
was actually worse than that provided under the Godesberg terms, 
as the diplomatic correspondent of the pro-Munich Times itself ad- 
mitted. The right of option of the Sudeten Germans, of which a great 
deal was made at the time of Munich — that they could choose them- 
selves whether to remain Czechoslovak citizens or to become Germans 
— was denied them. Helpless after the loss of its fortifications and the 
subsequent internal pohtical changes forced upon it by Germany, 
“Czecho-Slovakia” 7 was forced also to sign an agreement giving up 
this right of option for the German-speaking population of the 
Sudeten districts, and actually declaring the German-speaking refugees 
themselves for the most part to be German citizens, whose surrender 
could be demanded by the German Government. Thirdly, one out- 
rageous feature of the map presented to Chamberlain at Godesberg 
— a German corridor running right across Czechoslovak territory to 
connect Austria with south-eastern Germany, and dividing Czech 
Bohemia from the other territories — reappeared after the signature 
of the Munich settlement, in the shape of an agreement “voluntarily” 


7 As the Republic was now called, reflecting the aid given by the Nazis to the Slovak 
Fascists in disrupting it after Munich. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 


240 

signed by Czechoslovakia with Germany (November 19, 1938) for 
the construction of an extra-territorial German motor road across its 
territory. Much was made of Hidcr’s having “dropped” the demand 
for a plebiscite in certain predominantly Czech areas. In reality, he 
annexed these areas without plebiscite — either immediately, or by 
“agreement”, or (finally) when he felt ready to annex the whole 
territory of the Republic, on March 15, 1939. 

3 

A further argument was that Munich provided Czechoslovakia with 
something much more valuable than the pledges of security contained 
in its pacts with France and the U.S.S.R. — namely, an international 
guarantee. “I myself believe that the international guarantee in which 
we have taken part will more than compensate for the loss of the 
strategic frontier”, announced Sir Samuel Hoare in Parliament on 
October 3, 1938. The Government felt under “a moral obligation 
to treat the guarantee as being now in force”, added his Cabinet col- 
league, Sir Thomas Inskip, next day. On October 5, with what might 
almost be called a touch of buffoonery, Sir John Simon expressed the 
hope that Russia would join the guarantee ! 

It is hardly probable that within one month of Munich there were 
many among the supporters of Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier who 
wished to talk very much about this “wholly discreditable” guarantee. 8 

The proceedings of the International Commission set up in Berlin 
to work out the details of the application of the Munich settlement — 
or the Ambassadors’ Conference, as it was in fact — proved conclu- 
sively the futility of a guarantee by Powers unable in any way to 
resist any German demand which might be put forward. Furthermore, 
the guarantor Powers were unable to intervene wdien Hungary and 
Poland extorted further territorial concessions, over and above what 
had been provided at Munich. When they were making preparations 
for an attack on Ruthenia (Trans-Carpathian Ukraine), with the ob- 
ject of dividing it between them and thus establishing a common 
frontier, it was not the guarantor Powers w T ho intervened successfully, 
but the new German “protector” of Czechoslovakia. And when Ger- 
many began to press the mutilated Czechoslovakia to renounce the 

8 The Conservative constitutional historian. Professor A. Bcrriedale Keith, who uses 
this expression, adds that Chamberlain and Daladier “were acting like financiers who 
guarantee sums they know they cannot pay, on the speculative chance that things will 
so work out that they will never be confronted with the need of action. . . . While 
financiers may disregard their own honour, Prime Ministers have to remember that 
the honour of their countries should not be pledged without all reasonable certainty 
that any undertaking shall be made good” ( The Causes of the War, 1940, pp. 378-9). 


24I 

system of guarantees altogether, Britain and France showed by their 
silence that here, too, they were impotent. 

Indeed, the essential futility of the “international guarantee” was 
that it could not be implemented by Britain and France, should Ger- 
many decide to attack Czechoslovakia, once the latter’s barrier of 
fortifications had been taken from her — except in conditions infinitely 
more unfavourable than those which were held to justify the Munich 
settlement. And in fact by December it was clear to Coulondre, the 
French Ambassador in Berlin (newly transferred from Moscow-), that 
the “vassalisation” of Czechoslovakia was now almost complete, while 
at the German Foreign Office, when he raised the question of the 
guarantees, Weizsacker replied: “Couldn’t that business be forgotten? 
It is regarded without any sympathy here.” 9 

4 

A fourth argument frequently put forward after Munich was that 
it was better for Czechoslovakia to yield the territories concerned 
(the bearing of this surrender on the future of Czechoslovak inde- 
pendence and democracy was not unduly stressed) rather than be 
“destroyed by a war”. “The only alternative to this plan would be 
an invasion and a dismemberment of the country by force, and 
Czechoslovakia, though a conflict might arise which wmuld lead to 
incalculable loss of life, could not be reconstituted in her frontiers whatever 
the result of the conflict may be”, was the double threat cabled from 
London on September 27. 10 The Czechs should make the best terms 
they could with Berlin, otherwise “wc shall be exposing Czecho- 
slovakia to the same fate as Abyssinia”, the thoughtful Sir Nevilc 
Henderson cabled to London the same day. 11 However great the 
injustice of Munich (echoed the Manchester Guardian on October 1, 
but one of many), “they cannot be measured against the horrors that 
might have extinguished not only Czccho-Slovakia, but the whole 
of Western civilisation”. 

There are serious grounds for believing, as has been seen earlier, 
that a firm front of the Great Powers in support of Czechoslovak 
territorial integrity would have acted as a serious deterrent to Ger- 
many. Moreover, as has been pointed out, Hitler’s army and air force 
w-crc by no means as strong as they w'ere twelve months later. But 
even assuming that, through some unwise precipitation or irrevoc- 
able commitment, Hitler had begun a war against Czechoslovakia 
and the Soviet Union alone, it does not follow that the alternative 

9 Coulondre, op. cit., pp. 248-9. 10 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 572-3. 11 Ibid., p. 562. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


242 

to fighting was destruction. Serbia and Belgium were not destroyed 
in the first world war, although they suffered the loss of almost their 
entire territory in the course of military operations, and in the case 
of Serbia even greater trials and miseries for the common people. 
Spain, deprived at one blow of almost its entire army, and subject to 
an invasion organised by two well-equipped Great Powers, was not 
destroyed, but on the contrary, in spite of terrible losses, made im- 
mense strides towards overcoming the heritage of age-long economic 
and social backwardness, in the course of the war itself. There was no 
foreign observer of the spirit of the Chinese people, during the most 
unequal period of the struggle against the well-armed Japanese invad- 
ing armies, who did not testify that, in that struggle, the Chinese 
people achieved a degree of national unity and heroic resistance un- 
equalled in their history. 

Nor were these considerations foreign to general opinion in Czecho- 
slovakia, as could have been found had it been consulted (which 
doubtless was the very reason why, after Munich as after Berchtes- 
gaden, the representatives of the British and French Governments 
would not allow the necessary time for submitting the proposed terms 
to the Czechoslovak Parliament). Two and a half months after Munich, 
an English economist and publicist who never erred in excessive desire 
to embarrass Mr. Chamberlain — Sir Walter (later Lord) Layton — 
wrote in the News Chronicle , 12 after a visit to Prague: 

“The Czechs arc convinced almost to a man that they ought to 
have fought in September. They might have suffered the fate of 
Serbia in 1914, and have been driven back for a time into Slovakia, 
Ruthcnia — even into Rumania. But Germany was not in a con- 
dition to fight a prolonged war. It is doubtful if she would have 
fought at all, and if she had done so she would certainly have col- 
lapsed before very long. Such is the view of the man in the street.” 

Such also was the view of the main leaders of the army in private, 
even though they refused to fight side by side with the U.S.S.R. for 
political reasons. And the implication of the contrary argument must 
be clearly understood. It was that there should be no resistance by 
a small power to a large aggressive State, since in such a contest, even 
though the small State might be supported by those much stronger 
than itself, the small State usually had to bear the brunt of the first 
attack, which as a general rule it was least able to withstand. As Gamelin 
had said, “everytliing will be settled by the Peace Treaty”. In this 

12 December 14, 1938. 


TIIE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 243 

particular case, the small State was exceptionally well equipped for 
resistance; but the implication remains the same. And it led directly 
to the admission that the aggressor, particularly when he had formed 
an offensive and defensive alliance with other aggressors, should be 
yielded world hegemony without a struggle. 

5 

A further argument was contained in the famous remark of Mr. 
Chamberlain, in his broadcast on September 27, that this was a 
quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know 
nothing”. Most of the people of the Dominions, like the great 
majority of the people in tliis country”, had never heard of Czecho- 
slovakia, and it was very difficult to see how they were concerned 
“in so remote a matter”, recalls Viscount Maugham, Lord Chancellor 
in Chamberlain’s Government in 1938. 

It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that, in view of the 
far greater interest taken by the general public in foreign affairs 
after the first world war, the much greater space devoted by the 
newspapers to foreign politics, and the very much more frequent 
debates on foreign policy in the House of Commons (a circumstance 
which Mr. Chamberlain frequently deplored), a much larger section 
of the British people did know something about Czechoslovakia in 
1938, and had made up its mind about her, than in 1914 had known 
anything about Serbia, or was moved by the question of Belgian 
neutrality. As for France, it is sufficient to remember the Franco- 
Czcchoslovak treaties. The proof that for the peoples the issue was 
by no means a remote one has already been given, in the preceding 
chapter. Of course, it is certain that both Chamberlain and Daladier, 
by the methods of negotiation which they pursued in 1938, and by 
keeping their parliaments in recess for months, did their best to see 
that their peoples should know as little as possible. 

There is a further point to tliis argument, however. Mr. Chamber- 
lain had more than once made it clear that the plea of remoteness and 
ignorance would not be valid when territory belonging to the British 
Empire was attacked (for example, Singapore, hardly a subject of ex- 
tensive knowledge among the mass of the British people), or if some- 
one attacked a client of Great Britain, as Egypt was then, or Irak 
although not in any of these cases were the conditions of the people 
made well known in Great Britain (and with good reason). The 
horrors of war would not restrain Mr. Chamberlain where British 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


244 

interests or British-controlled territory were at stake. “Any sugges- 
tion that we might offer to surrender some portion of the British 
Empire in order to buy Hitler off was indignantly rejected”, wrote 
Lord Cecil sarcastically. 13 To concentrate attention on the remote- 
ness of the country, therefore, in the case of Czechoslovakia was a 
politician’s trick, all very well in an election speech, but dishonour- 
able in an international crisis. 

6 

Then there is the assertion that the Munich agreement was in no 
sense “exclusive”, that it was intended as the stepping-stone to wider 
conciliation, and that in particular the only reason why the U.S.S.R. 
was not invited to Munich — although at least as interested in the fate 
of Czechoslovakia as the Italian Government — was Hitler’s prejudices 
and the pressing character of the emergency, and did not in any sense 
mean a desire to exclude the U.S.S.R. from international consulta- 
tions. Sir Samuel Hoare on October 3 even misled the House of 
Commons into imagining that there had been regular contact with 
the U.S.S.R. before Munich, by saying that in consultations with the 
Soviet Government, Britain had “naturally” let France take the lead, 
since it was on her action that Soviet support of Czechoslovakia de- 
pended (a statement false in itself, as has been shown). The composi- 
tion of the Munich meeting (said Lord Halifax in the House of Lords) 
did not mean “any weakening of the desire on our part ... to preserve 
our understanding and relations with the Soviet Government” — a 
masterpiece of deceptive insinuation (the italics arc ours). 

It required a truly brazen front, in any case, to go so obviously 
against the plain facts obvious to all the world — facts which led 
Potemkin on October 4, 1938, to tell the French Ambassador: “The 
Western Powers deliberately excluded the U.S.S.R. from the negotia- 
tions.” 14 

For in an earlier chapter it has been shown that the failure to invite 
the U.S.S.R. to Munich was not an isolated or unexpected event, but 
the last stage of a deliberate policy almost openly pursued throughout 
the months since March. 15 It may be perfectly true that Hitler was 

13 Op. tit., p. 317. 14 Coulondre, op. tit., p. 17 6. 

16 On July 14 the German Ambassador in London, commenting on the British Govern- 
ment’s “low opinion” of the U.S.S.R., said that its treatment of Kagan, the Soviet repre- 
sentative in the Non-Intervention Committee (of which Lord Plymouth, Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was Chairman), was a further sign of the desire 
“to exclude Soviet Russia from any discussion on a European settlement” ( D.G.F.P . , 
vol. II, p. 486). 


THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 


245 

in no mood for meeting a Soviet representative on September 29, 
3:938 — particularly as the U.S.S.R. had plainly announced that it would 
fight, if Czechoslovakia did. But there was no reason for him to be 
in any other mood, in view of the very obvious avoidance by the 
British and French Governments themselves, during the preceding 
months, of any serious discussions on this subject, and of any associa- 
tion at all, with Soviet representatives. Indeed, we now have direct 
evidence that the Germans understood this very well. As early as 
July 10, 1938, the German Ambassador in London was reporting 16 
that Chamberlain’s Cabinet had “come nearer to understanding the 
most essential points of the major demands advanced by Germany, 
with respect to excluding the Soviet Union from the decision of the 
destinies of Europe. ...” From the morning after the Munich con- 
ference (Robert Coulondre wrote from Berlin in a survey of six 
months’ German policy, on March 19, 1939). it was clear that be- 
yond the Rhine the agreements signed were interpreted as meaning 
for Germany freedom of action in central and eastern Europe with, 
as a corollary, the relative abandonment of interest in these regions 
by the western Powers”. 17 

Here again the proof of the pudding was in the eating. During the 
months that immediately followed the Munich Conference, apart 
from profuse verbal assurances by British Ministers in the House of 
Commons of their desire to keep in close contact with the U.S.S.R., 
there was no evidence whatsoever that that desire existed in fact. 
A number of important occasions were allowed to pass without the 
slightest attempt being made to establish such contact — contact which 
was obviously called for, had the assurances been serious. 

Thus the King’s Speech at the opening of a new session of the British 
Parliament, soon after Munich, very demonstratively omitted any 
reference to the U.S.S.R., cither in friendship or otherwise. The same 
applies to the speech of the Government spokesman who wound up 
the debate in the House of Commons. The same is true also of the 
French Government’s statement to the Chamber of Deputies, and to 
the latter’s Foreign Affairs Committee, in December, 1938 (we shall 
see why, in a later chapter). And it is noteworthy that, while the 
Western Governments arranged and sponsored a series of diplomatic 
visits between their capitals and those of the aggressor States — Berlin 
and Rome— there was at no time during this period any suggestion 
of such a visit, or even of a frank exchange of views on policy in a 

16 D. & M., vol. I, p. 132. 

17 Documents Diplomatiques, 1938-1939 (French Yellow Book, 1939). P- 8 7- 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



246 

meeting between leading statesmen, where the U.S.S.R. was con- 
cerned. 

Even when Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union 
were simultaneously involved in serious disputes with Japan in the 
spring of 1939 — the first two on account of commercial interests in 
China, the third on account of commercial and political relations 
with Japan: and all three in consequence of the boundless truculence 
of the Japanese in asserting a claim to overlordship in Eastern Asia — 
the British Government organised contact and parallel action only 
with the United States, not with the U.S.S.R. 

Thus the promises not to attempt to exclude the U.S.S.R. from 
international consultations in future were only in the nature of pohtc 
assurances, intended to cloak a very different policy, rather than 
serious expressions of the British Government’s intentions. 

7 

One further argument, of a very special character, is worth notice 
— not so much because it was put forward originally by some ultra- 
“rcvolutionary” and Trotskyist journalists, but because the idea had 
already been taken up before Munich by a certain number of pacifists, 
who wanted to provide a thoroughly up-to-date justification of non- 
resistance suited to modern conditions. 

This was as follows: the quarrel over Czechoslovakia was of no 
interest to the working classes, or to the mass of the people, since it 
was a quarrel about a capitalist State, and between two rival imperi- 
alist groups — the Franco-British and the German-Italian. Lenin, these 
new-found disciples of the great Russian revolutionary declared, had 
insisted hi 1914 that the workers should turn such a war into a civil 
war, and that they should not let themselves be butchered to safe- 
guard the investments of their masters. 

This argument might have been more impressive — although not 
less misleading — had it proceeded from persons who accepted the 
other teachings of Lenin inseparably bound up with his views on 
war. But quite apart from this, their belated application of the lessons 
of the world war of 1914-18 to the situation of 1938 overlooked 
several important differences. One was that, even in 1914, Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks, as indeed the international Socialist movement before 
them, had always determined the character of a war by the character 
of the social order in the State waging it, and by the policy of its ru lin g 
class. Consequently they distinguished between a war for markets, 
raw materials and cheap labour, such as two rival imperialist groups 




THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 


247 


might wage, and a war which arose on account of the aggression of 
an imperialist country against a country less advanced on the capitalist 
road — such as a colony, or even an independent capitalist country 
which, for economic and social reasons, had not become a fully im- 
perialist State. In cither of these cases, although the victim of aggres- 
sion was not a Socialist State by any means, its self-defence would be 
progressive from the point of view of the working class. Since the 
ultimate enemy of the working class also was imperialism, it was 
bound to see a possible ally in a colonial people, defending its right 
of independent existence or in the people of an independent capitalist 
State, defending itself against transformation into the colonial append- 
age of some imperialist Power. 

Of course, some imperialist group might support the weaker party 
in such a war for its own selfish purpose. In that case there might be 
an interweaving of two types of war — a just war of national self- 
defence, and an imperialist conflict — to which the answer could not 
be one of sheer abstentionism, unless the workers frankly adopted 
the attitude that it was wrong to kill at all. 

But in present circumstances there were two additional factors 
which did not exist in 1914. 

The fust was Fascism— the most ruthless, retrogressive, barbarous 
and desperate form of government ever adopted by capitalism. Even 
pillars of capitalist society who regarded Marxist ideas with abhor- 
rence— Conservative leaders, archbishops, bankers— were forced to 
admit that Fascism throws humanity back to the dark ages, and de- 
stroys gradually all the positive achievements of subsequent stages of 
civilisation. The working classes, whose philosophy — to the extent 
that they have achieved one of their own — includes appreciation of 
the positive acliievements of successive liistorical epochs, could not 
ignore this distinction between Fascism and capitalist democracy. 
They could not, therefore, deny that the fight in defence of even a 
bourgeois (capitalist) democracy against Fascism, whether conducted 
within national boundaries or against the international aggression of 
a Fascist State, was a progressive fight requiring their support. Suffi- 
cient has been said earlier to show that, with all its defects and with 
all its limitations from the point of view of the working class, Czecho- 
slovakia before Munich was such a bourgeois democracy; and its 
defence against the supreme exponents of aggressive Fascism, Hitler 
and his allies, was a progressive fight. 

The second factor which did not exist in 1914 was the U.S.S.R. 
If it supported Czechoslovakia, or was prepared to enter into a peace 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



248 

bloc with capitalist States, as it had been for a number of years, this 
was not because it sought colonics, more raw materials or cheap 
labour — an absurdity for a country constituted on the basis of social 
ownership of the means of production like the U.S.S.R. — but pre- 
cisely because it distinguished between those States whose interest lay 
in war for a new redivision of the world, and those who for their own 
purpose wanted to preserve peace, and whose interests therefore — 
for very different reasons — coincided on this question with those of 
the common people of all countries. Moreover, for the working class 
there was more than a theoretical interest in the U.S.S.R. actively 
participating either in international political action to defend Czecho- 
slovakia, or if need be in military action. For in cither case the presence 
of the U.S.S.R. meant that purely imperialist designs could not be 
pursued with freedom, were the allies of Czechoslovakia ever so selfish 
or treacherous in the purposes for which they were opposing Germany. 

That, no doubt, after the experience of the years from 1933 on- 
wards, was the very reason why the self-styled friends of Czecho- 
slovakia were evidently determined from the very beginning to keep 
the Soviet Union out of international consultations: and particularly 
kept it out of Munich, which might have been “unsuccessful” — as 
a peaceful carving-up of Czechoslovakia — had the Soviet Union been 
present. But the particular pacifists and ultra-'* revolutionaries” were 
not concerned about that. 

8 

Another argument abandoned all pretence of altruism and lofty 
purpose, and said that “Britain and France were not ready, and dare 
not risk a fight”. The French were inferior in planes and tanks, anti- 
aircraft guns and anti-tank guns: this has been the constant defence of 
all the apologists for Munich since the war, from Bonnet to Maugham. 
The British could only offer the French, in mid-September, two divi- 
sions and 150 aeroplanes: “What could France do?” asks Bonnet (not 
mentioning that he had systematically rejected the support of scores 
of Soviet divisions and thousands of Soviet aeroplanes). 

It must be replied, in the first place, that in spite of these admitted 
(and wcll-cxploitcd) deficiencies, if a war — contrary to probability — 
really did begin, the odds were overwhelmingly against Germany, 
as shown in Chapter IX. 

A land attack on Czechoslovakia at Germany’s then level of strength 
could have been held up for weeks by the Czechoslovak army: the 
Germans themselves thought so. Not only was the Germany of 





THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 249 


September, T938, much weaker than she was a year later: industri- 
alised Czechoslovakia was far stronger than agrarian, squire-ridden 
Poland in 1939. It is relevant to recall that an artillery officer of the 
German army, employed as an instructor at a German military aca- 
demy, told a Reuter correspondent on October 7 that “even the 
German army, aided by constant pounding of heavy artillery and 
supported by tanks, would have found these forts impregnable”. An 
air attack would have been met immediately by the numerically in- 
ferior but strong Czechoslovak air force (winch was within a very 
short flying distance of important German industrial centres), and 
almost immediately would have met with a destructive counter-attack 
from the much stronger air forces of Czechoslovakia’s Eastern ally. 
The danger to Germany in tins respect would have left comparatively 
small resources available for air attacks in the West. It could not be 
seriously alleged that the line of Western fortifications hastily con- 
structed by the Germans after 1936 would have presented any tiring 
like the obstacles to an invasion of Germany which the Maginot Line 
presented to an invasion of France by the then forces of Germany. 
Over and above these considerations, there would have been the im- 
mediate effect of a British naval blockade, and, before a very few days 
were out, the effect of tire arrival on the scene of the Soviet land forces. 

The immensely greater economic potential of the countries oppos- 
ing Germany would come increasingly into play as time went on. 

But the most extraordinary thing about this argument from weak- 
ness is that it was thrown aside more than once by the very people who 
used it. How did it come about that Chamberlain, in his anonymous 
statement to lobby correspondents on September 11, could so far 
forget all the talk about Anglo-French impotence as to tell Germany 
that “she cannot with impunity carry out a rapid and successful mili- 
tary campaign again st Czechoslovakia without the fear of intervention 
by France and even Great Britain”? How was it that he and Daladicr 
on September 23 could withdraw their disapproval of Czechoslovak 
general mobilisation, which was supposed to be terribly provocative? 
How was it that he and Lord Halifax could agree to issue the famous 
Foreign Office communique of September 26, threatening that “Great 
Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France”? It was because all 
of them, like the grossly anti-Czech Henderson on August 6, knew 
that Hitler would not dare to make war if they “showed their teeth”. 

Indeed, all this was made quite obvious by several important mem- 
bers of the British Government within a short time after Munich. 
The Minister for Co-ordination of Defence said at Gravesend on 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



250 

October 13 : “We are ready to defend British interests, British liberty 
and British territory against any invader or against any aggressor. . . . 
There was nothing unready about the Air Force, small though it was, 
and I say that in efficiency and courage our Air Force has no equal in 
the world.” The Home Secretary, in his speech at Cambridge, already 
quoted, declared that he was there that night definitely and expressly 
to contradict the charge that Mr. Chamberlain had “capitulated” at 
Munich because British defence forces were too weak to resist. He 
said: “Let no one suppose that because we published to the world our 
own deficiencies, we were the only great country that did not possess 
a navy, an army and an air force ready to the last button to take the 
field. If other countries had welcomed public criticism as we wel- 
comed it, it would have been found that there was not a navy, army 
or air force in the world that had not gaps in its organisation and 
deficiencies in its personnel. Our programme was incomplete and, 
as we had publicly stated the general lines of our expansion, there was 
no secret about its incompleteness. Yet for all its incompleteness, our 
rearmament had reached a stage at which we should have shown our- 
selves unshakcablc in the early days of a war, and irresistible as the 
war progressed.” 

Even the Prime Minister himself found it necessary to declare, in 
a speech in the City of London on December 15, 1938: “We may 
take it that when German statesmen — I will not say the German 
people — reflect upon the possible consequences of conflict, if ever con- 
flict should arise between our two countries, they think not only of 
our armaments but of our great financial resources, which in a war 
of long duration might well prove to be the deciding factor.” 

This reply, from the author and champion of the Munich agree- 
ment, may well be considered conclusive by those who advanced the 
argument from weakness. The fact is that the argument was turned 
on and off, as required, like a water-tap. 

9 

But the grand and prime argument was that all Europe had been 
saved from war. Any other policy would have been a gamble with 
“preventive war”, said Sir Terence O’Connor, the Solicitor-General, 
on October 12, 1938. “We should have been gambling with the lives 
of 50,000,000 people”, declared the Minister of Pensions, in his speech 
on October 31. The Times wrote, on the morning after Munich: “It 
is as certain as can be that war, incalculable in its range, would have 
broken out against the wishes of every people concerned.” And nearly 


THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 25I 

twenty years later Lord Halifax wrote: “The only possible defence of 
Munich, which was the genuine defence, was that it was a horrible 
and wretched business, but the lesser of two evils.” 18 

This was not the first time that such an argument had been used. 
It was used to justify the non-intervention scheme, against the protests 
of the Spanish Republic and the Soviet Union, during the German 
and Italian invasion which began in 1936. The remarkable fact was, 
however, that when, in defiance of all the sophistries used a few 
months before, the French Government, supported by the British, 
gave Germany warning in January, 1937, that it would take military 
action in Morocco unless German fortifications and batteries were 
removed from that portion which was under the control of the 
Spanish rebel Franco, there was no world war, and Germany — for 
the time being, at least — desisted. Similarly, some months later, when 
the ravages of Italian submarines were threatening th e vital communi- 
cations of Great Britain and France in the Mediterranean, the inter- 
national conference was rapidly summoned at Nyon, in September, 
under conditions similar in all essentials to those which prevailed a 
year before, and the governments concerned, led by Britain, France 
and theU.S.S.R., decided on drastic measures which were directed, and 
could only be directed, against Italy. Yet there was no war. The "un- 
known submarines” disappeared from the Mediterranean trade routes. 

There had been a still more striking disproof of the argument that 
to present a firm front to the aggressor meant gambling with the risk 
of a general war. From October, 1936, the Soviet Union was helping 
the Spanish Republic. It did so in the teeth of violent protests by 
Britain and France. If its help to Spain had involved it in an attack 
by the Fascist “axis” — particularly by Germany and Japan — no one 
could seriously believe that either the British or French Government 
would raise a finger at that time. The Fascist Powers were actively 
assisting the Spanish rebels, and their artillerymen and aviators were 
frequently in action against “Red” material. Yet the Fascist “axis” 
did not dare, under these most favourable conditions, to attack the 
U.S.S.R.— obviously because it knew it was not strong enough to 
do so. Obviously, therefore, it would have been still less inclined to 
attack a combination of the U.S.S.R. and Spain with Great Britain 
and France, not to speak of other allies who were then available. 
Yet Mr. Chamberlain and the members of his Cabinet continued, 
month after month, to assert that any firm front against the invaders 
of Spain involved the terrible risk of a general war. 

18 Halifax, Fulness of Days, p. 198. 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


THE DEFENCE OF MUNICH 


252 

The truth was, of course, that the danger of war did not He in 
resisting the aggressor, but on the contrary in co-operating with him. 
For from that he derived encouragement, and his allies also. If two 
such Great Powers as Britain and France could not intervene to save 
the keystone of any collective security on the European continent, 
their own vital interests being at stake, the aggressor might well form 
the impression that they could do nothing effective to stop him 
henceforth. The Munich agreement from this viewpoint did not 
avert war, but rather made a possible (and largely problematical) 
war more certain in the future. For those interests which both the 
British and the French Empires might consider to be vital, and there- 
fore worth defending, were so far-flung, that an aggressor who felt 
that he had a free hand would be bound to come into conflict with 
them somewhere, sooner or later. 

10 

With this argument usually went yet another — that, as the Daily 
Mail wrote on October 1, Chamberlain had ‘laid the foundation of 
lasting peace in Europe”. On October 12, 1938, the Minister for Co- 
ordination of Defence explained that the influence of peace was 
“infectious”. At last they had “got on the road to friendly relations 
with that great nation, Germany”. “After Munich he had been per- 
suaded that fifty years of world peace were now assured”, Lord 
Halifax informed the German Ambassador in London on August 9, 
I939! 9 

In the next chapter an attempt will be made to trace the inter- 
national consequences of Munich. This should provide some material 
forjudging whether these professed hopes were justified, or whether 
the “infectiousness” of the peace concluded at Munich ivas under- 
stood by Hitler in a different sense from that in. which Sir Thomas 
Inskip’s audience understood it. “The fact of Munich was a stepping- 
stone to further aggression”, a United States prosecuting attorney 
was to say at the Nuremberg trials, seventeen years after the Munich 
Conference. 20 

However, within a few weeks of Munich itself there were signs 
that those who bore primary responsibility for it were beginning to 
have doubts as to whether the Munich arrangements were working 
quite as they themselves had intended. 

At Cambridge on November 25, Sir Samuel Hoare, the Home 
Secretary, stated that “in recent days there have been setbacks in the 
19 D. & M., vol. II, p. 128. 20 Trial, part II, p. 24. 


253 

course of European appeasement. I am afraid that we must be pre- 
pared for setbacks.” So also with Lord Zetland, Secretary for India 
and Burma, who declared in a speech at Torquay on November 18: 
“I had hoped that the Conference at Munich marked the opening of 
a new chapter of human history. I am obliged to confess that my 
hope has been rudely shaken.” He admitted that it had “become 
clear” at Munich that what Germany wanted in Czechoslovakia was 
a strategic and not a racial frontier. 

So also the President of the Board of Education, Lord de la Warr, 
speaking at Bradford on December 4, declared that “there was a 
deep and growing feeling that there was no tiling that we could do 
that could satisfy them, that friendly words and friendly actions were 
mistaken for cowardice, and that only armaments could speak effec- 
tively”. 

And the Prime Minister himself, addressing the Foreign Press 
Association in London on December 13, found it necessary to say 
that the checks, disappointments and setbacks he had received had 
come “perhaps in greater measure than I had anticipated”. Of course, 
he was not disheartened or deterred thereby in Ins defence of Munich 
— even though he was speaking to an audience from which the repre- 
sentatives of his partner at Munich, the German Ambassador and the 
German journalists, had demonstratively absented themselves. But even 
so, Mr. Chamberlain was forced to express his regret that the German 
press, controlled from top to bottom by Dr. Goebbels, “in few cases 
sho-ws any sign of a desire to understand our point of view”. Nor 
was the Prime Minis ter content to confine himself to these plaintive 
comments. Justifying the expansion of British armaments after the 
Munich agreement, he declared: “While I hope we shall always be 
ready to discuss in a reasonable spirit any grievances or any injustices 
that may be alleged to exist, it is to reason that we are prepared to 
listen, and not to force.” The overwhelming majority of Iris audience 
applauded this statement very loudly, because the diplomats repre- 
senting many small States, the British and foreign diplomatic journal- 
ists assembled for the occasion, and the numerous British public 
men who were also present, understood very well whom this warning 
would reach, w'hatever were the intentions of the Prime Minister. 

Thus it would seem that whatever had proved infectious at Munich, 
it was not the influence of peace, and that the prospects of fifty years 
of peace in Europe, within three months of Munich, were not so 
certain — at any rate in the sense which Lord Halifax had expected. 
But what was that sense? 



PART THREE 


CONCLUSIONS 


CHAPTER XHI 

WHY DID THEY DO IT? 

E VEN if there were no documents to demonstrate the contrary, 
it cannot seriously be contended that what was obvious to British 
and French diplomats on the spot, to special correspondents and poli- 
tical journalists, to military men of experience and to their secret 
agents, was hidden from the Ministers governing Britain and France 
in 1938. 

They knew very well, from diplomatic dispatches and other re- 
ports, that the whole “Sudeten German” agitation was a purposeful 
swindle engineered from Berlin, and that the mass of German-speaking 
citizens of Czechoslovakia, whatever grievances they had, had no 
desire to be forced under the bloody tyranny of Hitler’s Reich instead 
of getting their grievances remedied in Czechoslovakia. The British 
and French Governments, whatever they told their respective publics, 
knew perfectly well that the Munich terms w r ere no better than those 
of Godesbcrg, and their own precious “international guarantee” not 
worth the paper it was written on — except to tide them over a diffi- 
cult moment in face of public opinion. They were well aware that 
they had excluded the U.S.S.R., and that — if they had put all the 
facts before their peoples — no one would have cried out that Czecho- 
slovakia was “a far-away country”, with a people “of whom we 
know nothing”. They did not require generals to tell them that, even 
if Czechoslovakia were partly ravaged in the first onset of war, that 
would not decide its outcome: and that, however great their defi- 
ciencies in armaments, the real balance of strength in 1938, if they 
called in the U.S.S.R. soon enough, would be overwhelmingly on 
their side 1 before ever a question of war arose, and probably would 

1 “It would not be correct to say that our military weakness was the principal cause 
of the Munich agreement”, wrote one of its chief architects, Sir Samuel Hoarc (Lord 
Templewood), in his memoirs, Nine Troubled Years (1945), p. 289. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


WHY DID THEY DO IT? 


256 

prevent it. Nor were they so uninformed — for then they would have 
been almost alone in their respective countries — as to be ignorant of 
the step-by-step tactics of conquest pursued by Hitler, in applying 
the policy of Mein Kampf, or of the possibilities opened to him, both 
in Eastern and Western Europe, if Czechoslovakia were destroyed. 2 
That is to say, they were well aware that, in the literal sense, peace 
would be more, not less, threatened by Munich. 

No one who takes the trouble to read either the diplomatic docu- 
ments or the memoirs of the time — or even some competent account 
of how the machinery of government works in Britain and France — 
could have the slightest illusion about the foregoing. Chamberlain, 
Daladicr and their associates could only have been blind to these 
things if they wanted to be blind. 

Therefore the real question is, why did they want to be blind? In 
what sense did they hope that peace was strengthened by Munich? 
Or let us put it in another way. The excuses and apologies they made 
after the event arc not important: all these men were politicians, 
trained up and well versed in a system which puts a premium on pro- 
mising one thing at elections and doing another after winning them. 
To look at what they said in public, while carrying out their opera- 
tion on the flesh of the Czechoslovak people, would be as helpful 
as liste nin g to the cheap-jack’s patter in the market, instead of look- 
ing at the goods he is selling. But what did they really have in mind, 
in doing what they did between March and September, 1938? 

I11 trying to answer this question, we should take into account one 
remarkable circumstance. On all sides, during these fatal months, re- 
sponsible people were telling each other how dangerous it was for 
them to go to war, because the Soviet Union and Communism would 
be likely to win it. 

On April 30, 1938, Bonnet told Wclczcck, the German Ambassador 
in Paris, that in the event of world war “all Europe would perish, 
and both victor and vanquished v/ould fall victims to world Com- 
munism”. 3 On May 10 the same opinion was conveyed to Welczeck 
by Paul Reynaud, Minister of Justice and Bonnet’s colleague: war 
would be a catastrophe “from which Europe would never recover, 
with the possible exception of Russia, remote and already living under 
Communism”. 4 On May 22 it was Daladicr’s turn. War, he told 

2 Take, for example, Daladier’s remark on September 25 that Hitler’s aim was clearly 
“to destroy Czechoslovakia by force, enslaving her, and afterwards effecting the domi- 
nation of Europe” ( D.D.F.P. , vol. II, p. 527). 

3 D.G.F.P., voL II, p. 254. 4 Ibid., p. 267. 


257 

Welczeck, “would mean the utter destruction of European civilisa- 
tion. Into the battle zones, devastated and denuded of men, Cossack 
and Mongol hordes would pour, bringing to Europe a new ‘culture’. 
This must be prevented, even if it entailed great sacrifices.” 5 On the 
same day, in Berlin, Nevile Henderson was conveying to Ribbentrop 
the same terrifying information: he couldn’t guarantee that Great 
Britain would stand aside if Germany used forcible measures — and 
“only those will benefit from such a catastrophe who wish to sec 
the destruction of European civilisation”. 6 

The idea was not entirely novel to the Germans: but on June 20, 
in a memorandum presented to Ribbentrop by Wcizsackcr, warning 
him against a policy which would bring Britain and France into war 
with Germany too soon, we read again that “the common loser with 
us would be the whole of Europe, the victors chiefly the non-European 
continents and the anti-social powers”. 7 However, the French Ambas- 
sador in Moscow joined in the lecturing some time in August. Express- 
ing the hope that there would be no Franco-German conflict, “you 
know as well as I do for whom we are working if we come to blows”, 
Coulondre told von der Schulenburg. 8 The next day, in Prague, 
Benes was telling the Henleinite leaders that “he was only afraid of 
two tilings, a war and, after it, a Bolshevik revolution”. 9 And the 
complete unity of Germany’s actual and possible opponents on tins 
point was again underlined for her rulers the next day again (August 
25), when a cable from the German Legation in Prague informed 
them that the Secretary of the British Legation, in conversation with 
both journalists and diplomats, was declaring: “If it came to war 
between Germany, France and Britain, the only ones to benefit would 
be the Soviets.” 10 

Endlessly, the terrible tidings went round in ever-larger circles. On 
September 2 it was the turn of the United States Ambassador in Paris. 
As we have seen earlier, Bullitt on that day told Sir Eric Phipps, the 
British Ambassador, that after provoking “a general conflagration”, 
Russia would rise “like a phoenix, but out of all our ashes”, in order 
to bring about “a world revolution”. 11 On September 6 the Ruma- 
nian Foreign Minister, Comncn, insisted to the Germans that world 
war would be unavoidable if there were armed conflict between them 

5 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 327. 

0 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 341 (Lord Perth, in Rome, gave the same warning to Ciano that 
evening). 

7 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 420. 8 Ibid., p. 631. 9 Ibid., p. 641. 

10 Ibid., pp. 656-7. 11 D.B.F.P., vol. D, p. 219. 


R 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


WHY DID THEY DO IT? 


258 

and Czechoslovakia, and that “the sole beneficiaries of a conflict would 
be Bolshevism and international Jewry”. 12 Next day it was Daladicr 
once again rubbing it into the German Charge d’ Affaires: “After die 
end of a war, the outbreak of a revolution, irrespective of victor or 
vanquished, was as certain in France as in Germany and Italy. Soviet 
Russia would not let the opportunity pass of bringing world revolu- 
tion to our lands after the weakening of the European continent.” 13 
Nor were the Germans idle. On September 11 the German military 
attache in Paris, Kuhlenthal, said to General Gamelin: “When Ger- 
many and France arc prostrate, Russia, who will have stood aside, 
will intervene and it will be universal revolution.” 14 

These opinions were shared in the United States. On September 25, 
as described in the note to Chapter VII, the German Charge d’ Affaires 
in Washington cabled about the “pronounced antipathy” of the lead- 
ing authorities in the U.S. Army towards the Soviet Union, whom 
they believed to be “attempting to incite the Powers against one 
another so as to promote Communism”. 15 Nor was tins feeling 
confined to the Pentagon. Roosevelt’s first message to Hidcr, in 
more veiled yet unmistakable terms, warned him that if there 
were war, “the social structure of every country involved may 
be completely wrecked”. And in later conversation with Benes — as 
the latter revealed many years afterwards — Roosevelt confirmed that 
these had been his feelings: “I realised that he was also aware of 
the universal social crisis which would inevitably spring from a new 
war.” 16 

Such was the chorus rising on all sides. Each was trying to frighten 
the other — the Anglo-French camp, in order to persuade the Germans 
to accept Czechoslovakia peacefully in stages, so to speak: the Ger- 
man camp, in order to keep Anglo-French pressure on the Czecho- 
slovak Government up to the mark: the Americans, evidently, to 
reinforce their argument, addressed to both sides, that the Chamberlain 
way was the best. 

Now of course it was perfectly obvious that another world war 
would precipitate a deepening of the profound crisis in the capitalist 
system ushered in by the outbreak of the first world war in 1914. 
Tins was no diplomatic secret. Stalin had publicly reminded the world 
of it on several occasions. “Every time the contradictions of capitalism 
become acute,” he said, in his political report on behalf of the Central 
Committee, to the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of the 

12 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 701. 13 Ibid., p. 713. 14 Gamelin, op. at., p. 343 - 

16 D.G.F.P., vol. II, p. 922. 16 Benes, op. cit., pp. 79-80. 


259 

Soviet Union, 17 "the bourgeoisie turns its gaze towards the U.S.S.R., 
and asks whether it would not be possible to solve this or that contra- 
diction of capitalism, or all the contradictions together, at the expense 
of the U.S.S.R. . . . But intervention is a two-edged sword. The bour- 
geoisie knows this perfectly well. It will be all right, it thinks, if inter- 
vention goes off smoothly and ends in the defeat of the U.S.S.R. But 
what if it ends in the defeat of the capitalists? There has been interven- 
tion once and it ended in failure. If the first intervention, when the 
Bolsheviks were weak, ended in failure, what guarantee is there that 
the second will not end in failure? Everybody sees that the Bolsheviks 
arc very much stronger now.” More recently, on January 26, 1934, 
Stalin had returned to the question more forcibly and in greater detail. 18 

If the German bourgeoisie launched a new war, now that Fascism 
was in the saddle, he said, “it is sure to unleash revolution and jeopardise 
the very existence of capitalism in a number of countries, as was the 
case in the course of the first imperialist war. . . . What guarantee is 
there that the second imperialist war will produce ‘better’ results for 
them than the first? Would it not be more correct to assume that 
the opposite will be the case?” As for war against the U.S.S.R., such 
a war would be “the most dangerous war” for the bourgeoisie which 
started it. “And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame us if some of 
the governments so near and dear to them, which to-day rule happily 
‘by the grace of God’, are missing on the morrow of such a war. . . . 
It can hardly be doubted that a second war against the U.S.S.R. will 
lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to revolution in a num- 
ber of countries in Europe and in Asia, and to the destruction of the 
bourgeois-landlord governments in these countries.” 

But if this was the universally agreed prospect, and if— -as was 
obvious from the experience of the years 1933-8, and still more of the 
months from March to September, 1938 — the ambitions of the Nazi 
leaders in a revived imperialist Germany were creating the threat of 
a new world war which must bring revolution in its train, why 
encourage them? Why not prevent war? Why not enlist the sup- 
port of the Soviet Union in putting it off? These questions w'ere all 
the more reasonable because Stalin at no time and in no way was 
extolling the virtues of war. On the contrary, hi the very same speech 
of January, 1934, which had become known throughout the world, 
Stalin had said that, without having “to sing the praises of the Ver- 
sailles Treaty, we merely do not agree to the world being flung into 

17 June 27, 1930 (Works, vol. XII, pp. 262-3). 

18 Political report to the 17th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (Works, vol. XIII, pp. 3°o-3)- 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


260 

the abyss of a new war on account of that treaty”. He had, moreover, 
in referring to the restoration of normal relations between the U.S.S.R. 
and the U.S.A. (in December, 1933), emphasised that it improved 
the chances of preserving peace. And in 1938 itself the Soviet Govern- 
ment, as we have seen, had repeatedly offered to co-operate in pre- 
serving peace. 

Why were the Soviet offers rejected, if the British and French 
were so afraid of the revolutionary consequences of a war? Why 
was the chance of calling a halt to the declared organisers of world 
conquest, and therefore of world war, thrown away? Why did the 
British and French Governments prefer yet a further settlement with 
Hitler at someone else’s expense, after all the previous deals of 1933-8 
— and even though it meant gambling with their own security in 
Europe — to a full understanding with the U.S.S.R. which would have 
inflicted such a check on Hitler as must inexorably have broken his 
prestige among his own people? 

The answer to these questions is the answer to the question at the 
head of this chapter. 

To some extent it was given, of course, by the experience of the 
years prior to 1938. And behind the scenes much was said in those 
years to make that clear. Some examples were given in the first part 
of this book; here are more. In 1935 Chamberlain himself, then Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer, had replied to A. V. Ozcrsky, the Soviet 
Trade Representative in London, enquiring about credit and other 
facilities for expanding trade between the two countries: “But why 
should we assist our worst enemy!” 19 The Franco-Soviet pact of 
mutual assistance was never implemented by France in 1936 and 1937, 
wrote the French Ambassador in Moscow 7 during those years, “be- 
cause of the prejudices teeming in France against the Soviets and their 
regime”. 20 Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of The Times (writes his 
biographer), w 7 as, in October and November, 1937, when his friend 
Lord Halifax w 7 ent to Berlin, “fully cognisant” that “Nazi Germany 
undoubtedly stood as a w 7 edge between Russian Communism and 
the West”, and that to ring Germany about “with vigilant allied 
States, sometimes masquerading as the League of Nations, like trained 
elephants round a tiger in the jungle to prevent her expansion in any 
direction beyond the limits imposed twenty years ago” was a process 
which should be stopped — otherwise it must “lead inevitably to w 7 ar 
and to the downfall of civilisation in the West”. 21 That is to say, the 

19 Ozcrsky described the interview to the writer, immediately afterwards. 

20 Robert Coulondre, op. cit., p. 35. 21 Wrench, op. cit., pp. 362-3. 


WHY DID THEY DO IT? 26l 

“West” had more in common with Hitler than with the U.S.S.R.: 
if Flitler were overthrown, on account of his “expansion”, it would 
mean the overthrow of civilisation: if he expanded only against 
“Russian Communism”, even at the expense of that “masquerade” 
known as the League of Nations, it would be a different story — 
and it was wnrth risking world w'ar in the future for the sake of that. 
Then Chamberlain, Eden and Halifax met the French Premier Chau- 
temps, his Foreign Minister Delbos and Lcger, the permanent head 
of the Foreign Ministry, at the end of November, 1937 (just after 
Halifax’s visit to Hitler). Chamberlain liked Chautemps. “He was 
quick and witty and, as it seemed to me, quite candid and straight- 
forward. He did not conceal Iris dislike for Soviet Russia. . . .” 22 
These dots are in the extract quoted by Chamberlain’s biographer: 
a pity they should come just at that point. 

Here one should draw attention to the special role of “dots”, and 
other signs of omission and ellipsis, in the documents of the time. 
Again and again — in memoirs, diaries, collections of diplomatic docu- 
ments — they appear and reappear, with almost invariable regularity, 
whenever the dangerous subject of the Soviet Union arises. In the 
same way masses of documents suddenly disappear, just w r hen they 
would throw a good deal of light on w 7 liat the spokesmen of ‘ ‘civilisa- 
tion in the West” w 7 ere saying about the Soviet Union. The French 
Yellow Book, published in 1939, is one example: it did not print 
a single document between March 13, 1938, and September 29 of 
that year. During those “pregnant” months it suffered — like other 
collections — “from vapours and faintness, and from a most remark- 
able mental blackout”, in Professor Namier’s sarcastic words. 23 Yet 
we know from Coulondrc’s, Noel’s, Francois Poncet’s, Gamelin s and 
Bonnet’s memoirs — not to speak of the British and German diplo- 
matic documents — that all kinds of important messages were passing, 
and opinions being expressed, through diplomatic channels, about 
relations with the U.S.S.R. Similarly the compilers of the collection 
of British documents on the Czechoslovak question in 1938 apparently 
believe that the eighteen letters and telegrams passing between London 
and the British Embassy in Moscow between March and September, 
1938, which arc printed in tw r o bulky volumes containing over 1200 
others to and from other capitals — vivid enough as they are for those 
seeking an insight into the spirit of the Foreign Office when it con- 
templates the Soviet Union — exhaust the correspondence on the 
subject. Bead credentes! 

22 Feiling, op. cit., p. 334. 


23 Diplomatic Prelude (1948), p- 33- 


262 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Here is a striking example of the effectiveness of dots, in this con- 
nection, taken from a time long before Munich. King George V, we 
are told, “consulted Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary 
at the Foreign Office, as to whether there was in fact any possibility 
of our being able to reach a firm understanding with Nazi Germany”. 
Vansittart replied on November 7, 1935: “I do not think it would 
be profitable to undertake any serious attempt for an agreement with 
Germany until our own national re-equipment is well under way. . . . 
Secondly, it would be essential that any such exploration should be 
undertaken in concert with the French. . . . Any arrangement with 
Germany will have to be paid for, and handsomely paid for. ... I 
am convinced that modern Germany is highly expansive, and will 
become highly explosive if it is sought to cramp her anywhere. . . . 
Any attempt at giving Germany a free hand to annex other people’s 
property in Central or Pastern Europe is both absolutely imm oral 
and completely contrary to all the principles of the League which 
form the backbone of the policy of this country. Any British Govern- 
ment that attempted to do a deal would almost certainly be brought 
down in ignominy— and deservedly. . . . Any suggestion that a 
British Government contemplates leaving, let alone inviting, Ger- 
many to satisfy her land-hunger at Russia’s expense, would quite 
infallibly split this country from top to bottom.” 24 

When Vansittart wrote it was but six months since the Franco- 
Soviet pact had aroused violent criticism in Nazi and Tory circles: 
how much the passages replaced by dots after the reference to France 
might tell us! It was five months since the Anglo-German Naval 
Treaty: what extra bribes would have been needed to “pay for” an 
arrangement with Germany? It was also five months since the Peace 
Ballot results had shown the British people enthusiastic for collective 
security, and still less since the Tory Government had been returned 
to power by pretending that it shared their enthusiasm: could the dots 
after the sections about a deal giving Germany a free hand in Eastern 
Europe, and letting her satisfy herself at Russia’s expense, have possibly 
replaced passages which throw light on who was considering such a 
deal? The incident is also an indication of the effectiveness of whole 
documents disappearing: might not the dots have a new significance, 
if we blew what the King had asked, in the first place? When the head 
of the State, who secs all important dispatches and discusses policy on 
intimate terms with successive Foreign Secretaries, asks questions which 
produce such an answer as Vansittart’s, it is not a mere “incident”. 

24 Harold Nicolson, King George the Fifth (1952), p. 529. 


WIIY DID THEY DO IT? 263 

For these very reasons it should not be expected that, on the all- 
important question of the rejection of the Soviet offers, the published 
collections of official documents or memoirs of statesmen would con- 
tain memoranda or dispatches setting forth clearly the real reasons 
why the British and French Governments preferred agreement with 
Hitler — and the consequent aggression — to agreement with the Soviet 
Union. Dots and omissions are too convenient a device. One must 
fall back on circumstantial evidence in most cases. Only on a few occa- 
sions does a slip or chance oversight give a pointer: but when it does, 
the direction is always the same. 

Thus on January 16, 1938, Chamberlain wrote to a friend in the 
U.S.A. that he was “about to enter upon a fresh attempt to reach 
a reasonable understanding with both Germany and Italy”, and hoped 
for help in this from the U.S.A., particularly when it came to hinting 
to Hitler that overwhelming force might be used against him. In his 
diary, on February 19, he entered that from the first he had been “try- 
ing to improve relations with the two storm centres, Berlin and 
Rome”. 25 We blow already, from his speech in the House of Com- 
mons on February 21 in which he developed this idea, that he excluded 
the Soviet Union as “half Asiatic” from his four-Powcr scheme for 
settling the peace of Europe. These sentiments, “admirable as they 
sound out of their context, were alarming to devotees of collective 
security who lived on the eastern side of the Axis, remote from 
Britain and France, and who looked to the Soviet Republic to join 
at least with France, if not also with Britain in their defence. They 
were correspondingly encouraging to the declared enemies of the 
League of Nations at Berlin.” 26 How much more alarming to the 
one, and encouraging to the other, Chamberlain’s sentiments would 
have sounded, a month later, if they had known that, in a letter to 
another correspondent, he had written of “the Russians stealthily and 
cunningly pulling all the strings behind the scenes to get us involved 
in war with Germany” — because, three days before, they had offered 
their co-operation in stopping further aggression (Litvinov’s proposal 
of March 17), at a time when Germany was “flushed with triumph” 
and Britain was unable to “beat her to her knees in a reasonable 
time” ! 27 

Would not both have concluded that, should Hitler, flushed with 
triumph, have decided to attack the U.S.S.R., with or without the 
agreement of Poland, and whether or not he stopped by the way to 
devour Czechoslovaba, Chamberlain would have heaved a sigh of 

26 Feiling, op. cit., pp. 324, 322. 28 Survey, p. 55. 27 Feiling, op. cit., pp. 347-8- 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



264 

relief (never mind what Vansittart had written two and a half years 
before)? The information was not disclosed at the time: but it pro- 
vides a key to Munich. It was, indeed, shortly after this (April 4, 
1938) that U.S. Ambassador Davies wrote from Moscow to Stephen 
Early, President Roosevelt’s secretary: '“Russia might be a helpful 
bulwark for the protection of international peace. The European 
democracies, however, seem deliberately to play into the hands of 
the Fascists in the effort to isolate completely the great power that is 
here from the rest of the world, and particularly from France and 
England. It is a pity, but it is true.” 28 

What the minds of “the European democracies” were running on 
was in fact not very difficult to understand, for people who read the 
newspapers carefully, even then. Rut they would have been helped 
had they known that, on April 25, the British War Minister (Leslie 
Horc-Bclisha) had a talk with the chief of the French General Staff 
about Germany’s policy after the annexation of Austria' — and “saw 
her ambitions, at least at first, towards Eastern Europe”. 29 This remark 
indicates the real background to Chamberlain’s complacent statement 
— at the meeting of British and French Ministers in London, three 
days later — that “he wondered if the picture of the European situation 
was as black as Daladier had painted it”. 30 Churchill himself, only 
a few days before, had expressed privately the fear that Chamberlain 
intended to follow up the Italo-British Agreement signed on the 16th 
(giving Italy virtually a free hand in Ethiopia and Spain while the 
League of Nations was still pledged to support both) with “something 
even more specious with Germany, which will lull the British public 
while letting the German armed strength grow and German designs 
in the East of Europe develop”. 31 

Churchill himself, however, did not always take pains to discourage 
those designs, judging by the translated record in the German archives 
of a conversation on July 14, 1938, between himself and Foerstcr, 
head of the Danzig Nazis, who was on a visit to England. At one point, 
the record runs: “I remarked that I did not believe that Germany 
really feared Russia, to which he replied that they knew for a fact of 
the existence of Russian airfields in Czechoslovakia, from which an 
attack could be launched on Berlin in half an hour. I replied that, in 
my opinion, it would be quite possible, as part of a general European 
agreement, to pledge Britain and France to come to Germany’s assist- 
ance with all their forces should she be the victim of an unprovoked 

28 Davies, op. cit., p. 317. 29 Gamelin, op. cit., p. 318. 

30 D.B.F.P., vol. I, p. 221. 31 Churchill, op. cit., p. 221. 


WHY DID THEY DO IT? 265 

attack on the part of Russia through Czechoslovakia, or in any other 
way. He asked who was to determine who was the aggressor? I re- 
plied that the aggressor would be the nation that first forcibly crossed 
the frontier of another nation.” 32 

But would the agreement work the other way, so far as the U.S.S.R. 
was concerned? On that Churchill seems to have said nothing. Natur- 
ally, this may be represented as a manoeuvre, only intended to draw 
Focrster out by dangling before him the bait of a one-sided guarantee 
(such as was implicit in Chamberlain’s plans and speeches of February 
and March). But the curious thing is that it fitted in very well with 
a suggestion made by Chamberlain himself, during his talks with 
Hitler at Bcrchtesgadcn on September 15. “The British Prime Minister 
asked whether German objections regarding this role ol Czecho- 
slovakia” (which Hitler had described as “a menace to Germany— 
a spearhead in Germany’s side”) “would cease to exist if it were 
possible so to alter the relations between that country and Russia that, 
on the one hand, Czechoslovakia would be released from her obliga- 
tions to Russia in the case of an attack on that country and, on the other 
hand, if she like Belgium no longer had the possibility of obtaining 
assistance from Russia or another country” (the record kept by 
Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter; Chamberlain’s own minute, made later 
for the Cabinet, spoke of Czechoslovakia not providing facilities for 
Soviet planes on her airfields). 33 

Thus in both cases, in July and September, the idea put to the Ger- 
mans was that, if Hitler could find some way of attacking the U.S.S.R. 
which did not draw Britain into war, by the necessity of assisting 
France, the way might be open to him, if he wanted it. 

Now it so happens that, more than once, the Nazis had suggested 
to the Polish Government that the two States should co-operate in 
“defending themselves against aggression from the East” (Flitler’s ex- 
pression in talking to the Polish Ambassador on January 24, 1935) 
and in a joint attack on Russia after which “the Ukraine would be 
a Polish sphere of influence and North-Western Russia would be 
Germany’s” (Goering’s expressions during a visit to Warsaw in 
February, 1935). “Russia is Asia— Germany was faced with the prob- 
lem of finding areas for economic expansion or space for its popula- 
tion. Poland had not and could not provide cither,” Hitler said to 
the Polish Ambassador on May 22, 1935. “He was in favour of Euro- 
pean solidarity, but in his opinion this solidarity ended at the Polish- 
Soviet frontier,” he told the Ambassador on December 18, 1935. As 
32 D. & M., vol. I, pp. 136-7. 33 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 340, 347 - 


266 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


late as February 23, 1938, Goering gave the Polish Commandcr-in- 
Chief, Smigly-Rydz, “to understand that, in the event of war, it 
would not be difficult to inflict a military defeat on the Soviets”. 34 

According to the then Polish leaders, throughout this period they 
had “firmly rejected any suggestion of a common Polish-German 
policy against the Soviets”. 35 In reality, from 1934 they regularly sided 
with Hitler in all the stages of his expanding aggression, in which the 
U.S.S.R. was on the other side. They refused to join the proposed 
Eastern Locarno in 1935. In 1936 and 1937 they regularly opposed 
the cause of the Spanish Republic at the League, and in 1937 also 
refused to support the League’s condemnation of Japan and appeal 
for aid to China. In March, 1938, they all but invaded Lithuania, being 
restrained only by a threat from the U.S.S.R. All this was done in 
full view of the world public. “The (Polish) government of colonels 
had vied with Hitler and Mussolini in its contempt for the League. . . . 
It had made its full contribution to the deterioration of the general 
situation of Europe, and in particular to the destruction of the 
League’s power to prevent aggression”, writes the League’s extremely 
moderate and by no means anti-Polish former Deputy Secretary- 
General. 36 

Of course this conduct did not prove incontrovertibly that, if 
Hitler once more repeated his proposal for a joint operation against 
the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government would accept it. But who could 
tell, in the late summer of 1938? They might. Had not the chief of 
the Polish general staff quite recently (June 14) told the British mili- 
tary attache in Warsaw, with many details, that “Russia would very 
soon reach a crisis which would put her out of action not for months 
but for years”? There was always the possibility, if that was the Polish 
view, that they might be tempted. And in that case France would 
not necessarily be drawn in under her treaty with the U.S.S.R. This 
was the real meaning of Chamberlain’s innocent enquiry. And this 
makes it all the more natural to find General Gamelin recording, 
shortly afterwards, that when he was discussing the question of mili- 
tary co-operation with the British service chiefs in London, on Sept- 
ember 26 — it seemed a dark moment — it was “evident that the 
hypothesis of seeing Russia invade Poland” (i.e. should she attack 
Czechoslovakia) “hardly attracts our Allies”. 87 

So much for the diplomatic documents before September, 1938. 
They begin to suggest the true explanation of British and French 

34 Polish White Book (London, 1939), pp. 24, 26, 29, 31, 45. 33 Ibid., p. 216. 

33 F. P. Walters, op. cit., vol. II, p. 793. 37 Gamelin, op. cit., p. 352. 


WHY DID THEY DO IT? 267 

policy at Munich — that it was an agreement to let Hitler take Czecho- 
slovakia, in the hope that it was but a temporary stopping place on 
the road to a German war with the Soviet Union. The reader will 
remember that tins was precisely the explanation which Mr. Gedye 
got in official, diplomatic and political quarters in London, long be- 
fore Munich. When we come to the memoirs of other eye-witnesses 
of that time, of participants in the tragedy, men who cannot be 
accused of Communist sympathies, we hear it again and again. 

BeneS wrote: “Munich with all its catastrophic European conse- 
quences would not have occurred but for the hostility of Western 
Europe towards the Soviet Union and the differences between them. 

. . . The exclusion of the Soviet Union from all pre- and post-Munich 
discussions was equivalent — in the Soviet view — to an attack against 
the Soviet Union and to an attempt to secure its complete isolation. 
Moscow rightly” (the italics are Benes’) “feared that this fatal step 
could soon lead to a military attack by Germany against the Soviet 
Union.” 38 If Moscow was right in fearing, Chamberlain could hardly 
avoid hoping: that is the logic of Benes’ words. 

Wheeler-Bennett, present in Czechoslovakia in September, in fact 
writes: “This willingness to see Hitler dominant in Central and Eastern 
Europe was not, however, merely a by-product of the general trend 
of British diplomacy. It was of far greater significance than that, and 
represented one of the prime factors in the whole political situation. 
Behind the general desire for peace and for an ‘accommodation’ with 
Hitler then lay, if not in the mind of Mr. Chamberlain himself at any 
rate in the minds of some of his advisers, the secret hope that, if 
German expansion could be directed towards the East, it would in 
time come into collision with the rival totalitarian imperialism of 
Soviet Russia. In the conflict which would ensue both the forces of 
National Socialism and Communism would be exhausted. ... It was 
believed by those who held these opinions that Bolshevik Russia was 
of greater danger to Britain than Nazi Germany.” 39 

Paul-Boncour, dismissed by Daladier in April, 1938, because he 
favoured a policy of close political and military co-operation with 
the U.S.S.R., wrote in his memoirs (in 1942, after the defeat of 
France) that it was “the fear of Communism” (in this case the U.S.S.R.) 
“which made the frogs ask for the Fiihrer who would protect them. 
This helped them to get the Anschluss, Munich, the suppression of 
Czechoslovakia. Tliis had interfered with the utilisation of the 
Franco-Soviet pact, to the point of ruining it.” This was the sentiment, 

38 Benes, op. cit., pp. 131, 240. 39 Whccler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 295-6. 


268 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


lie said, which had “hung so heavily on French foreign policy since 
1936”. 40 

Coulondre wrote from his Embassy in Moscow to Bonnet, on 
October 4, 1938 (a document not included in the French Yellow 
Book): “The Munich agreement, so pregnant with consequences for 
the future of all Europe, of which many of the values will doubtless 
have to be revised, is particularly heavy with menace for the Soviet 
Union.” Is it to be supposed that Chamberlain did not see what 
Coulondre did? He continued: “With the neutralisation of Czecho- 
slovakia, the road to the South-East is henceforth open to Germany. 
Will there be any Powers willing and able to prevent her entering it, 
or halting on it before she reaches Russia, in order to see there the 
Lebensraum announced in Mein Kainpf ? This question is certainly at 
present the central point of the Soviet Government’s worries, and the 
negative reply which it is led to give to that question — not without good 
grounds, too ” (my italics) “ — is sufficient to explain the mood of the 
press.” 41 

And Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State of the U.S.A., 
who came on a tour of Europe in 1940? “It should never be for- 
gotten”, he wrote, “that the Soviet Union did not desert the League. 
It was the great Powers which dominated the League in its later years 
that deserted the Soviet Union.” Hitler in 1938, said Welles, counted 
“on the unwillingness of both France and Great Britain to align them- 
selves with the Soviet Union in a war in Central Europe. Nor did he 
underestimate the influence of those in the two western countries who 
still believed that German domination of Europe was preferable to 
the growth of Russian power.” 42 

Here is another contemporary voice, that of Professor A. B. Keith 
— though a Tory professor of constitutional history, and not a dip- 
lomat, yet for many years a close student of modern diplomacy — 
writing on the very day of Munich (the note is reproduced in his 
book of 1940, The Causes of the War). Chamberlain and Daladier, he 
said, had “acquired the rank of peacemakers by the convenient method 
of imposing further surrenders on Czechoslovakia”. They knew that 
Mussolini and Hitler were demanding wholesale concessions to the 
demands of Hungary and Poland. With German armies in possession 
of the ceded areas of Czechoslovakia, the latter — and Chamberlain 
and Daladier as well — would be compelled once more to accept the 
dictation of Germany and Italy. “The way will be made ready for 

40 J. Paul-Boncour, op. cit., vol. Ill, pp. 153-4. 41 Coulondre, op. cit., pp. 165-6. 

42 Welles, The Time for Decision (1944), pp. 29, 34. 


WHY DID THEY DO IT? 269 

the undisputed control by these Powers of eastern Europe, preparatory 
to advance against Russia.” 43 

Some of the statements quoted are clear and unambiguous, others 
couched in diplomatic language. But their principal meaning cannot 
be misunderstood. 

Let us turn to later writers, historians. Three will suffice: none of 
them can be accused of being pro-Communist. 

Professor L. B. Namier wrote in 1948: “Munich was a Four-Power 
Pact dictated by the Axis. Could the Western Powers believe that 
Hitler had reached the limit of his ambitions (and would now re-start 
painting Christmas cards), or were they willing to remain passive 
spectators if, for instance, he turned against the U.S.S.R.?” To ask 
a question in such a way is to answer it. Referring to Hitler’s “offer” 
to Poland on October 24, 1938 — to give up Danzig, allow a German 
corridor across the Polish Corridor, and sign an alliance with Ger- 
many — Namier wrote: “It had been assumed in the West that such 
an understanding would be directed against Russia, and aim at con- 
quering Lebensraum in the East for both partners.” And later on he 
added: “Ramsay MacDonald’s ‘Four-Power Pact’ of 1933, associating 
the Western Powers with the Dictators, delineated the pattern of 
policy which led to the Munich surrender. . . . Did they mean to 
deflect Hitler against the East, especially against the Soviet Union? 
They yearned for peace all round; but if there had to be aggression, 
they like everyone else hoped that Hitler would start on some country 
other than their own, and at as great a distance from it as possible.” 44 
The difference between this policy and that of the U.S.S.R., on which 
Professor Namier did not enlarge, was that the latter strove, not to 
“deflect” Hitler westwards, but to enlist the help of Britain and France 
in checkmating him. 

Then there is the Survey of International Affairs of Chatham House 
for 1938 — a volume published in 1951, far less unkind to Chamberlain 
than Sir Lewis Namier, and one which strains every nerve to find 
something soothing to say about him. Writing of the British Con- 
servatives who were in power, it says “a very numerous element” 
(to avoid saying “the overwhelming majority”) were “peculiarly re- 
ceptive of the German propaganda harping constantly on the theme 
that Britain had no interests in Central Europe, while the Reich had 
no intention of interfering with British interests in other continents”. 
In France, “for the bulk of the bourgeoisie, Bolshevism was the 
enemy”: and the “Right” (to avoid saying all the bourgeois parties, 
43 Keith, op. cit., p. 362. 44 Diplomatic Prelude, pp. xii, 146. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 





270 

since the Government included both Radicals and Socialists, but none 
of the Right) “believed that Nazism could be canalised, that its anti- 
Bolshevism was a real matter of faith, that the peace of Western 
civilisation could be saved by deflecting Germany to the conquest 
of the East”. 46 

Lastly we have the historian of the League of Nations — a non-party 
international civil servant for many years, correct and obviously 
anxious to be objective. From its exclusion from the negotiations over 
Czechoslovakia, writes Mr. Walters, and from the failure of its efforts 
to revive the security system of the Covenant (efforts which Britain 
took the lead in opposing), “the Soviet Government was justified 
in concluding that the British and French did not desire its participa- 
tion in their search for peace. It drew also, doubtless with less justi- 
fication, the conclusion that they secretly hoped to see Russia attacked 
by Germany and that, if this should happen, she could not count upon 
their help.” 46 The only comment which the reader will probably 
make, after all the foregoing, will be to ask: why with “less justi- 
fication”? 

There can be no reasonable doubt that we have the answer to the 
question asked in the title of this chapter. The British and French 
Governments acted as they did in 1938 because they hoped, by hand- 
ing over Czechoslovakia to Hitler, to keep the door open for him to 
commit further aggression in the east of Europe, preferably against 
the U.S.S.R. This was no new idea for the British Government: it 
had been an integral strand in their foreign policy for many years, 
and particularly since 1933. For the French Government it dated from 
a little later, but not very much later. That this put them in danger 
themselves they did not believe: they were too sure of Hitler as their 
partner in this scheme, and perhaps they thought he shared their 
belief in the nonsense which the British Embassy in Moscow (and 
some others) were feeding to them, about internal conditions in the 
U.S.S.R. It seemed a winning card. All that was now necessary, to 
back it up, was to build up their armaments as fast as possible, in 
order to make sure that Hitler kept his side of the bargain. Who 
would fail to choose attacking the Soviet Union — chaotic, militarily 
feeble, economically disorganised, politically oppressed, etc., etc. — 
rather than attacking powerful, democratic, prosperous and well- 
armed Britain and France? 

That was the gamble of Munich: and there lies the error of calling 
it “appeasement”. It was a good deal more than that. 

45 Op. tit., pp. 167, 173-4. 46 Walters, History of the League of Nations, vol. II, p. 782. 


WHY DID THEY DO IT? 27I 

If two gangsters, with an already long list of murders on their re- 
cord, announce their intention of doing away with another victim: 
and two others, outwardly respectable businessmen, but who have 
been privately financing them for years in order to keep the gangsters 
away from their own well-lined safes, make all the arrangements with 
them for the new crime, each of the four may have his own little 
calculations. The calculations may be very different. The first two may 
be secretly planning to attack the second two, next time. The second 
two may be hoping that the next “job” they finance will rid them 
of a powerful business competitor — and of a pair of dangerous part- 
ners into the bargain. But for the moment these diverging motives 
are secondary. For the time being all four arc partners — partners in 
a conspiracy, with both immediate and long-term ends. The latter 
may differ: the short-term ends coincide. 

That is what went on in 1938, and culminated at Munich. For the 
moment, the victim w'as Czechoslovakia. For Hitler, seconded by his 
Italian partner, it was one more of his chain of “improvisations” on 
the road to fulfilment of Mein Kampf. For the British and French 
Governments, it was one more inducement to Hitler to go East — of 
course observing their interests — and ultimately to attack the Soviet 
Union. Which of these hopes would be realised, only the future could 
tell. But for the moment the conspiracy was certain — and all four 
were partners in it, their several parts in it determined by their cir- 
cumstances. 

Munich was a conspiracy for aggression. 



CHAPTER XIV 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 

l. Czechoslovakia 

I MMEDIATELY after Munich political changes began in Czecho- 
slovakia which completed the process of making sure that she 
should be totally impotent to resist further German demands. Poland 
took large areas in Silesia and Slovakia, with 225,000 inhabitants of 
whom more than half were Czechs. Hungary annexed a much larger 
area in Slovakia, with a population of 850,000 of whom over 300,000 
were Slovaks and Ukrainians. In Slovakia and Trans-Carpathian 
Ukraine, Fascist groups, in the pay of Germany and Hungary respec- 
tively and regularly receiving orders from Berlin, were put in power, 
in charge of obedient “Parliaments” and “Cabinets” filled with their 
agents. In Bohemia and Moravia Belies and Syrovy resigned, and 
were replaced by men who could be relied upon not to make even 
a show of resistance to demands from Berlin. All the parties except 
the Communists were merged into two — one official, pro-Nazi, the 
“National Union”, the other nominally in opposition, the “Party of 
Labour”: the Communist Party was made illegal and went under- 
ground. Fascist groups functioned openly in addition, and were able 
to enforce (with the help of direct demands from Ribbcntrop) various 
anti-Semitic measures. A special agreement with Germany put the 
railways at her disposal for troop transport. Many liberal newspapers 
were suppressed. The army was reduced hi size and “cleansed” of 
officers known as supporters of Benes. 1 

French (Schneider-Creusot) shares hi the great Skoda armaments 
works were sold to a “Czech” firm— hi reality' passing under German 
control. The big chemical trust hi the Sudeten area, Prager Verchi, 
passed into the hand of I. G. Farben. Czech coal mines and banks 
were taken over in similar deals by German concerns. 2 

But all these measures w r cre insufficient for Hitler’s plans. He began 

1 A detailed account can be found by English readers in Ripka, op. cit., ch. VI, sections 
1 and 2. 

2 Matveyev, op. cit., pp. 93 , 106-7. 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 


273 

preparations hi secret for what Chamberlain’s opponents had anti- 
cipated in their public protests and warnings before Munich. On 
October 11, 1938 — ten days after the German forces crossed the fron- 
tier— Keitel replied to a telegram from Hitler which had asked four 
questions, of which the first is the key one: “What reinforcements 
are necessary in the present situation to break all Czech resistance hi 
Bohemia and Moravia?” On October 21, 1938, Keitel issued an order, 
signed by Hitler, to the heads of the armed forces, winch stated that 
they “must be prepared at all times for the following eventualities : 
(i) the securhig of frontiers of Germany and protection against sur- 
prise air attacks, (ii) the liquidation of the remainder of Czecho- 
slovakia, (iii) the occupation of the Memclland” (in Lithuania). De- 
tailed instructions for a surprise attack on Czechoslovakia, “if her 
policy should become hostile towards Germany”, followed. On Dec- 
ember 17, 1938, Keitel issued a supplementary order, that preparations 
for liquidating the rest of Czechoslovakia “are to continue on the 
assumption that no resistance worth mentioning is to be expected. 
To the outside world, too, it must clearly appear that it is merely 
an act of pacification and not a warlike undertaking.” 3 

On March 15, 1939, these military preparations were put into 
effect. To make this as certain as possible, the Germans had made 
careful arrangements with their paid agents in Slovakia. Some time 
in the winter of 1938-9 two of these, Durcansky (Minister of Trans- 
port) and Mach (Minister of Propaganda) worked out with Goering 
a full programme for proclaiming the “independence” of Slovakia — 
“with strongest political, economic and military ties with Germany” 
(the Hungarians were intriguing to re-establish their century-old con- 
trol of the country). Goering commented that they should be sup- 
ported. “Czechoslovakia without Slovakia is still more at our mercy. 
Air bases in Slovakia are of great importance for the German Air 
Force for use against the East.” On February 12, 1939, Hitler and 
Ribbentrop received Karmasin, a Slovak German (Secretary of State 
and organiser of Nazi storm-troops in Slovakia) and Tuka (a Slovak 
nationalist previously paid by Hungary but now in German employ), 
and received pledges of their co-operation. On March 11 (after the 
Prague Government had dismissed several of the Slovak Ministers for 
open separatist agitation) the new Slovak Government was hi session 
when suddenly Biirckel (Nazi governor of Vienna), Seyss-Inquart 
(Nazi viceroy in Austria) and five German generals came into the 

3 Extensive extracts from the texts of these documents are printed in Trial, part II, 
pp. 42-4. 


s 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



I 


274 

meeting and told the Government that they must proclaim the inde- 
pendence of Slovakia. They would not do so immediately. Accord- 
ingly, on March 13 the dismissed Premier (the Roman Catholic priest 
Tiso) and Durcansky were received by Hitler in Berlin, and were 
told that they must at once proclaim the independence of Slovakia, 
or “he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of events, 
for which he would be no longer responsible”. Ribbentrop added 
that Hungarian troops were moving to the Slovak frontier. Tiso 
accepted, and flew back to Slovakia in a German plane. The next 
day, the Slovakian Parliament proclaimed the “independence” of 
Slovakia. 4 

Now, in the evening of March 14, Hacha, Benes’ successor, was 
summoned to Berlin with liis Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky. They 
were brought to Hitler’s office at 1.15 a.m.: Goering, Ribbentrop, 
Keitel and other officials were present. Hitler said that the German 
army had orders to march in at 6 a.m. that morning, and invited 
Hacha to discuss what should be done, adding that he would give 
Czechoslovakia “fullest autonomy” within the German Reich. The 
pretext given for this action was that “Benes’ tendencies were not 
completely revised” in the new State. Goering, in the subsequent 
conversations, threatened to bombard Prague. Finally, after hours of 
pressure, Hacha at 4.30 a.m. signed a document already prepared, 
which “entrusts with entire confidence the destiny of the Czech people 
and the Czech country to the hands of the Fiihrer of the German 
Reich”. 5 At dawn the same day, the German army entered the country 
from all sides. Hitler took up his quarters in Prague Castle, and in 
the afternoon issued a proclamation to the German army and people 
stating that “Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist”. 0 On the 16th he 
issued a decree incorporating Czechoslovakia into Germany as the 
“Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia”. 

On March 15 Tiso placed Slovakia under Hitler’s “protection”, and 
German troops entered the country in large numbers. However, this 
did not prevent the eastern portions of Slovakia from being occupied 
(by preliminary agreement with Hitler) by Hungarian forces; who 
also occupied and annexed Trans-Carpathian Ukraine. 

Nazi Germany derived great material benefit from the seizure of 
Czechoslovakia. On April 28, 1939, in a speech at the Kroll Opera 

4 Documents in Trial, part II, pp. 89-90, 93-6. 

6 Documents in Trial, part II, pp. 96-101. 

6 The proclamation talked of “wild excesses”, “terror gangs” in Czechoslovakia and 
of "the number of oppressed and persecuted people crying for help” increasing hourly 
{ibid., p. 115). This, six months after Munich! But why trouble to invent new. pretexts? 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 



275 


House in Berlin, Hitler listed as follows the booty seized in Czecho- 
slovakia, “international depot of explosives situated in the centre of 
Europe”: 1582 planes; 2175 light and heavy guns, 735 mortars, 591 
anti-aircraft guns, 43,876 macliinc-guns; 468 tanks. In addition, as 
Coulondre reported to Paris, 7 they had now complete control of the 
Skoda Works, which supplied armaments not only to their own 
country but to Yugoslavia and Rumania, her partners in the Little 
Entente, and aero engines to France. Owning these works (including 
Skoda establishments in Austria), as well as Krupps, put Germany in 
an exceptionally powerful position, politically as well as militarily. 
Moreover, Coulondre pointed out, “taking over Bohemia and Mor- 
avia is the first territorial operation which is not a deficit for the 
Reich from the food point of view. On the contrary, it very tangibly 
improves Germany’s supply position, not only because of the relative 
fertility of Bohemia and Moravia but also, and above all, because 
the Reich is now at the very door of the Hungarian and Rumanian 
granaries.” Germany lacked one and a half m ill i on workers for in- 
dustry and agriculture: she now had three million Czechs who, unsafe 
for military service, would enable her to mobilise her own manpower 
for the army to the full. Her strategic position too had greatly im- 
proved for pressure on the countries in Europe: a sign of this was 
that she had already followed up her conquest of Czechoslovakia (he 
was writing on March 19) by setting up a fourth Air Fleet, based on 
Vienna. 

The way for this had already been prepared by March in the eco- 
nomic field. Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary had, in the 
three months following Munich, signed agreements with Germany 
to supply her with huge quantities of grain, fats, pigs, oil, certain 
other minerals and other raw materials. Funk, the German Minister 
of Economics, had called this the building up of “an economic area 
which will stretch from the North Sea to the Black Sea and will be 
naturally self-sufficient”. 8 What he meant was that the entire resources 
of the area he mentioned would shortly be at the disposal of the 
Nazi war machine. 


2. Spain 

Aggression in Europe by both Hitler and Mussolini was already in 
progress when the preparations for the dismemberment of Czecho- 
slovakia began in March, 1938. This was in Spain. It received great 

7 French Yellow Book (1939), pp. 89-90. 

8 Article of October 17, 1938, quoted by Ripka, op. cit., p. 302. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


277 


276 

encouragement from British and French Government policy in the 
subsequent months, and Munich gave it the final impetus. 

In March and April, 1938, supported by some 50,000 Italian and 
15,000 German “technicians”, air crews and communications troops, 
Franco developed an offensive against the Republican armies, which 
he succeeded in breaking through, and reached the Mediterranean at 
Valencia on April 16. For a few weeks in those months the French 
Government reopened the frontier to war supplies for the Republic, 
but much too late to affect the campaign. On June 13 the frontier 
was closed again. 

On April 16, the British Government — despite its clearly-expressed 
promise at the League of Nations Assembly in September, 1937, to 
consider ending non-intervention if the “veritable foreign army 
corps” on Spanish soil were not withdrawn “in the near future” 
(which the French and British delegates privately said meant about 
ten days) — signed an agreement with the Italian Government pledg- 
ing good-neighbour relations on a number of Mediterranean ques- 
tions (including recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, i.c. 
earlier aggression). On May 13, 1938, at the session of the League 
Council, the British and French Governments voted against a resolu- 
tion ending non-intervention, i.e. restoring the Spanish Government’s 
rights under international law. It cannot be doubted that this per- 
fidious conduct reflected the anxiety of the British and French Govern- 
ments to do nothing which would annoy Hitler and Mussolini. 
Indeed, at the September, 1937, Assembly, Blum as French Prime 
Minister had already begged del Vayo not to name Germany and 
Italy as aggressors, as that would “prejudice the conversations with 
Italy”: and in May, 1938, “there can be no doubt that Lord Halifax 
insisted on the rejection of the resolution in the light of the delicate 
relations existing between Britain and Italy”. 9 

The net result was that Mussolini flatly refused to discuss any with- 
drawal of his forces throughout the whole period of the negotiations 
over Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, more troops and planes 
were sent to Spain, and Mussolini openly declared (in a speech on 
May 15) that Italy and France were “on the opposite sides of the 
barricade”. This was rightly interpreted by Bonnet as connected with 
the “extreme gravity of the international situation”, i.e. the German 
threats to Czechoslovakia. From March until September, a series of 

9 Sec the accounts of these proceedings by Robert Dell, one of several well-informed 
eye-witnesses of the transactions at Geneva, in The Geneva Racket, pp. 156-76: and a 
later account of “non-intervention” by Patricia van der Esch, Prelude to War (The Hague, 
* 95 i)» PP- 109-16. 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 

air attacks on British ships in Spanish ports took place: but on June 13 
Chamberlain publicly announced in the House of Commons that 
nothing could be done about it, while the French Government simul- 
taneously gave secret orders to close the Spanish frontier; and on 
July 6 a Paris court upheld the refusal of the Bank of France to make 
available to the Spanish Government its own gold — -£7,500,000 w'orth, 
deposited in Paris since 1931. 

Thus, at every point, preparations for one aggression helped to 
finish off another, and the Spanish Republic was gradually strangled 
by British and French policy. The process could now be speeded up. 
At Munich, Chamberlain suggested a Four-Power Conference to 
arrange a truce in Spain: Mussolini in return promised him to with- 
draw' 10,000 men. These went in the middle of October, mostly 
wounded and sick (foreign volunteers on the Republic’s side had 
been withdrawn in September). On November 2, Chamberlain sub- 
mitted the Anglo-Italian agreement for ratification. The French had 
already recognised the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia on 
October 2: the British Government did so on November 16: on 
November 28 Chamberlain announced that he and Lord Halifax 
would visit Rome. Already (as we now know) Mussolini had on 
October 28 told Ribbcntrop that he would send more arms to 
Franco: 10 Chamberlain’s announcement was followed on November 
30 by scenes in the Italian Parliament, when the deputies shouted their 
demands for territory belonging to France—' “Tunisia ! Corsica ! Nice ! 

Thus the greater was assistance to the aggressor, the bigger and 
more brazen his demands; but this did not deter the British and 
French Governments from pursuing the course mapped out before 
Munich and at Munich. On January 11-14, 1939. the British Ministers 
visited Rome. In Chamberlain’s conversations with Mussolini, many 
generalities w r ere talked: but the British Prime Minister accepted with- 
out question the Italian statements that they now had “only” 20-25,000 
men in Spain and that they would remain until Tarragona and Bar- 
celona were occupied. All Lord Halifax wanted was assurances to 
France (such as Italy had given to Great Britain) that they would not 
exploit a Franco victory against her, and not advertising more than 
was necessary the help they w r ere giving to General Franco . In 
fact, the British Ministers got no reassurances for France at all— and 
Mussolini and Hitler soon had the opportunity of satisfying them- 
selves that this refusal, keeping the Western Governments guessing, 
brought satisfactory' results. 

10 Ciatio's Diplomatic Papers (London, 1948), p- 246. 11 D.B.F.P., vol. Ill, pp. 521-3- 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


On December 23 Franco had opened a new offensive against Cata- 
lonia. O11 January 15 Tarragona was taken. On January 18 Chamber- 
lain and Daladier simultaneously announced — the one in a letter to 
Attlee, the other by a decision of the French Cabinet — their refusal 
even to discuss the ending of non-intervention. Ciano had told the 
British Ambassador on the 16th that thirty regular battalions, fully 
equipped, were ready to embark at the first sign of French interven- 
tion: “We shall do this even if it should provoke a European war.” 12 
On January 26 Barcelona fell, and on February 27 Great Britain and 
France simultaneously recognised Franco. On March 29 his troops 
occupied Madrid. The part played by the British and French Govern- 
ments had “heightened the contempt of the Axis powers for the 
strength of the democratic world and contributed to the blind pre- 
sumption which ultimately plunged Europe and the world into 
general war”. 13 

The last days of the Spanish war were moreover marked by an 
extremely characteristic attempt to curry favour with Mussolini, the 
consequence of his more than frigid attitude to previous French ap- 
proaches. On February 2 Baudouin, president of the French Banque 
de 1’Indochine, saw Ciano on secret instructions from Daladier and 
Bonnet. He offered Italy (i) a free zone hi the French Somaliland port 
of Djibouti, at which the only railway to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian 
capital, ended, (ii) ownership of that part of the railway which fell 
within Ethiopia, with customs-free transit rights from Ethiopia to the 
free port, (iii) help in securing seats on the Board of Directors of the 
Suez Canal, (iv) guarantees for Italians living in Tunis. A similar ap- 
proach, made in Addis Ababa, promised in addition some frontier 
revisions in North Africa favouring Italy. In agreeing to open official 
negotiations on these points (Ciano told the German Ambassador on 
February 4), Mussolini did not object to “peaceful solutions” for 
these questions “of the first stage”: but added that this did not affect 
in the slightest degree “the further, second, ‘historical’ stage”. 14 

In plainer language, he would take what he could peacefully, shice 
the French were giving tilings away: but the “historical” questions — 
Tunis itself, Nice, Corsica — would be solved by war at the “second” 
stage. 

On February 27 the Italian Ambassador proposed, and on March 10 
the Germans agreed, to begin talks between the general staffs of the 
armed forces of Italy and Germany. The draft notes for these had 

12 Ciano, op. cit., p. 13. 13 Van der Esch, op. cit., p. 164. 

14 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, pp. 575-7, 582-3. 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 


279 

already been drawn up by the supreme command of the German 
armed forces and communicated by Keitel to Ribbcntrop on Nov- 
ember 30, 1938. 15 Their section headed: “Military political basis for 
the negotiations” is worth reproducing, for it was the background 
to the last stages of the German-Italian invasion of Spain, as the in- 
structions to Keitel of October 21 were for the last months of the 
mutilated Czechoslovakia. It runs : 

“War by Germany and Italy against France and Britain, with the 
object first of knocking out France. That would also hit Britain, as 
she would lose her bases for carrying on the war on the Continent 
and would then find the whole power of Germany and Italy directed 
against herself alone. 

“Combined with: 

“Strict neutrality of Switzerland, Belgium and Holland. 

“Benevolent neutrality towards Germany and Italy: Hungary 
and Spain. 

“Doubtful attitude: Balkans and Poland. 

“Hostile attitude towards Germany and Italy: Russia. 

“The Non-European powers can be left out of the picture at the 
beginning.” 

This was the basis on which Hitler agreed to open staff talks with 
Italy, on the eve of the “liquidation” of the rest of Czechoslovakia. 
It was also the reward of the British and French Governments for 
destroying a democratic Republic in Western Europe as they had in 
Central Europe. 

3. Poland 

The Polish Government was also to have its reward. Not content 
with taking the jackal’s piece out of Czechoslovakia at Munich, Beck 
after it unreservedly made himself “the auxiliary of the German 
Chancellor”. 16 

But whereas previously (and since the Polish-German pact of 1934) 
Hitler had repeatedly sworn that there were no questions of issue 
between Germany and Poland, now suddenly, on October 24, i93^» 
there was a change of tunc. On that day Ribbentrop invited Lipski, 
the Polish Ambassador in Germany, to lunch at Berchtesgadcn, and 
in the course of it made the following proposals. 17 (/) Danzig, which 

36 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, pp. 529-32. 

16 Noel, L’ Agression allemande centre la Pologne (Paris, 1946), pp. 205-rt. 

I’ An account of the successive stages in these negotiations, from October 24, 1938, 
to February 6, 1939 (and beyond), is contained in the documents of the Polish White 

Book, 1939- 




280 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

had belonged to Poland since the Versailles Treaty, should be re- 
turned to Germany, (») Germany should be allowed to build an 
extra-territorial motor road and railway hue across the Polish Corri- 
dor, (Hi) Poland would have railway and economic facilities at Danzig, 
(iv) Polish-German frontiers would be guaranteed, and the pact ex- 
tended by twenty-five years. There would also be joint action on 
colonial questions, emigration of Polish Jews (Beck had publicly 
raised this question as a “demographic problem for Poland”, at the 
League of Nations) and a “joint policy towards Russia”. If Poland 
agreed to the main proposals (Ribbcntrop added later), she would 
get satisfaction over her claims in Trans-Carpathian Ukraine (then 
called “Carpathian Russia”) — on which she was in conflict with 
Hungary. 

Although the Polish Government rejected the proposals straight 
away then and on later occasions, reminding the Germans of specific 
declarations by Hitler on November 5, 1937 (that “there would be 
no changes in the legal and political position of Danzig”), and on 
January 14, 1938 (that “Polish rights in Danzig would be in no way 
violated”), the Germans went on, suavely but firmly, pressing them. 
Ribbcntrop renewed them in a talk on November 19, 1938, under- 
lining that he had only talked “indefinitely” with Hitler on the sub- 
ject, and that (a delicate hint) “negotiations with Poland were of 
quite a different character from those with M. Benes for Czecho- 
slovakia”; but that “Danzig was a German city”. On November 22, 
von Moltke, the German Ambassador in Warsaw, took up the point 
with Beck, assuring him however that “he had always warned M. 
von Ribbentrop that Danzig was a problem in regard to which the 
Polish attitude was adamant”. On January 5, 1939, Hitler told Beck 
that as Danzig was a German city, “sooner or later it must return 
to the Reich”. He was sure that an agreement protecting the legiti- 
mate interests of both countries could be found: then all difficulties 
between the two States “could quite definitely be settled and cleared 
out of the way”. In that case he would give an assurance like that 
he had already given the French — that the question of Alsace-Lorraine 
had been settled for good. Hitler also talked about the need for “greater 
freedom of communication between Germany and East Prussia”. But 
he wanted Beck “to be quite at case” — there would be no faits accomplis 
in Danzig. Next day Ribbcntrop repeated to Beck that “Germany 
was not seeking any violent solution”. He repeated this in later con- 
versations in Warsaw, on January 2 6. On February 6, 1939, the 
German Ambassador in Warsaw, while “under no illusions whatever 


281 



TOWARDS NEW AGCRESSIONS 

as to the difficulties”, nevertheless told Count Szembek, the 
Polish Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that “from the 
point of view of our general relations, and also from the historical 
standpoint, it would be desirable to achieve a definite solution . 

Right up to the entry into Prague, no tiling more violent passed 
between the two governments, in these (and other) conversations. 
But behind the scenes, things were very different. 

On November 24, 1938, Keitel had issued an appendix to a pre- 
vious order by Hitler, stating that “preparations arc to be made for 
a surprise occupation by German troops of the Free State of Danzig”. 
True, he added that in making these preparations, “the primary 
assumption is the lightning seizure of Danzig by exploiting a favour- 
able political situation, and not war with Poland”. 18 But of course, 
in reality — as was obvious, not only from common-sense considera- 
tions, but also from the way the Poles had reacted to Ribbentrop’s 
suggestions — war with Poland would thereafter be inevitable. Pre- 
parations were accordingly put in hand. By December 6, 1938, the 
British military attache was reporting that various “military prepara- 
tions in February for action in an easterly direction”, to take place 
“in the early summer”, had already begun; and he had heard that 
these might be against Poland, though other alternatives were sug- 
gested. 19 

What we know is that, in a lecture at Munich on November 7, 
1943, Jodi said: “The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the 
autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939, and the annexation of Slovakia, 
rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it 
now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of 
more or less favourable strategic premises.” 

Much the same idea had been elaborated by Hitler in the speech to 
his generals on November 23, 1939, already quoted: “The next step 
was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step, too, it was not possible 
to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortifications 
had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. 
It was clear to me, from the first moment, I could not be satisfied 
with the S u dcten-Gcr man territory. That was only a partial solution. 
The decision to march into Bohemia was made: then followed the 
erection of the Protectorate and, with that, the basis for the action 
against Poland was laid.” 20 

Thus (t) an attack on Poland was part of a premeditated scheme, 
(ii) Hitler could not think of it until the first stage in wiping out 
is Trial, part II, p. 68. 19 D.B.F.P., vol. II, pp. 546-51. 20 Trial, part II, p. 107. 



282 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


Czechoslovakia had been completed, (in) even in preparing for the 
second stage, Hitler began the planning of the attack on Poland, 
(iv) while drawing up Iris plans he maintained the friendliest tones 
in talking to the Polish Government, yet already dropping the first 
hints of what — later on — was to be the pretext of the attack. The 
essential point was the completion of the first stage — and that was 
achieved at Munich. Those who conspired with Hider to carry out 
that aggression were in fact conspiring with him for the next stage 
(March 15) — and doubtless unconsciously for the stage after that, 
Poland. 

4. Ukrainian Mirage 

Thus two conspiracies in progress were brought swiftly to their 
conclusion, while active preparations began for a third aggression. 
No small part in producing the co-operation of the British and French 
Governments in procuring the final triumph of German aggression 
in Czechoslovakia and Italo-German aggression in Spain, and in 
blinding their eyes to the preparations against Poland, was played 
by their illusions about a coming attack on the Soviet Union — in 
particular, for the seizure of Soviet Ukraine. 

The latter idea was no new one for the Nazis, and all politicians 
knew it. Hitler had written about it in Mein Kampf long before com- 
ing to power. Within a few months of his appointment as Reichs- 
chancellor, at the World Economic Conference in London in June, 
1933, his delegate Hugenbcrg (Minister of Economics) had startled 
everyone by issuing a memorandum asking for lands in Eastern Europe 
for Germany to colonise. At the Nuremberg Nazi Congress in 1936, 
Hitler himself had spoken about how Germany “would swim in 
plenty” if she had the raw materials of the Urals, the Siberian forests 
and “the unending cornfields of the Ukraine”. Former Russian land- 
owners in the Ukraine entered his pay, proclaimed themselves 
“Ukrainian” patriots, founded propaganda bureaux in Berlin and 
other European capitals, and found a ready response among Right-wing 
politicians and bankers in London, Paris, New York and elsewhere. 
Moreover, in Poland other emigrants from Soviet Ukraine were able 
to take advantage of the rabid national oppression practised by the 
ruling classes of Poland — landlords and capitalists — in Western Ukraine 
(and Western Belorussia). These territories, inhabited by Ukrainians 
(and Belorussians) and recognised in 1919 even by the Allies who 
were then invading Soviet Russia as rightfully part of the Ukraine and 
Belorussia respectively, were forcibly occupied by the Polish army 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 2»3 

in 1919-20, and the Soviet Government at that time was not strong 
enough to reclaim them. 

With the disintegration of Czechoslovakia after Munich, the Germans 
began intensively cultivating the Ukrainian nationalists in Trans- 
Carpathian Ukraine (“Ruthenia”), the extreme eastern tip of Czecho- 
slovakia which had been promised autonomy at Versailles but had 
never got it, and had been left in great economic and cultural back- 
wardness. Controlled more and more after Munich by Nazi agents, 
this territory was a very convenient centre for transplanting Nazi- 
inspired Ukrainian nationalist propaganda from Berlin and Viennese 
offices and cafes on to what was, after all, authentic Ukrainian soil. 
A “National Council” for a “Greater Ukraine” was set up there on 
December 8, 1938. The Germans began to throw out the idea that 
“Carpathian Ukraine” with its 700,000 population, might play the 
same part as Piedmont-Sardinia did for Italy in the 19th century, i.c. 
become the military and political base for unifying the whole 
Ukrainian people — both the thirty millions living in the Soviet 
Ukraine and the ten millions living under Polish rule. The advantage 
of this propaganda for Hitler was that it kept other countries guessing 
as to whether it was more directed against the U.S.S.R. or against 
Poland. In fact, of course, the Ukrainian Nazis had no chances in the 
Soviet Ukraine, where there had been complete economic, cultural 
and political regeneration since the end of the Civil War in 1920 
for the working class, peasantry and intelligentsia: whereas Nazi- 
backed nationalist propaganda had a fertile field in Poland, where 
the mass of the Ukrainians lived under no better conditions than under 
Tsardom. 

But this was just not accessible to the intelligence of British and 
French politicians : and when the propaganda of a “Greater Ukraine 
began to come up in their own countries, as well as from obviously 
German sources, the mirage of a coming German * crusade for the 
Ukraine” began to beckon to them more and more alluringly. For 
more than three months, these day-dreams were indulged in: all the 
more because they seemed the very justification and realisation of the 
British and French Governments’ purposes in bringing about Munich. 

On October 20 M. Fran^ois-Poncet, in his final dispatch from the 
French Embassy at Berlin before his transfer to Rome, wrote after 
a talk with Hitler that the latter remained “faithful to his preoccupa- 
tion of pulling apart the Franco-British bloc and stabilising peace in 
the west in order to have his hands free in the east”. True, as yet, it 
was not clear whether it was Poland, Russia or the Baltic States who 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 


284 

would “pay the price”. 21 But on October 20 Lord Halifax was already 
telling Sir George Ogilvie-Forbcs, the British Charge d’Affaires at 
Berlin, that, “as we see it here”, it might be “in the minds of the 
Germans that Ruthenia would, if necessary, furnish a springboard to 
the Ukraine or a starting place for fomenting a Ukrainian movement”. 22 
And on November 1, writing to the British Ambassador at Paris, “to 
show you how my thoughts are working”, the Foreign Secretary 
spoke of “the problem raised by possible German expansion into the 
Ukraine. Subject only to the consideration that I should hope France 
would protect herself— and us — from being entangled by Russia in 
war with Germany, I should hesitate to advise the French Govern- 
ment to denounce the Franco-Soviet pact, as the future is still far too 
uncertain” ! 23 

In undiplomatic language, tins meant that France should keep the 
pact in order to be able to call for Soviet help if Germany struck 
westwards: but on no account should France and Britain place any 
barriers in Hitler’s way if he wanted to “go east” (though this might 
mean, not actual war Math the U.S.S.R., but frightening the latter 
into giving up the Ukraine voluntarily : such lunatic ideas were quite 
common in 1938, the fruit of the singularly misnamed “intelligence” 
reports constantly coming in from the foreign embassies in Moscow). 

On November 9 Ogilvie-Forbes was ready with his information. 
If Hitler were to ask for Danzig and the Corridor, Poland would 
need compensation. “I have indications that Hitler, about to take his 
stand on the Ruthenian springboard, is playing with the idea of 
associating Poland in a conflict with Russia at a moment when the 
Soviet Union is weak and, success being assured, compensating Poland 
at the expense of the Bolsheviks.” However, he did not think this 
likely “in the immediate future”. 24 Exactly a week later, Lord Halifax 
and Mr. Chamberlain w 7 ere told by the Hohenzollern King of Rumania, 
Carol II, of whom they had audience in London, that “he had reason 
to believe that both Germany and Poland had ideas on the establish- 
ment of an independent Ukrainian State” — with a disquisition on 
whether Rumania would be worried or not. 25 

There can be no doubt that these reports raised comfortable anti- 
cipations in the minds of the British leaders. For on November 24, 
1938, during a visit by Chamberlain and Halifax to Paris, attended 
by Cadogan and William Strang, we find the British Premier talking 
over the matter quite seriously with Bonnet and Daladier. 

21 French Yellow Book, p. 2 6. 22 D.B.F.P., vol. Ill, p. 201. 23 Ibid., p. 253. 

24 Ibid., p. 266. 26 Ibid., p. 232. 


285 

“There had been indications that there might be in the minds of 
the German Government an idea that they could begin the disruption 
of Russia by the encouragement of agitation for an independent 
Ukraine. There was no question of the German Government taking 
military action. It was more subtle than that. But if there were any 
truth in these rumours it would be unfortunate if France should one 
day find herself entangled as a consequence of her relations with 
Russia. He asked whether the French Government had given con- 
sideration to this point.” 

Bonnet replied that there were probably separatist movements in 
the Ukraine, which might create a dangerous situation if Russia were 
unable to repress them herself. 

“Mr. Chamberlain asked what the position would be if Russia were 
to ask France for assistance on the grounds that a separatist movement 
in the Ukraine was provoked by Germany. 

“M. Bonnet explained that French obligations towards Russia only 
came into force if there were a direct attack by Germany on Russian 
territory. 

“Mr. Chamberlain said that he considered M. Bonnet’s reply entirely 
satisfactory.” 26 And well he might — since it meant that military assist- 
ance by Germany — in the form of the entry of German troops — to 
a “separated” Ukraine need not be treated by the French Government 
as an attack on “Russian territory”. 

This was not surprising. The French press had been discussing “the 
Ukrainian problem” with gusto in recent weeks, and a leading article 
in the Temps of November 29 said that interest of the Western powers 
in East European conflicts must necessarily be much more limited 
than before. Reporting these developments to Berlin on November 
30, the German Ambassador at Paris, von Welczeck, wrote: “From 
what I hear, the Quai d’Orsay has requested those sections of the 
press amenable to its instructions not to arouse any exaggerated hopes 
of an imminent Russo-Polish rapprochement, to stress the unstable 
nature of relations in Eastern Europe and Polish responsibility for tins, 
and at the same time to point out that the Ukrainian question has now 
been raised. These ideas recur in the above-mentioned leading article 
of the Temps. They were also reproduced by and large in the other 
organs of the press where, so far as can be ascertained up to now, 
the emphasis was laid on the Ukrainian problem. I hear that this is 
attributable at least in part to representations made by financial 
circles here, formerly connected with South Russia, to the French 
28 D.B.F.P., vol. Ill, pp. 306-7. 


286 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 


Government and to the French press. These circles are convinced that 
sooner or later Germany will tackle the solution of the Ukrainian 
problem, and they consider it essential to demonstrate French interest 
in the matter now.” 27 

The latter point meant that the Franco- 13 clgian banks who had 
held the greater part of the shares in the coal, iron, steel and heavy 
engineering industries nationalised in the Ukraine in 1917, 28 wanted 
France to have her share in the pickings, if the German army got 
that far! At any rate, it was obvious that the French Government, 
no less than the British, was keenly interested in Hider’s plans for 
“solving the Ukrainian problem”, and would not dream of throwing 
any obstacle in his way. 

It is interesting that on the same day Mr. Newton was cabling from 
Prague — when German influence and propaganda were now para- 
mount — that “there is a general feeling that the Ukraine question is 
becoming ripe for development”. 29 

On December 6 Ogilvic-Forbcs in Berlin returned to the matter. 
“There seems to be a consensus of opinion in both Nazi and non- 
Nazi circles that the next objective, which may even be undertaken 
in 1939, is the establishment, with or without Polish co-operation, 
of an independent Russian Ukraine under German tutelage. This 
operation might conceivably be formed by peaceful means owing to 
the inability of Russia to resist, but it is assumed that war will be 
necessary.” It was thought by “most people”, he informed Lord 
Halifax, “that neither France nor England would be prepared to 
march in the defence of the integrity of Russia or of Ukrainian inde- 
pendence of Russia”. At the same time the British diplomat noted 
that there was “a school of thought here” which believed that Hitler 
would not risk a Russian adventure until he had made certain of his 
western flank, and that his first task would consequently be “to 
liquidate France and England”. 30 However, these were evidently ex- 
ceptional opinions. Lord Halifax must have been more impressed by 
the “consensus of opinion” from other directions too — for on Dec- 
ember 13 he forw r ardcd to the British Embassy in Moscow the report 
of a conversation between the head of the French Military Intelligence 
Department ( Deuxieme Bureau) and the British military attache in 
Paris on December 6 — the same day as Ogilvic-Forbcs’ message — 
to the effect that the Soviet Union was “militarily entirely impotent, 

27 D.G.F.P., vol. n, p. 469. 

28 Lyashchcnko, Istoria Narodnogo Hoziaistva S.S.S.R. (Moscow, 1952), vol. II, 
pp. 374-82. 

29 D.B.F.P., vol. Ill, p. 368. 80 Ibid., p. 387. 


287 

and that she would find it very difficult to offer any effective resist- 
ance to a movement for independence in the Soviet Ukraine, if such 
a movement were actually supported by Germany”. 31 

It is still more significant that in the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the French Senate on December 14 Bonnet made a statement 
similar to that he had recently made to Chamberlain — that the mutual 
assistance pact with the U.S.S.R. would not come into force if a 
separate “Ukrainian State” were set up. 32 And that this desirable end 
might be in sight, a dispatch from Coulondre at Berlin, the following 
day, must have made Bonnet even more confident. 

“To make himself master of Central Europe by ‘vassalising’ Czecho- 
slovakia and Hungary, then to create Greater Ukraine under German 
hegemony: such seems essentially to be the conception now adopted 
by the Nazi leaders, and doubtless by M. Hitler himself. ... As for 
the Ukraine, the whole National-Socialist personnel has been talking 
about it these last ten days. The Rosenberg Study Centre, the services 
of Dr. Goebbels, the Ost-Europa organisation directed by the former 
Minister Curtius, the Intelligence Service are engaged on the ques- 
tion. The ways and means are not determined yet, it seems, but the 
goal seems definitely fixed: to create a Greater Ukraine which would 
become the feeding-territory for Germany. For this, it is necessary 
to constrain Rumania, convince Poland, make the U.S.S.R. relax its 
grip: German dynamism docs not stop at any of these difficulties, 
and in military circles they arc already talking of striding on to the 
Caucasus and Baku. 

“It is improbable that M. Hidcr is seeking to carry out his Ukraine 
enterprise by direct military action. ... In his entourage people are 
thinking of an operation which ■would reproduce, on a bigger scale, 
that of the Sudeten.” It is very possible, Coulondre concluded, that 
Hitler saw in the “Ukrainian enterprise”, among other advantages, 
that of “distracting the attention of his people from dangerously 
increasing internal difficulties”. 33 

A dazzling prospect indeed: no wonder the French Ambassador in 
London, on December 16, told Lord Halifax that “the information 
of the French Government was that Herr Hider was contemplating 
some move in the East, with also possibly action in Memel”. Maisky 
the previous day “had affected not to take very seriously suggestions 

31 D.B.F.P., vol. in, p. 578. 

82 J. Bauvier, J. Gacon, La Viritl sur 1939 (Paris, 1953. p- 49). quoting the Revue 
Politique et Parliamctitaire for 10 January, 1939. 

33 French Yellow Book , pp. 39-40. 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



288 

of the German Government making trouble in the Russian Ukraine”: 
in Poland was more likely, the Soviet Ambassador had said. Halifax 
also thought the greater probability was that Hitler’s next “disturb- 
ing move” would perhaps be towards the East. At the same time 
Britain and France should be on their guard that Hidcr might turn 
West instead. One reason was because he “might think that cither or 
both of us might be tempted to obstruct his Eastern plan”. 34 

One may hazard the guess that Hitler was, on the contrary, quite 
certain that “cither or both of us” — at least so far as the Governments 
in London and Paris were concerned, and those whom they could 
influence — would see him damned before they obstructed him in such 
a plan, provided that only the U.S.S.R. were involved. It is hard to 
believe that the German Embassy in London at this time was less well 
able to appreciate the situation than, say, the Polish Ambassador Count 
Raczyhski. For he wrote to his Foreign Minister that very day, Dec- 
ember 16: “Notwithstanding all the talk of the active elements of the 
opposition, a conflict in Eastern Europe which threatens in one way 
or another to embroil Germany and Russia is universally and sub- 
consciously regarded here as a ‘ lesser evil ’ capable of deferring the menace 
to the Empire and its overseas components for a long period ” (underlining 
in the original). “The Premier officially is particularly careful to avoid 
doing anything to oppose Germany’s designs in the East”, added the 
Ambassador. 35 

The dispatch remarked on “something in the nature of an organised 
campaign among the public and the press here”, which had been 
going on “for some time” — primarily around the problem of Trans- 
Carpathian Ukraine and “the claims on the Ukraine”, but extending 
to other subjects like Danzig, Teschen, etc. Raczynski rightly pointed 
out that this was giving rise to alarm among the public about Poland’s 
situation. 36 

Evidently the public had a truer sense of proportion than its Govern- 
ment, which saw ahead only, in a golden haze as it were, the Holy 
Graal leading the modern Parsifal on to the Ukraine. But it is interest- 
ing that, at the same time, a similar campaign was going on in the 
French newspapers 37 — and the German and German-inspired news- 
papers too, noted the French-language Soviet Journal de Moscou on 
December 27. It added that, “if the Western European Powers are 
foolish enough to fall into the trap set for them by Germany, it is 
their own business. The Soviet Union for its part remains absolutely 

34 D.B.F.P., vol. in, pp. 436-7. 36 D. & M., voL I, pp. 300-1. 

36 Ibid., p. 303. 37 Wcrth, op. cit., p. 353 - 



TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 289 

indifferent to the noise made outside its frontiers over the so-called 
Ukrainian question.” 38 

On December 29, 1938, Sir George Ogilvic-Forbes transmitted a 
bulky memorandum on “military possibilities in 1939 from the mili- 
tary attache in Berlin, Col. Mason-Macfarlane. In a covering note, 
Ogilvie-Forbes said that there were factors in Germany which pointed 
“to the necessity of relieving by some foreign excursion the present 
political and economic discontents”. If they assumed serious propor- 
tions, Hitler might decide on a foreign adventure — in that case it is 
probable that it would be in an easterly direction”. For the first time, 
however, it appears to have dawned on the Charge d Affaires that tliis 
might be against Poland, as an alternative to attacking the Soviet 
Union. Mason-Macfarlanc’s memorandum reported from Lithuanian 
sources that the Poles would be invited to join with Germany in 
military action against the Soviet Union, but would be attacked them- 
selves if they refused. Mason-Macfarlane’ s own opinion was that the 
information may have been dchberatcly planted on the Lithuanians, 
“with intent to mislead”, and he seems to have given much more 
weight to forecasts of action against the U.S.S.R.: 

“For some time past there have been many rumours of intended 
German action in the Ukraine next year, and reports of preparations 
for commercial penetration and exploitation have been circulating. 
Our recent information regarding the commencement of progressive 
mobilisation in February gives the occupation of the Ukraine as the 
military objective.” 

Like Lord Flalifax, the military attache at the same time considered 
that hostilities against England instead were a possibihty which we 
cannot under any circumstances afford to exclude . However, in dis- 
cussion with his Dutch colleague they had “placed the odds on action 
in the East as against action in the West at about 10 to 1 . Provided 
there was no intervention from the West, Hitler was probably 
“and in my opinion rightly” — convinced that he was strong enough 
to deal with Poland “and any opposition to be anticipated from 
Russia”. 39 * 

On December 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, however, trans- 
mitted a report from Col. Fraser, his military attache, without any 
such reservations as Mason-Macfarlane had felt it necessary to include. 
Col. Petibon, General Gamclin’s most confidential staff officer, 

38 Mr. Verekcr (Moscow) to Lord Halifax, December 28, 1938 ( D.B.F.P. , vol. Ill, 

pp. 54 i- 2 )> 

30 D.B.F.P., vol. HI, pp. 545 * 5 *• 


T 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



290 

had shown himself on the 29th “strongly of the opinion that there 
would be war in Europe next year, although he said that it was pos- 
sible that neither France nor England might be engaged. He was 
evidently thinking of the Ukraine.” 40 

Nor was the impression made by Mason-Macfarlanc’s reservations 
very lasting. In a review of the situation by Ogilvie-Forbes on January 
3, 1939, he admitted that Hider might “by an overwhelming air 
attack and vigorous submarine action crush Great Britain while she 
is yet unready”. But it is quite obvious, on reading the three-page 
document, that this contingency — which he calls “remote” — had only 
been mentioned as a precaution. The real emphasis of the survey is in 
the opposite sense. “There is only one direction in which Herr FJitler 
with comparative ease could possess himself of many of the raw 
materials lacking to Germany”, wrote the British Charge d’ Affaires, 
“and that is in the East, and consequently the agricultural and mineral 
resources of the Ukraine and even of Rumanian territory arc the sub- 
ject of much talk. It is in that direction that Germany appears most 
likely to break out.” A little later, while admitting that war could 
not be avoided if Hider willed it, he stressed that British intervention 
in German relations with the East of Europe was already being “hody 
resented”, and in any case Britain was powerless forcibly to arrest 
German action. Hence “it should be possible to keep out of war (i) by 
facing the issue clearly and in good time that we cannot guarantee the 
status quo in Central and Eastern Europe, and (») by exerting all our 
efforts to cultivate and maintain good relations with Field-Marshal 
Goering and the moderate Nazis, with a view to their exercising a 
restraining influence on the extremists”. 41 

It was on the same date that von Dirksen, German Ambassador in 
London, in his annual review of the situation, was recording his 
opinion that “a further German penetration toward the Ukraine, 
whose conquest by Germany is firmly believed in Great Britain to 
be timed for the spring of 1939, would be accepted”. 42 The following 
day he devoted almost an entire dispatch to tills question. Dirksen 
noted in particular the interest of the British press in the Ukrainian 
question, which it always treated, he said, in connection with alleged 
German plans for expansion. “It is regarded here as fairly certain that 
Germany is playing with the idea of forming a Greater Ukrainian 
State and will sooner or later implement tliis aim” — although the 
newspapers stress that tliis would bring Germany into war not only 
with the Soviet Union but also with Poland, which “docs not enjoy 

40 D.D.F.P., vol. Ill, p. 557. 41 UM'' pp . 562.3. 42 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, p. 362. 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 


291 

any great sympathy in Britain at present”. The possibility of joint 
German-Polish action against the Soviet Union was “hardly con- 
sidered”, he said. 

Dirksen was struck by the way in which the British newspapers 
(even the opposition press) refrained from any suggestion of British 
intervention in Eastern Europe: their reports from there showed great 
interest, but were “like those of an impartial observer”. He mentioned 
in particular an article in the Daily Telegraph of December 19 “which 
simply states that the loss of the Ukraine would be a particularly 
severe blow for Russia”, giving the reasons in detail. It was not by 
chance that Dirksen selected the Daily Telegraph : during the months 
before Munich it had printed many criticisms of Chamberlain’s policy. 

As for “authoritative circles”, Dirksen considered it could be 
assumed that, “in accordance with the basic trend of Chamberlain s 
policy, they will accept a German expansionist policy in Eastern 
Europe, hi this connection the Polish question recedes into the back- 
ground as compared with the Ukrainian question. It is expected that 
the first move for a new order in Eastern Europe will arise out of the 
Ukrainian question, which would be tackled by Germany and brought 
to a head.” But Dirksen warned his chiefs that the authoritative circles 
in Britain didn’t want Germany to take precipitate action without 
adequately preparing European public opinion — otherwise France 
would be forced to intervene against an unprovoked attack by Ger- 
many, and tliis would have “inevitable repercussions”. However, if 
“a Ukrainian State were to come into being with German help, even 
if it were of a military nature, under the psychologically skilful slogan 
freely circulated by Germany: ‘Self-determination for the Ukrainians, 
liberation of the Ukraine from the domination of Bolshevist Jewry , 
this would be accepted by authoritative circles here and by British 
public opinion, especially if consideration for British economic in- 
terests in the development of the new State were an added inducement 
for the British ”. 43 

Tliis careful analysis— with its last hint of British economic interest, 
parallel with the hint of similar interest in France, noted earlier— is 
particularly valuable because it coincides so closely with the line of 
thought transparently visible in the various British diplomatic papers 
and discussions quoted earlier. Dirkscn’s survey is in effect a summary 
of the successes won by German publicity and confidential discussion 
with the “authoritative circles” of Great Britain, so anxious to believe 
that what they would have liked to see happen was in fact approaching. 

43 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, pp. 365-7. 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


292 

Of course similar successes had been won in France. There, too, 
the one thing that was not even given a moment’s consideration was 
the possibility that the Soviet Union might have something to say 
about all these plans. On January 8, 1939, the French Ambassador at 
Rome told Lord Perth, the British Ambassador, that “he did not 
think that Colonel Beck would resist the German demands further 
as regards the Ukraine, though a condominium might for a time be 
established there”. (The Ambassador also conveyed in all seriousness 
an observation which his Polish colleague had made to him that very 
day — “that as France and England had now disinterested themselves 
in Central Europe only two Great Powers remained there, namely 
Germany and Poland. It was therefore necessary for these two countries 
to come to an agreement.”) 44 

On January 10, 1939, Chamberlain and Halifax stopped in Paris, 
on their way to Rome, for a talk with the French Premier and Foreign 
Minister. The main subject of discussion was the worsened relations 
between France and Italy, as the latter’s victory in Spain grew more 
certain. But Chamberlain at once showed what was uppermost in 
his thoughts. He regretted the sudden change in the Italian attitude. 
“He wondered what was its true significance. Had it any connection 
with the project which Herr Hitler was said to have in his mind in 
regard to the Ukraine?” Bonnet thought this might very well be the 
case: “the design w r as to keep France occupied in the Mediterranean, 
thus leaving Germany free to attain her objective in Eastern Europe”. 46 

Chamberlain returned to the subject in the course of conversations 
with Mussolini on the 12th. Armament was accelerating in Germany, 
and there was massing of troops. There was a “general suspicion”, 
he said, that Hitler had in mind a further move in the near future 
which would “upset a great part of Europe”. Some people thought 
it would be in the direction of the Ukraine, others that it would be 
preceded by a sudden attack in the West — “Here Signor Mussolini 
shook his head emphatically”. Probably most people thought that the 
move, if made, would be towards the East, and feared a war between 
Germany and Poland, or Germany and Russia, or Germany with 
Poland and Russia combined. Chamberlain “would not say that such 
a war would necessarily involve Western Powers also, but once war 
began one never could tell when or where it would stop”. Could 
Mussolini give any assurances to mitigate his anxiety? 

Mussolini pondered a while, and then in his reply stated that 
(i) Hitler desired a long period of peace, (11) he did not believe Hitler 
44 D.D.F.P., vol. III, p. 572. « Ibid., p. 513. 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 293 

intended to set up an independent Ukraine or to attempt the disrup- 
tion of Russia, “although he, Mussolini, would not feel that it would 
be a bad tiling if an independent Ukraine were created”, (iii) in his 
view the stories about a move eastward by Germany were without 
foundation, invented by propagandists (he did not say which), (if) as 
to any idea of a German attack in the west, such a tiling was absolutely 
out of die question”; the frontier there was already decided. 

This reply served the purpose of Hider very well. It diverted atten- 
tion from the preparations for “liquidating the rest of Czechoslovakia , 
and from the question of a possible attack on Poland alone. At the 
same time it left the faintest shade of doubt that something might be 
attempted against the U.S.S.R. after all. And it did what Mussolini 
could to reassure the British Premier so far as an attack on Britain 
and France was concerned. Chamberlain, however, was not entirely 
reassured— and the direction which his anxieties took was again re- 
vealing. Germany, he said, was already so strong that no combination 
of Powers could attack her successfully: what did she want further 
armaments for? “Russia could not be an enemy to be feared by Ger- 
many, for she was far too weak internally to take the offensive, although 
she might put up a very good defence if she were attacked. 

This was of course a gentle hint that, if Hitler nevertheless wanted 
to expand, the U.S.S.R. was after all the easiest target. Mussolini 
avoided the point, confining himself to asserting the purely defensive 
nature of Hitler’s armaments and recounting how many enemies he 
had in the West. Chamberlain was still not satisfied with this, and the 
next evening (January 13), after dinner at the British Embassy, probed 
the matter further. He told Mussolini that he was not altogether con- 
vinced. He said it was a grave misapprehension to think that demo- 
cracies would not fight “under certain circumstances , and it would 
be a terrible tragedy “if aggressive action were taken under a mis- 
apprehension as to what lengths the democracies might be prepared 
to go”. 46 

The subject dropped after that: but Chamberlain had at any rate 
done what he could to clear up the “misapprehension”. While Russia 
was “weak” internally, the Western democracies would fight against 
aggression “under certain circumstances”. He was assuming, no doubt, 
that Hitler and Mussolini shared his and Bonnet’s views (nurtured by 
such convincing reports from Moscow) about the relative strengths 
of the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and the British-French affiance on 
the other— and consequently would choose accordingly. There 
« D.D.F.P., vol m, pp. 525-9- 


294 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 


remained, of course, to find out what were the “certain circumstances” 
in which the British and French Governments would fight. For tliis 
further discussions would be necessary. 

In fact, however, these never took place, because suddenly the 
bottom dropped out of the whole “Ukrainian” scheme. At the be- 
ginning of January, Hitler had told Beck, during their interview at 
Berchtesgadcn, that in his view the Ukrainian question was not 
“pressing” (Coulondre cabled from Berlin on March 14. The Polish 
minute says Hitler’s expression was that “he was interested in the 
Ukraine from the economic viewpoint, but he had no interest in it 
politically”). 47 New's of tliis talk, however, did not percolate at once. 
Only on January 13 could Ogilvic-Forbes report to London that, 
according to the Polish Ambassador in Berlin whom he had seen that 
very morning, Hitler in his talk with Beck “scoffed at the report of 
intended German aggression in the Ukraine”. 48 On January 14 (the 
day Chamberlain and Halifax left Rome) there reached London a 
report from Mr. Vcrckcr, British Minister at the Embassy in Moscow, 
sent by him on the 10th: in tliis he discounted the press talk of a 
movement of revolt in the Soviet Ukraine, and declared that German 
conquest of the Ukraine from the outside would “present the greatest 
difficulties”. Apart from the unlikeliness of Poland co-operating (for 
fear of losing her own large Ukrainian territories), Vereker pointed 
out the strength of the U.S.S.R., strategic and military, and disagreed 
emphatically with the remarks of the French military intelligence 
chief on December 6 (quoted earlier) about its “weakness”. On the 
contrary, he thought “there would be much popular enthusiasm in 
the Soviet Union for a war against a Fascist aggressor”, and tliis would 
be shared by the Ukrainian population, ‘which cannot retain pleasant 
recollections of the German occupation in 1918-19”. 49 On January 16 
there reached London from Paris the report of a conversation between 
the British air attache there and the head of French air intelligence 
on the 10th. Wliile the Frenchman was “certain that the next move 
would be towards the Ukraine”, he thought it would be engineered 
step by step, but Poland stood in the way, and therefore she would 
fight. The U.S.S.R. would fight too. Hence, “if France and England 
took a firm line and refused to acquiesce in Germany’s ambitions in 
the East, she would be faced with a serious war on two fronts and she 
would be beaten”. Whereas “if France and England acquiesced, Ger- 
many would smash Poland, overrun Rumania, seize the Ukraine and 

47 French Yellow Book, p. 68; Polish While Book, p. 53. 

48 D.B.F.P., vol. HI, p. 582. 49 Ibid., pp. 575-8. 


295 

be the unchallenged mistress of Europe and the world”. The British 
officer suggested that, if Britain and France did take a strong line, 
“Hitler would draw back and not continue his designs on the Ukraine” ; 
but the Frenchman thought he was too urgently pressed by home 
difficulties. 50 

All this was dispiriting enough for those who had pinned their 
hopes on a German march into Soviet Ukraine as the solution of 
many problems. It must have been still worse when on January 17 
Mr. Strang, in summing up at the Foreign Office various reports on 
the Hitler-Beck interview, minuted that “as regards the Ukraine, our 
sources agree that nothing much seems to have been said”. Moreover, 
there was evidence — both from these sources and from others — that 
Hitler was interested now in an attack in the West, rather than the 
East. 51 

However that might be, hi his Reichstag speech on January 30 
Hitler not only spoke of his desire to live at peace, and to trade, with 
all nations (specially mentioning Britain and France), but also, for the 
first time, did not attack the Soviet Union. And in talking of Lebens- 
raum, he referred not to the Ukraine or to Eastern Europe, but to 
overseas colonics. 

Thus, after over three months of hopes that he would “go east” 
to seek the riches of the Ukraine, the hopes proved barren. When 
they revived, later on, it was in very different circumstances. But 
they had served their purpose— for Hitler. He had convinced himself 
that, just as in the years 1933-8, just as in the months from March to 
September of the latter year, it was a powerful incentive for the British 
and French Governments to co-operate in his aggressions, and to agree 
to his breaches of treaties, if he raised before them the mirage of 
an anti-Soviet crusade. 

5. Politicians 

It cannot be said that the significance of the events after Munich 
was entirely lost upon members of the Tory majority governing 
Great Britain. The assassination of a German diplomat in Paris on 
November 7 by a young Jewish emigrant was followed by a carefully 
prepared pogrom against the Jews throughout Germany, involving 
the ferocious beating to death of men, women and children, and the 
destruction of property on a huge scale. No outrage of such dimen- 
sions against the Jews was known to history. Tliis produced some 
admissions of disappointment by Ministers, as we have seen (Chapter 
so D.B.F.P., vol. Ill, pp. 583-4. 61 Ibid., pp. 589-90- 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



296 

XII). Nor was it without justification that the Polish Ambassador in 
London, in the dispatch to Warsaw already quoted, wrote on Dec- 
ember 16: “Premier Chamberlain’s assertion that a new era had come 
guaranteeing peace to ‘our generation’ is considered by all to be an 
illusion, which contact with reality is causing swiftly to fade away.” 52 

But, as the Ambassador noted, this was not influencing Chamberlain 
himself (or his closest colleagues of the Inner Cabinet). His attitude 
was reflected in the statement of The Times diplomatic correspondent 
when the forthcoming visit of Chamberlain and Halifax was an- 
nounced : 

“In London it has been clearly realised during the past few weeks 
that the disposal of the Czechoslovak crisis and the signature of the 
Munich agreement marked a turning-point in the relations of Great 
Britain with the rest of Europe; and the end of the French alliance 
with Czechoslovakia could not fail to render the change even more 
decisive for France.” 

But it was not only in the foreign relations of Great Britain that 
this turning-point was marked, so far as the Government was con- 
cerned: it affected home policies as well. 

Thus, at any other time a British Government would have reacted 
strongly to the type of attacks which Hitler began against opposition 
leaders, denouncing Duff Cooper and Eden in a speech at Saarbriicken 
on October 9, and Churchill and Greenwood in a speech at Weimar 
on November 5, as men whom it would be dangerous to sec in the 
British Government. Later began attacks on orthodox Conservative 
leaders, such as Lord Baldwin (after he had deplored the Jewish 
pogroms of November 10). That there was a programme, and not 
chance, in the attacks on British, politicians, w r as very w'ell revealed 
by the Frankfurter Zeitung on October 30, when it wrote: “So long 
as Churchill and Lloyd George are permitted to broadcast agitation 
speeches to America and to disavow their own Government, w r e can- 
not believe that public opinion in England is ready for an agreement, 
and so long must we constantly reckon with the possibility of a turn 
to the line of Churchill and Eden. The Italians have ascertained the 
same thing with regard to France. Any further progress has as a pre- 
condition the fmal clarification of the internal situation in England 
and France.” 

These outbursts produced no protests from Chamberlain. On the 


62 D. & M., vol. I, p. 294. Lord Halifax told the German Ambassador, the same day 
privately, that lie “had been a good deal disappointed by the deterioration in the situation 
since Munich” ( D.B.F.P. , vol. Ill, p. 434). 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 297 

contrary. In the House of Commons on November 1 (the day before 
he proposed ratification of the Anglo-Italian agreement) lie compared 
the critics of Munich to a bird ‘ ‘fouling its own nest”. On November 9, 
at the Lord Mayor’s annual banquet, he proclaimed that “Europe is 
settling down to a more peaceful state . When the Italian Fascists 
began the campaign for Corsica, Nice and Tunis, heralded by the anti- 
French scene on November 30 in the Italian Chamber, Chamberlain 
was asked in the House of Commons whether any treaty, pact or 
agreed understanding ensured that Britain -would render military aid 
to France in the event of an attack by Italy. FIc replied coldly (Dec- 
ember 12): “No such specific requirement exists” — deploring, in a 
further reply, not the demands of the Italians themselves, but the 
demonstrations in which they had been put forward. 

A great volume of protest, in Great Britain and France, 53 induced 
the Prime Minister to change his attitude in subsequent statements, 
and to declare more specifically against the Italian claim to Tunis. 
This does not alter the fact that the immediate reaction of the British 
Government was so automatically to apply the principles of Munich 
that, for an instant, the world saw' France in the position of Czecho- 
slovakia, and was already beginning to look round for Lord Runciman. 

Much excitement was aroused when the German Ambassador 
stayed away, with his staff, from the Foreign Press Association’s 
anniversary dinner on December 13 on account of a very mild ex- 
pression of regret in Chamberlain’s speech (circulated beforehand) 
that there had been attacks in Germany on a man like Lord Baldwin. 
What attracted much less attention — although far more important — 
was Chamberlain’s declaration that critics of Munich w^erc rendering 
“no service to democracy or to the chances of further international 
co-operation” and— one month after the Nazi pogroms against the 
j ews — that he found it difficult “to rouse much excitement over dif- 
ferent systems of government, apart from particular actions which 
may not necessarily be inherent in the system”. 

Other examples of this kind could be quoted: nor must the arrange- 
ments be overlooked which began at the end of January, I939> to 
prepare for an Anglo-German economic agreement by reciprocal 
visits between British and German trade Ministers, beginning in 
the middle of March, and of simultaneous talks between British and 
German industrialists. In these preliminary arrangements, as the records 

&3 Even Bonnet asked for some reassuring phrase to be put into the speech which the 
Prime Minister was to deliver at the Foreign Press Association the next day — and was 
refused ! {D.B.F.P., vol. Ill, pp. 425-6.) 




298 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

show, the British side was the one pressing for meetings, while the 
Germans, conscious of the situation in Britain, were adopting a pose 
of superiority and reserve. 54 

Every effort was made in Britain to suppress criticism of Germany 
in the newspapers. As Wickham Steed, a former editor of The Times, 
pointed out shortly after Munich, the Saarbriicken speech by Hitler 
on October 9, to which reference has already been made, aroused 
general indignation in Great Britain when the news of it was broad- 
cast the same evening. But “of the depths of the wrath hardly a hint 
was given next morning in the leading British newspapers”. The 
reason was that “certain large advertising agents” had warned them 
that advertisements yielding large revenue would be withheld if they 
“played up” the international crisis, which would be “bad for trade”. 
During the whole of September numerous “hints” and “suggestions” 
from Government sources were used to direct the British press, con- 
veyed “confidentially” along lines which would be acceptable to the 
Government. 56 Similarly, it was revealed by the Prime Minister on 
December 1, after much turning and twisting, that, through the agency 
of the United States Ambassador, the Government had secured the 
deletion from American-owned films of sections containing talks by 
leading British journalists hostile to the National Government. 

On the other hand, all the resources of the press subservient to the 
Government were mobilised to consolidate the “victory” gained at 
Munich. The following arc characteristic examples : 

On October 17 The Times wrote that “any conceivable form of 
appeasement in Europe” must necessarily acknowledge the “peculiar 
interest (of Germany) as an industrial power in the agricultural and 
other markets of Central and Eastern Europe”. On the 19th it printed 
a long article, in possibly the most prominent place in the newspaper, 
in which the Aga Khan told Germany that Danzig would “probably 
come under direct Reich administration”, that a similar fate “prob- 
ably” awaited Memcl, that there were “spheres where, for geographi- 
cal and natural reasons, Germany will be the dominating economic 
factor” and that the four Powers — Britain, France, Germany and Italy 
— ought to guarantee “one another’s frontiers and colonies”. His 
Highness did not explain what frontiers they ought not to guarantee; 
but this was cleared up after a letter to the editor — from one of his 
own leader-writers, and given equal prominence with the Aga Khan’s 


64 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, pp. 396-426. 

66 Wickham Steed, The Press (October, 1938), pp. 249-50. One example of this was 
given above, on p. 215). 


TOWARDS NEW ACCRESSIONS 


299 

article — in which the latter was respectfully criticised because Hitler’s 
Mein Katnpf had not been amended in such a way as to encourage 
confidence in France (October 20). Nothing had been done, wrote 
another correspondent, “to suggest that a France which ceased to 
encircle and oppose Germany in the East would still have to be de- 
stroyed”. Of course, he said, it might well be that Plitler “still has his 
eye on the Ukraine or other parts of Soviet Russia”, but his mind 
might be working in another direction. 

Lest there should be any doubt as to the inference which The Times 
itself wished to be drawn from this correspondence, it printed, on 
the same day as the second letter just mentioned (October 24), an 
editorial welcoming the “cosdy failure” of the French system of inter- 
locked alliances beyond Germany’s eastern frontier, and explaining 
that “there are many who hold that both the security of France and 
the peace of Europe will be better served by such a policy (a general 
settlement with Germany and Italy) than by any attempt to hold 
Germany in check by building up counter-forces on her eastern 
frontier”. 

Anticipating somewhat, it is worth noting that by November 
23 The Times no longer felt it necessary to attribute to “many” the 
view that France’s pacts of mutual assistance against aggression were 
“an artificial system of equilibrium”. It said that the breakdown of 
what it called, in terms borrowed direedy from the vocabulary of 
the German Propaganda Ministry, “the policy of encirclement”, 
made it much easier for Britain and France to pursue a common policy. 

On October 25, The Times ventured out into the open with an 
extraordinary article on Soviet industry, explaining that the U.S.S.R. 
was “prostrate”, that the planning system had “broken down”, that 
the situation of Soviet agriculture, timber industry, coalmining, iron- 
working, steel manufacture and cotton textiles was worse than before 
the war. Above all, in a revealing “aside”, The Times informed any 
prospective occupier of this shamefully neglected territory that, “if 
the Union were engaged in a major war, agriculture would very 
soon be paralysed”. 

Making assurance doubly sure, the paper the next day, in the course 
of an editorial on the situation in China, pointed out to Japan that, 
while there was no reason to suppose that China would “discontinue 
organised resistance”, the alleged “completely passive attitude adopted 
by the U.S.S.R. in these days” made it “tolerably clear” that the Far 
Eastern Red Army was really incapable of meeting the Japanese army 
in combat. It might be mentioned in passing that this was not the 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



300 

only editorial, by any means, in which The Times, in the course of 
1938, lamented bitterly the obstinacy of the Japanese in persisting in 
an attack on China which only brought quarrels with her “former 
friends” (November 29), and weakened her for her professed aims of 
combating Bolshevism. 

It would be most unfair, of course, to suggest that The Times had 
the monopoly of this amiable theory that Europe’s troubles could 
be alleviated if the aggressor Powers, and particularly Germany and 
Japan, would only turn their attention to the U.S.S.R. Thus Sir Eric 
Teicliman, for many years a British diplomat in China, wrote an 
article which was given considerable prominence in the Sunday Times 
of October 30, in which he, too, warned the Japanese that they, 
“who claim to be the bulwark guarding the Far East against the Soviet 
tide, may end by driving China’s millions into the Russian fold” — 
a prospect which was “very grim”, unless the leaders of Japan would 
call the whole business off. 

Again, another friend of the Prime Minister’s, Lord Elton, in an 
article printed by the same Sunday Times (November 27), congratulated 
his leader on the conversations with the French Government and the 
negotiations for a Franco-German declaration similar to that of Hitler 
and Chamberlain, on the grounds that the policy of encirclement had 
“collapsed”, and that France had returned to a “realistic” policy. 
British permanent interest in Europe was “the defence of the West”, 
proclaimed Lord Elton. 

As though to confirm tins point of view, Lord Halifax received the 
Soviet Ambassador for the first time since Munich — nearly four 
months — only on January 27, 1939: and then at the Ambassador’s 
own request, to discuss the Aaland Islands. 

The climax of the campaign for confidence in Germany was reached 
on the very eve of Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia. On March 9 
in the lobbies of the House of Commons, Chamberlain gave another 
of his anonymous talks, to be published as from “authoritative quar- 
ters”. On March 10 the world learned from the British press that 
these “quarters” considered that the international situation “is less 
anxious and arouses less concern over possible unpleasant develop- 
ments than it has done for some time” (Manchester Guardian), and 
were “optimistic about the international situation for the first time 
for many months” ( Daily Express); “an agreement to Emit arms may 
be possible before the year is out” (ibid.). That evening, hi a speech 
at Chelsea, Sir Samuel Hoarc announced that the greatest “oppor- 
tunity to discover the road to peace” in world history now existed. 


TOWARDS NEW AGCRESSIONS 301 

“Co-operation between five men — the tliree Dictators and the Prime 
Ministers of Britain and France — might create a Utopia in Europe 
in an increasingly short space of time.” 

In France, Government policy followed the same broad trend. 
Almost at the beginning of the preliminary negotiations for the visit 
of Ribbentrop to Paris and the Franco-German declaration of Dec- 
ember 6, lasting over six weeks, Bonnet assured the German Ambas- 
sador that the Government’s policy was one of “building up a front 
against those elements hostile to an understanding” and of “suppressing 
and excluding the Communists”. 56 This was a reference to Daladier’s 
speech at the Radical-Socialist Congress at Marseilles on October 27, 
three days before, which had violendy attacked the Communists for 
their attitude over Munich. Daladier thereby had indicated that the 
Radical-Socialist party intended to break up the People’s Front formed 
to combat Fascism in 1936. hi fulfilment of this policy, Bonnet used 
the most flagrant official pressure to prevent the French newspapers 
“writing up” the outrages against the Jews in the second week of 
November, and even to restrain its descriptions of the anti-French 
demonstrations in the Italian Chamber at the end of the month. 67 
In the meantime, on November 12, Daladier (who had secured extra- 
ordinary powers from the Chamber after Munich) issued a series of 
decree-laws abolishing the five-day week of eight hours a day and 
legalising compulsory overtime — thus sweeping away the basic social 
achievement of the People’s Front. A one-day General Strike of pro- 
test on November 30, in which two-and-a-half to three million workers 
participated, was treated as an “insurrection” by the Government. It 
“requisitioned” the railwaymen, concentrated tanks and called up re- 
servists; and there were thousands of strikers victimised, with Govern- 
ment approval. Even anti-Semitism received its official encouragement : 
at the Premier’s reception when Ribbentrop came to Paris on December 
6, the two Jewish members of the Government, the Ministers of Colo- 
nies and Education, were not invited. As late as January 26, the French 
Ambassador in Berlin was telling the Germans “that he had succeeded, 
partly through the Quai d’Orsay and partly by direct contact with 
journalists and editors of his acquaintance, in keeping the French press 
and the Strasbourg broadcasting station in order”. 58 

66 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, pp. 443-4- 

67 A description of the processes used for this purpose, by one who knew the under- 
side of the French press world very well, is given by Worth, op. cit., pp. 380-3. He also 
gives instances of persecution of foreign correspondents (pp. 392-3). 

68 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, p.492. 



THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



302 

Meanwhile, discussions for closer Franco-Gcrman commercial re- 
lations, begun while Ribbcntrop was in Paris by a detailed exchange 
of views between economic advisers of the two Governments, 59 were 
pushed ahead, with a view to meetings between French and German 
industrialists after the latter’s conference with a delegation of the 
Federation of British Industries, i.c. in the second half of March. 
A far-reaching programme of these discussions, covering close co- 
operation in a variety of capital development schemes both in Europe 
and in colonial territories, was submitted by the French Embassy in 
Berlin on March n. 60 

Thus the M.P.s, newspapers and big business of Britain and 
France were being harnessed into the operation of building a 
new order based on Munich (so far as lay within the powers of 
their respective Governments) when Hitler sent his armies into 
Czechoslovakia. 

It is not surprising that Stalin’s speech of Friday, March 10, 1939, 
at the opening of the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union — which reached the French and British newspapers in 
ample time for the Saturday afternoon and Sunday newspapers — 
was almost completely suppressed by them, or heavily overlaid with 
the “sunshine talk” emanating from the two Governments (such a 
careful observer as Wcrth, basing his narrative mainly on the press, 
does not even mention the speech). For Stalin not only cruelly analysed 
and exposed the policy of “non-intervention” and encouraging aggres- 
sors for what it was, but warned the world that a new imperialist war 
was already in progress since 1935, and had already involved over 
500 million people in Ethiopia, Spain, China, Austria and Czecho- 
slovakia. He went on: 

“The war has created a new situation with regard to the relations 
between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmosphere of alarm 
and uncertainty. By undermining the basis of the postwar peace 
regime and overriding the elementary principles of international law, 
it has cast doubt on the value of international treaties and obligations. 
Pacifism and disarmament schemes arc dead and buried. Feverish arm- 
ing has taken their place. Everybody is arming, small States and big 
States, including primarily those which practise the policy of non- 
intervention. Nobody believes any longer in the unctuous speeches 
which claim that the Munich concessions to the aggressors and the 
Munich agreement opened a new era of ‘appeasement’. They arc dis- 
believed even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, Britain 
59 D.G.F.P., vol. IV, pp. 477-81. 60 Ibid., pp. 510-13. 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 



303 

and France, who arc increasing their armaments no less than other 
countries.” 61 

This strong and merciless realism was the exact opposite of the 
“sunshine” propaganda which was being spread far and wide in 
London and Paris at the same moment. Yet it was the truth, while 
the propaganda was nothing but lies. That is why it had to be sup- 
pressed. But four days later events justified Stalin fully, and exposed 
the propaganda of Chamberlain and Bonnet. 

6 . The Peoples 

It would be wrong to suppose that these events took everyone by 
surprise. The highly secret development of the Munich conspiracy 
by the diplomats, politicians, businessmen and generals of the four 
Powers which signed the agreement of September 30 did not prevent 
those who had seen through Munich from understanding what was 
going on. 

The day after Munich, Maurice Thorez, general secretary of the 
French Communist Party, declared that Chamberlain’s talk of peace 
for a generation was “an abominable he”, and that “Munich meant 
war”. 62 After hearing Bonnet justifying Munich, at the Foreign 
Affairs Commission of the Chamber, Gabriel Peri — foreign editor 
of Humanite, shot by the Germans on December 15, 1941 — said: 
“These blackguards are leading the country to a catastrophe!” 63 
Along these lines the French Communists continued their fight — 
pointing out, for example, that “Munich and the decrees (abolishing 
the forty-hour week) are inseparable”. 64 They organised a demon- 
stration of protest on the arrival of Chamberlain and Halifax in Paris 
on November 23, and exposed the collaboration with Mussolini which 
was putting French territory itself in danger. 65 The majority of the 
trade union rank and file sympathised with them: the fact that over 
two-and-a-half millions struck in very adverse conditions on Nov- 
ember 30 — an action which Ministerial speeches, hundreds of news- 
papers and the French radio told them was support for the Communists 
— was an outstanding confirmation. But for that very reason all sec- 
tions of bourgeois opinion — from the extreme Right to the vast majority 
of the Socialist Party’s M.P.s and higher officials — were united against 
them. Only a handful of courageous individuals — the Right-wing 

61 Full text in Stalin, Problems of Leninism (English edition, Moscow, 1953), pp. 756-7. 

62 Florimond Bonte, Le Chernin d'Honneur (Paris, 1949), p. 251. 

63 Fernand Grenier, France d’hier, d’aujourd'hui, de demain (London, 1943), p- 3. 

64 Werth, op. cit., p. 376. 65 Ibid., pp. 395, 405-6. 



304 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

Nationalist Kerillis and some other M.P.s and journalists among them 
—ventured to denounce the policy of the Munichites. Few as they 
were, they were sufficient to cause concern to the German Ambassador. 
On November 25 he reported that “in the press and in political circles 
opposition to the Daladier-Bonnet policy is growing. It is seen very 
strongly in its clear co-operation with the British opposition to 
Chamberlain and Halifax . . . who are severely criticised by all papers 
of the Left and also by papers of the Right such as £poque” (Kerillis’ 
paper). But the “main opposition”, he said, was against the proposed 
Franco-German declaration. On December 28 he repeated that there 
were elements of the Right, as well as of the “Marxist Left”, carrying 
on an offensive against the Munich Agreement. On February 18, 
when he protested against Bonnet publicly talking about France ex- 
tending her friendships in Eastern and Central Europe, Bonnet pleaded 
that “the warmongers” would gain the upper hand in the Chamber 
if he did not. They were already reproaching him with attributing 
greater importance to the Franco-German agreement (of December 6) 
than was done in Germany. 06 

Nevertheless, Bonnet’s great asset was the Socialist Party’s support 
of Munich. In the absence of a united working-class opposition, the 
other elements disgusted with Munich were powerless. 

In the speech at the British Communist Party’s Congress which 
was quoted earlier, R. P. Dutt (enlarging on the point made earlier 
by Harry Pollitt) had said on September 18, 1938, that the British 
Government was deliberately creating a war atmosphere. The war 
crisis was real enough, but Chamberlain was using it to stage a decep- 
tion — “that to-morrow we may find Britain, France and the Soviet 
Union at war with Germany”— and if possible to destroy the Peace 
Front idea by associating it with the idea of war. He continued: 

“If Chamberlain wins, if he succeeds in breaking the Peace Front 
by putting forward his policy as the triumph of peace, then, when 
the bells of peace arc ringing over his victory, the real menace begins. 
If Chamberlain’s policy, which will be celebrated as a policy of peace, 
goes through, then Fascism, enormously strengthened in Europe, will 
at last be able to turn its forces upon the democracies, and the British 
people will then have to fight all the same, but under immeasurably 
worse conditions.” 67 t 

These prophetic words were reinforced by the Communist Party’s 
declaration, on October 1, that at Munich “the peace of the world 

D.G.F.P., vol. IV, pp. 464, 485, 497-8. 

67 Passage reproduced in Labour Monthly (London), November, 1938. 


TOWARDS NEW AGGRESSIONS 3°5 

has not been saved. It has been betrayed to the custody of Hitler, to 
be broken when he considers the time favourable for his next act of 
conquest, with his military forces enormously strengthened by his 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. ... If the Munich Agreement is not 
repudiated, ask yourself the question : 1 Which country in Europe will 
be the next to be attacked?’ ” Proposing various measures of popular 
pressure to secure a single front of progressive forces, opposed to 
Chamberlain in Britain, and make certain of the world conference 
proposed by Litvinov, the declaration underlined: The Four-Power 
Pact of Flitler and Chamberlain, of Mussolini and Daladier, is directed 
ag ains t your future interests even more than it is against the people 
of Czechoslovakia now.” 68 

This policy, preached in the Daily Worker, the factories and trade 
unions, found an echo in scores of local Labour Parties which began 
pressing for such progressive unity: but also in a wider public still. 
I11 five by-elections after Munich, held between October and Decem- 
ber, the Government vote increased only from 123,000 (at the 1935 
General Election) to 124,000, whereas the anti-Govemmcnt vote went 
up from 99,000 to 131,000. In two of these contests, Oxford and 
Bridgwater, Independent Progressive candidates fought on a People s 
Front basis: so did the Labour candidate in a third, Dartford. Thirty- 
nine Labour M.P.s supported the People’s Front candidate who won 
Bridgwater — against Labour Party Executive wishes. In January, 1939. 
a leading member of that Executive, Stafford Cripps, laid a policy 
statement for progressive unity on foreign and home policy before 
his colleagues. When they rejected it by 17 to 3, he circulated it to 
the local Labour Parties. For this he was expelled — yet by mid-March, 
i.e. when Hitler seized Czechoslovakia, 79 divisional (i.e. constituency) 
parties and 163 local parties had endorsed the memorandum, while 
another 27 divisional and 60 local parties had protested against his 
expulsion. 69 

In the meantime, minority groups in the capitalist class were 
responding to the campaign. One most arresting example was the 
League of Nations Union meeting at Chingford on December 9. 
Here, on the platform, were independent Conservatives, Liberals, the 
Labour M.P. Arthur Henderson and other Labour Party members, 
and the local secretary of the Communist Party — to hear Winston 
Churchill call for a foreign policy “to gather together all the forces 

68 Report of the Central Committee of the 1 6th Party Congress (Communist Party of Great 
Britain), pp. 36-7. 

Labour Monthly, April, 1939, PP- 209 (editorial), 230-5 (article by Allen Hutt). 


u 


306 THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 

of resistance to the aggression of dictators and to make a common 
cause with other like-minded nations”, and for “a real National 
Government, one embracing all the forces in the country which make 
for its strength, its safety and its survival”. 70 Other occasions, less 
vivid but no less significant, could be found in other parts of the 
country. There can be no question but that a vast mass of disgusted 
opposition to Munich and to the policy behind it was in existence. 

But in British political conditions the organisation of such an 
opposition depended for its success upon the Labour Party, as basic- 
ally the parliamentary representative body of the trade unions. The 
different elements of opposition had not the opportunity, or means 
of publicity, to build up another machinery of co-operation in time. 
And the leaders of the main trade unions and of the Labour Party, 
in their great majority, rejected such a responsibility, not only expelling 
Cripps but threatening to dissolve local Labour Parties which sup- 
ported him. They did so because, as we have seen earlier, they had 
in principle supported the policy of Chamberlain — though leaving 
him and the Tories with the responsibility for Munich when it came 
to the vote. They proved themselves (not for the first time and not 
for the last) an asset to Chamberlain rather than an obstacle. 

Thus kindred difficulties prevented, in Britain and in France, the 
true issues being put before the mass of the people after Munich, and 
left the opposition weak and insufficiently organised. Yet on March 15, 
1939, Hitler proved that they had been right. 

70 Quoted in Labour Monthly, January, 1939, p. 17. 


EPILOGUE 


“t DO not knew whether your countries will benefit from this 
1 decision taken at Munich, but certainly we shall not be the last. 
After us, others will meet with the same fate.” These were the words 
with which the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, on September 30, 193 8 > 
closed the interview with the French, British and Italian Ministers in 
which he told them that Iris Government was accepting the decision 
taken against Czechoslovakia at Munich. 1 

On March 15, 1939, Gauleiter Streichcr addressed a great demon- 
stration at Nuremberg to celebrate the entry of German armies into 
Bohemia. Fie said (reported the French Consul at that city next day) : 
“This is only a beginning: much more considerable events will follow. 
The democracies can rear up as much as they like, they will succumb 
in the end.” 2 

In fact, on May 23, 1939, Hitler held a decisive conference with 
many high officers, including Goering, Keitel and Raeder, in which 
he announced that, in order to expand Germany’s living space in the 
East (“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all”), Poland was 
to be attacked at the earliest opportunity. And he went on: “We 
cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war.” 3 

And there was war. Yet, as we have seen both Hitler and Jodi 
noting, it was the seizure of Czechoslovakia which laid the basis of 
action against Poland”, and created “more or less favourable strategic 
premises” for attacking her. But the seizure of Czechoslovakia in 
March, 1939, was made possible by forcing her to surrender her 
fortified frontiers to Nazi Germany in September, 1938. That too we 
have seen. “It was with Munich that World War II began”, BcncS 
said in a B.B.C. broadcast on August 8, 1942. 4 

By March, 1939, said the Judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal on September 30, 1946, sixteen years to the very day after 
Munich, “the time had now come for the German leaders to consider 
further acts of aggression”. The accomplishment of the programme 
which Hitler had discussed with his closest associates on November 5, 
1937, had made these further acts “more possible of attainment . 6 
The first step in the accomplishment was Munich. 

So much must be clear. Those who to-day defend Munich are 

1 D. & M., vol. I, p. 270. 2 French Yellow Book, p. 82. 

3 Trial, part II, p. 71. 4 Op. cit., p. 209. 

5 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal London, H.M. Stationery Office), 
p. 22. 





THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



308 

defending Hitler’s whole programme of aggression and his launch- 
ing of the second world war. But there is much else that emerges 
from the study of the causes and consequences of Munich. 

Who provided the funds which put Hitler in power? Whose works 
provided the arms and the ammunitions for liis armies, the cement 
and steel for his fortifications, the planes for his air force? Who 
organised the economic exploitation of his tributory lands in Central 
Europe and the Balkans? Who would have made profits from the 
Lebensraum which he was hoping to keep in Czechoslovakia, in Austria, 
in Poland and in the Soviet Union? The answer to all these questions 
is one and the same : German finance-capital, the great banking, indus- 
trial and commercial monopolies. But these were the very forces 
which had stood behind Kaiser Wilhelm II, in preparing and waging 
the first world war? Quite so. These w r crc the forces which the Allies 
had saved from “Bolshevism” in 1918-19 — and which now had turned 
against them. Munich was the final stage before these forces launched 
their war of revenge, with Hitler as their paladin. They had not been 
rooted out after their first try: now they would have their second. 

Secondly. Why had they not been rooted out? Why were they 
given, on the contrary, repeated injections of lifegiving resources — 
the Dawes Plan, the American credits which followed, the foreign 
investments, the great renewal of short-term credits when Hitler came 
to power — until, with that, they could begin building up a massive 
war machine for themselves? Why, during the years before Hitler, 
did the Western Powers wink at the “secret” training and armament 
of military cadres in Germany? Why the long series of so-called 
“capitulations” to them, on political questions, in the years from 1933 
to 1938? The evidence is massive and consistent. These were not 
capitulations at all, but more and more far-reaching gambles in an 
unspoken, tacit conspiracy — unspoken, that is, so far as the British 
and French Governments were concerned — until Munich, when it 
became spoken, and set out in black and white. The conspiracy was 
to make Hiderite Germany (and its allies) the formidable engine of 
assault on the Soviet Union, an assault in which the British, French, 
Italian, Japanese and United States finance-capital had failed in 1918-22. 
Implacable, unforgetting hatred of the Soviet Union, not “cowardly 
surrender to Hitler”, was the second active component of Munich. 
Of course at every stage there were doubts, hesitations and divisions 
among the henchmen of finance-capital — the politicians and the news- 
paper owners — but the decisions were made ultimately by the strongest 
groups : and the significance of those decisions was always the same. 


EPILOGUE 


309 

Tliirdly. Why did the peoples not see through these policies? Why 
did the democratic politicians, the liberal-minded newspapers, the 
Socialist and trade union militants, not rise up in revolt against them? 
Because— in both camps, the Nazi side and the Western imperialist 
side— of the tactics of diplomatic camoufiage, of lying to the people, 
of thinking out specious excuses for action on each occasion which 
had no connection with the real reason: because of those “impro- 
visations” which we heard Hitler’s interpreter describing at Nurem- 
berg. In this way step after step, although in reality logically linked 
in policy with what came before and after, seemed to be detached and 
to stand by itself. The study of Munich— that is, of a six months’ 
period in the diplomatic and political intrigue of rival imperialisms, 
against the background of the events since 1917* and hi a period of 
world history when one-sixth of the world was already Socialist and 
the labouring classes elsewhere had begun to take an interest in vital 
international questions — is a case-history of the swindling of man by 
man, and most particularly of the vast majority of working mankind 
by the tiny minority which exploits it. The mass of the people in the 
countries of capitalism was too sincere, too good-hearted itself in its 
desire for peace, to conceive of the lengths of deception to which 
imperialist diplomacy can go — and, in those where the capitalists ruled 
by Fascist methods, it had no means of expressing its protest. 

Yet there were men and women in Britain and France as well as 
in Czechoslovakia, as has been shown, who not only understood the 
real trend of events but struggled to point it out to their fellow- 
citizens, and first of all to the working class on whom modern society, 
in the long run, depends. Why were they not successful? Very simply: 
because they were too few. The labour movement in these countries 
was in the hands of people who accepted the policy which led up to 
Munich and was consummated at Munich: for whom solidarity with 
the capitalists of their country came, in the long run, before peaceful 
coexistence with the Soviet Union. Above all, they preferred to keep 
the labour movement divided — and thereby to prevent the forming of 
a movement of resistance to Hitler even wider than the working class 
—rather than unite it by joining hands with the Communists, to thwart 
their rulers’ dream of sending someone (the Germans, the Japanese, 
anyone who seemed to be offering themselves) against the U.S.S.R. 

These brief deductions stand out from a study of Munich and the 
way it was brought about. They are important, because the circum- 
stances which lead to them did not end when the Munich settlement 
ended, on March 15, 1939. 


BOOKS AND PAPERS QUOTED 


A NUMBER of newspapers and journals, quoted in the text, are 
not listed here. Nor are works to which reference is made but 
without quotations. 

Collections of Official Documents 

Abbreviated Titles 

D. & M. Documents and Materials relating to the Eve of the Second 
World War (English edition), Moscow, 1938, 2 vols. 

D.B.F.P. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Third Series, 
vols. I, II, III (1949, 1950), H.M. Stationery Office. 

D.G.F.P. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1943, Scries D, 
vols. I, II, III, IV (1949, 1950, 1951), H.M. Stationery Office. 
F.R.U.S. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1938, 
vol. I (1955), Department of State. 

French Yellow Book. Documents Diplomatiques, 1938-1939, Ministere des 
Affaires Etrangcrcs, Paris, 1939. 

Polish White Book. Official Documents concerning Polish-German and 
Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939, Hutchinson and Co., London, 
1939. 

Trial. Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the Inter- 
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 1946-1947, H.M. 
Stationery Office. 

Other Titles 

Berber, F. Dokumenle des Deutschen Friedenstvillen (Essen, 1940). 
Litvinov, M. Against Aggression (Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1939). 

Memoirs and Diaries 

Benes, E. Memoirs (English edition), 1954 (George Allen and Unwin, 
London). 

Bonnet, G. Defense de la Paix, vol. I (De Washington au Quai d’Orsay), 
1946 (Editions du Cheval Aile, Geneve). 

Bonte, F. Le Chemin de I’Honneur, 1949 (Editeurs Frangais Rcunis, 
Paris). 

Cecil, Viscount. A Great Experiment, 1941 (Jonathan Cape, London). 
Churchill, W. S. The Second World War, vol. 1, 1948 (Cassell, London). 
Ciano, G. Diplomatic Papers, ed. M. Muggeridge, 1948 (Odhams, 
London). 

Cot, P. 'Triumph of Treason, 1944 (Ziff Davies, Chicago). 

Coulondre, R. De Staline a Flitler, 1950 (Hachette, Paris). 


BOOKS AND PAPERS QUOTED 3 11 

D’Abernon, Viscount. An Ambassador of Peace, vol. I, T9 2 9> v °h HE 
1930 (Hodder and Stoughton, London). 

Davies, J. E. Mission to Moscow, 1941 (Simon and Schuster, New York). 
Dell, R. The Geneva Racket, 1920-1939, 1941 (Robert Hale, London). 
Gamelin, M. Servir, vol. II (Le Prologue du Dramc, 1930-9), 1946 
(Plon, Paris). 

Gedye, G. E. R. Fallen Bastions, 1939 (Gollancz, London). 

Gcyr von Schweppenburg. The Critical Years, 1952 (Wingate, London). 
Halifax, Earl of. Fulness of Days, 1957 (Coffins, London) . 

House, E. Intimate Papers, vol. IV, 1928 (Ernest Bcnn, London). 

Jones, T. A Diary with Letters, 1954 (Oxford University Press). 

Noel, L. L’ Agression allemande contre la Pologne, 1946 (Flammarion, 
Paris). 

Paul-Boncour, J. Entre Deux Guerres, vol. Ill, 1946 (Plon, Paris). 
Pcrtinax. Les Fossoyeurs, 2 vols., 1943 (Editions de la Maison Frangaise, 
New York). 

Reynaud, P. La France a sauve V Europe, vol. 1, 1947 (Flammarion, Paris). 
Simon, Viscount. Retrospect, t 95 2 (Hutchinson, London). 

Tempcrley, A. C. The Whispering Gallery of Europe, 1938 (Collins, 
London). 

Vansittart, Lord. Lessons of My Life, 1943 (Hutchinson, London). 
Vayo, J. A. del. Freedom's Battle, 1940 (Heinemann, London). 

Welles, Sunnier. A Time for Decision, 1944 (Harper, New' York). 
Werth, A. The Destiny of France, 1937 (Hamish Hamilton, London). 
France and Munich, 1939 (Hamish Hamilton, London). 

Other Works 

Beloff, M. The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, vol. II, 1949 (Royal 
Eistitute of International Affairs, London). 

Bilainkin, G. Maisky, 1944 (George Allen and Unwin, London). 
Churchill, W. S. Arms and the Covenant, 1938 (Cassell, London). 

Into Battle, 1941 (Cassell, London). 

Step by Step, 1942 (Macmillan, London). 

Esch, P. van dcr. Prelude to War, 1951 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague). 
Feiling, K. The Life of Neville Chamberlain, 1946 (Macmillan, London). 
Grachev, S. Pomoshch S.S.S.R. Narodam Chehoslovakii v ih Borbe za 
Svobodu i Nezavisimost, 1953 (Gospolitizdat, Moscow). 

Hadley, W. W. Munich Before and After, 1944 (Cassell, London). 
Hitler, A. Speeches, ed. N. H. Baynes, 1942 (Oxford University Press). 
Mein Kampf (extracts), 1936 (Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Com- 
mittee, London). 


THE MUNICH CONSPIUACY 



312 

Istoria Diplomatic vol. Ill, 1919-39, 1945 (Gospolitizdat, Moscow). 

Keith, A. B. The Catises of the War, 1940 (Nelson, London). 

Kennan, G. F. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, 1952 (Seeker and 
Warburg, London). 

Keynes, J. M. The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1919 (Macmillan, 
London). 

Krai, V. O kontrrevolutsionnoi i antisovetskoi politiki Masarika i Benesha 
(translated from Czech), 1955 (Izdatelstvo Inostrannoi Litcra- 
tury, Moscow). 

Langer, W., and Gleason, S. The Challenge to Isolation, 1957-1940, 
T952 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and 
New York). 

Matveyev, V. A. Proval Miunhenskoi Politiki, 1955 (Gospolitizdat, 
Moscow). 

Maugham, Viscount. The Truth about the Munich Crisis, 1944 (Flcinc- 
mami, London). 

Namier, L. B. Diplomatic Prelude, 1948 (Macmillan, London). 

• Europe in Decay, 1950 (Macmillan, London). 

In the Nazi Era, 1952 (Macmillan, London). 

Nicolson, H. King George the Fifth, 1952 (Constable, London). 

Pollitt, H. Selected Articles and Speeches, vol. II, 1954 (Lawrence and 
Wishart, London). 

Ripka, H. Munich, Before and After, 1939 (Gollancz, London). 

Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. Germany and the 
Rhineland, 1936. 

Survey of International Affairs, 1938, vol. II, 1951. 

Scton-Watson, R. W. Munich and the Dictators, 1939 (Methuen, London) . 

AFIistory of the Czechs and the Slovaks, 1943 (Hutchinson, London). 

Stalin, J. V. Collected Works, vols. XII, XIII, English edition, 1955 
(Lawrence and Wishart, London). 

Stein, B. E. Burjuaznye Falsifikatory Istorii, 1951 (Izdatelstvo Akadcmii 
Nauk S.S.S.R., Moscow). 

Thomson, S. H. Czechoslovakia in European History, 1943 (Princeton 
University Press). 

Walters, F. P. A History of the League of Nations, 2 vols., 1952 (Oxford 
University Press). 

Wheeler-Beimctt, J. W. Munich, Prologue to Tragedy, 1948 (Macmillan, 
London). 

Wickham Steed, FI. The Press, 1938 (Penguin Books, London). 

Wrench, J. E. Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times, 1955 (Hutchinson, 
London). 


INDEX 


Agrarian Party (Czechoslovakia), 45. 86, 
135-6, 146, 150, 151-2, 158 
Anglo-French conversations (28-9/4/1938), 

' 80-1, 94, 109; (18/9/1938), 99, 125-6; 
(25-6/9/1938), 102, 104, 129-30 
Anglo-French mutual guarantees, 80, 81, 
X02 

Anglo-German declaration (Munich), 107-8 
Anglo-Italian relations, 276-7 
“Appeasement”, 37, 270 
Aristocracy, Czechoslovak, 92-3, 148 
Attlee, C. R., M.P., 99, 106, 208, 209, 213- 


14, 217 

“Augur”, interview with Chamberlain 

(10/5/1938), 83 . 

Austria (post-1918), Hitler and seizure ot, 
37-8, 52, 74, 77, n8 
Austria-Hungary, 11, 4*, 42-3, *34-5 


Baldwin, Stanley, speeches (6/10/1933), 24; 
(30/7/1934), 79 
and U.S.S.R., 31, 35 
and Austria, 37 

Baltic Pact (proposed, 1934), 25 
Barrington Ward, memorandum on 
Czechoslovakia (March, 1938), 78; 
talk with Hoare (17/9/1938), 147 
Barthelemy, Joseph, 120 
Barthou, Louis, and Eastern Locarno, 25 
assassinated (9/10/1934), 25-6 
Beck, Jozef, 175, 181, 279-80, 292 
Beck, Ludwig (Colonel-General), 192, 196 
Bcnei, Eduard, and Soviet Russia (to 1922), 
45 

and U.S.S.R., 46, 109, 137, 138, 139, 14°, 
147, 154, 175, 181-2, 257 

and French obligations, 126-7 
and Nazis, 50, 138, 139, 147 
broadcast (22/9/1938), 156 
on British attitude to Czechoslovakia, 
83,91, 95,219 

on U.S. Ambassadors in 1938, 160 
proposals to Henleinites, 62-3, 64, 93-4, 
94-5 

on World War II, 307 
on meaning of Munich, 267, 307 
Beran, Rudolf, 136-7 
B6ranger, Henri, 117 
Berchtesgaden, talks at, 67, 265 
Blombcrg, Werner von, 50-1 
Blum, Leon, 32, 115, 118, 220-3, 276 
Bohemia, principality (10th century), 41 ; 
kingdom and Electorate (12th cen- 
tury), 41 ; civilisation (14th century), 
41-2; conquest and rule by Austria 
(1620-1918), 42 


Bolshevism (Spartacism) in Germany, 12- 


13, 14 

Bonnet, Georges, replaces Paul-Boncour 
(10/4/1938), 119 

on Communism to German Ambassador 
(30/4/1938), X2i, 256 
evades staff talks with U.S.S.R. (May, 
1938), 121-3, 174 , , , , , 

finds German attitude reasonable (24/5 / 
1938), 122 

promises Germans to threaten Czecho- 
slovakia (25/5/1938), 57, 122 
on co-operation with U.S.S.R., to Polish 
Ambassador (27/5/1938), 122 
distorted versions of Soviet proposals, 


109, 180 

Cabinet report on talk with Litvinov 
(12/9/1938), 124, 180 

favours peace at any price, 124, 190 

manoeuvre at London talks (18/9/1938), 
126 

breaks pledge to Cabinet (19-20/9/1938), 
126 

and Lacroix’s telegram (21/9/1938), 
126-7 

at Anglo-French conversations (25-6/9/ 
1938), 129 

demands to British Government (26/9/ 
1938), 130 . , . 

on Foreign Office communique (26/9/ 
1938), 131 

proposes Four-Power conference (28/9/ 


1938), 131 

forecasts more territorial changes (29/9/ 
1938), 131 
and U.S.A., 162-3 


negotiates Franco-German agreement 
(6/12/1938), 300, 301-2, 304 
on Ukraine (24/11/1938), 285; (14/12/ 
1938), 287; (10/1/1939), 292 
Brinon, Fernand de, 56 
British Embassy, Moscow, reports on 
Soviet conditions and policy, 108-9, 

270, 293 

British Legation,’ Prague, 65, 86, 95 
British policy : 

support of German reaction 12, 14 
towards France, 27, 29-30, 35, 75, 78, 9° 
aid for Japan against China, 36 
support for Hitler, 31, 35, 80, 84, 270 
keeps U.S.S.R. at arms’ length, 1938, 
105, 108-10, 185-6, 188-9, 244-6, 300 
British trade unions’ resolutions (1938), 
229-30 

Brussels Conference (November, 1937), 
36, 163, 167 

Bullitt, William C., 160, 161-2, 163, 257 





THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


314 

Butler, R. A. B., M.P., 59, 185 
By-elections, 305 

Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 89, 93, T95, 215 
Carlsbad (Karlovy Vary) demands, 55, 64, 
80, 81-2, 93, 94 
Carol II, 284 

“Case Otto” (war plan against Austria), 37 
Cecil, Lord (Robert), 34, 98, 172-3, 244 
Cerny, Josef, 86, 137, 146, 151 
Chamberlain, Austen, 18 
Chamberlain, Neville, on U.S.S.R., 39, 
260, 261, 263 

on Hitler’s attitude to U.S.S.R. (1935), 26 
against overthrowing Mussolini, 29 
on Europe beyond the Rhine (1935), 28 
on Austria (1938), 39 
on peace in Europe (1938), 39, 264 
attitude to Czechoslovakia (24/3/1938), 
53, 7^-7 

on support for France if she helped 
Czechoslovakia, 53, 66 
on threat to Czechoslovakia (May, 1938), 
56 

her “neutralisation”, attitude to, 78 
agrees to pressure on Czechoslovakia, 79 
Cliveden luncheon with journalists 
(10/5/T938), 83-4, 88, 96 
lobby talk with journalists (1/6/1938), 88 
on invitation to Goering (July, 1938), 89 
denies “hustling” Czechs (26/7/1938), 
92, 127 

cable to Hitler (13/9/1938), 67, 98 
press statement (1 1/9/193 8), 65-6, 97, 
125, 249 

cables to Hitler (13/9/1938), 67, 98 
flies to Berchtesgaden, 67, 98, 213; to 
Godesberg, 100, 127, 216; to Munich, 
71 

refuses to call Parliament (20/9/1938), 99, 
216 

suggests Henleinites should get task of 
keeping order in borderlands (22/9/ 
1938), 100 

renounces guarantees for transferred 
population (23/9/1938), 101 
support for Godesberg terms (24-5/9/ 
1938), 101 

suggests international conference (25/9/ 
1938), 103, 106, 

offers Hitler an anti-Soviet pact (26/9/ 

1938), 103 

suggests Four-Power conference (28/9/ 
1938), 106, 131 

broadcasts (26/9/1938), 104; (27/9/1938), 
104-5, 243 

works out plan of German occupation 
(27/9/1938), 104 

accepts Hitler’s exclusion of Czechs at 
Munich (29/9/1938), 107 
suggests Four-Power mediation hi Spain 
(30/9/1938), 102, 277 


proposes Anglo-German declaration 
(30/9/1938), '107-8 

on Ukraine (24/11/1938), 285; (10/1/ 
1939), 292; (12/1/1939 and I3/I/I939), 
292-3 

on critics of Munich (1/11/1938 and 
13/12/1938), 297 

on prospects in Europe (9/11/1938), 
297 

on aid to France against Italy (12/12/ 
1938), 297 

on British strength (15/12/1938), 250 
“sunshine talk” (9/3/1939), 300 
Champcticr dc Ribes, Auguste, 127 
Chautcmps, Camille, on Austria, 37 
on Czechoslovakia, 118 
on U.S.S.R., 1 16, 261 
China, Soviet aid to, 36, 167, 169 
France and, 114 
Britain and, 36 
U.S.A. and, 36 

Churchill, W. S., 25, 34, 97, 102, 106, no, 
154, 179-80, 186, 227, 264-5, 305-6 
Chvalkovsky, Frantisck, 72, 274 
Clemenceau, Georges, 12 
Communism, fear of, 14, 85, 121, 130, 138, 
147, 160, 256-8 
Communist Party; 

French, 127, 132, 221-2, 232, 304 
British, 230, 231-2, 232-3, 234, 304 
German, 16 

Comnen, Nicolae Petrescu, 204-5, 257-8 
Confederation of Labour, French (C.G.T.), 
224, 228 

Co-operative Party, British, 226 
Cot, Pierre, 1 16 

Coulondrc, Robert, 57, 115, 139, 201, 205, 
241, 244, 245, 257, 260, 268, 275, 287 
Cripps Memorandum, 305 
Criticism of Germany, suppressed : 
in Britain, 234, 298 
in France, 127, 234, 301 
Czechoslovak Communist Party, 62, 137, 
146, 155, 15 6, 158, 272 
Czechoslovak Government, internal con- 
flict in, 136, 139, 140 
concession to Henleinites, 55, 59, 62-3, 
64, 80, 92, 93, 95 

surrender to Anglo-French ultimatum 
(21/9/1938), 68, 99-100, 149 
rejects Godesberg terms (25/9/1938), 70, 
102 

agrees to international conference 
(26/9/1938), 103 

refused admission at Munich (29/9/ 1938), 
107 

told it must accept Munich Agreement 
(30/9/1938), 107, in 
Czechoslovakia before 1938: 
population, 40 
history, 40-6 
frontiers, 41 


1ND 


Czechoslovakia before 1938 — cont. 

Legions, counter-revolutionary role of, 
45. 136 

national minorities in, 43-4, 44 _ 5 
democracy in, 44-5 
attack on Soviet Hungary (1919). 45 
official support of Russian Whites, 45, 
136 

trade agreement with Russia (1922), 45. 
46 

diplomatic relations with U.S.S.R. 
(1934), 46 

mutual assistance treaty with U.S.S.R. 

(1935). 46, 50, 170 
reservations on treaty, 46, 170-1 
mutual assistance treaties with France 
(25/1/1924), 50, m-12; (16/10/1925), 
17-18, 50, 112 

Hitler’s plans against, 37, 50 
arbitration treaty with Germany (1925), 
T 7. 52-3, 99 

Czechoslovakia in 1938-9; 

frontiers of, 52, 57, 74, 84, 103, 200 
strategic significance of, 48-9 
strength of armed forces, 74, 102, 131, 
139, 151. 157. 195. 197. 198, 199-200, 
249 

non-Nazi German parties in, 54, 77, 136, 
138, 147-8 
and Spain, 137 

mobilisation (20/5/1938), 57. 85, 86, 
120-1, 140, 148-9, 175; (23/9/1938), 
101, 128, 131, 150- 1 , 156 
reliance on Western Powers, 135, U9- 
40, 145, 146 

losses at Munich, 5, 73-4, 238, 272 
and Soviet aid, 147, 153-7. 181-2 
annexation, 273-4, 300 

D’Abcmon, Viscount, 13, 14, 17, 75 
Daily Herald, 208, 209, 209-10, 21 1, 214- 
15, 215-16, 217, 218, 228 
Daily Worker, 232, 305 
Daladicr, Edouard, prefers Bonnet to Paul- 
Boncour (10/4/1938), 119 
understands Hitler’s real aims, 256 
expresses anti-Soviet sentiments to Ger- 
mans (22/5/1938), 122, 256-7; (7/9/ 
1938), 258 

has “bad information” on Soviet army 

(23/5/1938), 121 

at discussions in London, 81, 99, 102, 120 
declares obligations to Czechoslovakia 
“sacred”, 123 

stresses German weakness (8/9/1938), 

124, 197 

changed after Hitler’s speech (12/9/1938), 
124 

suggests Three-Power conference (13/9/ 
1938), 125 

persuades Cabinet minority not to re- 
sign (22/9/1938), 127-8 


EX 315 

manoeuvre at party meeting (23/9/1938), 
128-9, 222 

admits strength of Soviet forces (25/9/ 
1938), 129 

invited to Munich (28/9/1938), 106 
embarrassed there by Czechs (30/9/1938), 
hi 

attacks Communists for criticising Mun- 
ich (27/10/1938), 301 
issues anti-Labour decree-laws (12/11/ 
1938), 224, 301 

treats General Strike as insurrection 
(30/11/1938), 224, 301 _ 

Danzig, Nazis raise question with Poles 
(1938), 279-80 

Davies, Joseph E., 57, 167, 171, 173. 201, 
264 

Dawson, Geoffrey, 26, 31, 64, 78, 96, 180, 
260-1 

De la Warr, Lord, 185, 187, 205, 253 
Delbos, Yvon, 116, 117-18 
Derer, Ivan, 157 

Dirksen, Herbert von, 89, 160, 170, 244, 
245, 253, 2901 
Dodd, William E., 31 
Driscoll, Joseph, interview with Neville 
Chamberlain, 83 
Duff Cooper, Alfred, 102, 13 1 
Dutt, R. Palme, 232-3, 304 

Eastern Locarno, 25 

Economic co-operation with Germany 
(plans), 297, 302 

Eden, Anthony, on oil sanctions (1935-6), 

29 

on Spain (1936), 33. 35 
on Austria (1937), 37 
on “Sudeten-Gcrmans” (1937). 5 1 
Eiscnlohr, Ernst, 52, 58, 90, 136, 138, 139, 
204 

Ethiopia, Italian war on, 28-9, 77, 1 *3, 169, 
278 

Fabry, Jean, 1 14-15 
Farben, LG., 272 
Fascism, 47 

Fauchcr, Eugene (General), 128, 152 
Fierlinger, Zdenek, 123, 139, 173 
Flandin, Pierrc-Etienne, 117, 118, 130 
Foerster, Albert, 264-5 
Foreign Office, press statement (26/9/1938), 
70, 102-3, 130, 186-7, 217. 249 
Four-Power Pact (1933). 23 
Four-Power Conference, suggested by 
Nevile Henderson (2/8/1938), 105-6 
“Fourteen Points”, 59, 88 
“Fourth Plan”, 64, 65, 94-5, 9 6 . I2 i 
France, Hitler’s designs on, 22-3, 117 
mutual assistance treaties with Czecho- 
slovakia, m-13, 117, 132-3 
mutual assistance treaty with U.S.S.R. 
(i935), 33, 35, 56 , 1x4-16, 121 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 


316 

France — cont. 
pledges to Czechoslovakia (1938), 53. 123 
breaches of international obligations 
(1935-8), 1 1 3-14 

military intelligence, on U.S.S.R., 286-7 
military strength in 1938, 102, 129, 195, 
200-1 

Frangois-Poncet, Andre, 56, 283 
Franco-Italian relations, 276, 278 
Frank, Karl Hermann, 54, 90, 93 
Free hand in East for Germany, 17, 18, 24, 
25, 27, 35. 39. 245. 262, 264, 270, 283, 
286, 288 

French co-operation with Britain (1938), 
120-1 

French Socialist Party: 

Roy an Congress (1938), 220 
deputies’, (manoeuvres in September, 
1938), 221-2; support for Munich, 

223. 303 

Seine Federation of, on Munich, 223 
resolutions, 223, 224 

French trade unions, 224, 228; Seine de- 
partmental union, 228 
strike of (30/11/1938), 224, 301, 303 
Fritsch, Werner von, 5 1 
Funk, Walter, 275 

Gallacher, William, M.P., 106, 234 
Gamelin, Marie Gustave, 24, 102, 114, 115, 
120, 124, 129, 137, 152, 180, 187, 197, 
242, 266 
Garvin,). L., 38 
Genoa Conference (1922), 15 
George V, 262-3 
German Army: 

retention on Russian territory (1918-19), 
12, 13 

movements on Czechoslovak frontiers 
(1938), 54. 56, 60, 68, 85, 128, 220 
generals’ attitude on war with Czecho- 
slovakia (1938), 58, 192, 195, 196-7, 
198-9 

military strength of (1938), 102, 124, 
194-6, 197-9 

economic strength of, 48 (after Mun- 
ich) 275 

Germany, monopolies in, 13, 19, 308 
non-aggression treaty with U.S.S.R. 
(1926), 18 

occupation of Austria by (1938), 38 
rearmament in secret (1918-35), 13, 14, 
16, 308; public, 23, 24-5, 26, 49, 74 
rejection of Eastern Locarno (1934), 25 
revolution in (November, 1918), xi 
threats to Czechoslovakia, 56, 61, 62, 
65, 66 

threats to France, 22-3, 56, 82, 121 
war preparations against Poland, 281-2, 
307 

war preparations against France and 
Britain, 61 


withdrawal from Disarmament Con- 
ference (1933), 24 

as bulwark against Bolshevism, 14, 17, 
19. 23, 31 

Godesberg, talks at (22-3/9/1938), 69-70, 
128, 185 

terms, British Cabinet divided on, 102 
terms supposedly worse than at Munich, 
72, 219, 239-40 

Goebbels, Joseph, 47-8, 59, 65, 88, 138 
Goering, Hermann, 51, 53, 60, 61, 65, 
68-9, 89, 149, 192, 204, 273, 274 
Gottwald, Klement, 155, 158, 174-5 
Greenwood, Arthur, 219 
Grzybowski, Waclaw, 121-2 
Guarantee, Anglo-French, to Czecho- 
slovakia, 72, 86-7, 99, 104, 240 

Hacha, Emil, 274 

Halifax, Lord, and Hitler on Austria (1937), 
37 

and Hitler on Czechoslovakia (1937), 51 
tribute to Hitler’s services (19/11/1937), 
75 

rejects or ignores Soviet proposals 
(22/3/1938), 79, 108; (5/9/1938), 180; 
(8/9/1938), no, 180; (23/9/1938), no 
proposes Anglo-French pressure on 
Czechoslovakia (22/3/1938), 79, 119 
warns French against too great hopes of 
British support (11/4/1938), 119; 

(22/5/1938), 122 

no British defence of Czechoslovakia 
(April, 1938), 81 

assurances to Germans and Italians 
(29/4/1938), 56, 81 

fear of alliance with U.S.S.R. (21/5/1938), 

85 

favours “neutralisation” of Czecho- 
slovakia, 86 

objects to her getting guarantees 
(9/6/1938), 87 

would like to see Hitler as King’s guest 
in London (18/6/1938), 89 
on proposals for “special investigator”, 
“independent British expert”, “medi- 
ator”, etc. (April-July, 1938), 90-1 
opposes Anglo-French warning to Hit- 
ler (9/9/1938), 96-7 

rejects French request for assurances of 
support (12/9/1938), 97 
and British-Soviet talks at Geneva 
(23/9/1938), no, 185, 188 
warnings to Czechs (27/9/1938), 104 
urges French not to act against Germany 
without consulting British Govern- 
ment (27/9/1938), 104 
on why U.S.S.R. not invited to Munich, 
110, 188, 244 

defence of Munich, 251, 252 
disappointment in results of Munich, 
296 


INDEX 


317 


Halifax, Lord — cont. 

on the Ukraine (20/10 and 1/1 1/1938), 
284; (16/12/1938), 288 
Hassan, Lake, battles at, 1938, 168 
Henderson, Arthur, M.P., 209, 219 
Henderson, Sir Nevile, 57, 60, 71, 79-80, 
82, 85, 88-9, 96, 101, 105-6, 159, 161, 
196, 204, 241, 249, 257 
Hcnlein, Konrad, lecture at Vienna 

(4/3/1941), 50 

visit to London (October, 1937), 51, 54 
on Czechoslovak fortifications (19/ 11 / 
1937), 52 

speech at Karlovy Vary (Carlsbad), 55-6 
visit to London (May, 1938), 54, 56, 84-5 
Daily Mail interview (26/5/1938), 57, 210 
press statement (25/7/1938), 60-1 
announces formation of “Free Corps’ ’ 
( 17 / 9 / 1938 ). 68 
Hess, Rudolf, 60, 88 

Hitler, Adolf, Lord Vansittart on class 
forces behind, 19 
British support of, 35, 75 
preparations to seize Austria (1936-7), 37 
negotiations with BeneS (19 3 6), 50 
hate campaigns against Czechoslovakia, 
50, 53-4, 58, 65-6, 70, 78, 88 
preparations for attacking Czechoslo- 
vakia, 37, 50-1, 54, S6-7, 57-8, 63, 65, 


67, 86, 195-6 

peaceful assurances about Czechoslo- 
vakia (1938), 51, 53 

directions to Henlein (28/3/1938), 54, 


78; (2/9/1938), 94 

speeches (22/2/1938), 775 (28/3/1938), 
54, 79; (12/9/1938), 66, 86, 98; 
(26/9/1938), 70; (9/10/1938), 296; 
(5/11/1938), 296; (30/1/1939), 245; 
(28/4/1939), 274-5 

demands at Berchtesgaden, 67; at Godes- 


berg, 69-70, 100-101 
letter to Chamberlain (27/9/1938), 71, 


i°5 

cable to President Roosevelt, 70 
issues imitations to Munich (28/9/1938), 
71, 106 

agrees to Anglo-German declaration 
(30/9/1938), 107-8 

peaceful assurances to Poland (1938-9), 
265-6, 280-1 

occupation of Czechoslovakia, 273-4 
orders plans for war on Poland, 281-2, 

307 

on Ukraine (to Beck), 294 
Hoarc, Sir Samuel (Lord Templewood), 
agreement with Laval (1935), 28-9 
speech at Geneva (11/9/1935), 28 
urges Czechoslovakia to accept Anglo- 
French “good offices”, 79 
on international guarantee, 240 
handles press after Munich, 215 
reports Cabinet view that Czechoslo- 


vakia is “disintegrating” (17/9/1938), 
147 

and exclusion of U.S.S.R., 188, 244 
on British strength, 250, 255 
Hodza, Milan, 52, 83, 88, 100, 126-7, 136- 
7, 151-2, 153 
Hore-Belisha, Leslie, 264 
Hossbach, Friedrich, “memorandum” 
(1937), 37, 5i 
notes in diary (1938), 54-5 
Houghton, Alanson B., speech as U.S. 

Ambassador in London, 17 
House, Colonel Edward, 12 
House of Commons, scene in (29/9/1938), 
106 

Hugenberg Memorandum (1933), 282 
Hull, Cordell, 159, 161 
Humanity 127, 224, 232 
Hungary, Government’s attitude to 
Czechoslovakia, 52, 67, 68-9 
action after Munich, 73-4, 240, 272, 274 
Hussites, 42 

Inskip, Sir Thomas, M.P., 240, 249-50, 252 
International Commission, 71,111, 219, 239 
International Conference, offered to Czechs 
by Chamberlain, 103, 106 
suggested to Hitler by Roosevelt, 106, 

163-4 

Soviet views on, 187 

International law, German plans to violate, 

63 . „ . 
Intervention (Allied) in Soviet Russia, 12 
Italy (Fascist), intervention in Spain, 32 
threats to France, 276 
French offers to placate, 278 
discussions with Germany of next war, 
278-9 

war on Ethiopia, 28-9 
Japan, free hand against Russia suggested, 

25, 299-300 

attacks on Soviet and Mongolian terri- 
tory (1936-8), 168 

attack on China (1937), 35-6, 77, 167-8 
Jodi, Alfred, notes in diary, 52, 58, 63, 68, 
196, 197 

lecture (7/11/1943), 281 

memorandum to Hitler (24/8/1938), 63 
evidence at Nuremberg, 195. I 97, *9 8 , 
199 

Jones, Thomas, excerpts from diary, 30-1, 
35, 37, 101 
Jouhaux, Leon, 116 

Kalinin, Mihail Ivanovich, 115, 173-4 
Keitel, Wilhelm, 52, 56, 85, 193, 194, *95, 
198-9, 273-4, 279, 281 
Keith, Professor Arthur Berriedale, 240, 
268-9 

Kennedy, Joseph P., 160, 163, 164, 215 
Kcrillis, Henri de, 132, 3©3-4 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



318 

Keynes, J. M., 13,14 
Kirkpatrick, Ivonc, 82 
Kleist, F.wald von, 196-7 
Knox, Sir Geoffrey Knox, 13 
Krcjci, Ludvik, 152, 157 
Krofta, Kamil, 83, 88, 306 
Kuehlenthal, General von, 258 
Kundt, Ernst, 64, 93-4 

Labour Party, speaker’s notes (1938), 208-9, 
210-n 

Executive Committee (1938), 208-9, 
210, 219, 306 

National Joint Council statements(i938), 

212-13, 216 
Scottish, 216 

local organisations, 229, 305 
Lacroix, Victor de, 126-7 
Lansbury, George, M.P., 106, 217 
Laval, Pierre, 28, 113, 117 
Layton, Sir Walter (Lord), 242 
League of Nations, German request for 
admission, 16 

Article 16 of its Covenant, 17, 18, 77, 
123, 206 

Soviet view of its role, 165, 169-70 
Assembly (September, 1938), 97-8, 108 
Left Book Club, 230-1 
Legcr, Alexis, iit, tt 4 
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 168-9, 246 
Liberals (rank and file), 227 
Lipski, Jozcf, 279 
Little Entente, France and, 113 
Litvinov, Maxim Maximovich, speeches, 
30, 31, 147, 156, 170, i7<>-7, 178-9, 
181, 182-3, 184-5, 188 
talks in Moscow, 69, 109-10, 118-19, 
122, 17T, 176, 177, 178, 181 
talks in Geneva, 29, 103, no, 166, 174, 
180, 185-6 

on “reform” of Covenant, 183-4 
and staff talks with France, 115-16 
Living-space ( Lebensratim ), 20-2, 268, 295 
Lloyd, Lord, interview (May, 1934), 25 
Lloyd George, David, 12, 35 
Locarno Agreements (1925), terms 17-18, 

29-30, ^117 

significance, 18-19, 170 
Lothian, Lord, on Hitler’s aims, 26 
on Litvinov, 31 

ideas on diverting Hitler eastwards, 31 

MacDonald, James Ramsay, 23 
Maisky, Ivan Mihailovich, 79, 108, no, 
179-80, 188-9, 287-8, 300 
Mandcl, Georges, 125, 127 
Marchbank, John, 228 
Masafik, Hubert, 107, m 
Masaryk, Jan, 79, 93, 103 
Masaryk, T. G., 45, 147 
Mason-Macfarlanc, Colonel F. N., 61, 195, 
196, 289 


Mastny, Vojtcch, 138 
Maugham, Viscount, 237, 243 
Maurras, Charles, 130 
Maxton, James, M.P., 106, 217 
Mein Kampf (extracts), 20-3 
Mendl, Charles (Sir), 119 
Militarism, German, 13, 19 
Mistier, Jean, 132 

Mobilisation, Czechoslovak. See Czecho- 
vakia in 1938 
German, 60, 68 
French, 70, 121, 128, 130-1 
British, 70, 102, 105, 131 
Moravska-Ostrava, incident at (7/9/1938), 

65, 96 

Morocco, German fortifications in, 207, 
251 

Munich, its spirit already at Locarno 

(1925), 19 

proceedings at, 71-2, 107-8 
assessments of (German), 73, 107; 
(Halifax’), 72, 73; (BeneS’), 267, 307; 
(Gottwald’s), 158; (British Ministers’), 
252-3; (Nuremberg Tribunal’s), 252, 
3°7 

Mussolini, Benito, and Four-Power Pact 
(i933), 23 

British desire not to overthrow, 29 
draft at Munich, 71 
on France, 276-8 

on the Ukraine (12/1 and 13/1/1939), 
292-3 

Namier, L. B. (Sir Lewis), 261, 269 
National Socialist Party (Czechoslovakia), 
45, 88, 136, 145 

Nationality Statute, 57, 59, 60, 92 
Naval Agreement (Anglo-German, 1935), 
27, 28, 74, 262 

Neurath, Konstantin von, 24, 51, 52, 53 
“Neutralisation” of Czechoslovakia, 78, 
80, 85, 86-7, 265 
New Statesman and Nation, 220 
Newton, Basil, on Hcnlein’s demands 
(19/3/1938), 54 
pressure on BcneS, 79, 94 
insists on pressure continuing, 79 
expects Czechoslovakia to enter “Ger- 
man orbit” (12/4/1938), 80 
pressure on Czechoslovak Ministers, 83, 
88 

indignant at mobilisation (May, 1938), 85 
acceptance of Henlein’s terms “inevi- 
table”, 94 

ultimatum to BcneS (21/9/1938), 100 
and Anglo-French guarantee (10/12/ 
1938), 72 

on the Ukraine (24/11/1938), 286 
Noel, lion, 139 
Noel-Buxton, Lord, 77 
Non-intervention, 32, 166, 251, 276, 278, 
286 


INDEX 


319 


Nuremberg Congress, 65, 86 
Nyon Conference (1937), 34, 207, 251 

Ogilvie-Forbcs, Sir George, 284, 286, 289, 
290, 294 

Omissions from documents, 261-3 
“Operation Green”, 50-1, 52, 56-7, 57-8, 
68, 85, 86, 195-6 

Option, right of, promised at Munich, 72 
denied, 72, 239 

Ormsby-Gore, W. C. A. (speech, 24/10/ 
1925), 18-19 
Osusky, Stefan, 117 
Ozcrsky, Alexandr Vasilicvich, 260 

Papen, Franz von, 24, 37 
Parliaments not consulted on ultimatum to 
Czechoslovakia, 99, 234 
voting on Munich Agreement, 132 
Paul-Boncour, Joseph, 119, 130, 173, 267-8 
Peace Ballot, 1935, 236, 262 
Peoples, how they felt: 

in Czechoslovakia before Munich, 148- 
51, 161, 200 

in Czechoslovakia after Munich, iS7 - 8, 
238 

in Germany before Munich, 191-4 
in France before Munich, 128, 130-1, 
228, 235 

in France after Munich, 228 
in Britain before Munich, 226-8, 234-5, 
in Britain after Munich, 228-31 
in the Soviet Union, 202-3 
Peri, Gabriel, 234, 303 
Pctibon, Colonel, 289-90 
Phipps, Sir Eric, 101, 103, 109, 126, 130, 163 
Pogroms in Germany (1938), 295 
Poland, treaty with France (1925), 17-18 
arbitration treaty with Germany (1925), 
17 

rejects Eastern Locarno (1934), 25 
and Rhineland (1936), 30 
co-operation with Hitler (1934-8), 266 
anti-Soviet offers from Germany, 265-6 
attitude to Czechoslovakia (1938), 69, 
121-2, 129, 176, 180-1, 266 
warned by U.S.S.R. (23/9/1938), 183 
action after Munich, 73-4, 240, 272 
Chief of Staff on state of U.S.S.R. (June, 
1938), 109, 266 

and passage of Soviet troops, 171, 174, 
176, 206 

menace to, after seizure of Czechoslo- 
vakia, 60, 131, 279-81 
Pollitt, Harry, 233 
Populaire, 223-4 

Potemkin, Vladimir Petrovich, 36, 122, 

183, 187, 244 

Prager Vcrcin, 272 

Prague, capital of Emperor Charles IV, 41 
insurrection (June, 1848), 42 
Pritt, D. N., K.C., M.P., 226 


Raczynski, Edward, 288, 296 
Radical-Socialists, French, Ministers’ 
threats to resign (1936), 32 
and Daladier (1938), 128-9, 221-2 
Racder, Erich, 51, 198 
Ramsbotham, H., M.P., 237 
Rapallo Treaty (1922), 15-16, 19 
Redivision of world, 11, 47-8, 73, 227 
Rcichswehr, “Black”, 13, 14 
Reparations, 15-16 

Reynaud, Paul, 19, 116, 125, 127, 206, 256 
Rhineland, 16, 17, 24, 29-31, 35, 38, 74, 
II3, 117 

Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 37, 52, 56, 62, 
85, 272, 274, 279-80, 301-2 
llipka, Hubert, 1 5 3, 1 5 5-6 
Roche, Emile, 124 

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 70, 106, 161, 162, 
164, 187, 258 

Ruhr, French occupation of, 16 
Rumania and passage of Soviet troops, 
123, 171, 174. 176, 203-5 
Runciman, Lord, idea of mission discussed 
(April-July, 1938), 61, 90-1 
offer of his services (18/7/1938), 91 
Czechs pressed into accepting, 91-2 
mission’s regular reports to Foreign 
Office, 91 

mission’s Nazi contacts, 61, 92-3 
negotiations, 62, 64, 65, 66, 92-5 
urges Benes to accept Henlein’s pro- 
posals, 94 
report, 91, 98-9 

Russian Revolution, 1917 (March), 11; 
(November), 11 

Sanctions against Germany, rejection of, 28 
against Italy (193 5-6), 29, 165-6 
Schmidt, Paul Otto, 23 
Schmundt, Major, 68, 195 
Schulenburg, Friedrich Werner von dcr, 
177 

Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 38, 138 
Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, 38, 273 
Shinwell, Emanuel, M.P., 226 
Simon, Sir John (Viscount), 23, 24, 26, 27, 
40, 102, 190, 240 

Sinclair, Sir Archibald, M.P., 106, 227 
Skoda Works, 272, 275 
Slav peoples of Austria-Hungary, 1 1 
Slovaks, 40-3, 45, 73-4. 274 
Slovak Fascists, 43, 69, 158, 272-4 
South Wales Miners’ Federation, 227 
Soviet Foreign Policy: 

peaceful co-existence with capitalist 
States, T5, 165, 168-9 
of collective security (on Ethiopia), 29, 
165-6; (on Rhineland), 30-1; (on 
Spain), 32-3, 166; (on China), 36, 167 
aid to China (1937-8), 36, 167 
not based on ideological sympathies, 
168-70 


THE MUNICH CONSPIRACY 



320 

Soviet Foreign Policy — cont. 

pledges to help Czechoslovakia (15/3/ 
1938), 17* ; (17/3/1938), 172-3; (end of 
March, 1938), 173 ; (26/4/1938), 173-4; 
(8/5/1938), 174; (12/5/1938), 174; 
(mid-May, 1938), 174-5; (25/5/1938), 
175; (23/6/1938), 176-7; (2/9/1938), 
178-80; (8/9/1938), 180; (n/9/1938), 
180; (13/9/1938), 180-1; (17/9/1938), 
181; (20/9/1938), 181-2; (21/9/1938), 
182-3; (23/9/1938), 184-5; (26/1/1938), 
187; (28/9/1938), 187 

warning to Germany (22/9/1938), 177, 
189 

proposals for collective help to Czecho- 
slovakia (17/3/1938), 53, 103, 108, 118- 
19; (2/9/1938), 103, 109-10, 178-80; 
(23/9/1938), no, 185 

supplies to Czechoslovakia, 139, 149, 200 
Soviet military strength, 1938, 102, 108, 
129, 201-2, 286-7, 294 
Soviet preparations for war, 1938, 102, 124, 
129, 175-6, 187 
Soviets, Allies and, 12, 14 
Spaak, Paul Henri, 36 
Spanish Republic, Britain and, 32-5, 107, 
276-8 

France and, 32-4, 113, 276-8 
Franco rebellion against, 32, 278 
German and Italian intervention against, 
32-4, 74, 77, 166, 251, 276 
Soviet aid to, 32-3, 34, 166, 169, 251 
Staff talks, Anglo-French, 78, 80 

Franco-Soviet, French evasion of, 114- 
16, 123, 180 

Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich, 116, 165, 174- 
5, 181, 258-9, 259-60, 302-3 
Strabolgi, Lord, 226 
Strang, William, 61, 87, 105, 295 
Streicher, Julius, 307 
Strcsa Conference (1935), 27-8, 38 
Stresemann, Gustav, 16, 17 
“Sudeten German Party” : 

disruptive proposals, 50, 55-6, 57, 59, 
60, 90 

links with Berlin, 50, 54, 143-4, 146 
terrorism by, 54, 58, 65, 100 
Government tolerance towards, 55, 86, 
137, 142-6 

formation and role of “Volunteers”, 56, 

85. 143-4 

arms smuggling, 56, 62 

tactics in negotiations, 54, 57, 62-3, 65, 

86, 90, 93-4 

insurrection (12/9/1938), 66, 98, 144-5, 

147,237 

“Sudeten Germans”, their origins, 43, 237 
political rights, 43-4, 141 
attitude of population, 66, 125, 141-2, 
144, 238 

Suritz, Yakov Zaharievich, 109 


Survey of International Affairs, 1938, 269-70 
Syrovy, Jan, 152, 153, 155-6, 238, 272 

Temps, Le, 120, 125, 130, 285 
Thierry, Adrien, 204-5 
Thorez, Maurice, 303 
Times, The (London), proposals for dis- 
ruption of Czechoslovakia, 64, 77-8 
editorials (16/5/1938), 85; (3/6/1938), 87; 
(14/6/1938), 88; (13/7/1938), 90; 
(7/9/1938), 64-s, 95-6, 123-4 
proposals for cancelling Czechoslovak 
pacts with France and U.S.S.R., 78, 
85, 290 

optimism after Munich, 298 
encouragement of aggression against 
U.S.S.R., 299-300 

Trades Union Congress, Blackpool (1938), 
212-13 

Troyanovsky, Alexandr Antonovich, 175 

Ukraine, Hitler’s designs on (1933-6), 24, 
27, 265, 282-3 

“mirage” (1938-9), 282-95, 299 
Trans-Carpathian, 45, 73, 240, 272, 274, 
280, 283, 284, 288 

Ultimatum, Anglo-French, 68, 100, 126-7, 
1 5 1-2 

United States, policy in Europe, 12, 17; 
(1938-9), 158-64 

Vansittart, Lord (Sir Robert), 19, 28, 51, 
79, 85, 262 

Vavrecka, Hugo, 155, 157 
Vavo, Alvarez del, 166, 276 
Verekcr, Gordon, 294 
Versailles, Treaty of, 12-13, 16, 26, 27, 29- 
30, 40-1, 61, 70, 74, 87, I3i, 259-60 
Vienna “Award” (2/11/1938), 73 
Voroshilov, Kliment Ycfremovich, 102, 
116, 180, 187 
Vuillcmin, Joseph, 61, 129 

Walters, Frank P., 33, 270 
Wedgwood, Josiah, M.P., 226 
Weizsacker, Ernst von, 60, 162, 241, 257 
Welczeck, Johannes von, 57, 120, 122, 285, 
304 

Welles, Sumner, 159, 163, 268 
Wickham Steed, Henry, 298 
Wiedemann, Fritz, 60, 89 
Wilkinson, Ellen, M.P., 226 
Wilson, Sir Horace, 70, 102, 103 
Wilson, Hugh, 159, 160, 161, 162 
Winterton, Lord, 188-9 
World War I, n 

Yugoslavia, 205-6 

Zetland, Lord, 253